Electrophysiological correlates of block-wise strategic adaptations to consciously and unconsciously triggered conflict

Effects of a three-week executive control training on adaptation to task difficulty and emotional interference

Intact executive functions are characterized by flexible adaptation to task requirements, while these effects are reduced in internalizing disorders. Furthermore, as executive functions play an important role in emotion regulation, deficits in executive functions may contribute to symptom generation in psychological disorders through increased emotional interference. Thus, the present study investigated transfer effects of a three-week executive control training on adaptation to task difficulty and emotional interference in healthy participants (n = 24) to further explore the training's suitability for clinical application. To assess the adaptation to task difficulty, the proportion congruency effect on behavioral data (response times, error rates) and ERP measures (N2, CRN) was assessed in a flanker task with varying frequency of incompatible trials (25%, 75%). To quantify emotional interference, flanker stimuli were superimposed on neutral or negative pictures. Replicating previous results, the training increased interference control as indexed by decreased response times and errors rates, increased N2 amplitude and decreased CRN amplitude in incompatible trials after training. Proportion congruency effects were weaker than expected and not affected by the training intervention. The training lead to a shift in the time-point of emotional interference: before training negative pictures lead to a reduction in CRN amplitude, while after training this reduction was observed for the N2. This pattern illustrates that the training leads to a change in task processing mode from predominant response-related cognitive control to predominant stimulus-related cognitive control (N2), indicating a proactive processing mode.

Cognitive control is quickly adapted to actual task requirements despite misleading context cues-Evidence from the N2, CRN, and ERN

Cognitive control is flexibly adapted to task requirements in healthy individuals. Medio-frontal negativities in the event-related potential of the electroencephalogram can serve as indicators of cognitive control. With increasing conflict frequency, stimulus-locked control, as indexed by the N2, is increased and response-locked control, as indexed by the correct-related negativity, is reduced. On the behavioral level, this shift is associated with improved conflict resolution as evident in reduced response times and error rates in incompatible trials and a reduced response time congruency effect. Cognitive control adaptation might be implemented through experience-based task sets specifying advantageous processing strategies. Here, we investigated whether the cognitive control task set will be sustained when coupled with a contextual cue, even when the initial task requirements are no longer present. A flanker task with two conflict frequency conditions (25% incompatible and 75% incompatible trials) was presented. In the training phase, the conflict frequency conditions were paired with a distinct context cue (i.e., background color). In the test phase, the previously associated cues were again presented, but conflict frequency was identical in both conditions (50% incompatible trials). Although typical cognitive control adaptation was observed in the training phase on the behavioral and event-related potentials level, this pattern was not sustained in the test phase. Thus, the present study provides further evidence that cognitive control is flexibly adapted to task requirements even in the presence of misleading cues.

Sequential Congruency Effects of Reverse Stroop Interference on Event-Related Potential Components for Go- and Nogo-Stimuli

Sequential congruency effects are observed in interference tasks, in which reaction times (RTs) are shorter for congruent stimuli preceded by congruent (cC) than incongruent stimuli (iC), and RTs are longer for incongruent stimuli preceded by congruent (cI) than incongruent stimuli (iI). These effects are interpreted as resulting from incongruent stimuli triggering attentional control in the next trial, which reduces cognitive control. This study aimed to examine sequential congruency effects on event-related potential (ERP) components for Go- and Nogo-stimuli. We used the hybrid reverse Stroop Go/Nogo task. The stimuli were Kanji characters, "" (i.e., red) and "" (i.e., blue) painted in congruent and incongruent colors. Participants responded to one of the two characters (i.e, the Go-stimulus) and stopped responding to the other character (i.e., the Nogo-stimulus). The results indicated that the Nogo-N1 was reduced by trials preceded by incongruent stimuli compared with congruent ones, suggesting that color processing was inhibited by attentional control; however, there was no reduction in the Go-N1. In addition, the Nogo-N2 amplitudes were larger for cI than iI and iC than cC. On the other hand, the Go-N2 was not modulated by sequential modulation effects, which was lower for incongruent stimuli than congruent stimuli. These results indicate that the Nogo-N2 is involved in cognitive control, whereas the Go-N2 is associated with selection processing. These findings suggest that the modulation of sequential congruency effects of N1 and N2 required the response inhibition task demand; however, Go-P3 and Nogo-P3 amplitudes were the largest for cI. Therefore, the time range of ERP components might be related to the susceptibility of an interaction effect between response inhibition task demand and sequential congruency effects.

Modality-specific neural mechanisms of cognitive control in a Stroop-like task

The successful resolution of ever-changing conflicting contexts requires efficient cognitive control. Previous studies have found similar neural patterns in conflict processing for different modalities using an event-related potential (ERP) approach and have concluded that cognitive control is supramodal. However, recent behavioral studies have found that conflict adaptation (a phenomenon with the reduction of congruency effect in the current trial after an incongruent trial as compared with a congruent trial) could not transfer across visual and auditory modalities and suggested that cognitive control is modality-specific, challenging the supramodal view. These discrepancies may have also arisen from methodological differences across studies. The current study examined the electroencephalographic profiles of a Stroop-like task to elucidate the modality-specific neural mechanisms of cognitive control. Participants were instructed to respond to a target always coming from the visual modality while disregarding the distractor coming from either the auditory or the visual modality. The results revealed significant congruency effects on both behavioral indices, i.e., reaction time and error rate, and ERP components, including the P3 and the conflict slow potential. Besides, the congruency effects on the amplitude of the P3 showed a negative correlation with reaction time, indicating an intrinsic link between these neural and behavioral indices. Furthermore, in the modality-repetition condition, conflict adaptation effects were significant on both reaction time and P3 amplitude, and the reaction time could be predicted by the P3 amplitude, while such effects were not observed in the modality-alternation condition. The time-frequency analysis also showed that conflict adaptation occurred in the modality-repetition condition, but not in the modality-alternation condition in low frequency bands, including the theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz), and beta1 (12-20 Hz) bands. Taken together, our results revealed modality-specific patterns of the conflict adaptation effects on the P3 amplitude and oscillatory power (in theta, alpha, and beta1 bands), providing neural evidence for the modality specificity of cognitive control and expanding the boundaries of cognitive control.

Learning rapidly about the relevance of visual cues requires conscious awareness

Humans have been shown to be capable of performing many cognitive tasks using information of which they are not consciously aware. This raises questions about what role consciousness actually plays in cognition. Here, we explored whether participants can learn cue-target contingencies in an attentional learning task when the cues were presented below the level of conscious awareness and how this differs from learning about conscious cues. Participants' manual (Experiment 1) and saccadic (Experiment 2) response speeds were influenced by both conscious and unconscious cues. However, participants were only able to adapt to reversals of the cue-target contingencies (Experiment 1) or changes in the reliability of the cues (Experiment 2) when consciously aware of the cues. Therefore, although visual cues can be processed unconsciously, learning about cues over a few trials requires conscious awareness of them. Finally, we discuss implications for cognitive theories of consciousness.

Temporal and spectral dynamics underlying cognitive control modulated by task-irrelevant stimulus-response learning

Behavioral and recent neuroimaging findings have shown reversal of interference effects due to manipulating proportion congruency (PC), which suggests that task-irrelevant stimulus-response (S-R) associations are strengthened and applied to predict responses. However, it is unclear how the strengthened S-R associations are represented and applied in the brain. We investigated with a between-subjects PC paradigm of the Hedge and Marsh task using electroencephalography (EEG). The behavioral results showed the reversal of the conflict effects, suggesting that task-irrelevant S-R associations were strengthened and used to prepare responses. The EEG results revealed the PC-related reversal of the conflict effects in the frontocentral N2 and parietal P3b amplitudes. Time-frequency analyses showed more pronounced PC-related reversal of the conflict effects in theta band (4-8 Hz) activity in frontocentral sites. These results suggest that the strengthened S-R associations due to PC manipulation modulated cognitive control. Importantly, the amplitude of lateralized readiness potential was higher in the high-PC condition than in the low-PC condition, suggesting that the strengthened short-term-memory spatial S-R associations that modulated cognitive control were applied similarly to long-term-memory spatial S-R associations.

Can application and transfer of strategy be observed in low visibility condition?

It has been long assumed that cognitive control processes can only be applied on consciously visible stimuli, but empirical evidence is contradictory. In the present study, we investigated strategic adaptation to conflict both in unmasked and in low-visibility masked trials. Using a paradigm derived from the Stroop task, we studied the application of strategies, but also the transfer of a strategy developed in unmasked trials to masked trials, and the trial-to-trial dynamics of strategic processing. In unmasked trials, we found evidence of strategic adaptation to conflict, both in reaction times and in ERPs (N2 and P300). In masked trials we found no evidence of behavioral adaptation to conflict, but a modulation of the P300 was present in masked trials included in unmasked blocks, suggesting the existence of a transfer of strategy. Finally, trial-to-trial analyses in unmasked trials revealed a pattern suggestive of dynamic subjective adherence to the instructed strategy.

Neural Correlates of Subjective Awareness for Natural Scene Categorization of Color Photographs and Line-Drawings

It remains controversial whether visual awareness is correlated with early activation indicated by VAN (visual awareness negativity), as the recurrent process hypothesis theory proposes, or with later activation indicated by P3 or LP (late positive), as suggested by global workspace theories. To address this issue, a backward masking task was adopted, in which participants were first asked to categorize natural scenes of color photographs and line-drawings and then to rate the clarity of their visual experience on a Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). The interstimulus interval between the scene and the mask was manipulated. The behavioral results showed that categorization accuracy increased with PAS ratings for both color photographs and line-drawings, with no difference in accuracy between the two types of images for each rating, indicating that the experience rating reflected visibility. Importantly, the event-related potential (ERP) results revealed that for correct trials, the early posterior N1 and anterior P2 components changed with the PAS ratings for color photographs, but did not vary with the PAS ratings for line-drawings, indicating that the N1 and P2 do not always correlate with subjective visual awareness. Moreover, for both types of images, the anterior N2 and posterior VAN changed with the PAS ratings in a linear way, while the LP changed with the PAS ratings in a non-linear way, suggesting that these components relate to different types of subjective awareness. The results reconcile the apparently contradictory predictions of different theories and help to resolve the current debate on neural correlates of visual awareness.

Neural signature of reward-modulated unconscious inhibitory control

Consciously initiated cognitive control is generally determined by motivational incentives (e.g., monetary reward). Recent studies have revealed that human cognitive control processes can nevertheless operate without awareness. However, whether monetary reward can impinge on unconscious cognitive control remains unclear. To clarify this issue, a task consisting of several runs was designed to combine a modified version of the reward-priming paradigm with an unconscious version of the Go/No-Go task. At the beginning of each run, participants were exposed to a high- or low-value coin, followed by the modified Go/No-Go task. Participants could earn the coin only if they responded correctly to each trial of the run. Event-related potential (ERP) results indicated that high-value rewards (vs. low-value rewards) induced a greater centro-parietal P3 component associated with conscious and unconscious inhibitory control. Moreover, the P3 amplitude correlated positively with the magnitude of reaction time slowing reflecting the intensity of activation of unconscious inhibitory control in the brain. These findings suggest that high-value reward may facilitate human higher-order inhibitory processes that are independent of conscious awareness, which provides insights into the brain processes that underpin motivational modulation of cognitive control.

Comparing the Neural Correlates of Conscious and Unconscious Conflict Control in a Masked Stroop Priming Task

Although previous studies have suggested that conflict control can occur in the absence of consciousness, the brain mechanisms underlying unconscious and conscious conflict control remain unclear. The current study used a rapid event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging design to collect data from 24 participants while they performed a masked Stroop priming task under both conscious and unconscious conditions. The results revealed that the fronto-parietal conflict network, including medial frontal cortex (MFC), left and right dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and posterior parietal cortex (PPC), was activated by both conscious and unconscious Stroop priming, even though in MFC and left DLPFC the activations elicited by unconscious Stroop priming were smaller than conscious Stroop priming. The findings provide evidence for the existence of quantitative differences between the neural substrates of conscious and unconscious conflict control.

EEG neural oscillatory dynamics reveal semantic and response conflict at difference levels of conflict awareness

Although previous work has shown that conflict can be detected in the absence of awareness, it is unknown how different sources of conflict (i.e., semantic, response) are processed in the human brain and whether these processes are differently modulated by conflict awareness. To explore this issue, we extracted oscillatory power dynamics from electroencephalographic (EEG) data recorded while human participants performed a modified version of the Stroop task. Crucially, in this task conflict awareness was manipulated by masking a conflict-inducing color word preceding a color patch target. We isolated semantic from response conflict by introducing four color words/patches, of which two were matched to the same response. We observed that both semantic as well as response conflict were associated with mid-frontal theta-band and parietal alpha-band power modulations, irrespective of the level of conflict awareness (high vs. low), although awareness of conflict increased these conflict-related power dynamics. These results show that both semantic and response conflict can be processed in the human brain and suggest that the neural oscillatory mechanisms in EEG reflect mainly "domain general" conflict processing mechanisms, instead of conflict source specific effects.

Exogenous capture of medial-frontal oscillatory mechanisms by unattended conflicting information

A long-standing debate in psychology and cognitive neuroscience concerns the way in which unattended information is processed and influences goal-directed behavior. Although selective attention allows us to filter out task-irrelevant information, there is a substantial number of unattended, yet relevant, events that must be evaluated in a flexible manner so that appropriate behaviors can succeed. Here we inspected the extent to which unattended conflicting visual information, which cannot be consciously identified, influences behavior and activates medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) mechanisms of action-monitoring and regulation, traditionally associated with conscious control processes. To that end, we performed two experiments using a novel variant of the Eriksen flanker task in which spatial attention was manipulated, preventing the conscious identification of unattended visual events. The first behavioral experiment was conducted to validate the efficacy of the novel paradigm. In the second experiment, we evaluated electrophysiological correlates of mPFC activity (a frontocentral negative ERP component and medial-frontal theta oscillations) in response to attended and unattended conflicting events. The results of both experiments demonstrated that attended and unattended conflicting stimuli altered subjects' behavior in a similar fashion, i.e. slowing down their reaction times and increasing their error rates. Importantly, the results of the EEG experiment showed that unattended conflicting stimuli, similarly to attended conflicting stimuli, led to an increase in theta-related frontocentral ERP activity and medial-frontal theta power, irrespective of the degree of conscious representation of the sources of conflict. This study provides evidence that medial-frontal theta oscillations represent a neural mechanism through which the mPFC may suppress and regulate potentially inappropriate actions that are automatically triggered by conflicting environmental stimuli to which we are oblivious.

Manipulating word awareness dissociates feed-forward from feedback models of language-perception interactions

Previous studies suggest that linguistic material can modulate visual perception, but it is unclear at which level of processing these interactions occur. Here we aim to dissociate between two competing models of language-perception interactions: a feed-forward and a feedback model. We capitalized on the fact that the models make different predictions on the role of feedback. We presented unmasked (aware) or masked (unaware) words implying motion (e.g. "rise," "fall"), directly preceding an upward or downward visual motion stimulus. Crucially, masking leaves intact feed-forward information processing from low- to high-level regions, whereas it abolishes subsequent feedback. Under this condition, participants remained faster and more accurate when the direction implied by the motion word was congruent with the direction of the visual motion stimulus. This suggests that language-perception interactions are driven by the feed-forward convergence of linguistic and perceptual information at higher-level conceptual and decision stages.