Topographic-dynamic reorganisation model of dreams (TRoD) - A spatiotemporal approach

Out-of-body experiences in relation to lucid dreaming and sleep paralysis: A theoretical review and conceptual model

Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are characterized by the subjective experience of being located outside the physical body. Little is known about the neurophysiology of spontaneous OBEs, which are often reported by healthy individuals as occurring during states of reduced vigilance, particularly in proximity to or during sleep (sleep-related OBEs). In this paper, we review the current state of research on sleep-related OBEs and hypothesize that maintaining consciousness during transitions from wakefulness to REM sleep (sleep-onset REM periods) may facilitate sleep-related OBEs. Based on this hypothesis, we propose a new conceptual model that potentially describes the relationship between OBEs and sleep states. The model sheds light on the phenomenological differences between sleep-related OBEs and similar states of consciousness, such as lucid dreaming (the realization of being in a dream state) and sleep paralysis (feeling paralyzed while falling asleep or waking up), and explores the potential polysomnographic features underlying sleep-related OBEs. Additionally, we apply the predictive coding framework and suggest a connecting link between sleep-related OBEs and OBEs reported during wakefulness.

Learning beyond sensations: How dreams organize neuronal representations

Semantic representations in higher sensory cortices form the basis for robust, yet flexible behavior. These representations are acquired over the course of development in an unsupervised fashion and continuously maintained over an organism's lifespan. Predictive processing theories propose that these representations emerge from predicting or reconstructing sensory inputs. However, brains are known to generate virtual experiences, such as during imagination and dreaming, that go beyond previously experienced inputs. Here, we suggest that virtual experiences may be just as relevant as actual sensory inputs in shaping cortical representations. In particular, we discuss two complementary learning principles that organize representations through the generation of virtual experiences. First, "adversarial dreaming" proposes that creative dreams support a cortical implementation of adversarial learning in which feedback and feedforward pathways engage in a productive game of trying to fool each other. Second, "contrastive dreaming" proposes that the invariance of neuronal representations to irrelevant factors of variation is acquired by trying to map similar virtual experiences together via a contrastive learning process. These principles are compatible with known cortical structure and dynamics and the phenomenology of sleep thus providing promising directions to explain cortical learning beyond the classical predictive processing paradigm.

Theories of consciousness and psychiatric disorders - A comparative analysis

Disorders of consciousness represent an efficient way to test theories of consciousness' (ToCs) predictions. So far, ToCs have mostly focused on disorders of quantitative awareness such as coma, vegetative state, spatial neglect and hemianopia. Psychiatric disorders, by contrast, have received little attention, leaving their contribution to consciousness research almost unexplored. Therefore, this paper aims to assess the relation between ToCs and psychiatric disorders - that is, the extent to which current ToCs can account for psychiatric symptomatology. First, I review direct and indirect evidence linking each ToC to psychiatry disorders. Next, I differentiate ToCs based on their theoretical and methodological ground, highlighting how they distinctively address neural, cognitive, and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience and, in turn, psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I refer to one specific symptom to directly compare ToCs' explanatory power. Overall, Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) appears to provide a more comprehensive account of psychiatric disorders, suggesting that a novel dimension of consciousness (i.e., form of consciousness) may be needed to address more qualitative alterations in conscious experience.