Cortical networks for auditory detection with and without informational masking: Task effects and implications for conscious perception

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

Information-Theoretic Approaches in EEG Correlates of Auditory Perceptual Awareness under Informational Masking

In informational masking paradigms, the successful segregation between the target and masker creates auditory perceptual awareness. The dynamics of the build-up of auditory perception is based on a set of interactions between bottom-up and top-down processes that generate neuronal modifications within the brain network activity. These neural changes are studied here using event-related potentials (ERPs), entropy, and integrated information, leading to several measures applied to electroencephalogram signals. The main findings show that the auditory perceptual awareness stimulated functional activation in the fronto-temporo-parietal brain network through (i) negative temporal and positive centro-parietal ERP components; (ii) an enhanced processing of multi-information in the temporal cortex; and (iii) an increase in informational content in the fronto-central cortex. These different results provide information-based experimental evidence about the functional activation of the fronto-temporo-parietal brain network during auditory perceptual awareness.

Human visual consciousness involves large scale cortical and subcortical networks independent of task report and eye movement activity

The full neural circuits of conscious perception remain unknown. Using a visual perception task, we directly recorded a subcortical thalamic awareness potential (TAP). We also developed a unique paradigm to classify perceived versus not perceived stimuli using eye measurements to remove confounding signals related to reporting on conscious experiences. Using fMRI, we discovered three major brain networks driving conscious visual perception independent of report: first, increases in signal detection regions in visual, fusiform cortex, and frontal eye fields; and in arousal/salience networks involving midbrain, thalamus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula; second, increases in frontoparietal attention and executive control networks and in the cerebellum; finally, decreases in the default mode network. These results were largely maintained after excluding eye movement-based fMRI changes. Our findings provide evidence that the neurophysiology of consciousness is complex even without overt report, involving multiple cortical and subcortical networks overlapping in space and time.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

Is the posterior cingulate cortex an on-off switch for tinnitus?: A comparison between hearing loss subjects with and without tinnitus

As the human brain works in a Bayesian manner to minimize uncertainty toward external stimuli, the deafferented brain may generate tinnitus in an attempt to fill in missing auditory information, e.g. due to hearing loss. However, not everybody with hearing loss develops tinnitus. Understanding the differences between people with hearing loss who develop tinnitus versus those who do not offers a unique opportunity to unravel critical brain areas involved in the generation of a phantom sound. In this study, we compared resting-state quantitative electroencephalography between hearing loss patients with (HL-T) and without tinnitus (HL-NT) to identify cortical oscillatory signatures that may reveal prerequisites for the selective development of tinnitus in subjects with hearing loss. We enrolled 65 subjects with HL-NT and 65 subjects with HL-T whose tinnitus handicap inventory scores were <16 (grade 1) to minimize the bias induced by distress-induced cortical activity changes. Subjects in the HL-T and HL-NT groups were matched in terms of the bilateral hearing threshold (0.25-8 kHz) using nearest neighbor method. Compared to the HL-NT group, the HL-T group showed significantly higher activity in the right parahippocampus for the beta 1 frequency band, in the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL) for the beta 2 frequency band, and in the right IPL for the beta 3- and gamma frequency bands. Functional connectivity analyses revealed that the HL-T group had significantly higher connectivity than the HL-NT group between both parahippocampal gyri and the right IPL for the delta frequency band, and between the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and right IPL for the beta 2 frequency band. These results suggest that tinnitus may be perceived only if auditory memory stored in the parahippocampus is actively linked to the IPL-based "circuit breaker" system and the circuit breaker signal is connected to the PCC-based default mode network (DMN). Thus, when the circuit breaker system regards tinnitus secondary to peripheral deafferentation as a salient event and then the DMN regards tinnitus as a norm, subjects with hearing loss may consciously perceive tinnitus. The results of this study further refine the recently proposed Bayesian model and decipher the neurobiological mechanism of the selective development of tinnitus in subjects with hearing loss.

Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Task Relevance in Face Perception Using Simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current theories of visual consciousness disagree about whether it emerges during early stages of processing in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network becomes involved. Moreover, disentangling conscious perception from task-related postperceptual processes (e.g., report) and integrating results across different neuroscientific methods remain ongoing challenges. The present study addressed these problems using simultaneous EEG-fMRI and a specific inattentional blindness paradigm with three physically identical phases in female and male human participants. In phase 1, participants performed a distractor task during which line drawings of faces and control stimuli were presented centrally. While some participants spontaneously noticed the faces in phase 1, others remained inattentionally blind. In phase 2, all participants were made aware of the task-irrelevant faces but continued the distractor task. In phase 3, the faces became task-relevant. Bayesian analysis of brain responses demonstrated that conscious face perception was most strongly associated with activation in fusiform gyrus (fMRI) as well as the N170 and visual awareness negativity (EEG). Smaller awareness effects were revealed in the occipital and prefrontal cortex (fMRI). Task-relevant face processing, on the other hand, led to strong, extensive activation of occipitotemporal, frontoparietal, and attentional networks (fMRI). In EEG, it enhanced early negativities and elicited a pronounced P3b component. Overall, we provide evidence that conscious visual perception is linked with early processing in stimulus-specific sensory brain areas but may additionally involve prefrontal cortex. In contrast, the strong activation of widespread brain networks and the P3b are more likely associated with task-related processes.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does our brain generate visual consciousness-the subjective experience of what it is like to see, for example, a face? To date, it is hotly debated whether it emerges early in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network is activated. Here, we use simultaneous fMRI and EEG for high spatial and temporal resolution and demonstrate that conscious face perception is predominantly linked to early and occipitotemporal processes, but also prefrontal activity. Task-related processes (e.g., decision-making), on the other hand, elicit brain-wide activations including late and strong frontoparietal activity. These findings challenge numerous previous studies and highlight the importance of investigating the neural correlates of consciousness in the absence of task relevance.

Auditory cortex activity related to perceptual awareness versus masking of tone sequences

Sequences of repeating tones can be masked by other tones of different frequency. When these tone sequences are perceived, nevertheless, a prominent neural response in the auditory cortex is evoked by each tone of the sequence. When the targets are detected based on their isochrony, participants know that they are listening to the target once they detected it. To explore if the neural activity is more closely related to this detection task or to perceptual awareness, this magnetoencephalography (MEG) study used targets that could only be identified with cues provided after or before the masked target. In experiment 1, multiple mono-tone streams with jittered inter-stimulus interval were used, and the tone frequency of the target was indicated by a cue. Results showed no differential auditory cortex activity between hit and miss trials with post-stimulus cues. A late negative response for hit trials was only observed for pre-stimulus cues, suggesting a task-related component. Since experiment 1 provided no evidence for a link of a difference response with tone awareness, experiment 2 was planned to probe if detection of tone streams was linked to a difference response in auditory cortex. Random-tone sequences were presented in the presence of a multi-tone masker, and the sequence was repeated without masker thereafter. Results showed a prominent difference wave for hit compared to miss trials in experiment 2 evoked by targets in the presence of the masker. These results suggest that perceptual awareness of tone streams is linked to neural activity in auditory cortex.

Distinguishing the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing

To identify the neural correlates of perceptual awareness, researchers often compare the differences in neural activation between conditions in which an observer is or is not aware of a stimulus. While intuitive, this approach often contains a critical limitation: to link brain activity with perceptual awareness, observers traditionally report the contents of their perceptual experience. However, relying on observers' reports is problematic because it is difficult to know whether the neural responses being measured are associated with conscious perception or with postperceptual processes involved in the reporting task (e.g., working memory, decision-making). To address this issue, we combined a standard visual masking paradigm with a recently developed "no-report" paradigm in male/female human participants. In the visual masking paradigm, observers saw images of animals and objects that were visible or invisible, depending on their proximity to masks. Meanwhile, on half of the trials, observers reported the contents of their perceptual experience (i.e., report condition), while on the other half of trials they refrained from reporting about their experiences (i.e., no-report condition). We used electroencephalography to examine how visibility interacts with reporting by measuring the P3b event-related potential, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of conscious processing. Overall, we found a robust P3b in the report condition, but no P3b whatsoever in the no-report condition. This finding suggests that the P3b itself is not a neural signature of conscious processing and highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the neural correlates of perceptual awareness from postperceptual processing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT What are the neural signatures that differentiate conscious and unconscious processing in the brain? Perhaps the most well established candidate signature is the P3b event-related potential, a late slow wave that appears when observers are aware of a stimulus, but disappears when a stimulus fails to reach awareness. Here, however, we found that the P3b does not track what observers are perceiving, but instead tracks what observers are reporting. When observers are aware of simple visual stimuli, the P3b is nowhere to be found unless observers are reporting the contents of their experience. These results challenge the well established notion of the P3b as a neural marker of awareness and highlight the need for new approaches to the neuroscience of consciousness.

A special role for the right posterior superior temporal sulcus during speech production

This fMRI study of 24 healthy human participants investigated whether any part of the auditory cortex was more responsive to self-generated speech sounds compared to hearing another person speak. The results demonstrate a double dissociation in two different parts of the auditory cortex. In the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (RpSTS), activation was higher during speech production than listening to auditory stimuli, whereas in bilateral superior temporal gyri (STG), activation was higher for listening to auditory stimuli than during speech production. In the second part of the study, we investigated the function of the identified regions, by examining how activation changed across a range of listening and speech production tasks that systematically varied the demands on acoustic, semantic, phonological and orthographic processing. In RpSTS, activation during auditory conditions was higher in the absence of semantic cues, plausibly indicating increased attention to the spectral-temporal features of auditory inputs. In addition, RpSTS responded in the absence of any auditory inputs when participants were making one-back matching decisions on visually presented pseudowords. After analysing the influence of visual, phonological, semantic and orthographic processing, we propose that RpSTS (i) contributes to short term memory of speech sounds as well as (ii) spectral-temporal processing of auditory input and (iii) may play a role in integrating auditory expectations with auditory input. In contrast, activation in bilateral STG was sensitive to acoustic input and did not respond in the absence of auditory input. The special role of RpSTS during speech production therefore merits further investigation if we are to fully understand the neural mechanisms supporting speech production during speech acquisition, adult life, hearing loss and after brain injury.

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In right auditory cortex, a region is more sensitive to own than another’s speech.

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This region (RpSTS) responds to phonological input in the absence of auditory input.

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RpSTS may match auditory feedback with internal representations of speech sounds.

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.