Differential temporo-spatial pattern of electrical brain activity during the processing of abstract concepts related to mental states and verbal associations

What we mean when we say semantic: Toward a multidisciplinary semantic glossary

Tulving characterized semantic memory as a vast repository of meaning that underlies language and many other cognitive processes. This perspective on lexical and conceptual knowledge galvanized a new era of research undertaken by numerous fields, each with their own idiosyncratic methods and terminology. For example, "concept" has different meanings in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology. As such, many fundamental constructs used to delineate semantic theories remain underspecified and/or opaque. Weak construct specificity is among the leading causes of the replication crisis now facing psychology and related fields. Term ambiguity hinders cross-disciplinary communication, falsifiability, and incremental theory-building. Numerous cognitive subdisciplines (e.g., vision, affective neuroscience) have recently addressed these limitations via the development of consensus-based guidelines and definitions. The project to follow represents our effort to produce a multidisciplinary semantic glossary consisting of succinct definitions, background, principled dissenting views, ratings of agreement, and subjective confidence for 17 target constructs (e.g., abstractness, abstraction, concreteness, concept, embodied cognition, event semantics, lexical-semantic, modality, representation, semantic control, semantic feature, simulation, semantic distance, semantic dimension). We discuss potential benefits and pitfalls (e.g., implicit bias, prescriptiveness) of these efforts to specify a common nomenclature that other researchers might index in specifying their own theoretical perspectives (e.g., They said X, but I mean Y).

Concreteness ratings for 36,000 Estonian words

We present a collection of concreteness ratings for 35,979 words in Estonian. The data were collected via a web application from 2278 native Estonian speakers. Human ratings of concreteness have not been collected for Estonian beforehand. We compare our results to Aedmaa et al. (2018), who assigned concreteness ratings to 240,000 Estonian words by means of machine learning. We show that while these two datasets show reasonable correlation (R = 0.71), there are considerable differences in the distribution of the ratings, which we discuss in this paper. Furthermore, the results also raise questions about the importance of the type of scale used for collecting ratings. While most other datasets have been compiled based on questionnaires entailing five- or seven-point Likert scales, we used a continuous 0-10 scale. Comparing our rating distribution to those of other studies, we found that it is most similar to the distribution in Lahl et al. (Behavior Research Methods, 41(1), 13-19, 2009), who also used a 0-10 scale. Concreteness ratings for Estonian words are available at OSF .

Experiential grounding of abstract concepts: Processing of abstract mental state concepts engages brain regions involved in mentalizing, automatic speech, and lip movements

concepts like mental state concepts lack a physical referent, which can be directly perceived. Classical theories therefore claim that abstract concepts require amodal representations detached from experiential brain systems. However, grounded cognition approaches suggest an involvement of modal experiential brain regions in the processing of abstract concepts. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we investigated the relation of the processing of abstract mental state concepts to modal experiential brain systems in a fine-grained fashion. Participants performed lexical decisions on abstract mental state as well as on verbal association concepts as control category. Experiential brain systems related to the processing of mental states, generating verbal associations, automatic speech as well as hand and lip movements were determined by corresponding localizer tasks. Processing of abstract mental state concepts neuroanatomically overlapped with activity patterns associated with processing of mental states, generating verbal associations, automatic speech and lip movements. Hence, mental state concepts activate the mentalizing brain network, complemented by perceptual-motor brain regions involved in simulation of visual or action features associated with social interactions, linguistic brain regions as well as face-motor brain regions recruited for articulation. The present results provide compelling evidence for the rich grounding of abstract mental state concepts in experiential brain systems related to mentalizing, verbal communication and mouth action.

Conceptual representations in the default, control and attention networks are task-dependent and cross-modal

Conceptual knowledge is central to human cognition. Neuroimaging studies suggest that conceptual processing involves modality-specific and multimodal brain regions in a task-dependent fashion. However, it remains unclear (1) to what extent conceptual feature representations are also modulated by the task, (2) whether conceptual representations in multimodal regions are indeed cross-modal, and (3) how the conceptual system relates to the large-scale functional brain networks. To address these issues, we conducted multivariate pattern analyses on fMRI data. 40 participants performed three tasks-lexical decision, sound judgment, and action judgment-on written words. We found that (1) conceptual feature representations are strongly modulated by the task, (2) conceptual representations in several multimodal regions are cross-modal, and (3) conceptual feature retrieval involves the default, frontoparietal control, and dorsal attention networks. Conceptual representations in these large-scale networks are task-dependent and cross-modal. Our findings support theories that assume conceptual processing to rely on a flexible, multi-level architecture.

Context matters: How do task demands modulate the recruitment of sensorimotor information during language processing?

Many theories of semantic representation propose that simulations of sensorimotor experience contribute to language processing. This can be seen in the body-object interaction effect (BOI; how easily the human body can interact with a word's referent). Words with high BOI ratings (e.g., ball) are processed more quickly than words with low BOI ratings (e.g., cloud) in various language tasks. This effect can be modulated by task demands. Previous research established that when asked to decide if a word is an object (entity condition), a BOI effect is observed, but when asked to decide if a word is an action (action condition), there is no BOI effect. It is unclear whether the null behavioral effect in the action condition reflects top-down modulation of task-relevant sensorimotor information or the absence of bottom-up activation of sensorimotor simulations. We investigated this question using EEG. In Experiment 1 we replicated the previous behavioral findings. In Experiment 2, 50 participants were assigned to either the entity or action conditions and responded to the same word stimuli. In both conditions we observed differences in ERP components related to the BOI effect. In the entity condition the P2 mean amplitude was significantly more positive for high compared to low BOI words. In the action condition the N400 peak latency was significantly later for high compared to low BOI words. Our findings suggest that BOI information is generated bottom-up regardless of task demands and modulated by top-down processes that recruit sensorimotor information relevant to the task decision.

Meta-analytic evidence for a novel hierarchical model of conceptual processing

Conceptual knowledge plays a pivotal role in human cognition. Grounded cognition theories propose that concepts consist of perceptual-motor features represented in modality-specific perceptual-motor cortices. However, it is unclear whether conceptual processing consistently engages modality-specific areas. Here, we performed an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis across 212 neuroimaging experiments on conceptual processing related to 7 perceptual-motor modalities (action, sound, visual shape, motion, color, olfaction-gustation, and emotion). We found that conceptual processing consistently engages brain regions also activated during real perceptual-motor experience of the same modalities. In addition, we identified multimodal convergence zones that are recruited for multiple modalities. In particular, the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) are engaged for three modalities: action, motion, and sound. These "trimodal" regions are surrounded by "bimodal" regions engaged for two modalities. Our findings support a novel model of the conceptual system, according to which conceptual processing relies on a hierarchical neural architecture from modality-specific to multimodal areas up to an amodal hub.

Academic training increases grounding of scientific concepts in experiential brain systems

Scientific concepts typically transcendent our sensory experiences. Traditional approaches to science education therefore assume a shift towards amodal or verbal knowledge representations during academic training. Grounded cognition approaches, in contrast, predict a maintenance of grounding of the concepts in experiential brain networks or even an increase. To test these competing approaches, the present study investigated the semantic content of scientific psychological concepts and identified the corresponding neural circuits using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in undergraduate psychology students (beginners) and in graduated psychologists (advanced learners). During fMRI scanning, participants were presented with words denoting scientific psychological concepts within a lexical decision task (e.g. "conditioning", "habituation"). The individual semantic property content of each concept was related to brain activity during abstract concept processing. In both beginners and advanced learners, visual and motor properties activated brain regions also involved in perception and action, while mental state properties increased activity in brain regions also recruited by emotional-social scene observation. Only in advanced learners, social constellation properties elicited brain activity overlapping with emotional-social scene observation. In line with grounded cognition approaches, the present results highlight the importance of experiential information for constituting the meaning of abstract scientific concepts during the course of academic training.