1
|
Larner AJ, Leff AP, Nachev PC. Phantasia, aphantasia, and hyperphantasia: Empirical data and conceptual considerations. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 164:105819. [PMID: 39032843 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105819] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2024] [Revised: 07/08/2024] [Accepted: 07/17/2024] [Indexed: 07/23/2024]
Abstract
Within the past decade, the term "phantasia" has been increasingly used to describe the human capacity, faculty, or power of visual mental imagery, with extremes of imagery vividness characterised as "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia". A substantial volume of empirical research addressing these constructs has now been published, including attempts to find inductive correlates of behaviourally defined aphantasia, for example using research questionnaires and functional magnetic resonance imaging. Mental imagery has long been noted as a source of conceptual confusions but no specific conceptual analysis of the new formulation of phantasia, aphantasia, and hyperphantasia has been undertaken hitherto. We offer some conceptual considerations on phantasia, noting the ongoing confusion of perceptual with mental images, and the ubiquitous use of unvalidated subjective assessment instruments such as the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) in diagnosis and assessment, development of which was predicated on these conceptual confusions. We offer some suggestions for a conceptual framework for future empirical studies in this field, circumventing these conceptual confusions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- A J Larner
- Department of Brain Repair & Rehabilitation, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
| | - A P Leff
- Department of Brain Repair & Rehabilitation, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - P C Nachev
- Department of Brain Repair & Rehabilitation, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Siena MJ, Simons JS. Metacognitive Awareness and the Subjective Experience of Remembering in Aphantasia. J Cogn Neurosci 2024; 36:1578-1598. [PMID: 38319889 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_02120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/08/2024]
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia, a nonclinical condition typically characterized by mental imagery deficits, often report reduced episodic memory. However, findings have hitherto rested largely on subjective self-reports, with few studies experimentally investigating both objective and subjective aspects of episodic memory in aphantasia. In this study, we tested both aspects of remembering in aphantasic individuals using a custom 3-D object and spatial memory task that manipulated visuospatial perspective, which is considered to be a key factor determining the subjective experience of remembering. Objective and subjective measures of memory performance were taken for both object and spatial memory features under different perspective conditions. Surprisingly, aphantasic participants were found to be unimpaired on all objective memory measures, including those for object memory features, despite reporting weaker overall mental imagery experience and lower subjective vividness ratings on the memory task. These results add to newly emerging evidence that aphantasia is a heterogenous condition, where some aphantasic individuals may lack metacognitive awareness of mental imagery rather than mental imagery itself. In addition, we found that both participant groups remembered object memory features with greater precision when encoded and retrieved in the first person versus third person, suggesting a first-person perspective might facilitate subjective memory reliving by enhancing the representational quality of scene contents.
Collapse
|
3
|
Nedergaard JSK, Lupyan G. Not Everybody Has an Inner Voice: Behavioral Consequences of Anendophasia. Psychol Sci 2024; 35:780-797. [PMID: 38728320 DOI: 10.1177/09567976241243004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/12/2024] Open
Abstract
It is commonly assumed that inner speech-the experience of thought as occurring in a natural language-is a human universal. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the experience of inner speech in adults varies from near constant to nonexistent. We propose a name for a lack of the experience of inner speech-anendophasia-and report four studies examining some of its behavioral consequences. We found that adults who reported low levels of inner speech (N = 46) had lower performance on a verbal working memory task and more difficulty performing rhyme judgments compared with adults who reported high levels of inner speech (N = 47). Task-switching performance-previously linked to endogenous verbal cueing-and categorical effects on perceptual judgments were unrelated to differences in inner speech.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Gary Lupyan
- Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Scholz CO. Reevaluating aphantasia representation skepticism in light of the HeXaGen model Comment on "Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture" by A. Spagna et al. Phys Life Rev 2024; 49:115-116. [PMID: 38579491 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2024.03.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2024] [Accepted: 03/26/2024] [Indexed: 04/07/2024]
Affiliation(s)
- Christian O Scholz
- Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801, Bochum, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Tononi G, Boly M, Cirelli C. Consciousness and sleep. Neuron 2024; 112:1568-1594. [PMID: 38697113 PMCID: PMC11105109 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.04.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2024] [Revised: 04/04/2024] [Accepted: 04/10/2024] [Indexed: 05/04/2024]
Abstract
Sleep is a universal, essential biological process. It is also an invaluable window on consciousness. It tells us that consciousness can be lost but also that it can be regained, in all its richness, when we are disconnected from the environment and unable to reflect. By considering the neurophysiological differences between dreaming and dreamless sleep, we can learn about the substrate of consciousness and understand why it vanishes. We also learn that the ongoing state of the substrate of consciousness determines the way each experience feels regardless of how it is triggered-endogenously or exogenously. Dreaming consciousness is also a window on sleep and its functions. Dreams tell us that the sleeping brain is remarkably lively, recombining intrinsic activation patterns from a vast repertoire, freed from the requirements of ongoing behavior and cognitive control.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Giulio Tononi
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53719, USA.
| | - Melanie Boly
- Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| | - Chiara Cirelli
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53719, USA
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Maw KJ, Beattie G, Burns EJ. Cognitive strengths in neurodevelopmental disorders, conditions and differences: A critical review. Neuropsychologia 2024; 197:108850. [PMID: 38467371 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2024.108850] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2023] [Revised: 03/04/2024] [Accepted: 03/07/2024] [Indexed: 03/13/2024]
Abstract
Neurodevelopmental disorders are traditionally characterised by a range of associated cognitive impairments in, for example, sensory processing, facial recognition, visual imagery, attention, and coordination. In this critical review, we propose a major reframing, highlighting the variety of unique cognitive strengths that people with neurodevelopmental differences can exhibit. These include enhanced visual perception, strong spatial, auditory, and semantic memory, superior empathy and theory of mind, along with higher levels of divergent thinking. Whilst we acknowledge the heterogeneity of cognitive profiles in neurodevelopmental conditions, we present a more encouraging and affirmative perspective of these groups, contrasting with the predominant, deficit-based position prevalent throughout both cognitive and neuropsychological research. In addition, we provide a theoretical basis and rationale for these cognitive strengths, arguing for the critical role of hereditability, behavioural adaptation, neuronal-recycling, and we draw on psychopharmacological and social explanations. We present a table of potential strengths across conditions and invite researchers to systematically investigate these in their future work. This should help reduce the stigma around neurodiversity, instead promoting greater social inclusion and significant societal benefits.
Collapse
|
7
|
Kay L, Keogh R, Pearson J. Slower but more accurate mental rotation performance in aphantasia linked to differences in cognitive strategies. Conscious Cogn 2024; 121:103694. [PMID: 38657474 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103694] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2023] [Revised: 04/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/18/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Mental rotation tasks are frequently used as standard measures of mental imagery. However, aphantasia research has brought such use into question. Here, we assessed a large group of individuals who lack visual imagery (aphantasia) on two mental rotation tasks: a three-dimensional block-shape, and a human manikin rotation task. In both tasks, those with aphantasia had slower, but more accurate responses than controls. Both groups demonstrated classic linear increases in response time and error-rate as functions of angular disparity. In the three-dimensional block-shape rotation task, a within-group speed-accuracy trade-off was found in controls, whereas faster individuals in the aphantasia group were also more accurate. Control participants generally favoured using object-based mental rotation strategies, whereas those with aphantasia favoured analytic strategies. These results suggest that visual imagery is not crucial for successful performance in classical mental rotation tasks, as alternative strategies can be effectively utilised in the absence of holistic mental representations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lachlan Kay
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Zeman A. Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:467-480. [PMID: 38548492 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2023] [Revised: 02/09/2024] [Accepted: 02/13/2024] [Indexed: 05/12/2024]
Abstract
The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Adam Zeman
- Centre for Clinical Brain Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; University of Exeter Medical School, Exeter, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Bouyer LN, Arnold DH. Deep Aphantasia: a visual brain with minimal influence from priors or inhibitory feedback? Front Psychol 2024; 15:1374349. [PMID: 38646116 PMCID: PMC11026567 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1374349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 02/20/2024] [Indexed: 04/23/2024] Open
Abstract
The authors are both self-described congenital aphantasics, who feel they have never been able to have volitional imagined visual experiences during their waking lives. In addition, Loren has atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena that involve an extrapolation or integration of visual information across space. In this perspective, we describe Loren's atypical experiences of a number of visual phenomena, and we suggest these ensue because her visual experiences are not strongly shaped by inhibitory feedback or by prior expectations. We describe Loren as having Deep Aphantasia, and Derek as shallow, as for both a paucity of feedback might prevent the generation of imagined visual experiences, but for Loren this additionally seems to disrupt activity at a sufficiently early locus to cause atypical experiences of actual visual inputs. Our purpose in describing these subjective experiences is to alert others to the possibility of there being sub-classes of congenital aphantasia, one of which-Deep Aphantasia, would be characterized by atypical experiences of actual visual inputs.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Loren N Bouyer
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Derek H Arnold
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Krempel R, Monzel M. Aphantasia and involuntary imagery. Conscious Cogn 2024; 120:103679. [PMID: 38564857 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/25/2023] [Revised: 03/06/2024] [Accepted: 03/09/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Raquel Krempel
- Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science, State University of Campinas, R. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, 251 - Cidade Universitária, Campinas, SP 13083-859, Brazil; Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4200 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
| | - Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Monzel M, Handlogten J, Reuter M. No verbal overshadowing in aphantasia: The role of visual imagery for the verbal overshadowing effect. Cognition 2024; 245:105732. [PMID: 38325233 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105732] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2023] [Revised: 01/16/2024] [Accepted: 01/19/2024] [Indexed: 02/09/2024]
Abstract
The verbal overshadowing effect refers to the phenomenon that the verbal description of a past complex stimulus impairs its subsequent recognition. Theoretical explanations range from interference between different mental representations to the activation of different processing orientations or a provoked shift in the recognition criterion. In our study, 61 participants with aphantasia (= lack of mental imagery) and 70 controls participated in a verbal overshadowing paradigm. The verbal overshadowing effect did not occur in people with aphantasia, although the effect was replicated in controls. We speculate that this is either due to the lack of visual representations in people with aphantasia that verbal descriptions could interfere with, or to the absence of a shift in processing orientation during verbalisation. To rule out criterion-based explanations, further research is needed to distinguish between discriminability and response bias in people with aphantasia. Finally, data indicated that the verbal overshadowing effect may even be reversed in individuals with aphantasia, partly due to a lower memory performance in the no verbalisation condition. Effects of further variables are discussed, such as mental strategies, memory confidence, and difficulty, quantity and quality of verbalisation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany.
| | | | - Martin Reuter
- Personality Psychology and Biological Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, 53111 Bonn, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Dawes AJ, Keogh R, Pearson J. Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse. Neurosci Res 2024; 201:50-59. [PMID: 38029861 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2023.11.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2023] [Accepted: 11/20/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023]
Abstract
Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Dupont W, Papaxanthis C, Madden-Lombardi C, Lebon F. Explicit and implicit motor simulations are impaired in individuals with aphantasia. Brain Commun 2024; 6:fcae072. [PMID: 38515440 PMCID: PMC10957132 DOI: 10.1093/braincomms/fcae072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2023] [Revised: 01/11/2024] [Accepted: 03/13/2024] [Indexed: 03/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Individuals with aphantasia report having difficulties or an inability to generate visual images of objects or events. So far, there is no evidence showing that this condition also impacts the motor system and the generation of motor simulations. We probed the neurophysiological marker of aphantasia during explicit and implicit forms of motor simulation, i.e. motor imagery and action observation, respectively. We tested a group of individuals without any reported imagery deficits (phantasics) as well as a group of individuals self-reporting the inability to mentally simulate images or movements (aphantasics). We instructed the participants to explicitly imagine a maximal pinch movement in the visual and kinaesthetic modalities and to observe a video showing a pinch movement. By means of transcranial magnetic stimulation, we triggered motor-evoked potentials in the target right index finger. As expected, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials, a marker of corticospinal excitability, increased for phantasics during kinaesthetic motor imagery and action observation relative to rest but not during visual motor imagery. Interestingly, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials did not increase in any of the conditions for the group of aphantasics. This result provides neurophysiological evidence that individuals living with aphantasia have a real deficit in activating the motor system during motor simulations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- William Dupont
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
| | | | - Carol Madden-Lombardi
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France
| | - Florent Lebon
- UFR des Sciences du Sport, INSERM UMR1093-CAPS, Université Bourgogne, Dijon F-21000, France
- Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Paris, France
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Weber S, Christophel T, Görgen K, Soch J, Haynes J. Working memory signals in early visual cortex are present in weak and strong imagers. Hum Brain Mapp 2024; 45:e26590. [PMID: 38401134 PMCID: PMC10893972 DOI: 10.1002/hbm.26590] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/18/2023] [Revised: 12/06/2023] [Accepted: 12/29/2023] [Indexed: 02/26/2024] Open
Abstract
It has been suggested that visual images are memorized across brief periods of time by vividly imagining them as if they were still there. In line with this, the contents of both working memory and visual imagery are known to be encoded already in early visual cortex. If these signals in early visual areas were indeed to reflect a combined imagery and memory code, one would predict them to be weaker for individuals with reduced visual imagery vividness. Here, we systematically investigated this question in two groups of participants. Strong and weak imagers were asked to remember images across brief delay periods. We were able to reliably reconstruct the memorized stimuli from early visual cortex during the delay. Importantly, in contrast to the prediction, the quality of reconstruction was equally accurate for both strong and weak imagers. The decodable information also closely reflected behavioral precision in both groups, suggesting it could contribute to behavioral performance, even in the extreme case of completely aphantasic individuals. Our data thus suggest that working memory signals in early visual cortex can be present even in the (near) absence of phenomenal imagery.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Simon Weber
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin and Berlin Center for Advanced NeuroimagingCharité ‐ Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of the Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Research Training Group “Extrospection” and Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Research Cluster of Excellence “Science of Intelligence”Technische Universität BerlinBerlinGermany
| | - Thomas Christophel
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin and Berlin Center for Advanced NeuroimagingCharité ‐ Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of the Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Department of PsychologyHumboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
| | - Kai Görgen
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin and Berlin Center for Advanced NeuroimagingCharité ‐ Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of the Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Research Cluster of Excellence “Science of Intelligence”Technische Universität BerlinBerlinGermany
| | - Joram Soch
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin and Berlin Center for Advanced NeuroimagingCharité ‐ Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of the Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Institute of Psychology, Otto von Guericke University MagdeburgMagdeburgGermany
| | - John‐Dylan Haynes
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin and Berlin Center for Advanced NeuroimagingCharité ‐ Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of the Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Research Training Group “Extrospection” and Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Research Cluster of Excellence “Science of Intelligence”Technische Universität BerlinBerlinGermany
- Department of PsychologyHumboldt‐Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
- Collaborative Research Center “Volition and Cognitive Control”Technische Universität DresdenDresdenGermany
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Schwarzkopf DS. What is the true range of mental imagery? Cortex 2024; 170:21-25. [PMID: 37949779 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2023] [Revised: 08/28/2023] [Accepted: 09/12/2023] [Indexed: 11/12/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Dietrich S Schwarzkopf
- School of Optometry & Vision Science, University of Auckland, New Zealand; Experimental Psychology, University College London, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Trakas M. Journeying to the past: time travel and mental time travel, how far apart? Front Psychol 2023; 14:1260458. [PMID: 38213608 PMCID: PMC10783551 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1260458] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/05/2023] [Accepted: 12/06/2023] [Indexed: 01/13/2024] Open
Abstract
Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Marina Trakas
- National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina
| |
Collapse
|
17
|
Blomkvist A, Marks DF. Defining and 'diagnosing' aphantasia: Condition or individual difference? Cortex 2023; 169:220-234. [PMID: 37948876 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.09.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2023] [Revised: 06/16/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 11/12/2023]
Abstract
Research into the newly-coined 'condition' of 'aphantasia', an individual difference involving the self-reported absence of voluntary visual imagery, has taken off in recent years, and more and more people are 'self-diagnosing' as aphantasic. Yet, there is no consensus on whether aphantasia should really be described as a 'condition', and there is no battery of psychometric instruments to detect or 'diagnose' aphantasia. Instead, researchers currently rely on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to 'diagnose' aphantasia. We review here fundamental and methodological problems affecting aphantasia research stemming from an inadequate focus on how we should define aphantasia, whether aphantasia is a pathological condition, and the extensive use of VVIQ as a 'diagnostic test' for aphantasia. Firstly, we draw attention to 'literature blindness' for visual imagery research from the 1960s-1990s concerning individual differences in visual imagery vividness. Secondly, despite aphantasia being defined as a 'condition' where voluntary visual imagery is absent as indicated by the lowest score on the VVIQ, aphantasia studies inconsistently employ samples comprised of a mixture of participants with no visual imagery and low visual imagery, and we argue that this hinders the uncovering of the underlying cause of aphantasia. Thirdly, the scores used to designate the boundary between aphantasia and non-aphantasia are arbitrary and differ between studies, compromising the possibility for cross-study comparison of results. Fourthly, the problems of 'diagnosing' aphantasia are not limited to the academic sphere, as one can 'self-diagnose' online, for example by using the variant-VVIQ on the Aphantasia Network website. However, the variant-VVIQ departs from the original in ways likely to impact validity and accuracy, which could lead people to falsely believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia by a scientifically-validated measure. Fifthly, we discuss the hypothesis that people who believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia might be vulnerable to health anxiety, distress, and stigma. We conclude with a discussion about some fundamental aspects of how to classify a disorder, and suggest the need for a new psychometric measure of aphantasia.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Andrea Blomkvist
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.
| | - David F Marks
- 13200 Arles, Bouches-du-Rhône, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, France
| |
Collapse
|
18
|
Logie RH. Strategies, debates, and adversarial collaboration in working memory: The 51st Bartlett Lecture. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2023; 76:2431-2460. [PMID: 37526243 PMCID: PMC10585951 DOI: 10.1177/17470218231194037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2023] [Revised: 07/03/2023] [Accepted: 07/05/2023] [Indexed: 08/02/2023]
Abstract
Frederic Bartlett championed the importance of individual strategy differences when remembering details of events. I will describe how long-running theoretical debates in the area of working memory may be resolved by considering differences across participants in the strategies that they use when performing cognitive tasks, and through adversarial collaboration between rival laboratories. In common with the established view within experimental cognitive psychology, I assume that adults have a range of cognitive functions, evolved for everyday life. However, I will present evidence showing that these functions can be engaged selectively for laboratory tasks, and that how they are deployed may differ between and within individuals for the same task. Reliance on aggregate data, while treating inter- and intra-participant variability in data patterns as statistical noise, may lead to misleading conclusions about theoretical principles of cognition, and of working memory in particular. Moreover, different theoretical perspectives may be focused on different levels of explanation and different theoretical goals rather than being mutually incompatible. Yet researchers from contrasting theoretical frameworks pursue science as a competition, rarely do researchers from competing labs work in collaboration, and debates self-perpetuate. These approaches to research can stall debate resolution and generate ever-increasing scientific diversity rather than scientific progress. The article concludes by describing a recent extended adversarial collaboration (the WoMAAC project) focused on theoretical contrasts in working memory, and illustrates how this approach to conducting research may help resolve scientific debate and facilitate scientific advance.
Collapse
|
19
|
Monzel M, Dance C, Azañón E, Simner J. Aphantasia within the framework of neurodivergence: Some preliminary data and the curse of the confidence gap. Conscious Cogn 2023; 115:103567. [PMID: 37708622 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103567] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2023] [Revised: 08/15/2023] [Accepted: 08/22/2023] [Indexed: 09/16/2023]
Abstract
Aphantasia is a neurocognitive phenomenon affecting voluntary visual imagery, such that it is either entirely absent, or markedly impaired. Using both the social and medical models of disability, this article discusses the extent to which aphantasia can be understood as a disorder or just a form of neutral neurodivergence, given that imagery plays a central role in thinking and memory for most other people. Preliminary school performance data are presented, showing that low imagery does not necessarily complicate life, especially given compensatory strategies and low societal barriers. In addition, we discuss the consequences of labelling aphantasia a disorder with regard to self- and public stigma, and we provide further data regarding a confidence gap, by which aphantasics perceive themselves as performing worse than they objectively do. We conclude that aphantasia should be understood as neutral neurodivergence and that labelling it a disorder is not only wrong, but potentially harmful.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Kaiser-Karl-Ring 9, Bonn, Germany.
| | - Carla Dance
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
| | - Elena Azañón
- Department of Neurology, University Medical Center, Leipziger Str. 44, 39120 Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences (CBBS), Universitätsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany; Department of Behavioral Neurology, Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology, Brenneckestr. 6, 39118 Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Intervention and Research on adaptive and maladaptive brain Circuits underlying mental health, Jena-Magdeburg-Halle
| | - Julia Simner
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
| |
Collapse
|
20
|
Liu J, Bartolomeo P. Probing the unimaginable: The impact of aphantasia on distinct domains of visual mental imagery and visual perception. Cortex 2023; 166:338-347. [PMID: 37481856 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2023] [Revised: 03/09/2023] [Accepted: 06/15/2023] [Indexed: 07/25/2023]
Abstract
Different individuals experience varying degrees of vividness in their visual mental images. The distribution of these variations across different imagery domains, such as object shape, color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships, remains unknown. To address this issue, we conducted a study with 117 healthy participants who reported different levels of imagery vividness. Of these participants, 44 reported experiencing absent or nearly absent visual imagery, a condition known as "aphantasia". These individuals were compared to those with typical (N = 42) or unusually vivid (N = 31) imagery ability. We used an online version of the French-language Battérie Imagination-Perception (eBIP), which consists of tasks tapping each of the above-mentioned domains, both in visual imagery and in visual perception. We recorded the accuracy and response times (RTs) of participants' responses. Aphantasic participants reached similar levels of accuracy on all tasks compared to the other groups (Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA, BF = .02). However, their RTs were slower in both imagery and perceptual tasks (BF = 266), and they had lower confidence in their responses on perceptual tasks (BF = 7.78e5). A Bayesian regression analysis revealed that there was an inverse correlation between subjective vividness and RTs for the entire participant group: higher levels of vividness were associated with faster RTs. The pattern was similar in all the explored domains. The findings suggest that individuals with congenital aphantasia experience a slowing in processing visual information in both imagery and perception, but the precision of their processing remains unaffected. The observed performance pattern lends support to the hypotheses that congenital aphantasia is primarily a deficit of phenomenal consciousness, or that it employs alternative strategies other than visualization to access preserved visual information.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jianghao Liu
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013 Paris, France; Dassault Systèmes, Vélizy-Villacoublay, France.
| | - Paolo Bartolomeo
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013 Paris, France
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
Sulfaro AA, Robinson AK, Carlson TA. Modelling perception as a hierarchical competition differentiates imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad018. [PMID: 37621984 PMCID: PMC10445666 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2022] [Revised: 07/03/2023] [Accepted: 07/14/2023] [Indexed: 08/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Mental imagery is a process by which thoughts become experienced with sensory characteristics. Yet, it is not clear why mental images appear diminished compared to veridical images, nor how mental images are phenomenologically distinct from hallucinations, another type of non-veridical sensory experience. Current evidence suggests that imagination and veridical perception share neural resources. If so, we argue that considering how neural representations of externally generated stimuli (i.e. sensory input) and internally generated stimuli (i.e. thoughts) might interfere with one another can sufficiently differentiate between veridical, imaginary, and hallucinatory perception. We here use a simple computational model of a serially connected, hierarchical network with bidirectional information flow to emulate the primate visual system. We show that modelling even first approximations of neural competition can more coherently explain imagery phenomenology than non-competitive models. Our simulations predict that, without competing sensory input, imagined stimuli should ubiquitously dominate hierarchical representations. However, with competition, imagination should dominate high-level representations but largely fail to outcompete sensory inputs at lower processing levels. To interpret our findings, we assume that low-level stimulus information (e.g. in early visual cortices) contributes most to the sensory aspects of perceptual experience, while high-level stimulus information (e.g. towards temporal regions) contributes most to its abstract aspects. Our findings therefore suggest that ongoing bottom-up inputs during waking life may prevent imagination from overriding veridical sensory experience. In contrast, internally generated stimuli may be hallucinated when sensory input is dampened or eradicated. Our approach can explain individual differences in imagery, along with aspects of daydreaming, hallucinations, and non-visual mental imagery.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alexander A Sulfaro
- School of Psychology, Griffith Taylor Building, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW 2006, Australia
| | - Amanda K Robinson
- School of Psychology, Griffith Taylor Building, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW 2006, Australia
- Queensland Brain Institute, QBI Building 79, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD 4067, Australia
| | - Thomas A Carlson
- School of Psychology, Griffith Taylor Building, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW 2006, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
22
|
The relationship between interactive-imagery instructions and association memory. Mem Cognit 2023; 51:371-390. [PMID: 35948821 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-022-01347-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/12/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Interactive imagery, one of the most effective strategies for remembering pairs of words, involves asking participants to form mental images during study. We tested the hypothesis that the visual image is, in fact, responsible for its memory benefit. Neither subjectively reported vividness (all experiments) nor objective imagery skill (experiments 1 and 3) could explain the benefit of interactive imagery for cued recall. Aphantasic participants, who self-identified little to no mental imagery, benefited from interactive-imagery instructions as much as controls (experiment 3). Imagery instructions did not improve memory for the constituent order of associations (AB versus BA), even when participants were told how to incorporate order within their images (experiments 1 and 2). Taken together, our results suggest that the visual format of images may not be responsible for the effectiveness of the interactive-imagery instruction and moreover, interactive imagery may not result in qualitatively different associative memories.
Collapse
|
23
|
Visual cognition: A new perspective on mental rotation. Curr Biol 2022; 32:R1281-R1283. [PMID: 36413974 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2022.10.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Manipulating an object in one's mind has long been thought to mirror physically manipulating that object in allocentric three-dimensional space. A new study revises and clarifies this foundational assumption, identifying a previously unknown role for the observer's point-of-view.
Collapse
|
24
|
Cavedon-Taylor D. Predictive processing and perception: What does imagining have to do with it? Conscious Cogn 2022; 106:103419. [PMID: 36252520 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2021] [Revised: 07/29/2022] [Accepted: 09/29/2022] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
Predictive processing (PP) accounts of perception are unique not merely in that they postulate a unity between perception and imagination, but in claiming that (i) perception should be conceptualised in terms of imagination and (ii) the two involve an identity of neural implementation. This paper argues against these claims, on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, the manner in which PP theorists link perception and imagination belies an impoverished account of imagery as cloistered from the external world in its intentionality, akin to a virtual reality, as well as endogenously generated. Yet this ignores a whole class of imagery whose intentionality is directed on the actual environment-projected mental imagery-and also ignores the fact that imagery may be triggered crossmodally in a bottom-up, stimulus-driven way. Empirically, claiming that imagery and perception share neural circuitry ignores relevant clinical results in this area. These evidence substantial perception/imagery neural dissociations, most notably in the case of aphantasia. Taken together, the arguments here suggest that PP theorists should substantially temper, if not outright abandon, their claim to a perception/imagination unity.
Collapse
|
25
|
Wittmann BC, Şatırer Y. Decreased associative processing and memory confidence in aphantasia. Learn Mem 2022; 29:412-420. [PMID: 36253008 PMCID: PMC9578376 DOI: 10.1101/lm.053610.122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2022] [Accepted: 09/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Visual imagery and mental reconstruction of scenes are considered core components of episodic memory retrieval. Individuals with absent visual imagery (aphantasia) score lower on tests of autobiographical memory, suggesting that aphantasia may be associated with differences in episodic and associative processing. In this online study, we tested aphantasic participants and controls on associative recognition and memory confidence for three types of associations encoded incidentally: associations between visual-visual and audio-visual stimulus pairs, associations between an object and its location on the screen, and intraitem associations. Aphantasic participants had a lower rate of high-confidence hits in all associative memory tests compared with controls. Performance on auditory-visual associations was correlated with individual differences in a measure of object imagery in the aphantasic group but not in controls. No overall group difference in memory performance was found, indicating that visual imagery selectively contributes to memory confidence. Analysis of the encoding task revealed that aphantasics made fewer associative links between the stimuli, suggesting a role for visual imagery in associative processing of visual and auditory input. These data enhance our understanding of visual imagery contributions to associative memory and further characterize the cognitive profile of aphantasia.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bianca C Wittmann
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University, 35394 Giessen, Germany
| | - Yılmaz Şatırer
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University, 35394 Giessen, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
26
|
Furman M, Fleitas-Rumak P, Lopez-Segura P, Furman M, Tafet G, de Erausquin GA, Ortiz T. Cortical activity involved in perception and imagery of visual stimuli in a subject with aphantasia. An EEG case report. Neurocase 2022; 28:344-355. [PMID: 36103716 DOI: 10.1080/13554794.2022.2122848] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/14/2022]
Abstract
Aphantasia has been described as the inability to voluntarily evoke mental images using the "mind's eye." We studied a congenital aphantasic subject using neuropsychological testsand 64 channel EEG recordings, in order to studycortical activity involved in perception and imagery evaluating event-related potentials(N170, P200, N250). The subject is in the normal range of the neuropsychological tests performed, except for specific imagery tests. The EEG results show that when he evokes the same mental image, he starts the evoking process from left temporal instead of frontal areas, he does not activate occipital visual nor left anterior parietal areas.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mariano Furman
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Pablo Fleitas-Rumak
- Departamento de Toxicología y Farmacología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Pilar Lopez-Segura
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Martín Furman
- Asociación Civil Accionar Prevención, Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Gustavo Tafet
- Fundación Internacional para el Desarrollo de las Neurociencias, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina
| | - Gabriel A de Erausquin
- Glenn Biggs Institute for Alzheimer and Neurodegenerative Diseases, University of Texas Health San Antonio, USA
| | - Tomás Ortiz
- Departamento de Medicina Legal Psiquiatría y Patología, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| |
Collapse
|
27
|
Dawes AJ, Keogh R, Robuck S, Pearson J. Memories with a blind mind: Remembering the past and imagining the future with aphantasia. Cognition 2022; 227:105192. [PMID: 35752014 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105192] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2021] [Revised: 05/26/2022] [Accepted: 05/28/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Our capacity to re-experience the past and simulate the future is thought to depend heavily on visual imagery, which allows us to construct complex sensory representations in the absence of sensory stimulation. There are large individual differences in visual imagery ability, but their impact on autobiographical memory and future prospection remains poorly understood. Research in this field assumes the normative use of visual imagery as a cognitive tool to simulate the past and future, however some individuals lack the ability to visualise altogether (a condition termed "aphantasia"). Aphantasia represents a rare and naturally occurring knock-out model for examining the role of visual imagery in episodic memory recall. Here, we assessed individuals with aphantasia on an adapted form of the Autobiographical Interview, a behavioural measure of the specificity and richness of episodic details underpinning the memory of events. Aphantasic participants generated significantly fewer episodic details than controls for both past and future events. This effect was most pronounced for novel future events, driven by selective reductions in visual detail retrieval, accompanied by comparatively reduced ratings of the phenomenological richness of simulated events, and paralleled by quantitative linguistic markers of reduced perceptual language use in aphantasic participants compared to those with visual imagery. Our findings represent the first systematic evidence (using combined objective and subjective data streams) that aphantasia is associated with a diminished ability to re-experience the past and simulate the future, indicating that visual imagery is an important cognitive tool for the dynamic retrieval and recombination of episodic details during mental simulation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alexei J Dawes
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Sarah Robuck
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
28
|
Spatial transformation in mental rotation tasks in aphantasia. Psychon Bull Rev 2022; 29:2096-2107. [PMID: 35680760 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02126-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/16/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Aphantasia refers to the inability to summon images to one's own mind's eye, resulting in selective deficits of voluntary object imagery. In the present study, we investigated whether M. X., a case of acquired aphantasia, can still retain some form of spatial transformation processes even though he is unable to subjectively experience voluntary object imagery. M. X. and a group of control participants were asked to complete a letter mental rotation task (MRT), typically used to assess the nature of the spatial transformation, while behavioural and electrophysiological responses were recorded. M. X. was able to complete the MRTs as accurately as controls, showing the pattern of increasing RTs as a function of rotation angle typical of MRTs. However, event-related potential (ERP) results showed systematic differences between M. X. and controls. On canonical letter trials, the rotation-related negativity (RRN), an ERP component considered as the psychophysiological correlate of the spatial transformation of mental rotation (MR), was present in both M. X. and controls and similarly modulated by rotation angle. However, no such modulation was observed for M. X. on mirror-reversed letter trials. These findings suggest that, at least under specific experimental conditions, the inability to create a depictive representation of the stimuli does not prevent the engagement of spatial transformation in aphantasia. However, the ability to apply spatial transformation varies with tasks and might be accounted for by the specific type of mental representation that can be accessed.
Collapse
|
29
|
Kay L, Keogh R, Andrillon T, Pearson J. The pupillary light response as a physiological index of aphantasia, sensory and phenomenological imagery strength. eLife 2022; 11:72484. [PMID: 35356890 PMCID: PMC9018072 DOI: 10.7554/elife.72484] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2021] [Accepted: 03/30/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
The pupillary light response is an important automatic physiological response which optimizes light reaching the retina. Recent work has shown that the pupil also adjusts in response to illusory brightness and a range of cognitive functions, however, it remains unclear what exactly drives these endogenous changes. Here, we show that the imagery pupillary light response correlates with objective measures of sensory imagery strength. Further, the trial-by-trial phenomenological vividness of visual imagery is tracked by the imagery pupillary light response. We also demonstrated that a group of individuals without visual imagery (aphantasia) do not show any significant evidence of an imagery pupillary light response, however they do show perceptual pupil light responses and pupil dilation with larger cognitive load. Our results provide evidence that the pupillary light response indexes the sensory strength of visual imagery. This work also provides the first physiological validation of aphantasia.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lachlan Kay
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
| | - Thomas Andrillon
- Institut du Cerveau - Paris Brain Institute, Sorbonne Université, Paris, France
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
30
|
Chan A, Northoff G, Karasik R, Ouyang J, Williams K. Flights and Perchings of the BrainMind: A Temporospatial Approach to Psychotherapy. Front Psychol 2022; 13:828035. [PMID: 35444594 PMCID: PMC9014955 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.828035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/02/2021] [Accepted: 02/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
This article introduces a process-oriented approach for improving present moment conceptualization in psychotherapy that is in alignment with neuroscience: the Temporospatial movements of mind (TSMM) model. We elaborate on seven temporal movements that describe the moment-to-moment morphogenesis of emotional feelings and thoughts from inception to maturity. Temporal refers to the passage of time through which feelings and thoughts develop, and electromagnetic activity, that among other responsibilities, bind information across time. Spatial dynamics extend from an undifferentiated to three dimensional experiences of emotional and cognitive processes. Neurophysiologically, spatial refers to structures within the brain and their varying interactions with one another. This article culminates in the development of an atheoretical temporospatial grid that may help clinicians conceptualize where patients are in their cognitive and emotional development to further guide technique.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Aldrich Chan
- Graduate School of Education and Psychology, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, United States
- Center for Neuropsychology and Consciousness, Miami, FL, United States
- *Correspondence: Aldrich Chan,
| | - Georg Northoff
- Faculty of Medicine, Centre for Neural Dynamics, The Royal’s Institute of Mental Health Research, Brain and Mind Research Institute, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
- Mental Health Centre, Zhejiang University School of Medicine, Hangzhou, China
- Centre for Cognition and Brain Disorders, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Ryan Karasik
- Graduate School of Education and Psychology, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, United States
- Center for Neuropsychology and Consciousness, Miami, FL, United States
| | - Jason Ouyang
- Graduate School of Education and Psychology, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, United States
- Center for Neuropsychology and Consciousness, Miami, FL, United States
| | - Kathryn Williams
- Graduate School of Education and Psychology, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, United States
- Center for Neuropsychology and Consciousness, Miami, FL, United States
| |
Collapse
|
31
|
Monzel M, Mitchell D, Macpherson F, Pearson J, Zeman A. Aphantasia, dysikonesia, anauralia: call for a single term for the lack of mental imagery – Commentary on Dance et al. (2021) and Hinwar and Lambert (2021). Cortex 2022; 150:149-152. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2022.02.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2022] [Revised: 02/10/2022] [Accepted: 02/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
|
32
|
Does progressive aphantasia exist? The hypothetical role of aphantasia in the diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e299. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x21002375] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Aphantasia is a heterogeneous neuropsychological syndrome consisting of the inability to create mental images. We argue that its progressive form may be a harbinger of dementia. Aphantasia may manifest as the inability to create any mental images or to create complex scenes, inability to spontaneously initiate generation of mental images, and/or inability to visualize a sequence of events.
Collapse
|
33
|
Abstract
What are mental images needed for? A variety of everyday situations calls for us to plan ahead; one of the clever ways our mind prepares and strategizes our next move is through mental simulation. A powerful tool in running these simulations is visual mental imagery, which can be conceived as a way to activate and maintain an internal representation of the to-be-imagined object, giving rise to predictions. Therefore, under normal conditions imagination is primarily an endogenous process, and only more rarely can mental images be activated exogenously, for example, by means of intracerebral stimulation. A large debate is still ongoing regarding the neural substrates supporting mental imagery, with the neuropsychological and neuroimaging literature agreeing in some cases, but not others. This chapter reviews the neuroscientific literature on mental imagery, and attempts to reappraise the neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence by drawing a model of mental imagery informed by both structural and functional brain data. Overall, the role of regions in the ventral temporal cortex, especially of the left hemisphere, stands out unequivocally as a key substrate in mental imagery.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alfredo Spagna
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York City, NY, United States.
| |
Collapse
|
34
|
Pounder Z, Jacob J, Evans S, Loveday C, Eardley AF, Silvanto J. Only minimal differences between individuals with congenital aphantasia and those with typical imagery on neuropsychological tasks that involve imagery. Cortex 2022; 148:180-192. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2021.12.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/20/2021] [Revised: 09/16/2021] [Accepted: 12/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
|
35
|
Dance CJ, Ipser A, Simner J. The prevalence of aphantasia (imagery weakness) in the general population. Conscious Cogn 2021; 97:103243. [PMID: 34872033 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103243] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2021] [Revised: 11/12/2021] [Accepted: 11/15/2021] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Visual mental imagery is the ability to create a quasi-perceptual visual picture in the mind's eye. For people with the rare trait of aphantasia, this ability is entirely absent or markedly impaired. Here, we aim to clarify the prevalence of aphantasia in the general population, while overcoming limitations of previous research (e.g., recruitment biases). In Experiment 1, we screened a cohort of undergraduate students (n502) using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) and found that 4.2% had aphantasia. To establish the reliability of our estimate, we then screened a new sample of people (n502) at an online crowdsourcing marketplace, again finding that approximately four percent (3.6%) had aphantasia. Overall, our combined prevalence from over a thousand people of 3.9% - which shows no gender bias - provides a useful index for how commonly aphantasia occurs, based on measures and diagnostic thresholds in line with contemporary aphantasia literature.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- C J Dance
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK.
| | - A Ipser
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
| | - J Simner
- School of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of Sussex, BN1 9QJ, UK
| |
Collapse
|
36
|
Kutsuzawa K, Taguchi K, Shimizu E. Attention and Imagery in Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Chronic Pain: An Exploratory Study. J Psychosoc Nurs Ment Health Serv 2021; 60:45-54. [PMID: 34846226 DOI: 10.3928/02793695-20211118-01] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) has been shown to have a small to medium effect on chronic pain, necessitating further research to identify which components of CBT work for which type of patient. Previously, we developed a high-intensity individual CBT protocol and conducted a single-arm, uncontrolled feasibility study for chronic pain. In the current study, we explored patients' experiences in CBT sessions, including tactile attention-shift training; memory work using the peak-end rule; mental practice of action using motor imagery rescripting; and video feedback, including mirror therapy. Fourteen patients with chronic pain completed 16 CBT sessions. The tactile attention-shift training was very helpful for two patients and somewhat helpful for five, memory work was helpful for nine, mental practice was very helpful for four and somewhat helpful for three, and visual feedback was very helpful for six patients. Effective methodologies for new chronic pain CBT components should be developed. [Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and Mental Health Services, xx(xx), xx-xx.].
Collapse
|
37
|
Hinwar RP, Lambert AJ. Anauralia: The Silent Mind and Its Association With Aphantasia. Front Psychol 2021; 12:744213. [PMID: 34721222 PMCID: PMC8551557 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.744213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 09/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Auditory and visual imagery were studied in a sample of 128 participants, including 34 self-reported aphantasics. Auditory imagery (Bucknell Auditory Imagery Scale-Vividness, BAIS-V) and visual imagery (Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire-Modified, VVIQ-M) were strongly associated, Spearman's rho = 0.83: Most self-reported aphantasics also reported weak or entirely absent auditory imagery; and participants lacking auditory imagery tended to be aphantasic. Similarly, vivid visual imagery tended to co-occur with vivid auditory imagery. Nevertheless, the aphantasic group included one individual with typical auditory imagery; and the group lacking auditory imagery (N = 29) included one individual with typical visual imagery. Hence, weak visual and auditory imagery can dissociate, albeit with low apparent incidence. Auditory representations and auditory imagery are thought to play a key role in a wide range of psychological domains, including working memory and memory rehearsal, prospective cognition, thinking, reading, planning, problem-solving, self-regulation, and music. Therefore, self-reports describing an absence of auditory imagery raise a host of important questions concerning the role of phenomenal auditory imagery in these domains. Because there is currently no English word denoting an absence of auditory imagery, we propose a new term, anauralia, for referring to this, and offer suggestions for further research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Rish P Hinwar
- School of Psychology and Centre for Brain Research, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
| | - Anthony J Lambert
- School of Psychology and Centre for Brain Research, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
| |
Collapse
|
38
|
Monzel M, Vetterlein A, Reuter M. Memory deficits in aphantasics are not restricted to autobiographical memory - Perspectives from the Dual Coding Approach. J Neuropsychol 2021; 16:444-461. [PMID: 34719857 DOI: 10.1111/jnp.12265] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2021] [Accepted: 10/18/2021] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
Scene Construction Theory suggests similar neural mechanisms for visual imagery and autobiographical memory, supporting the seeming scientific consensus that a loss of visual imagery affects autobiographical memory. Based on the Dual Coding Theory and the Reverse Hierarchy Model, we also assumed influences of visual imagery on recent visual memory and even verbal memory, although little evidence has been provided so far. Thus, in a sample of 67 congenital aphantasics (= persons without mental imagery) and 32 demographically matched controls, it was investigated whether deficits in visual imagery are associated with deficits in visual as well as verbal short-term and long-term memory. The memory tasks were theoretically selected based on task difficulty, retrieval condition, and subcategories of stimuli, as previous null findings were attributed to insensitive tasks that were solvable by aphantasics by means of non-visual alternative strategies. Significant group differences were found in all memory components, with aphantasics performing worse than non-aphantasics. Therefore, evidence was obtained for the influence of visual imagery on all memory components beyond autobiographical memory.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Merlin Monzel
- Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Germany
| | | | - Martin Reuter
- Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Germany.,Center for Economics and Neuroscience (CENs), Laboratory of Neurogenetics, University of Bonn, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
39
|
Königsmark VT, Bergmann J, Reeder RR. The Ganzflicker experience: High probability of seeing vivid and complex pseudo-hallucinations with imagery but not aphantasia. Cortex 2021; 141:522-534. [PMID: 34172274 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2021.05.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2020] [Revised: 02/02/2021] [Accepted: 05/09/2021] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Abstract
There are considerable individual differences in visual mental imagery ability across the general population, including a "blind mind's eye", or aphantasia. Recent studies have shown that imagery is linked to differences in perception in the healthy population, and clinical work has found a connection between imagery and hallucinatory experiences in neurological disorders. However, whether imagery ability is associated with anomalous perception-including hallucinations-in the general population remains unclear. In the current study, we explored the relationship between imagery ability and the anomalous perception of pseudo-hallucinations (PH) using rhythmic flicker stimulation ("Ganzflicker"). Specifically, we investigated whether the ability to generate voluntary imagery is associated with susceptibility to flicker-induced PH. We additionally explored individual differences in observed features of PH. We recruited a sample of people with aphantasia (aphants) and imagery (imagers) to view a constant red-and-black flicker for approximately 10 min. We found that imagers were more susceptible to PH, and saw more complex and vivid PH, compared to aphants. This study provides the first evidence that the ability to generate visual imagery increases the likelihood of experiencing complex and vivid anomalous percepts.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Varg T Königsmark
- Institute of Psychology, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
| | - Johanna Bergmann
- Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Reshanne R Reeder
- Institute of Psychology, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany; Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences, Magdeburg, Germany; Department of Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
40
|
Bumgardner AL, Yuan K, Chiu AV. I cannot picture it in my mind: acquired aphantasia after autologous stem cell transplantation for multiple myeloma. Oxf Med Case Reports 2021; 2021:omab019. [PMID: 34055356 PMCID: PMC8143657 DOI: 10.1093/omcr/omab019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2020] [Revised: 11/14/2020] [Accepted: 02/09/2021] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Aphantasia, the loss of mental imagery, is a rare disorder and even more infrequent when acquired. No previous cases have been identified that were caused by transplant-related treatment. We describe a case of acquired aphantasia in a 62-year-old male with refractory IgG kappa multiple myeloma after receiving an autologous stem cell transplant (ASCT) following high-dose melphalan with a complicated hospital admission. The etiology of aphantasia remains unidentified, but we provide viable explanations to include direct effects from ASCT treatment and indirect effects from transplant-related complications.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Adam L Bumgardner
- Internal Medicine and Psychiatry Residency Program, National Capital Consortium, Bethesda, MD, USA
| | - Kyle Yuan
- F. Edward Hébert School of Medicine, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, USA
| | - Alden V Chiu
- Hematology-Oncology Service, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, MD, USA.,Department of Medicine, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, USA
| |
Collapse
|
41
|
Zaman A, Russell C. Does autonoetic consciousness in episodic memory rely on recall from a first-person perspective? JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2021.1922419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/08/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Andreea Zaman
- Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK
| | - Charlotte Russell
- Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK
| |
Collapse
|
42
|
Milton F, Fulford J, Dance C, Gaddum J, Heuerman-Williamson B, Jones K, Knight KF, MacKisack M, Winlove C, Zeman A. Behavioral and Neural Signatures of Visual Imagery Vividness Extremes: Aphantasia versus Hyperphantasia. Cereb Cortex Commun 2021; 2:tgab035. [PMID: 34296179 PMCID: PMC8186241 DOI: 10.1093/texcom/tgab035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 45] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2021] [Revised: 04/18/2021] [Accepted: 04/20/2021] [Indexed: 12/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Although Galton recognized in the 1880s that some individuals lack visual imagery, this phenomenon was mostly neglected over the following century. We recently coined the terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" to describe visual imagery vividness extremes, unlocking a sustained surge of public interest. Aphantasia is associated with subjective impairment of face recognition and autobiographical memory. Here we report the first systematic, wide-ranging neuropsychological and brain imaging study of people with aphantasia (n = 24), hyperphantasia (n = 25), and midrange imagery vividness (n = 20). Despite equivalent performance on standard memory tests, marked group differences were measured in autobiographical memory and imagination, participants with hyperphantasia outperforming controls who outperformed participants with aphantasia. Face recognition difficulties and autistic spectrum traits were reported more commonly in aphantasia. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory highlighted reduced extraversion in the aphantasia group and increased openness in the hyperphantasia group. Resting state fMRI revealed stronger connectivity between prefrontal cortices and the visual network among hyperphantasic than aphantasic participants. In an active fMRI paradigm, there was greater anterior parietal activation among hyperphantasic and control than aphantasic participants when comparing visualization of famous faces and places with perception. These behavioral and neural signatures of visual imagery vividness extremes validate and illuminate this significant but neglected dimension of individual difference.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Fraser Milton
- Discipline of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK
| | - Jon Fulford
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Carla Dance
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| | - James Gaddum
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| | | | - Kealan Jones
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Kathryn F Knight
- Discipline of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK
| | - Matthew MacKisack
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Crawford Winlove
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| | - Adam Zeman
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter Medical School, College House, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK
| |
Collapse
|
43
|
Hemispheric asymmetries in visual mental imagery. Brain Struct Funct 2021; 227:697-708. [PMID: 33885966 DOI: 10.1007/s00429-021-02277-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/17/2021] [Accepted: 04/10/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Visual mental imagery is the faculty whereby we can "visualize" objects that are not in our line of sight. Longstanding evidence dating back over thirty years has shown that unilateral brain lesions, especially in the left temporal lobe, can impair aspects of this ability. Yet, there is currently no attempt to identify analogies between these neuropsychological findings of hemispheric asymmetry and those from other neuroscientific approaches. Here, we present a critical review of the available literature on the hemispheric laterality of visual mental imagery, by looking at cross-method patterns of evidence in the domains of lesion neuropsychology, neuroimaging, and direct cortical stimulation. Results can be summarized under three main axes. First, frontoparietal networks in both hemispheres appear to be associated with visual mental imagery. Second, lateralization patterns emerge in the temporal lobes, with the left inferior temporal lobe being the most common finding in the literature for endogenously generated images, especially, but not exclusively, when orthographic material is used to ignite imagery. Third, an opposite pattern of hemispheric laterality emerges when visual mental images are induced by exogenous stimulation; direct cortical electrical stimulation tends to produce visual imagery experiences predominantly when applied to the right temporal lobe. These patterns of hemispheric asymmetry are difficult to reconcile with the dominant model of visual mental imagery, which emphasizes the implication of early sensory cortices. They suggest instead that visual mental imagery relies on large-scale brain networks, with a crucial participation of high-level visual regions in the temporal lobes.
Collapse
|
44
|
Dance C, Jaquiery M, Eagleman D, Porteous D, Zeman A, Simner J. What is the relationship between Aphantasia, Synaesthesia and Autism? Conscious Cogn 2021; 89:103087. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103087] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2020] [Revised: 01/01/2021] [Accepted: 01/17/2021] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
|
45
|
Bainbridge WA, Pounder Z, Eardley AF, Baker CI. Quantifying aphantasia through drawing: Those without visual imagery show deficits in object but not spatial memory. Cortex 2021; 135:159-172. [PMID: 33383478 PMCID: PMC7856239 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2020.11.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 56] [Impact Index Per Article: 18.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2020] [Revised: 07/31/2020] [Accepted: 11/10/2020] [Indexed: 01/19/2023]
Abstract
Congenital aphantasia is a recently characterized variation of experience defined by the inability to form voluntary visual imagery, in individuals who are otherwise high performing. Because of this specific deficit to visual imagery, individuals with aphantasia serve as an ideal group for probing the nature of representations in visual memory, particularly the interplay of object, spatial, and symbolic information. Here, we conducted a large-scale online study of aphantasia and revealed a dissociation in object and spatial content in their memory representations. Sixty-one individuals with aphantasia and matched controls with typical imagery studied real-world scene images, and were asked to draw them from memory, and then later copy them during a matched perceptual condition. Drawings were objectively quantified by 2,795 online scorers for object and spatial details. Aphantasic participants recalled significantly fewer objects than controls, with less color in their drawings, and an increased reliance on verbal scaffolding. However, aphantasic participants showed high spatial accuracy equivalent to controls, and made significantly fewer memory errors. These differences between groups only manifested during recall, with no differences between groups during the matched perceptual condition. This object-specific memory impairment in individuals with aphantasia provides evidence for separate systems in memory that support object versus spatial information. The study also provides an important experimental validation for the existence of aphantasia as a variation in human imagery experience.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Wilma A Bainbridge
- Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA; Laboratory of Brain and Cognition, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD, USA.
| | - Zoë Pounder
- Department of Psychology, University of Westminster, London, UK.
| | - Alison F Eardley
- Department of Psychology, University of Westminster, London, UK.
| | - Chris I Baker
- Laboratory of Brain and Cognition, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
46
|
Koenig-Robert R, Pearson J. Why do imagery and perception look and feel so different? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20190703. [PMID: 33308061 PMCID: PMC7741076 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0703] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/12/2020] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Despite the past few decades of research providing convincing evidence of the similarities in function and neural mechanisms between imagery and perception, for most of us, the experience of the two are undeniably different, why? Here, we review and discuss the differences between imagery and perception and the possible underlying causes of these differences, from function to neural mechanisms. Specifically, we discuss the directional flow of information (top-down versus bottom-up), the differences in targeted cortical layers in primary visual cortex and possible different neural mechanisms of modulation versus excitation. For the first time in history, neuroscience is beginning to shed light on this long-held mystery of why imagery and perception look and feel so different. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| |
Collapse
|
47
|
Spagna A, Hajhajate D, Liu J, Bartolomeo P. Visual mental imagery engages the left fusiform gyrus, but not the early visual cortex: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging evidence. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 122:201-217. [PMID: 33422567 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.12.029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 61] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2020] [Revised: 12/03/2020] [Accepted: 12/23/2020] [Indexed: 12/13/2022]
Abstract
The dominant neural model of visual mental imagery (VMI) stipulates that memories from the medial temporal lobe acquire sensory features in early visual areas. However, neurological patients with damage restricted to the occipital cortex typically show perfectly vivid VMI, while more anterior damages extending into the temporal lobe, especially in the left hemisphere, often cause VMI impairments. Here we present two major results reconciling neuroimaging findings in neurotypical subjects with the performance of brain-damaged patients: (1) A large-scale meta-analysis of 46 fMRI studies, of which 27 investigated specifically visual mental imagery, revealed that VMI engages fronto-parietal networks and a well-delimited region in the left fusiform gyrus. (2) A Bayesian analysis showed no evidence for imagery-related activity in early visual cortices. We propose a revised neural model of VMI that draws inspiration from recent cytoarchitectonic and lesion studies, whereby fronto-parietal networks initiate, modulate, and maintain activity in a core temporal network centered on the fusiform imagery node, a high-level visual region in the left fusiform gyrus.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Alfredo Spagna
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University in the City of New York, NY, 10027, USA; Sorbonne Université, Inserm U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, F-75013, Paris, France
| | - Dounia Hajhajate
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, F-75013, Paris, France
| | - Jianghao Liu
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, F-75013, Paris, France; Dassault Systèmes, Vélizy-Villacoublay, France
| | - Paolo Bartolomeo
- Sorbonne Université, Inserm U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Paris Brain Institute, ICM, Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière, F-75013, Paris, France.
| |
Collapse
|
48
|
Keogh R, Pearson J, Zeman A. Aphantasia: The science of visual imagery extremes. HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 2021; 178:277-296. [PMID: 33832681 DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-12-821377-3.00012-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/11/2022]
Abstract
Visual imagery allows us to revisit the appearance of things in their absence and to test out virtual combinations of sensory experience. Visual imagery has been linked to many cognitive processes, such as autobiographical and visual working memory. Imagery also plays symptomatic and mechanistic roles in neurologic and mental disorders and is utilized in treatment. A large network of brain activity spanning frontal, parietal, temporal, and visual cortex is involved in generating and maintain images in mind. The ability to visualize has extreme variations, ranging from completely absent (aphantasia) to photo-like (hyperphantasia). The anatomy and functionality of visual cortex, including primary visual cortex, have been associated with individual differences in visual imagery ability, pointing to a potential correlate for both aphantasia and hyperphantasia. Preliminary evidence suggests that lifelong aphantasia is associated with prosopagnosia and reduction in autobiographical memory; hyperphantasia is associated with synesthesia. Aphantasic individuals can also be highly imaginative and are able to complete many tasks that were previously thought to rely on visual imagery, demonstrating that visualization is only one of many ways of representing things in their absence. The study of extreme imagination reminds us how easily invisible differences can escape detection.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Rebecca Keogh
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Joel Pearson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Adam Zeman
- Cognitive Neurology Research Group, University of Exeter College of Medicine and Health, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom.
| |
Collapse
|
49
|
Abstract
Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state-as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery-including the most famous ones-do not actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious (as potentially unconscious) would bring much needed explanatory unification to mental imagery research. It would also help us to reassess some of the recent aphantasia findings inasmuch as at least some subjects with aphantasia would be best described as having unconscious mental imagery. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bence Nanay
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
| |
Collapse
|
50
|
Cayol Z, Nazir TA. Why Language Processing Recruits Modality Specific Brain Regions: It Is Not About Understanding Words, but About Modelling Situations. J Cogn 2020; 3:35. [PMID: 33043245 PMCID: PMC7528693 DOI: 10.5334/joc.124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/19/2020] [Accepted: 09/07/2020] [Indexed: 02/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Whether language comprehension requires the participation of brain structures that evolved for perception and action has been a subject of intense debate. While brain-imaging evidence for the involvement of such modality-specific regions has grown, the fact that lesions to these structures do not necessarily erase word knowledge has invited the conclusion that language-induced activity in these structures might not be essential for word recognition. Why language processing recruits these structures remains unanswered, however. Here, we examine the original findings from a slightly different perspective. We first consider the 'original' function of structures in modality-specific brain regions that are recruited by language activity. We propose that these structures help elaborate 'internal forward models' in motor control (c.f. emulators). Emulators are brain systems that capture the relationship between an action and its sensory consequences. During language processing emulators could thus allow accessing associative memories. We further postulate the existence of a linguistic system that exploits, in a rule-based manner, emulators and other nonlinguistic brain systems, to gain complementary (and redundant) information during language processing. Emulators are therefore just one of several sources of information. We emphasize that whether a given word-form triggers activity in modality-specific brain regions depends on the linguistic context and not on the word-form as such. The role of modality-specific systems in language processing is thus not to help understanding words but to model the verbally depicted situation by supplying memorized context information. We present a model derived from these assumptions and provide predictions and perspectives for future research.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Zoé Cayol
- Univ. Lyon, CNRS, UMR 5304 – Institut des Sciences Cognitives – Marc Jeannerod, Bron, FR
| | - Tatjana A. Nazir
- Univ. Lyon, CNRS, UMR 5304 – Institut des Sciences Cognitives – Marc Jeannerod, Bron, FR
- Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9193 – SCALab – Sciences Cognitives et Sciences Affectives, Lille, FR
| |
Collapse
|