Self-observation reinstates motor awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia

The use of virtual reality as a perspective-taking manipulation to improve self-awareness in Alzheimer's disease

Lack of awareness of symptoms or having a condition referred to as anosognosia is a common feature of individuals with Alzheimer's Disease (AD). Previous literature on AD reported difficulties in evaluating self-abilities, often showing underestimation of limitations. There is increasing evidence that the perspective through which information is presented may moderate the performance appraisal and that anosognosia in AD might be a consequence of a deficit in assuming a third-person perspective. In this context, some studies showed that subjects may better recognize self-and other-difficulties when exposed to a third-person perspective. Considering the variety of approaches aiming to investigate the lack of awareness, there is still a scarcity of methods that provide great ecological validity and consider more than one facet of awareness, thus failing to offer more accurate evaluations of daily experiences. The present paper primarily addresses the theme of the multidimensional character of awareness of abilities in AD and the effect of perspective-taking on its trajectories. The focus turns to virtual reality as a promising tool for a greater evaluation of perspective-taking and self-awareness. Particularly, these systems offer the possibility to involve users in cognitive and sensorimotor tasks that simulate daily life conditions within immersive and realistic environments, and a great sense of embodiment. We propose that virtual reality might allow a great level of complexity, veracity, and safety that is needed for individuals with AD to behave according to their actual abilities and enable to explore the liaison between the subject's viewpoint, performance, and self-evaluation. In addition, we suggest promising clinical implications of virtual reality-based methods for individualized assessments, investigating specific impacts on subjects' life and possible improvements in their awareness.

The dual-path hypothesis for the emergence of anosognosia in Alzheimer's disease

Although neurocognitive models have been proposed to explain anosognosia in Alzheimer's disease (AD), the neural cascade responsible for its origin in the human brain remains unknown. Here, we build on a mechanistic dual-path hypothesis that brings error-monitoring and emotional processing systems as key elements for self-awareness, with distinct impacts on the emergence of anosognosia in AD. Proceeding from the notion of anosognosia as a dimensional syndrome, varying between a lack of concern about one's own deficits (i.e., anosodiaphoria) and a complete lack of awareness of deficits, our hypothesis states that (i) unawareness of deficits would result from primary damage to the error-monitoring system, whereas (ii) anosodiaphoria would more likely result from an imbalance between emotional processing and error-monitoring. In the first case, a synaptic failure in the error-monitoring system, in which the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices play a major role, would have a negative impact on error (or deficits) awareness, preventing patients from becoming aware of their condition. In the second case, an impairment in the emotional processing system, in which the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex play a major role, would prevent patients from monitoring the internal milieu for relevant errors (or deficits) and assigning appropriate value to them, thus biasing their impact on the error-monitoring system. Our hypothesis stems on two scientific premises. One comes from preliminary results in AD patients showing a synaptic failure in the error-monitoring system along with a decline of awareness for cognitive difficulties at the time of diagnosis. Another comes from the somatic marker hypothesis, which proposes that emotional signals are critical to adaptive behavior. Further exploration of these premises will be of great interest to illuminate the foundations of self-awareness and improve our knowledge of the underlying paths of anosognosia in AD and other brain disorders.

Key constructs of body awareness impairments post-stroke: a scoping review of assessment tools and interventions

PURPOSE

To summarise body awareness assessment tools and interventions relevant for stroke rehabilitation using a framework that categorises key body awareness constructs, disorders and impairments.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Online electronic databases and trial registries were searched from inception until July 2021, in addition to hand searching reference lists of included studies and reviews. Study selection included any study design where the investigation involved assessing and/or intervening in body awareness following stroke. Data were extracted based on predefined criteria by two independent reviewers and mapped to the emergent framework.

RESULTS

The final analysis included 144 papers that reported 43 assessment tools and 8 types of interventions for body awareness. Consensus was reached on a synthesised body awareness framework. This comprised specific impairments and disorders, constructs, sub-categories and main categories leading to the overarching term of body awareness. Clinical and psychometric properties of the assessment tools were not reported or poorly evaluated, and the interventions lacked robust study designs and rigorous methods.

CONCLUSIONS

The framework produced will enable future research and clinical practice to be based on consistent concepts and definitions. Clinicians can also use this information to cautiously select assessment tools and/or interventions but are reminded of the limitations identified in this review.Implications for rehabilitationThere is limited understanding, compounded by inconsistent terminology and definitions regarding body awareness after stroke.A synthesized framework to define key constructs and definitions of body awareness is proposed.Assessment tools and interventions reported in the literature are mapped to the proposed framework.Psychometric properties of available tools are reported.Significant work remains to refine concepts of body awareness, develop and evaluate assessment tools and interventions.

The self and self-knowledge after frontal lobe neurosurgical lesions

BACKGROUND

Evidence suggests that damage to the frontal lobes can be associated with changes in cognitive and behavioral functioning and reduced awareness that such changes have occurred. In the current study, the Cognitive Awareness Model was used as a theoretical framework to explore knowledge of the self in people with acquired frontal lesions.

METHODS

Fifteen individuals with focal frontal lobe lesions (FFL) and their nominated informants were compared with fifteen healthy matched control-informant dyads on questionnaire measures designed to assess awareness of difficulties. Questionnaires were adapted to ensure all enabled pre- and post-injury perspectives to be gained from both patient and informant, and to allow novel exploration of awareness of deficits from a third person perspective.

RESULTS

Individuals with frontal lobe lesions showed adequate awareness of their post-surgery changes, which was substantiated by their informant report. Compared to the control group, the patient group was found to acknowledge more difficulties in current functioning. Perspective-taking ability was limited with both patients and controls being comparatively unreliable in assessing how they were perceived by others.

CONCLUSION

These results demonstrate that FLL patients are engaging in more atypical behaviors compared to healthy controls, but suggest that they are aware of and acknowledge these difficulties. The importance of obtaining multiple viewpoints when examining an individual's level of awareness and the clinical implications of this are discussed.

Hemispheric Differences in Self-evaluation Errors of Upper Extremity Movement in Patients with Chronic Stroke

OBJECTIVE

There is growing evidence that the side of brain lesions results in distinct upper extremity deficits in motor control, movement behavior, and emotional and cognitive function poststroke. We investigated self-evaluation errors, which are the differences in scores between patient self-evaluation and clinician evaluations, and compared patients with left hemisphere damage (LHD) and right hemisphere damage (RHD) poststroke.

METHOD

Twenty-eight patients with chronic stroke (LHD = 16) performed the actual amount of the test twice with a one-week interval. We videotaped the participants' movements, and participants with stroke and evaluators graded the quality of movement scores by watching video recordings.

RESULTS

Self-evaluation errors were significantly lower in patients with LHD than in those with RHD (t = 2.350, p = .019). Interestingly, this error did not change after the clinician provided the correct score as feedback. Chi-squared analysis revealed that more patients with LHD underestimated their movements (χ² = 9.049, p = .002), while more patients with RHD overestimated (χ² = 7.429, p = .006) in the send evaluation. Furthermore, there were no correlations between self-evaluation error and age, cognitive function, physical impairment, ability to control emotions, or onset months poststroke.

CONCLUSIONS

Patients with stroke and therapists evaluated the same movements differently, and this can be dependent on hemispheric damage. Therapists might need to encourage patients with LHD who underestimate their movement to ensure continuous use of their more-affected arm. Patients with RHD who overestimate their movement might need treatment to overcome impaired self-awareness, such as video recordings, to protect from unexpected dangerous situations.

Temporal judgments of actions following unilateral brain damage

Sense of time is a complex construct, and its neural correlates remain to date in most part unknown. To complicate the frame, physical attributes of the stimulus, such as its intensity or movement, influence temporal perception. Although previous studies have shown that time perception can be compromised after a brain lesion, the evidence on the role of the left and right hemispheres are meager. In two experiments, the study explores the ability of temporal estimation of multi-second actions and non-biological movements in 33 patients suffering from unilateral brain lesion. Furthermore, the modulatory role of induced embodiment processes is investigated. The results reveal a joint contribution of the two hemispheres depending not only on different durations but also on the presence of actions. Indeed, the left hemisphere damaged patients find it difficult to estimate 4500 ms or longer durations, while the right hemisphere damaged patients fail in 3000 ms durations. Furthermore, the former fail when a biological action is shown, while the latter fail in non-biological movement. Embodiment processes have a modulatory effect only after right hemisphere lesions. Among neuropsychological variables, only spatial neglect influences estimation of non-biological movement.

Self- and Other-Evaluation in Alzheimer’s Disease

Background: Impaired awareness of ability is common in dementia and has important clinical implications. Evidence from different clinical groups has shown that awareness can vary according to whether evaluation refers to self or other performance. Objective: The present study aimed to investigate awareness for self- and other-performance in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients, exploring if results vary according to cognitive domain of the tasks. It was hypothesized that, particularly for memory tasks, AD patients would be inaccurate in relation to self-but not other-performance. Methods: Twenty-two mild to moderate AD patients and twenty-two healthy older adults participated. Two tasks, with reaction time (RT) and working memory tasks, were carried out, and each had a success and a failure condition. Participants were asked to estimate their own performance, as well as the performance of another person they observed. Awareness of performance was measured comparing participant estimations of performance with actual performance. Results: For both the RT and working memory tasks, results indicate that participants from both groups overestimated the performance in the failure condition and underestimated the performance in the success condition. They tended to overestimate more the performance of the other person compared to themselves. Additionally, for the working memory task, AD patients tended to overestimate more performances compared to controls. Conclusion: Findings suggest that the AD and control groups present the same pattern, with attribution of better performance to another person. For the AD group, the pattern of response was different for memory tasks, which may suggest domain-specific limited awareness.

Computational mechanisms underlying illusion of control in delusional individuals

Humans navigate complex situations that require the accurate estimation of the controllability of the environment. Aberrant controllability computation might lead to maladaptive behaviors and poor mental health outcomes. Illusion of control, which refers to a heightened sense of control while the environment is uncontrollable, is one such manifestation and has been conceptually associated with delusional ideation. Nevertheless, this association has not yet been formally characterized in a computational framework. To address this, we used a computational psychiatry approach to quantify illusion of control in human participants with high (n = 125) or low (n = 126) trait delusion. Participants played a two-party exchange game in which their choices either did ("Controllable condition") or did not ("Uncontrollable condition") influence the future monetary offers made by simulated partners. We found that the two groups behaved similarly in model-agnostic measures (i.e., offer size, rejection rate). However, computational modeling revealed that compared to the low trait delusion group, the high delusion group overestimated their influence ("expected influence" parameter) over the offers made by their partners under the Uncontrollable condition. Highly delusional individuals also reported a stronger sense of control than those with low trait delusion in the Uncontrollable condition. Furthermore, the expected influence parameter and self-reported beliefs about controllability were significantly correlated in the Controllable condition in individuals with low trait delusion, whereas this relationship was diminished in those with high trait delusion. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that delusional ideation is associated with aberrant computation of and belief about environmental controllability, as well as a belief-behavior disconnect.

Video self-confrontation as a therapeutic tool in schizophrenia: A randomized parallel-arm single-blind trial

BACKGROUND

Lack of insight is a barrier to treating psychosis. Preliminary studies have suggested that showing people videos of their psychotic behaviour may improve personal insight. This clinical trial aimed to assess the effect of video self-confrontation.

METHODS

Inpatients between 18 and 65 years old with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were filmed upon admission to two psychiatric hospitals while experiencing acute psychosis. After stabilization, individuals were randomized 1:1 to the "self-video" group where they watched their own video or to the "no video" control group. The primary outcome was the Scale to assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD) at 48 h by a blinded assessor. Secondary objectives included psychotic and depressive symptoms, medication adherence and functioning using the Functional Remission of General Schizophrenia. Patients were followed up for four months.

RESULTS

60 participants were randomized and the level of insight did not differ between groups at 48 h (p = 0.98). There was no impact on SUMD subscores or the other insight questionnaires at any timepoint, nor on psychopathology or medication adherence. At one month, the level of functioning of those in the "self-video" group (n = 23) was higher (61.8 vs 53.5, p = 0.02), especially concerning "Treatment" and "Daily life". No adverse effects were reported. After video self-confrontation, people expressed more positive than negative emotions and were less lost to follow-up.

CONCLUSION

Video self-confrontation did not change levels of insight, but may have a therapeutic impact nonetheless, by improving levels of self-care and adherence to care, indicating that this innovative therapeutic tool requires further study.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

NCT02664129.

The relations between cognitive and motivational components of anosognosia for left-sided hemiplegia and the right hemisphere dominance for emotions: A historical survey

Since the description of anosognosia for hemiplegia by Babinski (who also stressed the links between anosognosia and right hemisphere damage) both motivational and cognitive mechanisms have been advanced to explain this awareness disorder. In this review I will discuss first the neurophysiological mechanisms that can impede the discovery of the motor deficits contralateral to the brain lesion and then suggest that some instances of anosognosia for left-sided hemiplegia may also be due to motivational mechanisms of denial. Among the cognitive mechanisms, sensory feedback and intentional feed-forward disorders can lead to a poor awareness of the motor defects, whereas denial mechanisms could result from an interaction between the right hemisphere dominance for emotions and the anxiety raised by the catastrophic consequences of the brain damage. In particular, a maladaptive reaction to the personal implications of the brain lesion could be revealed by the presence of an implicit acknowledgement of the motor defect.

The Seven Selves of Dementia

The self is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing a variety of cognitive processes and psychosocial influences. Considering this, there is a multiplicity of "selves," the current review suggesting that seven fundamental self-processes can be identified that further our understanding of the experience of dementia. These include (1) an embodied self, manifest as corporeal awareness; (2) an agentic self, related to being an agent and influencing life circumstances; (3) an implicit self, linked to non-conscious self-processing; (4) a critical self, which defines the core of self-identity; (5) a surrogate self, based on third-person perspective information; (6) an extended self, including external objects or existences that are incorporated into the self; and, finally, (7) an emergent self, a property of the self-processes that give rise to the sense of a unified self. These are discussed in relation to self-awareness and their use in making sense of the experience of dementia.

Multiple Network Disconnection in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia

Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is a complex syndrome whose neural correlates are still under investigation. One hypothesis, mainly based on lesion mapping studies, is that AHP reflects a breakdown of neural systems of the right hemisphere involved in motor function. However, more recent theories have suggested that AHP may represent a disorder of cognitive systems involved in belief updating, self-referential or body processing. Two recent studies, using a method to estimate the degree of white matter disconnection from lesions, have indeed shown that patients with AHP suffer from damage of several long-range white matter pathways in association cortex. Here, we use a similar indirect disconnection approach to study a group of patients with motor deficits without anosognosia (hemiparesis or hemiplegia, HP, n = 35), or motor deficits with AHP (n = 28). The HP lesions came from a database of stroke patients, while cases of AHP were selected from the published literature. Lesions were traced into an atlas from illustrations of the publications using a standard method. There was no region in the brain that was more damaged in AHP than HP. In terms of structural connectivity, AHP patients had a similar pattern of disconnection of motor pathways to HP patients. However, AHP patients also showed significant disconnection of the right temporo-parietal junction, right insula, right lateral and medial prefrontal cortex. These associative cortical regions were connected through several white matter tracts, including superior longitudinal fasciculus III, arcuate, fronto-insular, frontal inferior longitudinal, and frontal aslant. These tracts connected regions of different cognitive networks: default, ventral attention, and cingulo-opercular. These results were not controlled for clinical variables as concomitant symptoms and other disorders of body representation were not always available for co-variate analysis. In conclusion, we confirm recent studies of disconnection demonstrating that AHP is not limited to dysfunction of motor systems, but involves a much wider set of large-scale cortical networks.

Anosognosia for limb and bucco-facial apraxia as inferred from the recognition of gestural errors

Anosognosia is a multifaceted syndrome characterized by a lack of awareness of motor, cognitive, or emotional deficits. While most studies have focused on basic motor disorders such as hemiplegia, only recently, the issue of whether anosognosia also concerns higher-order motor disorders like apraxia has been addressed. Here, we explore the existence of a specific form of anosognosia for apraxia in forty patients with uni-hemispheric vascular lesions. The patients were requested to imitate actions involving upper limb or bucco-facial body parts and then judge their performance. Successively, they were also asked to observe video recordings of the same actions performed by themselves or by other patients and judge the accuracy of the displayed actions. The comparison of participants versus examiner judgement and between error recognition of others' versus self's actions was considered as an index of awareness deficit for the online and offline conditions, respectively. Evidence was found that awareness deficits occurred both immediately after action execution (online anosognosia) and in the video recording task (offline anosognosia). Moreover, bucco-facial and limb apraxic patients were specifically unaware of their errors in bucco-facial and limb actions, respectively, indicating for the first time a topographical organization of the syndrome. Our approach allowed us to distinguish awareness deficits from more general disorders in error recognition; indeed, anosognosic patients were able to identify errors when the same action was executed by another patient but not when the video showed their own actions. Finally, we provide evidence that anosognosia for apraxia might be associated with frontal cortical and subcortical networks.

You or me? Disentangling perspectival, perceptual, and integrative mechanisms in heterotopagnosia

Heterotopagnosia-without-Autotopagnosia (HwA) is characterized by the incapacity to point to body parts on others, but not on one's own body. This has been classically interpreted as related to a self-other distinction, with impaired visual representations of other bodies seen in third person perspective (3PP), besides spared own body somatosensory representations in 1PP. However, HwA could be impacted by a deficit in the integration of visual and somatosensory information in space, that are spatially congruent in the case of one's own body, but not for others' body. Here, we test this hypothesis in a rare neurological patient with HwA, H+, as well as in a control patient with a comparable neuropsychological profile, but without HwA, and in age-matched healthy controls, in two experiments. First, we assessed body part recognition in a new task where somatosensory information from the participant's body and visual information from the target body shown in virtual reality was never aligned in space. Results show that, differently from the flawless performance in controls, H+ committed errors for not only the body of others in 3PP, but for all conditions where the information related to the real and the target body was not spatially congruent. Then, we tested whether the integration between these multisensory bodily cues in space, as during visuo-tactile stimulation in the full-body illusion, improves the patient's performance. Data show that after the stimulation prompting visuo-tactile integration, but not in control conditions, the patient's abilities to process body parts improved up to normal level, thus confirming and extending the first findings. Altogether, these results support a new interpretation of HwA as linked to the matching between somatosensory inputs from one's body and visual information from a body seen at a distance, and encourage the application of multisensory stimulation and virtual reality for the treatment of body-related disorders.

The Proactive Self in Space: How Egocentric and Allocentric Spatial Impairments Contribute to Anosognosia in Alzheimer's Disease

In addition to impairments in episodic and spatial memory, anosognosia (i.e., loss of awareness of the deficient aspect of own cognitive functioning) may be considered an important cognitive marker of Alzheimer's disease (AD). However, although a growing body of interesting models have been proposed to explain this early symptom, what is still missing is a unifying framework of all the characteristic signs occurring in patients with AD that may guide the search for its causal neuropathological process and, ultimately, the etiological process. This contribution will first show how anosognosia may be related to the above-mentioned episodic and spatial memory impairment through a unifying framework of all these characteristic signs, i.e., the continuous interaction between different spatial representations. Second, we hypothesize that a break in the interaction between different spatial representations, as we suggest occurs in AD, may contribute significantly both to the early impairments in spatial and episodic memory, and to a deficient self-awareness since it may interfere with the capacity of the brain to detect predictive errors.

Unawareness for Motor Impairment and Distorted Perception of Task Difficulty

OBJECTIVES

Anosognosia for motor impairment is a complex syndrome that can manifest itself under different forms, guiding patients' behavior and task decisions. However, current diagnostic tools tend to evaluate only more explicit aspects of anosognosia (asking the patients about their motor abilities) and fail to address more subtle features of awareness. We have developed a new assessment measure, the ECT (Errand Choice Test), where patients are asked to judge task difficulty rather than estimate their own impairment.

METHODS

We assessed awareness in a group of 73 unilateral left- and right-brain damaged (30 LBD and 43 RBD, respectively) patients by means of the VATAm, which explicitly requires them to evaluate their own motor abilities, and the ECT. A control group of 65 healthy volunteers was asked to perform the ECT under two conditions: Current condition (i.e., using both hands) and Simulated conditions (i.e., simulating hemiplegia).

RESULTS

A total of 27% of the patients showed different performance on the VATAm and ECT, 21% of the patients showing lack of awareness only on VATAm and 6% only on ECT. Moreover, despite the ECT identified a higher frequency of anosognosia after RBD (33.3%) than LBD (27.6%), this hemispheric asymmetry was not significant. Remarkably, anosognosic patients performed very similarly to controls in the "current condition", suggesting that anosognosic patients' ability to perceive the complexity of each task per se is not altered.

CONCLUSION

Different methods may be able to tackle different aspects of awareness and the ECT proved to be able to detect less evident forms of awareness. (JINS, 2018, 24, 45-56).

Differences between Subjective and Objective Assessment of Speech Deficiency in Parkinson Disease

OBJECTIVES

This study aims to establish the frequency at which patients with Parkinson disease subjectively assess the intensity of their speech disorders, factors that the patients believe determine the severity of their vocal impairment, and how their subjective self-assessment of vocal impairment by means of the Voice Handicap Index compares with the objective evaluation of the performance of the articulatory organs by means of Frenchay Dysarthria Assessment.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The methods used Voice Handicap Index, Frenchay Dysarthria Assessment, and the Hoehn and Yahr scale.

RESULTS

Positive correlation was found between the subjective assessment of the performance of the speech organs and the impaired differentiation of lip movements and tongue sideways movements, impaired saliva control, dysfunction of the soft palate, and the pitch. Negative correlation was found between the subjective assessment of the severity of speech disorder, breathing at rest, and sentence comprehension.

CONCLUSIONS

Although we observed correlation between the subjective perception of certain speech disorders of patients with Parkinson disease and the objective assessment carried out by means of the Frenchay Dysarthria Assessment scale, the subjects did not believe the disorders had a significant impact on the quality of speech. Negative results of an examination do not necessarily reflect the subjective perception of the decline in the functioning of the articulatory organs. It should be assumed that lack of correlation between the subjective perception measured using Voice Handicap Index and the objective Frenchay Dysarthria-based assessment of the performance of the articulatory organs may result from a good adaptation to the progressive changes.

Modulation of somatoparaphrenia following left-hemisphere damage

Somatoparaphrenic symptoms after left-hemisphere damage are rare. To verify the potential role of body-related sensory (proprioceptive, visual, and somatosensory) manipulation in patients experiencing sensations of hand disownership, the symptoms of a patient suffering from right-hand somatoparaphrenia were monitored and clinical and neuropsychological variables were controlled. Four types of manipulation were administered: changes in spatial position of the hand, multisensory stimulation, and self-observation using video or mirrors. Multisensory visuo-tactile stimulation was efficacious in terms of reducing somatoparaphrenia, and changes in the position of the hand produced some positive effects. Third-person perspective self-observation did not, however, result in any changes.

Metacognition and Perspective-Taking in Alzheimer's Disease: A Mini-Review

Metacognition refers to the monitoring and regulation of cognitive processes and its impairment can lead to a lack of self-awareness of deficits, or anosognosia. In the context of different neurological and psychiatric disorders (e.g., traumatic brain injury, dementia, and schizophrenia), studies have shown that patients who present impairments in metacognitive abilities may be able to recognize such difficulties in others and in themselves when exposed to material in a third-person perspective. Considering that metacognitive impairments are an important characteristic of dementia, especially in Alzheimer's Disease (AD), studies of the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking may be relevant to improve the quality of life of people with dementia. The current paper first briefly addresses the theme of metacognition and the impact of metacognitive deficits in people with AD. The focus then turns to the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking in different neurological and psychiatric disorders, particularly AD. This relationship is also discussed based on theoretical models, particularly the Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM). Specifically, the CAM suggests the existence of distinct memory systems for self- and other-information, an idea which is supported by neuroimaging findings. We suggest that the Default Mode Network, as it has been shown to be implicated in self vs. other processing and is affected early in AD, could explain the impact of perspective-taking on awareness of deficits in AD. Finally, we present possible clinical implications of the relationship between metacognition and perspective-taking in AD. Indeed, we considered the possibility of improving patient's awareness through the use of a third-person perspective, which, consequently, may decrease the negative impacts of anosognosia in AD.

Mentalizing the body: spatial and social cognition in anosognosia for hemiplegia

Following right-hemisphere damage, a specific disorder of motor awareness can occur called anosognosia for hemiplegia, i.e. the denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion. The study of anosognosia can offer unique insights into the neurocognitive basis of awareness. Typically, however, awareness is assessed as a first person judgement and the ability of patients to think about their bodies in more 'objective' (third person) terms is not directly assessed. This may be important as right-hemisphere spatial abilities may underlie our ability to take third person perspectives. This possibility was assessed for the first time in the present study. We investigated third person perspective taking using both visuospatial and verbal tasks in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia (n = 15) and without anosognosia (n = 15), as well as neurologically healthy control subjects (n = 15). The anosognosic group performed worse than both control groups when having to perform the tasks from a third versus a first person perspective. Individual analysis further revealed a classical dissociation between most anosognosic patients and control subjects in mental (but not visuospatial) third person perspective taking abilities. Finally, the severity of unawareness in anosognosia patients was correlated to greater impairments in such third person, mental perspective taking abilities (but not visuospatial perspective taking). In voxel-based lesion mapping we also identified the lesion sites linked with such deficits, including some brain areas previously associated with inhibition, perspective taking and mentalizing, such as the inferior and middle frontal gyri, as well as the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri. These results suggest that neurocognitive deficits in mental perspective taking may contribute to anosognosia and provide novel insights regarding the relation between self-awareness and social cognition.

The Representation of Objects in Apraxia: From Action Execution to Error Awareness

Apraxia is a well-known syndrome characterized by the sufferer's inability to perform routine gestures. In an attempt to understand the syndrome better, various different theories have been developed and a number of classifications of different subtypes have been proposed. In this article review, we will address these theories with a specific focus on how the use of objects helps us to better understand upper limb apraxia. With this aim, we will consider transitive vs. intransitive action dissociation as well as less frequent types of apraxia involving objects, i.e., constructive apraxia and magnetic apraxia. Pantomime and the imitation of objects in use are also considered with a view to dissociating the various different components involved in upper limb apraxia. Finally, we discuss the evidence relating to action recognition and awareness of errors in the execution of actions. Various different components concerning the use of objects emerge from our analysis and the results show that knowledge of an object and sensory-motor representations are supported by other functions such as spatial and body representations, executive functions and monitoring systems.

The affective modulation of motor awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia: behavioural and lesion evidence

The possible role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e., denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion), has long been debated between psychodynamic and neurocognitive theories. However, there are only a handful of case studies focussing on this topic, and the precise role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia requires empirical investigation. In the present study, we aimed to investigate how negative and positive emotions influence motor awareness in anosognosia. Positive and negative emotions were induced under carefully-controlled experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (n = 11) and controls with clinically normal awareness (n = 10). Only the negative, emotion induction condition resulted in a significant improvement of motor awareness in anosognosic patients compared to controls; the positive emotion induction did not. Using lesion overlay and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping approaches, we also investigated the brain lesions associated with the diagnosis of anosognosia, as well as with performance on the experimental task. Anatomical areas that are commonly damaged in AHP included the right-hemisphere motor and sensory cortices, the inferior frontal cortex, and the insula. Additionally, the insula, putamen and anterior periventricular white matter were associated with less awareness change following the negative emotion induction. This study suggests that motor unawareness and the observed lack of negative emotions about one's disabilities cannot be adequately explained by either purely motivational or neurocognitive accounts. Instead, we propose an integrative account in which insular and striatal lesions result in weak interoceptive and motivational signals. These deficits lead to faulty inferences about the self, involving a difficulty to personalise new sensorimotor information, and an abnormal adherence to premorbid beliefs about the body.

Anosognosia as motivated unawareness: the 'defence' hypothesis revisited

Anosognosia for hemiplegia has seen a century of almost continuous research, yet a definitive understanding of its mechanism remains elusive. Essentially, anosognosic patients hold quasi-delusional beliefs about their paralysed limbs, in spite of all the contrary evidence, repeated questioning, and logical argument. We review a range of findings suggesting that emotion and motivation play an important role in anosognosia. We conclude that anosognosia involves (amongst other things) a process of psychological defence. This conclusion stems from a wide variety of clinical and experimental investigations, including data on implicit awareness of deficit, fluctuations in awareness over time, and dramatic effects upon awareness of psychological interventions such as psychotherapy, reframing of the emotional consequences of the paralysis, and first versus third person perspectival manipulations. In addition, we review and refute the (eight) arguments historically raised against the 'defence' hypothesis, including the claim that a defence-based account cannot explain the lateralised nature of the disorder. We argue that damage to a well-established right-lateralised emotion regulation system, with links to psychological processes that appear to underpin allocentric spatial cognition, plays a key role in anosognosia (at least in some patients). We conclude with a discussion of implications for clinical practice.

Selective improvement of anosognosia for hemiplegia during transcranial direct current stimulation: a case report

Right brain damage patients may not complain of a left sided paralysis up to the point of denying it or even claiming of having just moved an otherwise paralyzed limb. This condition is known as anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). Recent behavioural experiments suggest that some residual intentionality might be preserved in patients with anosognosia and that the false belief of having moved originates from a failure to notice discrepancies between movement expectancies and the actual state of the motor system. This failure may be caused by a lack of afferent sensory information concerning the movement or alternatively by a direct dysfunction of the brain regions involved in actions' motor monitoring (i.e., the comparator system). Here we examined the effect of anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the right premotor cortex in a patient with a bilateral lesion, involving predominantly the right hemisphere, and a dense unawareness for his left hemiplegia. During sham or anodal tDCS the patient was requested to judge his ability to perform simple motor actions (i) without actually executing the movement itself ("offline" condition) and after having performed a series of verbally cued finger opposition movements ("online" condition) with (i) eyes-closed or (ii) eyes-open. We found that anodal tDCS induces a significant remission of the false experience of movement only when the patient is requested to actually perform the movement with eyes open. Conversely, the patient's awareness does not improve in both the "offline" condition (in which the patient does not attempt to perform the movement) and in the "online" condition, when vision is precluded ("online" condition, eyes-closed). We conclude that the stimulation of the premotor cortex by tDCS activates brain regions involved in motor monitoring, temporary restoring the ability of the motor comparator system to correctly appreciate afferent information and build up a veridical motor awareness.

Crossmodal illusions in neurorehabilitation

In everyday life, many diverse bits of information, simultaneously derived from the different sensory channels, converge into discrete brain areas, and are ultimately synthetized into unified percepts. Such multisensory integration can dramatically alter the phenomenal experience of both environmental events and our own body. Crossmodal illusions are one intriguing product of multisensory integration. This review describes and discusses the main clinical applications of the most known crossmodal illusions in rehabilitation settings. We consider evidence highlighting the contribution of crossmodal illusions to restore, at least in part, defective mechanisms underlying a number of disorders of body representation related to pain, sensory, and motor impairments in neuropsychological and neurological diseases, and their use for improving neuroprosthetics. This line of research is enriching our understanding of the relationships between multisensory functions and the pathophysiological mechanisms at the basis of a number of brain disorders. The review illustrates the potential of crossmodal illusions for restoring disarranged spatial and body representations, and, in turn, different pathological symptoms.

An Investigation of the Effects of Different Pulse Patterns of Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation (TENS) on Perceptual Embodiment of a Rubber Hand in Healthy Human Participants With Intact Limbs

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this study was to investigate the strength of perceptual embodiment achieved during an adapted version of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) in response to a series of modified transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (TENS) pulse patterns with dynamic temporal and spatial characteristics which are more akin to the mechanical brush stroke in the original RHI.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A repeated-measures counterbalanced experimental study was conducted where each participant was exposed to four TENS interventions: continuous pattern TENS; burst pattern TENS (fixed frequency of 2 bursts per second of 100 pulses per second); amplitude-modulated pattern TENS (intensity increasing from zero to a preset level, then back to zero again in a cyclical fashion); and sham (no current) TENS. Participants rated the intensity of the RHI using a three-item numerical rating scale (each item was ranked from 0 to 10). Friedman's analysis of ranks (one-factor repeated measure) was used to test the differences in perceptual embodiment between TENS innervations; alpha was set at p ≤ 0.05.

RESULTS

There were statistically significant differences in the intensity of misattribution and perceptual embodiment between sham and active TENS interventions, but no significant differences between the three active TENS conditions (amplitude-modulated TENS, burst TENS, and continuous TENS). Amplitude-modulated and burst TENS produced significantly higher intensity scores for misattribution sensation and perceptual embodiment compared with sham (no current) TENS, whereas continuous TENS did not.

CONCLUSION

The findings provide tentative, but not definitive, evidence that TENS parameters with dynamic spatial and temporal characteristics may produce more intense misattribution sensations and intense perceptual embodiment than parameters with static characteristics (e.g., continuous pulse patterns).

Effect of pneumatic compressing powered orthosis in stroke patients: preliminary study

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of a knee-ankle-foot orthosis powered by artificial pneumatic muscles (PKAFO).

METHODS

Twenty-three hemiplegic patients (age, 59.6±13.7 years) were assessed 19.7±36.6 months after brain lesion. The 10-m walking time was measured as a gait parameter while the individual walked on a treadmill. Walking speed (m/s), step cycle (cycle/s), and step length (m) were also measured on a treadmill with and without PKAFO, and before and after gait training. Clinical parameters measured before and after gait training included Korean version of Modified Bathel Index (K-MBI), manual muscle test (MMT), and Modified Ashworth Scale (MAS) of hemiplegic ankle. Gait training comprised treadmill walking for 20 minutes, 5 days a week for 3 weeks at a comfortable speed.

RESULTS

The 10-m walking time, walking speed, step length, and step cycle were significantly greater with PKAFO than without PKAFO, and after gait training (both p<0.05). K-MBI was improved after gait training (p<0.05), but MMT and MAS were not.

CONCLUSION

PKAFO may improve gait function in hemiplegic patients. It can be a useful orthosis for gait training in hemiplegic patients.

New reflections on agency and body ownership: The moving rubber hand illusion in the mirror

No previous study has simultaneously examined body ownership and agency in healthy subjects during mirror self-observation. We used a moving rubber hand illusion to examine how both body ownership and agency are affected by seeing (i) the body moving in a mirror, compared with (ii) directly viewing the moving hand, and (iii) seeing a visually identical hand rotated by 180°. We elicited ownership of the hand using direct visual feedback, finding this effect was further enhanced when looking at the hand in a mirror, whereas rotating the hand 180° abolished ownership. Agency was similarly elicited using direct visual feedback, and equally so in the mirror, but again reduced for the 180° hand. We conclude that the reflected body in a mirror is treated as 'special' in the mind, and distinct from other external objects. This enables bodies and actions viewed in a mirror to be directly related to the self.

Implicit awareness in anosognosia: clinical observations, experimental evidence, and theoretical implications

Unawareness  of deficits caused by brain damage or neurodegeneration, termed anosognosia, has been demonstrated in a number of different neurological conditions. Clinical observation suggests that unawareness paradoxically can be accompanied by signs of understanding or representation of deficit, but not explicitly expressed. Such "implicit awareness," an apparent oxymoron, is implied by or inferred from actions or statements of the person with neurological disorder. In the current paper, we review clinical observations and experimental evidence which suggest the occurrence of implicit awareness in dementia and hemiplegia, and explore the clinical and theoretical implications of this phenomenon. We present a theoretical framework to understand implicit awareness in these two conditions.

Anosognosia for apraxia: experimental evidence for defective awareness of one's own bucco-facial gestures

Anosognosia is a multifaceted, neuro-psychiatric syndrome characterized by defective awareness of a variety of perceptuo-motor, cognitive or emotional deficits. The syndrome is also characterized by modularity, i.e., deficits of awareness in one domain (e.g., spatial perception) co-existing with spared functions in another domain (e.g., memory). Anosognosia has mainly been reported after right hemisphere lesions. It is however somewhat surprising that no studies have thus far specifically explored the possibility that lack of awareness involves apraxia, i.e., a deficit in the ability to perform gestures caused by an impaired higher-order motor control and not by low-level motor deficits, sensory loss, or failure to comprehend simple commands. We explored this issue by testing fifteen patients with vascular lesions who were assigned to one of three groups depending on their neuropsychological profile and brain lesion. The patients were asked to execute various actions involving the upper limb or bucco-facial body parts. In addition they were also asked to judge the accuracy of these actions, either performed by them or by other individuals. The judgment of the patients was compared to that of two external observers. Results show that our bucco-facial apraxic patients manifest a specific deficit in detecting their own gestural errors. Moreover they were less aware of their defective performance in bucco-facial as compared to limb actions. Our results hint at the existence of a new form of anosognosia specifically involving apraxic deficits.

Identification, recognition and misidentification syndromes: a psychoanalytical perspective

Misidentification syndromes are currently often understood as cognitive disorders of either the "sense of uniqueness" (Margariti and Kontaxakis, 2006) or the recognition of people (Ellis and Lewis, 2001). It is however, necessary to consider how a normal "sense of uniqueness" or normal person recognition are acquired by normal or neurotic subjects. It will be shown here that the normal conditions of cognition can be considered as one of the possible forms of a complex structure and not as just a setting for our sense and perception data. The consistency and the permanency of the body image in neurosis is what permits the recognition of other people and ourselves as unique beings. This consistency and permanency are related to object repression, as shown by neurological disorders of body image (somatoparaphrenia), which cause the object to come to the foreground in the patient's words (Thibierge and Morin, 2010). In misidentification syndromes, as in other psychotic syndromes, one can also observe damage to the specular image as well as an absence of object repression. This leads us to question whether, in the psychiatric disorders related to a damaged specular image, disorders of cognition can be studied and managed using the same methods as for neurotic patients.

Time to get rid of the 'Modular' in neuropsychology: a unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding

Cognitive neuroscience, being more inclusive and ambitious in scope than cognitive neuropsychology, seems to have taken the place of the latter within the modern neurosciences. Nevertheless, recent advances in the neurosciences afford neuropsychology with epistemic possibilities that simply did not exist even 15 years ago. Human lesion studies still have an important role to play in shaping such possibilities, particularly when combined with other methods of enquiry. I first outline theoretical and methodological advances within the neurosciences that can inform and shape the rebirth of a dynamic, non-modular neuropsychology. I then use an influential computational theory of brain function, the free energy principle, to suggest an unified account of anosognosia for hemiplegia as a research example of the potential for transition from a modular, cognitive neuropsychology to a dynamic, computational and even restorative neuropsychology. These and many other adjectives that can flexibly, take the place of 'cognitive' next to 'neuropsychology' will hopefully designate the much needed rebirth and demarcation of a field, neuropsychology itself, that has somehow lost its place within the modern neurosciences and yet seems to have a unique and important role to play in the future understanding of the brain.

The proprioceptive senses: their roles in signaling body shape, body position and movement, and muscle force

This is a review of the proprioceptive senses generated as a result of our own actions. They include the senses of position and movement of our limbs and trunk, the sense of effort, the sense of force, and the sense of heaviness. Receptors involved in proprioception are located in skin, muscles, and joints. Information about limb position and movement is not generated by individual receptors, but by populations of afferents. Afferent signals generated during a movement are processed to code for endpoint position of a limb. The afferent input is referred to a central body map to determine the location of the limbs in space. Experimental phantom limbs, produced by blocking peripheral nerves, have shown that motor areas in the brain are able to generate conscious sensations of limb displacement and movement in the absence of any sensory input. In the normal limb tendon organs and possibly also muscle spindles contribute to the senses of force and heaviness. Exercise can disturb proprioception, and this has implications for musculoskeletal injuries. Proprioceptive senses, particularly of limb position and movement, deteriorate with age and are associated with an increased risk of falls in the elderly. The more recent information available on proprioception has given a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying these senses as well as providing new insight into a range of clinical conditions.

The riddle of anosognosia: does unawareness of hemiplegia involve a failure to update beliefs?

Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is defined as a lack of awareness for motor incapacity after a brain lesion. The causes of AHP still remain poorly understood. Many associations and dissociations with other deficits have been highlighted but no specific cognitive or neurological impairment has been identified as a unique causative factor. We hypothesized that a failure to update beliefs about current state might be a crucial component of AHP. Here, we report results from a new test that are compatible with this view. We examined anosognosic and nosognosic brain-damaged patients, as well as healthy controls, on a task where they had to guess a target word based on successive clues, with increasing informative content. After each clue, participants had to propose a word solution and rated their confidence. Compared to other participants, anosognosic patients were abnormally overconfident in their responses, even when information from the clues was insufficient. Furthermore, when presented with new clues incongruent with their previous response, they often stuck to their former "false" beliefs instead of modifying them. This impairment was unrelated to global deficits in reasoning or memory, and all patients eventually identified the correct solution of riddles after the last, fully informative, clue. These results suggest that a deficit in the generation and adjustment of beliefs may be a key factor contributing to the occurrence and persistence of anosognosia, when associated with concomitant losses in motor, proprioceptive, and/or attentional functions. Patients may remain unaware of their deficit partly because they cannot "update" their beliefs about current state.

Effect of video self-observations vs. observations of others on insight in psychotic disorders

Improving insight in patients with schizophrenia and related disorders is a worthwhile goal. Previous work has suggested that patients' insight may improve if they see videos of themselves taken when ill. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that schizophrenia patients improve their insight after viewing videos of themselves when unwell more so than after viewing an actor. Forty patients admitted with an acute psychotic disorder underwent a videotaped recording of a clinical interview. The patients were then randomized to viewing this or a "control" video of a same-sex actor displaying psychotic symptoms approximately 3 weeks later. Insight, psychopathology, and mood were assessed before and 24 to 48 hours after viewing the videos. All participants showed general improvement across all measures. There was a trend for scores on the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight to improve more in those who viewed themselves when ill, but there were no clear statistically significant differences between the "self" and "other" video groups. In conclusion, video self-confrontation seems to be a safe and potentially effective means of enhancing insight, but evidence for a specific effect is lacking.

How Long is Your Arm? Using Multisensory Illusions to Modify Body Image from the Third Person Perspective

Updating body representations from the 3rd person perspectives (3PP) seems to require viewing the real body, unlike when viewing from a 1st person perspective. Here, 3PP updating was investigated through induction of a physically impossible multisensory illusion in which participants viewed real-time 3PP video of themselves having their arm pulled until it stretched to twice its normal length. The illusion elicited the subjective experience that the participant's own arm had been stretched and caused an overestimation of reaching distance, although actual reaches were unaffected. Multisensory illusions from the 3PP can alter body image when applied to real bodies.