The sense of agency for brain disorders: A comprehensive review and proposed framework

An investigation of the experience of control through the sense of agency in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder: a review and meta-analysis

The construct of sense of agency (SoA) has proven useful for understanding mechanisms underlying obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) phenomenology, especially in explaining the apparent dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions. Paradoxically, people with OCD appear to experience both diminished SoA (feeling unable to control their actions) and inflated SoA (having "magical" control over events). The present review investigated the extent to which the SoA is distorted in OCD, in terms of both implicit (ie, inferred from correlates and outcomes of voluntary actions) and explicit (ie, subjective judgment of one's control over an outcome) measures of SoA. Our search resulted in 15 studies that met the criteria for inclusion in a meta-analysis, where we also examined the potential moderating effects of the type of measure (explicit versus implicit) and of the actual control participants had over the outcome. We found that participants with OCD or with high levels of OCD symptoms show lower implicit measures of SoA and at the same time tend to overestimate their control in situations where they do not actually have it. Together, these findings support the hypothesized dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions.

Individual differences and motor planning influence self-recognition of actions

Although humans can recognize their body movements in point-light displays, self-recognition ability varies substantially across action types and participants. Are these variations primarily due to an awareness of visually distinct movement patterns, or to underlying factors related to motoric planning and/or individual differences? To address this question, we conducted a large-scale study in self-action recognition (N = 101). We motion captured whole-body movements of participants who performed 27 different actions across action goals and degree of motor planning. After a long delay period (~ 1 month), participants were tested in a self-recognition task: identifying their point-light action amongst three other point-light actors performing identical actions. We report a self-advantage effect from point-light actions, consistent with prior work in self-action recognition. Further, we found that self-recognition was modulated by the action complexity (associated with the degree of motor planning in performed actions) and individual differences linked to motor imagery and subclinical autism and schizotypy. Using dynamic time warping, we found sparse evidence in support of visual distinctiveness as a primary contributor to self-recognition, though speed distinctiveness negatively influenced self-recognition performance. Together, our results reveal that self-action recognition involves more than an awareness of visually distinct movements, with important implications for how the motor system may be involved.

The diversity of possible constitutive components in cognitive neurosciences

I aim to discuss which constitutive components are essential for explaining how the mind works. Rather than focusing on some specific components, I emphasize their diversity. Thus, I seek to complement the recent mechanistic proposal by underscoring that researchers should remain open-minded about which constitutive components should be investigated.

Non-invasive neuromodulation of the right temporoparietal junction using theta-burst stimulation in functional neurological disorder

Background

Disrupted sense of agency (SoA)-the sense of being the agent of one's own actions-has been demonstrated in patients with functional neurological disorder (FND), and a key area of the corresponding neuronal network is the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). Several functional MRI (fMRI) studies have found hypoactivation as well as hyperactivation of the rTPJ in FND. In a proof-of-concept study, we tested whether repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the rTPJ could restore this aberrant activity.

Methods

In a randomised, crossover, single-blinded, sham-controlled study design, theta-burst stimulation (tb-rTMS) was applied over the rTPJ in 23 patients with FND and 19 healthy controls (HC), with each participant undergoing three stimulatory visits (inhibitory continuous TBS (cTBS), excitatory intermittent TBS (iTBS) and sham). During fMRI, participants played a visuomotor task artificially reducing their SoA (manipulated agency, MA), repeated after each neurostimulation. We compared brain activity and behavioural SoA as primary outcomes before and after tb-rTMS and investigated the feasibility of tb-rTMS over the rTPJ in FND as secondary outcome.

Results

At baseline, patients showed decreased accuracy in detecting reduced agency compared with controls (p<0.001), paralleled by lower brain activation in the rTPJ during MA (p=0.037, volume of interest). A region of interest analysis on the rTPJ showed no effect of the sham condition in FND or HC (p=0.917; p=0.375) but revealed a significant effect of stimulation protocol (cTBS/iTBS, p=0.037) in patients with FND, with the excitatory protocol increasing the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, whereas this effect was not found in HC. In neither group, a behavioural effect of tb-rTMS was observed.

Conclusion

Aberrant processing of agency in FND was confirmed at baseline, reflected in behavioural outcome and reduced activity in the rTPJ. Tb-rTMS over this key region elicited neuronal changes in patients, paving ways for future studies exploring TMS as neurobiologically informed intervention to restore SoA in FND. We critically discuss methodological intricacies and outline further steps in this research line.

Sense of agency and its disturbances: A systematic review targeting the intentional binding effect in neuropsychiatric disorders

Sense of agency (SoA) indicates a person's ability to perceive her/his own motor acts as actually being her/his and, through them, to exert control over the course of external events. Disruptions in SoA may profoundly affect the individual's functioning, as observed in several neuropsychiatric disorders. This is the first article to systematically review studies that investigated intentional binding (IB), a quantitative proxy for SoA measurement, in neurological and psychiatric patients. Eligible were studies of IB involving patients with neurological and/or psychiatric disorders. We included 15 studies involving 692 individuals. Risk of bias was low throughout studies. Abnormally increased action-outcome binding was found in schizophrenia and in patients with Parkinson's disease taking dopaminergic medications or reporting impulsive-compulsive behaviors. A decreased IB effect was observed in Tourette's disorder and functional movement disorders, whereas increased action-outcome binding was found in patients with the cortico-basal syndrome. The extent of IB deviation from healthy control values correlated with the severity of symptoms in several disorders. Inconsistent effects were found for autism spectrum disorders, anorexia nervosa, and borderline personality disorder. Findings pave the way for treatments specifically targeting SoA in neuropsychiatric disorders where IB is altered.

Same but different: how agency modulates pain perception

Why is analgesic treatment more effective when it is self-administered? Strube et al. compare two possible accounts and show that the effect of agency on perception is linked to a shift in expectation (prior) rather than to reduced likelihood precision, highlighting that agency has a profound impact on the entire perceptual process.

Ready to go: Higher sense of agency enhances action readiness and reduces response inhibition

Sense of agency is the subjective feeling of being in control of one's actions and their effects. Many studies have elucidated the cognitive and sensorimotor processes that drive this experience. However, less is known about how sense of agency influences flexible cognitive and motor control. Here, we investigated the effect of sense of agency on subsequent action regulation using a modified Go/No-Go task. In Experiment 1, we modulated participants' sense of agency by varying the occurrence of action outcomes (present vs. absent) both locally on a trial-by-trial basis and globally in terms of the overall probability of action outcomes within a block of trials (high vs. low). Importantly, we investigated how this manipulation influenced participants' responses to subsequent Go, No-Go, or Free-Choice cues. When participants' previous action led to an outcome (i.e., a happy face) compared with no outcome, they responded more accurately and faster to Go cues, reacted less accurately to No-Go cues, as well as made go decisions more frequently and faster to Free-Choice cues. These effects were even stronger when action outcomes occurred more frequently overall in a given block or in several previous trials. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that the effects of action outcome manipulation on subsequent action regulation were independent of the emotional valence of the action outcome (i.e., a happy or an angry face). Our results suggest that a higher sense of agency as induced by the presence of action outcomes enhanced action readiness and suppressed response inhibition. These findings highlight the impact of the control felt on the control used in action regulation, thereby providing new insights into the functional significance of the sense of agency on human behavior.

Memory for actions and reality monitoring in adults with autism spectrum disorder

Reality monitoring is the cognitive process of distinguishing between internally and externally generated information sources such as imagined and performed actions. The purpose of this study was to examine self-self-monitoring with action in people with autism, which has not been examined previously, using subject performed tasks along with free recall and recognition. Twenty adults with ASD and 20 adults with typical development (TD) participated in this study. Participants memorized action sentences such as "write in pencil" and "under imagined, pantomime, or enacted conditions." Free recall, yes/no recognition, and reality monitoring tests were conducted immediately after and one week later. There was no difference in reality monitoring between the ASD and TD groups. The free recall and recognition performance of the ASD group was lower than that of the TD group. The results of the present study support the previously reported finding of unimpaired retrospective mechanisms of sense of agency related to reality monitoring in people with ASD. Moreover, low levels of free recall and recognition were discussed regarding difficulties in memory reconstruction and consolidation.

Motivation from Agency and Reward in Typical Development and Autism: Narrative Review of Behavioral and Neural Evidence

Our ability to perform voluntary actions and make choices is shaped by the motivation from having control over the resulting effects (agency) and positive outcomes (reward). We offer an overview of distinct and common behavioral and neural signatures of agency and reward. We discuss their typical and atypical developmental trajectories, focusing on autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is characterized by neurodiverse processes underlying action selection. We propose that reduced sensitivity to agency and reward in ASD may be related to atypical multisensory processes and motor planning, with potential for understanding restricted and repetitive behaviors. We emphasize the limitations of the existing literature, and prospects for future research. Understanding the neurocognitive processes that shape the way people with ASD select actions and perceive outcomes is essential to support not only learning, but also volition and self-determination.