The production and detection of deception in an interactive game

Preschoolers' deception related to prefrontal cortex activation: An fNIRS study

Deception is an essential part of children's moral development. Previous developmental studies have shown that children start to deceive at the age of 3 years, and as age increased to 5 years, almost all children were able to deceive for their own benefit. Although behavioral studies have indicated that the emergence and development of deception are related to cognitive abilities, their neural correlates remain poorly understood. Therefore, the present study examined the neural correlates underlying deception in preschool-aged children (N = 89, 44 % boys, age 3.13 to 5.96 years, Han Chinese) using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. A modified hide-and-seek paradigm was applied to elicit deceptive and truth-telling behaviors. The results showed that activation of bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was positively associated with the tendency to deceive an opponent in a competitive game in the 3-year-olds. In addition, 3-year-olds who showed a high tendency to deceive showed the same brain activation in the frontopolar area as 5-year-olds did when engaged in deception, whereas no such effect was found in 3-year-olds who never engaged in deception. These findings underscore the link between preschoolers' deception and prefrontal cortex function.

Altered neural mechanisms of deception in individuals with autistic traits

A successful deception involves making a decision, acting on it, and evaluating results. Here, we investigated deception in a non-clinical sample (n = 36) with varying autism traits using a coin-toss paradigm of active deception. The subjects were asked to react to the instructions by clicking one of the two boxes that could mislead their opponents, followed by feedback on their success or failure. During this reaction, their EEG activity was recorded, and the results suggested that people with high autistic traits exhibited longer reaction times and lower amplitude of P3 in the decision-making stage compared to individuals with low autistic traits. The feedback evaluation stage in the high autistic trait group elicited lower amplitude of FRN and P3. Overall, these results indicated that people with high autistic traits experienced difficulties in deceiving, which could be related to atypical neural mechanisms.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

Effects of Online Single Pulse Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation on Prefrontal and Parietal Cortices in Deceptive Processing: A Preliminary Study

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to test the functional role of parietal and prefrontal cortical regions activated during a playing card Guilty Knowledge Task (GKT). Single-pulse TMS was applied to 15 healthy volunteers at each of three target sites: left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and midline parietal cortex. TMS pulses were applied at each of five latencies (from 0 to 480 ms) after the onset of a card stimulus. TMS applied to the parietal cortex exerted a latency-specific increase in inverse efficiency score and in reaction time when subjects were instructed to lie relative to when asked to respond with the truth, and this effect was specific to when TMS was applied at 240 ms after stimulus onset. No effects of TMS were detected at left or right DLPFC sites. This manipulation with TMS of performance in a deception task appears to support a critical role for the parietal cortex in intentional false responding, particularly in stimulus selection processes needed to execute a deceptive response in the context of a GKT. However, this interpretation is only preliminary, as further experiments are needed to compare performance within and outside of a deceptive context to clarify the effects of deceptive intent.

Speech timing cues reveal deceptive speech in social deduction board games

The faculty of language allows humans to state falsehoods in their choice of words. However, while what is said might easily uphold a lie, how it is said may reveal deception. Hence, some features of the voice that are difficult for liars to control may keep speech mostly, if not always, honest. Previous research has identified that speech timing and voice pitch cues can predict the truthfulness of speech, but this evidence has come primarily from laboratory experiments, which sacrifice ecological validity for experimental control. We obtained ecologically valid recordings of deceptive speech while observing natural utterances from players of a popular social deduction board game, in which players are assigned roles that either induce honest or dishonest interactions. When speakers chose to lie, they were prone to longer and more frequent pauses in their speech. This finding is in line with theoretical predictions that lying is more cognitively demanding. However, lying was not reliably associated with vocal pitch. This contradicts predictions that increased physiological arousal from lying might increase muscular tension in the larynx, but is consistent with human specialisations that grant Homo sapiens sapiens an unusual degree of control over the voice relative to other primates. The present study demonstrates the utility of social deduction board games as a means of making naturalistic observations of human behaviour from semi-structured social interactions.

Functional Interactions Between Neural Substrates of Socio-cognitive Mechanisms Involved in Simple Deception and Manipulative Truth

Introduction: Deceptive intentions may be realized by imparting false (simple deception) or true (manipulative truth) information. Both forms of deception require inferring others' thoughts and are underpinned by the theory of mind (TOM) neural system. Manipulative truth is thought to more strongly recruit these processes. However, the organization of functional interactions underlying simple deception and manipulative truth remains unclear. Materials and Methods: We performed psychophysiological interaction analysis for a key node in the TOM system, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), using functional MRI data obtained from 23 volunteers (14 men and 9 women, age range 18-45 years) during the sender-receiver game. During the game, participants sent true, simple deceptive, or manipulative truthful messages to another player according to their own choice. A Bayesian approach to statistics was employed to perform statistical inference and define voxels with significant changes in functional interactions. Results: We observed functional interactions between nodes of the TOM system (bilateral TPJ, left precuneus, left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and right superior temporal sulcus) characterizing both forms of deception. We identified an increment in functional interactions of the rTPJ with the left TPJ (lTPJ) and right precuneus associated with manipulative truth. Furthermore, we demonstrated that a higher rate of manipulative truthful actions was associated with weaker functional interactions between the rTPJ and lTPJ, left precuneus, and left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Discussion: Compared with simple deception, manipulative truth is associated with a higher demand for socio-cognitive processes that contributes to the cognitive load of this form of deception.

The role of anterior prefrontal cortex (area 10) in face-to-face deception measured with fNIRS

Anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC, Brodmann area 10) activations are often, but not always, found in neuroimaging studies investigating deception, and the precise role of this area remains unclear. To explore the role of the PFC in face-to-face deception, we invited pairs of participants to play a card game involving lying and lie detection while we used functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to record brain activity in the PFC. Participants could win points for successfully lying about the value of their cards or for detecting lies. We contrasted patterns of brain activation when the participants either told the truth or lied, when they were either forced into this or did so voluntarily and when they either succeeded or failed to detect a lie. Activation in the anterior PFC was found in both lie production and detection, unrelated to reward. Analysis of cross-brain activation patterns between participants identified areas of the PFC where the lead player’s brain activity synchronized their partner’s later brain activity. These results suggest that during situations that involve close interpersonal interaction, the anterior PFC supports processing widely involved in deception, possibly relating to the demands of monitoring one’s own and other people’s behaviour.

What Deception Tasks Used in the Lab Really Do: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Ecological Validity of fMRI Deception Tasks

Interpretation of the neural findings of deception without considering the ecological validity of the experimental tasks could lead to biased conclusions. In this study we classified the experimental tasks according to their inclusion of three essential components required for ecological validity: intention to lie, social interaction and motivation. First, we carried out a systematic review to categorize fMRI deception tasks and to weigh the degree of ecological validity of each one. Second, we performed a meta-analysis to identify if each type of task involves a different neural substrate and to distinguish the neurocognitive contribution of each component of ecological validity essential to deception. We detected six categories of deception tasks. Intention to lie was the component least frequently included, followed by social interaction. Monetary reward was the most frequent motivator. The results of the meta-analysis, including 59 contrasts, revealed that intention to lie is associated with activation in the left lateral occipital cortex (superior division) whereas the left angular gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are engaged during lying under instructions. Additionally, the right IFG appears to participate in the social aspect of lying including simulated and real interactions. We found no effect of monetary reward in our analysis. Finally, tasks with high ecological validity recruited fewer brain areas (right insular cortex and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) compared to less ecological tasks, perhaps because they are more natural and realistic, and engage a wide network of brain mechanisms, as opposed to specific tasks that demand more centralized processes.

The Good, the Bad, and the Clever: Faking Ability as a Socio-Emotional Ability?

Socio-emotional abilities have been proposed as an extension to models of intelligence, but earlier measurement approaches have either not fulfilled criteria of ability measurement or have covered only predominantly receptive abilities. We argue that faking ability-the ability to adjust responses on questionnaires to present oneself in a desired manner-is a socio-emotional ability that can broaden our understanding of these abilities and intelligence in general. To test this theory, we developed new instruments to measure the ability to fake bad (malingering) and administered them jointly with established tests of faking good ability in a general sample of n = 134. Participants also completed multiple tests of emotion perception along with tests of emotion expression posing, pain expression regulation, and working memory capacity. We found that individual differences in faking ability tests are best explained by a general factor that had a large correlation with receptive socio-emotional abilities and had a zero to medium-sized correlation with different productive socio-emotional abilities. All correlations were still small after controlling these effects for shared variance with general mental ability as indicated by tests of working memory capacity. We conclude that faking ability is indeed correlated meaningfully with other socio-emotional abilities and discuss the implications for intelligence research and applied ability assessment.

Neural correlates of spontaneous deception in a non-competitive interpersonal scenario: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study

This study aims to examine neural correlates of spontaneous deception in a non-competitive interpersonal situation, and the difference in neural correlates between spontaneous deception and instructed deception using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). We used a modified poker game in which participants freely decided whether sending a piece of truthful/deceptive information to other participants. In the instructed session, participants sent truthful/deceptive information per the instructions. In this non-competitive interpersonal situation in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), deception produced higher neural activities than truth-telling. In addition, spontaneous deception exhibited higher neural activities than instructed deception in the frontopolar area, DLPFC, and frontal eye fields. Spontaneous truth-telling produced higher neural activities than instructed truth-telling in frontal eye fields and frontopolar area. This study provides evidence about neural correlates of spontaneous deception during non-competitive interpersonal scenarios and the difference between spontaneous deception and instructed deception.

The Role of Reward System in Dishonest Behavior: A Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Study

Previous studies showed that the cortical reward system plays an important role in deceptive behavior. However, how the reward system activates during the whole course of dishonest behavior and how it affects dishonest decisions remain unclear. The current study investigated these questions. One hundred and two participants were included in the final analysis. They completed two tasks: monetary incentive delay (MID) task and an honesty task. The MID task served as the localizer task and the honesty task was used to measure participants' deceptive behaviors. Participants' spontaneous responses in the honesty task were categorized into three conditions: Correct-Truth condition (tell the truth after guessing correctly), Incorrect-Truth condition (tell the truth after guessing incorrectly), and Incorrect-Lie condition (tell lies after guessing incorrectly). To reduce contamination from neighboring functional regions as well as to increase sensitivity to small effects (Powell et al., Devel Sci 21:e12595, 2018), we adopted the individual functional channel of interest (fCOI) approach to analyze the data. Specially, we identified the channels of interest in the MID task in individual participants and then applied them to the honesty task. The result suggested that the reward system showed different activation patterns during different phases: In the pre-decision phase, the reward system was activated with the winning of the reward. During the decision and feedback phase, the reward system was activated when people made the decisions to be dishonest and when they evaluated the outcome of their decisions. Furthermore, the result showed that neural activity of the reward system toward the outcome of their decision was related to subsequent dishonest behaviors. Thus, the present study confirmed the important role of the reward system in deception. These results can also shed light on how one could use neuroimaging techniques to perform lie-detection.

Contribution of self- and other-regarding motives to (dis)honesty

Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes-valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.

Neural mechanisms of deception in a social context: an fMRI replication study

Deception is a form of manipulation aimed at misleading another person by conveying false or truthful messages. Manipulative truthful statements could be considered as sophisticated deception and elicit an increased cognitive load. However, only one fMRI study reported its neural correlates. To provide independent evidence for sophisticated deception, we carried out an fMRI study replicating the experimental paradigm and Bayesian statistical approach utilized in that study. During the experiment, participants played a game against an opponent by sending deliberate deceptive or honest messages. Compared to truth-telling, deceptive intentions, regardless of how they were fulfilled, were associated with increased BOLD signals in the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left precuneus, and right superior temporal sulcus (STS). The right TPJ participates in the attribution of mental states, acting in a social context, and moral behaviour. Moreover, the other revealed brain areas have been considered nodes in the theory of mind brain neural system. Therefore, the obtained results reflect an increased demand for socio‑cognitive processes associated with deceptive intentions. We replicated the original study showing the involvement of the right TPJ and expanded upon it by revealing the involvement of the left TPJ, left precuneus and right STS in actions with deceptive intentions.

I lie, why don't you: Neural mechanisms of individual differences in self-serving lying

People tend to lie in varying degrees. To advance our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms of this heterogeneity, we investigated individual differences in self-serving lying. We performed a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in 37 participants and introduced a color-reporting game where lying about the color would in general lead to higher monetary payoffs but would also be punished if get caught. At the behavioral level, individuals lied to different extents. Besides, individuals who are more dishonest showed shorter lying response time, whereas no significant correlation was found between truth-telling response time and the degree of dishonesty. At the neural level, the left caudate, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) were key regions reflecting individual differences in making dishonest decisions. The dishonesty associated activity in these regions decreased with increased dishonesty. Subsequent generalized psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that individual differences in self-serving lying were associated with the functional connectivity among the caudate, vmPFC, IFG, and dlPFC. More importantly, regardless of the decision types, the neural patterns of the left caudate and vmPFC during the decision-making phase could be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty. The present study demonstrated that lying decisions differ substantially from person to person in the functional connectivity and neural activation patterns which can be used to predict individual degrees of dishonesty.

Cues to Lying May be Deceptive: Speaker and Listener Behaviour in an Interactive Game of Deception

Are the cues that speakers produce when lying the same cues that listeners attend to when attempting to detect deceit? We used a two-person interactive game to explore the production and perception of speech and nonverbal cues to lying. In each game turn, participants viewed pairs of images, with the location of some treasure indicated to the speaker but not to the listener. The speaker described the location of the treasure, with the objective of misleading the listener about its true location; the listener attempted to locate the treasure, based on their judgement of the speaker’s veracity. In line with previous comprehension research, listeners’ responses suggest that they attend primarily to behaviours associated with increased mental difficulty, perhaps because lying, under a cognitive hypothesis, is thought to cause an increased cognitive load. Moreover, a mouse-tracking analysis suggests that these judgements are made quickly, while the speakers’ utterances are still unfolding. However, there is a surprising mismatch between listeners and speakers: When producing false statements, speakers are less likely to produce the cues that listeners associate with lying. This production pattern is in keeping with an attempted control hypothesis, whereby liars may take into account listeners’ expectations and correspondingly manipulate their behaviour to avoid detection.

Telling a truth to deceive: Examining executive control and reward-related processes underlying interpersonal deception

Does deception necessarily involve false statements that are incompatible with the truth? In some cases, people choose truthful statements in order to mislead others. This type of deception has been investigated less. The current study employed event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neurocognitive processes when both truthful and false statements were used to deceive others. We focused our ERP analysis on two stages: a decision making stage during which participants decided whether to tell a false or a truthful statement, and an outcome evaluation stage during which participants evaluated whether their deception had succeeded or not. Results showed that in the decision making stage, intentions to deceive elicited larger N200s and smaller P300s than an honest control condition. During the outcome evaluation stage, success/failure feedback in the deception condition elicited larger Reward positivity (RewP) and feedback-P300 than feedback after honest responses. Importantly, whether participants chose to tell false or true statements, did not further modulate executive control or reward-related processes. Taken together, these results suggest that during interpersonal deception, having deceptive intentions engages executive control and reward-related processes regardless of the veracity of statements.

Accuracy, Confidence, and Experiential Criteria for Lie Detection Through a Videotaped Interview

An individual's ability to discriminate lies from truth is far from accurate, and is poorly related to an individual's confidence in his/her detection. Both law enforcement and non-professional interviewers base their evaluations of truthfulness on experiential criteria, including emotional and expressive features, cognitive complexity, and paraverbal aspects of interviewees' reports. The current experimental study adopted two perspectives of investigation: the first is aimed at assessing the ability of naïve judges to detect lies/truth by watching a videotaped interview; the second takes into account the interviewee's detectability as a liar or as telling the truth by a sample of judges. Additionally, this study is intended to evaluate the criteria adopted to support lie/truth detection and relate them with accuracy and confidence of detection. Results showed that judges' detection ability was moderately accurate and associated with a moderate individual sense of confidence, with a slightly better accuracy for truth detection than for lie detection. Detection accuracy appeared to be negatively associated with detection confidence when the interviewee was a liar, and positively associated when the interviewee was a truth-teller. Furthermore, judges were found to support lie detection through criteria concerning emotional features, and to sustain truth detection by taking into account the cognitive complexity and the paucity of expressive manifestations related with the interviewee's report. The present findings have implications for the judicial decision on witnesses' credibility.

Deceptive but Not Honest Manipulative Actions Are Associated with Increased Interaction between Middle and Inferior Frontal gyri

The prefrontal cortex is believed to be responsible for execution of deceptive behavior and its involvement is associated with greater cognitive efforts. It is also generally assumed that deception is associated with the inhibition of default honest actions. However, the precise neurophysiological mechanisms underlying this process remain largely unknown. The present study was aimed to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal the underlying functional integration within the prefrontal cortex during the task which requires that subjects to deliberately mislead an opponent through the sequential execution of deceptive and honest claims. To address this issue, we performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis, which allows for statistical assessment of changes in functional relationships between active brain areas in changing psychological contexts. As a result the whole brain PPI-analysis established that both manipulative honest and deceptive claiming were associated with an increase in connectivity between the left middle frontal gyrus and right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Taking into account the role played by rTPJ in processes associated with the theory of mind the revealed data can reflect possible influence of socio-cognitive context on the process of selecting manipulative claiming regardless their honest or deceptive nature. Direct comparison between deceptive and honest claims revealed pattern enhancement of coupling between the left middle frontal gyrus and the left inferior frontal gyrus. This finding provided evidence that the execution of deception relies to a greater extent on higher-order hierarchically-organized brain mechanisms of executive control required to select between two competing deceptive or honest task sets.

Unfolding the Spatial and Temporal Neural Processing of Making Dishonest Choices

To understand the neural processing that underpins dishonest behavior in an economic exchange game task, this study employed both functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) methodologies to examine the neural conditions of 25 participants while they were making either dishonest or honest choices. It was discovered that dishonest choices, contrary to honest choices, elicited stronger fMRI activations in bilateral striatum and anterior insula. It also induced fluctuations in ERP amplitudes within two time windows, which are 270–30 milliseconds before and 110–290 milliseconds after the response, respectively. Importantly, when making either dishonest or honest choices, human and computer counterparts were associated with distinct fMRI activations in the left insula and different ERP amplitudes at medial and right central sites from 80 milliseconds before to 250 milliseconds after the response. These results support the hypothesis that there would be distinct neural processing during making dishonest decisions, especially when the subject considers the interests of the counterpart. Furthermore, the fMRI and ERP findings, together with ERP source reconstruction, clearly delineate the temporal sequence of the neural processes of a dishonest decision: the striatum is activated before response, then the left insula is involved around the time of response, and finally the thalamus is activated after response.

Executive control- and reward-related neural processes associated with the opportunity to engage in voluntary dishonest moral decision making

Research has begun to examine the neurocognitive processes underlying voluntary moral decision making, which involves engaging in honest or dishonest behavior in a setting in which the individual is free to make his or her own moral decisions. Employing event-related potentials, we measured executive control-related and reward-related neural processes during an incentivized coin-guessing task in which participants had the opportunity to voluntarily engage in dishonest behavior, by overreporting their wins to maximize earnings. We report four primary findings: First, the opportunity to deceive recruited executive control processes involving conflict monitoring and conflict resolution, as evidenced by a higher N2 and a smaller P3. Second, processing the outcome of the coin flips engaged reward-related processes, as evidenced by a larger medial feedback negativity (MFN) for incorrect (loss) than for correct (win) guesses, reflecting a reward prediction error signal. Third, elevated executive control-related neural activity reflecting conflict resolution (i.e., an attenuated executive control P3) predicted a greater likelihood of engaging in overall deceptive behavior. Finally, whereas elevated reward-related neural activity (the reward P3) was associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in overall deceptive behavior, an elevated reward prediction error signal (MFN difference score) predicted increased trial-by-trial moral behavioral adjustment (i.e., a greater likelihood to overreport wins following a previous honest loss than following a previous honest win trial). Collectively, these findings suggest that both executive control- and reward-related neural processes are implicated in moral decision making.

Explicit Instructions Increase Cognitive Costs of Deception in Predictable Social Context

Convincing participants to deceive remains one of the biggest and most important challenges of laboratory-based deception research. The simplest and most prevalent method involves explicitly instructing participants to lie or tell the truth before presenting each task item. The usual finding of such experiments is increased cognitive load associated with deceptive responses, explained by necessity to inhibit default and automatic honest responses. However, explicit instructions are usually coupled with the absence of social context in the experimental task. Context plays a key role in social cognition by activating prior knowledge, which facilitates behaviors consistent with the latter. We hypothesized that in the presence of social context, both honest and deceptive responses can be produced on the basis of prior knowledge, without reliance on truth and without additional cognitive load during deceptive responses. In order to test the hypothesis, we have developed Speed-Dating Task (SDT), which is based on a real-life social event. In SDT, participants respond both honestly and deceptively to questions in order to appear similar to each of the dates. The dates are predictable and represent well-known categories (i.e., atheist or conservative). In one condition participants rely on explicit instructions preceding each question (external cue). In the second condition no explicit instructions are present, so the participants need to adapt based on prior knowledge about the category the dates belong to (internal cue). With internal cues, reaction times (RTs) are similar for both honest and deceptive responses. However, in the presence of external cues (EC), RTs are longer for deceptive than honest responses, suggesting that deceptive responses are associated with increased cognitive load. Compared to internal cues, deception costs were higher when EC were present. However, the effect was limited to the first part of the experiment, only partially confirming our initial hypothesis. The results suggest that the presence of social context in deception tasks might have a significant influence on cognitive processes associated with deception.

Being asked to tell an unpleasant truth about another person activates anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex

"Truth" has been used as a baseline condition in several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of deception. However, like deception, telling the truth is an inherently social construct, which requires consideration of another person's mental state, a phenomenon known as Theory of Mind. Using a novel ecological paradigm, we examined blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses during social and simple truth telling. Participants (n = 27) were randomly divided into two competing teams. Post-competition, each participant was scanned while evaluating performances from in-group and out-group members. Participants were asked to be honest and were told that their evaluations would be made public. We found increased BOLD responses in the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior insula and precuneus when participants were asked to tell social truths compared to simple truths about another person. At the behavioral level, participants were slower at responding to social compared to simple questions about another person. These findings suggest that telling the truth is a nuanced cognitive operation that is dependent on the degree of mentalizing. Importantly, we show that the cortical regions engaged by truth telling show a distinct pattern when the task requires social reasoning.

The neural basis of deception in strategic interactions

Communication based on informational asymmetries abounds in politics, business, and almost any other form of social interaction. Informational asymmetries may create incentives for the better-informed party to exploit her advantage by misrepresenting information. Using a game-theoretic setting, we investigate the neural basis of deception in human interaction. Unlike in most previous fMRI research on deception, the participants decide themselves whether to lie or not. We find activation within the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the (pre)cuneus (CUN), and the anterior frontal gyrus (aFG) when contrasting lying with truth telling. Notably, our design also allows for an investigation of the neural foundations of sophisticated deception through telling the truth-when the sender does not expect the receiver to believe her (true) message. Sophisticated deception triggers activation within the same network as plain lies, i.e., we find activity within the rTPJ, the CUN, and aFG. We take this result to show that brain activation can reveal the sender's veridical intention to deceive others, irrespective of whether in fact the sender utters the factual truth or not.

Deception rate in a "lying game": different effects of excitatory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation of right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex not found with inhibitory stimulation

Knowing the brain processes involved in lying is the key point in today's deception detection studies. We have previously found that stimulating the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) affects the rate of spontaneous lying in simple behavioural tasks. The main idea of this study was to examine the role of rTMS applied to the DLPFC in the behavioural conditions where subjects were better motivated to lie compared to our earlier studies and where all possible conditions (inhibition of left and right DLPFC with 1-Hz and sham; excitation of left and right DLPFC with 10-Hz and sham) were administered to the same subjects. It was expected that excitation of the left DLPFC with rTMS decreases and excitation of the right DLPFC increases the rate of lying and that inhibitory stimulation reverses the effects. As was expected, excitation of the left DLPFC decreased lying compared to excitation of the right DLPFC, but contrary to the expectation, inhibition had no different effects. These findings suggest that propensity to lie can be manipulated by non-invasive excitatory brain stimulation by TMS targeted at DLPFC and the direction of the effect depends on the cortical target locus.

The motor cost of telling lies: electrocortical signatures and personality foundations of spontaneous deception

Although universal, lying is generally considered immoral behavior. Most neuroscience studies on lying sanction or instruct deceptive behaviors and thus might fail to acknowledge the significance of lie-related moral conflicts. By combining electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings with a novel paradigm in which participants decided freely whether to deceive another person, we have generated indices of the cognitive (reaction times and stimulus-locked event-related components) and moral (readiness potential and its correlations with deception-related personality traits) cost of spontaneous deception. Our data fail to support the consensus that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth telling, suggesting that spontaneous deception, as opposed to lying out of requirement, might not mandate additional cognitive workload. Interestingly, lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an event-related potential (ERP) component that is linked to motor preparation of self-determined actions and modulated when we face moral dilemmas. Notably, this reduction was less extensive in manipulative participants and greater in those who cared highly about their impression management. Our study expands on previous findings on deception by associating a cortical marker of reduced preparation to act with individual differences in moral cognition.

The neural basis of dishonest decisions that serve to harm or help the target

We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms of harmful and helpful dishonest decisions. During scanning, the subjects read scenarios concerning events that could occur in real-life situations and were asked to decide whether to tell a lie as though they were experiencing those events. Half of the scenarios consisted of harmful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as bad lies, and the other half consisted of helpful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as good lies. In contrast to the control decision-making task, we found that the decision-making tasks that involved honesty or dishonesty recruited a network of brain regions that included the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In the harmful stories, the right temporoparietal junction and the right medial frontal cortex were activated when the subjects made dishonest decisions compared with honest decisions. No region discriminated between the honest and dishonest decisions made in the helpful stories. These preliminary findings suggest that the neural basis of dishonest decisions is modulated by whether the lying serves to harm or help the target.

Using fMRI to decode true thoughts independent of intention to conceal

Multi-variate pattern analysis (MVPA) applied to BOLD-fMRI has proven successful at decoding complicated fMRI signal patterns associated with a variety of cognitive processes. One cognitive process, not yet investigated, is the mental representation of "Yes/No" thoughts that precede the actual overt response to a binary "Yes/No" question. In this study, we focus on examining: (1) whether spatial patterns of the hemodynamic response carry sufficient information to allow reliable decoding of "Yes/No" thoughts; and (2) whether decoding of "Yes/No" thoughts is independent of the intention to respond honestly or dishonestly. To achieve this goal, we conducted two separate experiments. Experiment 1, collected on a 3T scanner, examined the whole brain to identify regions that carry sufficient information to permit significantly above-chance prediction of "Yes/No" thoughts at the group level. In Experiment 2, collected on a 7T scanner, we focused on the regions identified in Experiment 1 to examine the capability of achieving high decoding accuracy at the single subject level. A set of regions--namely right superior temporal gyrus, left supra-marginal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus--exhibited high decoding power. Decoding accuracy for these regions increased with trial averaging. When 18 trials were averaged, the median accuracies were 82.5%, 77.5%, and 79.5%, respectively. When trials were separated according to deceptive intentions (set via experimental cues), and classifiers were trained on honest trials, but tested on trials where subjects were asked to deceive, the median accuracies of these regions still reached 66%, 75%, and 78.5%. These results provide evidence that concealed "Yes/No" thoughts are encoded in the BOLD signal, retaining some level of independence from the subject's intentions to answer honestly or dishonestly. These findings also suggest the theoretical possibility for more efficient brain-computer interfaces where subjects only need to think their answers to communicate.

Mind Reading Using Neuroimaging

Traditional lie detection tools, such as the polygraph, voice stress analysis, or special interrogation techniques, rely on behavioral or psychophysiological manifestations of deception. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, the question emerged whether it would be possible to directly identify deceit in the part of the body where it is generated: the brain. After a few promising studies, these techniques became soon commercially available and there have been attempts to use such results in the court in recent years. The current article reviews the development of neuroimaging techniques in the field of deception detection and critically discusses the potential but also the shortcomings of such methods. Unfortunately, the majority of research in this field was rather unsystematic and neglected the accumulated knowledge regarding methodological pitfalls that were extensively discussed in the scientific community in conjunction with the polygraph. Therefore, neuroimaging studies on deception largely differ with respect to the experimental paradigm (the interrogation technique), the methods for analyzing the data, and the procedures to obtain individual diagnoses. Moreover, most studies used artificial laboratory settings that differ considerably from real-life applications. As a consequence, neuroimaging techniques are not applicable for detecting deception in individual field cases at the moment. However, recent advantages such as multivariate pattern analysis might yield novel neuroimaging applications in the near future that are capable of improving established techniques for detecting deception or concealed knowledge.

Possible role of an error detection mechanism in brain processing of deception: PET-fMRI study

To investigate brain maintenance of deliberate deception the positron emission tomography and the event related functional MRI studies were performed. We used an experimental paradigm that presupposed free choices between equally beneficial deceptive or honest actions. Experimental task simulated the "Cheat" card game which aims to defeat an opponent by sequential deceptive and honest claims. Results of both the PET and the fMRI studies revealed that execution of both deliberately deceptive and honest claims is associated with fronto-parietal brain network comprised of inferior and middle frontal gyri, precentral gyrus (BA 6), caudate nucleus, and inferior parietal lobule. Direct comparison between those claims, balanced in terms of decision making and action outcome (gain and losses), revealed activation of areas specifically associated with deception execution: precentral gyrus (BA 6), caudate nuclei, thalamus and inferior parietal lobule (BA 39/40). The obtained experimental data were discussed in relation to a possible role of an error detection system in processing deliberate deception.

Prospects of functional magnetic resonance imaging as lie detector

Following the demise of the polygraph, supporters of assisted scientific lie detection tools have enthusiastically appropriated neuroimaging technologies "as the savior of scientifically verifiable lie detection in the courtroom" (Gerard, 2008: 5). These proponents believe the future impact of neuroscience "will be inevitable, dramatic, and will fundamentally alter the way the law does business" (Erickson, 2010: 29); however, such enthusiasm may prove premature. For in nearly every article published by independent researchers in peer reviewed journals, the respective authors acknowledge that fMRI research, processes, and technology are insufficiently developed and understood for gatekeepers to even consider introducing these neuroimaging measures into criminal courts as they stand today for the purpose of determining the veracity of statements made. Regardless of how favorable their analyses of fMRI or its future potential, they all acknowledge the presence of issues yet to be resolved. Even assuming a future where these issues are resolved and an appropriate fMRI lie-detection process is developed, its integration into criminal trials is not assured for the very success of such a future system may necessitate its exclusion from courtrooms on the basis of existing legal and ethical prohibitions. In this piece, aimed for a multidisciplinary readership, we seek to highlight and bring together the multitude of hurdles which would need to be successfully overcome before fMRI can (if ever) be a viable applied lie detection system. We argue that the current status of fMRI studies on lie detection meets neither basic legal nor scientific standards. We identify four general classes of hurdles (scientific, legal and ethical, operational, and social) and provide an overview on the stages and operations involved in fMRI studies, as well as the difficulties of translating these laboratory protocols into a practical criminal justice environment. It is our overall conclusion that fMRI is unlikely to constitute a viable lie detector for criminal courts.

Who is honest and why: baseline activation in anterior insula predicts inter-individual differences in deceptive behavior

Humans engage in deceptive behavior that negatively affects others. The propensity to deceive is, however, characterized by vast inter-individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. Attempts to investigate the origins of this heterogeneity have so far mainly relied on subjective measures and have shown little predictive power. Here, we used resting electroencephalography to measure objective and stable individual differences in neural baseline activation in combination with an ecologically valid deception paradigm. Results showed that task-independent baseline activation in the anterior insula, a brain area implicated in mapping internal bodily states and in representing emotional arousal and conscious feelings, predicts individuals' propensity for deceptive behavior. The higher the neural baseline activation in this area is, the lower individuals' propensity to deceive. Moreover, results provide evidence that high baseline activation in the anterior insula is associated with negative affect and dispositional tendencies to avoid aversive emotional situations. These results provide converging neural and psychological evidence that individuals might avoid a deceptive act due to a highly active negative emotional system which would make a deceptive act too stressful and bothersome.

When Pinocchio's nose does not grow: belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception

Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true) claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

Sex, lies and fMRI--gender differences in neural basis of deception

Deception has always been a part of human communication as it helps to promote self-presentation. Although both men and women are equally prone to try to manage their appearance, their strategies, motivation and eagerness may be different. Here, we asked if lying could be influenced by gender on both the behavioral and neural levels. To test whether the hypothesized gender differences in brain activity related to deceptive responses were caused by differential socialization in men and women, we administered the Gender Identity Inventory probing the participants’ subjective social sex role. In an fMRI session, participants were instructed either to lie or to tell the truth while answering a questionnaire focusing on general and personal information. Only for personal information, we found differences in neural responses during instructed deception in men and women. The women vs. men direct contrast revealed no significant differences in areas of activation, but men showed higher BOLD signal compared to women in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Moreover, this effect remained unchanged when self-reported psychological gender was controlled for. Thus, our study showed that gender differences in the neural processes engaged during falsifying personal information might be independent from socialization.

A distinct role of the temporal-parietal junction in predicting socially guided decisions

To make adaptive decisions in a social context, humans must identify relevant agents in the environment, infer their underlying strategies and motivations, and predict their upcoming actions. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging, in conjunction with combinatorial multivariate pattern analysis, to predict human participants' subsequent decisions in an incentive-compatible poker game. We found that signals from the temporal-parietal junction provided unique information about the nature of the upcoming decision, and that information was specific to decisions against agents who were both social and relevant for future behavior.

What if I Get Busted? Deception, Choice, and Decision-Making in Social Interaction

Deception is an essentially social act, yet little is known about how social consequences affect the decision to deceive. In this study, participants played a computerized game of deception without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent. Participants were questioned by an opponent outside the scanner about their knowledge of the content of a display. Importantly, questions were posed so that, in some conditions, it was possible to be deceptive, while in other conditions it was not. To simulate a realistic interaction, participants could be confronted about their claims by the opponent. This design, therefore, creates a context in which a deceptive participant runs the risk of being punished if their deception is detected. Our results show that participants were slower to give honest than to give deceptive responses when they knew more about the display and could use this knowledge for their own benefit. The condition in which confrontation was not possible was associated with increased activity in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. The processing of a question which allows a deceptive response was associated with activation in right caudate and inferior frontal gyrus. Our findings suggest the decision to deceive is affected by the potential risk of social confrontation rather than the claim itself.

Situational and dispositional determinants of intentional deceiving

Does opportunity make the thief or are people dispositionally prone to deceive? The interaction between personality and the circumstances surrounding deception is crucial to understand what promotes dishonesty in our society. Due to its inherent spontaneity and sociality, deceptive behaviour may be hardly reproducible in experimental settings. We developed a novel paradigm in the form of an interactive game where participants can choose whether to lie to another person in situations of loss vs. gain, and of no-reputation-risk vs. reputation-risk linked to the disclosure of their deceptive behaviour to others. Thus, our ecological paradigm allowed subjects to spontaneously decide when to lie and face the challenge of deceiving others. In the case of loss, participants lied to reverse the outcome in their favour. Deception was lower in the reputation-risk condition where personality traits concerning social interactions also played an important role. The results suggest that deception is definitely promoted by unfavourable events, and that maintaining one's own reputation encourages honesty, particularly in socially inclined individuals.

How the brain shapes deception: an integrated review of the literature

How do people tell a lie? One useful approach to addressing this question is to elucidate the neural substrates for deception. Recent conceptual and technical advances in functional neuroimaging have enabled exploration of the psychology of deception more precisely in terms of the specific neuroanatomical mechanisms involved. A growing body of evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in deception, and some researchers have recently emphasized the importance of other brain regions, such as those responsible for emotion and reward. However, it is still unclear how these regions play a role in making effective decisions to tell a lie. To provide a framework for considering this issue, the present article reviews current accomplishments in the study of the neural basis of deception. First, evolutionary and developmental perspectives are provided to better understand how and when people can make use of deception. The ensuing section introduces several findings on pathological lying and its neural correlate. Next, recent findings in the cognitive neuroscience of deception based on functional neuroimaging and loss-of-function studies are summarized, and possible neural mechanisms underlying deception are proposed. Finally, the priority areas of future neuroscience research-human honesty and dishonesty-are discussed.