Gaze modulates non-propositional reasoning: further evidence for spatial representation of reasoning premises

Magnitude shifts spatial attention from left to right in rhesus monkeys as in the human mental number line

Humans typically represent numbers and quantities along a left-to-right continuum. Early perspectives attributed number-space association to culture; however, recent evidence in newborns and animals challenges this hypothesis. We investigate whether the length of an array of dots influences spatial bias in rhesus macaques. We designed a touch-screen task that required monkeys to remember the location of a target. At test, monkeys maintained high performance with arrays of 2, 4, 6, or 10 dots, regardless of changes in the array's location, spacing, and length. Monkeys remembered better left targets with 2-dot arrays and right targets with 6- or 10-dot arrays. Replacing the 10-dot array with a long bar, yielded more accurate performance with rightward locations, consistent with an underlying left-to-right oriented magnitude code. Our study supports the hypothesis of a spatially oriented mental magnitude line common to humans and animals, countering the idea that this code arises from uniquely human cultural learning.

The transitive inference task to study the neuronal correlates of memory-driven decision making: A monkey neurophysiology perspective

A vast amount of literature agrees that rank-ordered information as A>B>C>D>E>F is mentally represented in spatially organized schemas after learning. This organization significantly influences the process of decision-making, using the acquired premises, i.e. deciding if B is higher than D is equivalent to comparing their position in this space. The implementation of non-verbal versions of the transitive inference task has provided the basis for ascertaining that different animal species explore a mental space when deciding among hierarchically organized memories. In the present work, we reviewed several studies of transitive inference that highlighted this ability in animals and, consequently, the animal models developed to study the underlying cognitive processes and the main neural structures supporting this ability. Further, we present the literature investigating which are the underlying neuronal mechanisms. Then we discuss how non-human primates represent an excellent model for future studies, providing ideal resources for better understanding the neuronal correlates of decision-making through transitive inference tasks.

Developmental grey matter changes in superior parietal cortex accompany improved transitive reasoning

The neural basis of developmental changes in transitive reasoning in parietal regions was examined, using voxel-based morphometry. Young adolescents and adults performed a transitive reasoning task, subsequent to undergoing anatomical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scans. Behaviorally, adults reasoned more accurately than did the young adolescents. Neural results showed (i) less grey matter density in superior parietal cortex in the adults than in the young adolescents, possibly due to a developmental period of synaptic pruning; (ii) improved performance in the reasoning task was negatively correlated with grey matter density in superior parietal cortex in the adolescents, but not in the adult group; and (iii) the latter results were driven by the more difficult trials, requiring greater spatial manipulation. Taken together, the results support the idea that during development, regions in superior parietal cortex are fine-tuned, to support more robust spatial manipulation, resulting in greater accuracy and efficiency in transitive reasoning.

Interference between Space and Time Estimations: From Behavior to Neurons

Influences between time and space can be found in our daily life in which we are surrounded by numerous spatial metaphors to refer to time. For instance, when we move files from one folder to another in our computer a horizontal line that grows from left to right informs us about the elapsed and remaining time to finish the procedure and, similarly, in our communication we use several spatial terms to refer to time. Although with some differences in the degree of interference, not only space has an influence on time but both magnitudes influence each other. Indeed, since our childhood our estimations of time are influenced by space even when space should be irrelevant and the same occurs when estimating space with time as distractor. Such interference between magnitudes has also been observed in monkeys even if they do not use language or computers, suggesting that the two magnitudes are tightly coupled beyond communication and technology. Imaging and lesion studies have indicated that same brain areas are involved during the processing of both magnitudes and have suggested that rather than coding the specific magnitude itself the brain represents them as abstract concepts. Recent neurophysiological studies in prefrontal cortex, however, have shown that the coding of absolute and relative space and time in this area is realized by independent groups of neurons. Interestingly, instead, a high overlap was observed in this same area in the coding of goal choices across tasks. These results suggest that rather than during perception or estimation of space and time the interference between the two magnitudes might occur, at least in the prefrontal cortex, in a subsequent phase in which the goal has to be chosen or the response provided.

Neuronal Modulation in the Prefrontal Cortex in a Transitive Inference Task: Evidence of Neuronal Correlates of Mental Schema Management

When informed that A > B and B > C, humans and other animals can easily conclude that A > C. This remarkable trait of advanced animals, which allows them to manipulate knowledge flexibly to infer logical relations, has only recently garnered interest in mainstream neuroscience. How the brain controls these logical processes remains an unanswered question that has been merely superficially addressed in neuroimaging and lesion studies, which are unable to identify the underlying neuronal computations. We observed that the activation pattern of neurons in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) during pair comparisons in a highly demanding transitive inference task fully supports the behavioral performance of the two monkeys that we tested. Our results indicate that the PFC contributes to the construction and use of a mental schema to represent premises. This evidence provides a novel framework for understanding the function of various areas of brain in logic processes and impairments to them in degenerative, traumatic, and psychiatric pathologies.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

In cognitive neuroscience, it is unknown how information that leads to inferential deductions are encoded and manipulated at the neuronal level. We addressed this question by recording single-unit activity from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of monkeys that were performing a transitive inference (TI) task. The TI required one to choose the higher ranked of two items, based on previous, indirect experience. Our results demonstrated that single-neuron activity supports the construction of an abstract, mental schema of ordered items in solving the task and that this representation is independent of the reward value that is experienced for the single items. These findings identify the neural substrates of abstract mental representations that support inferential thinking.

Factors and processes in children's transitive deductions

Transitive tasks are important for understanding how children develop socio-cognitively. However, developmental research has been restricted largely to questions surrounding maturation. We asked 6-, 7- and 8-year-olds (N = 117) to solve a composite of five different transitive tasks. Tasks included conditions asking about item-C (associated with the marked relation) in addition to the usual case of asking only about item-A (associated with the unmarked relation). Here, children found resolving item-C much easier than resolving item-A, a finding running counter to long-standing assumptions about transitive reasoning. Considering gender perhaps for the first time, boys exhibited higher transitive scores than girls overall. Finally, analysing in the context of one recent and well-specified theory of spatial transitive reasoning, we generated the prediction that reporting the full series should be easier than deducing any one item from that series. This prediction was not upheld. We discuss amendments necessary to accommodate all our earlier findings.

The NMDAr antagonist ketamine interferes with manipulation of information for transitive inference reasoning in non-human primates

One of the most remarkable traits of highly encephalized animals is their ability to manipulate knowledge flexibly to infer logical relationships. Operationally, the corresponding cognitive process can be defined as reasoning. One hypothesis is that this process relies on the reverberating activity of glutamate neural circuits, sustained by NMDA receptor (NMDAr) mediated synaptic transmission, in both parietal and prefrontal areas. We trained two macaque monkeys to perform a form of deductive reasoning - the transitive inference task - in which they were required to learn the relationship between six adjacent items in a single session and then deduct the relationship between nonadjacent items that had not been paired in the learning phase. When the animals had learned the sequence, we administered systemically a subanaesthetic dose of ketamine (a NMDAr antagonist) and measured their performance on learned and novel problems. We observed impairments in determining the relationship between novel pairs of items. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that transitive inference premises are integrated during learning in a unified representation and that reducing NMDAr activity interferes with the use of this mental model, when decisions are required in comparing pairs of items that have not been learned.

Effects of spatial training on transitive inference performance in humans and rhesus monkeys

It is often suggested that transitive inference (TI; if A > B and B > C, then A > C) involves mentally representing overlapping pairs of stimuli in a spatial series. However, there is little direct evidence to unequivocally determine the role of spatial representation in TI. We tested whether humans and rhesus monkeys use spatial representations in TI by training them to organize 7 images in a vertical spatial array. Then, we presented subjects with a TI task using these same images. The implied TI order was either congruent or incongruent with the order of the trained spatial array. Humans in the congruent condition learned premise pairs more quickly, and were faster and more accurate in critical probe tests, suggesting that the spatial arrangement of images learned during spatial training influenced subsequent TI performance. Monkeys first trained in the congruent condition also showed higher test trial accuracy when the spatial and inferred orders were congruent. These results directly support the hypothesis that humans solve TI problems by spatial organization, and suggest that this cognitive mechanism for inference may have ancient evolutionary roots.

Cognitive mechanisms for transitive inference performance in rhesus monkeys: measuring the influence of associative strength and inferred order

If Ben is taller than Emily and Emily is taller than Dina, one can infer that Ben is taller than Dina. This process of inferring relations between stimuli based on shared relations with other stimuli is called transitive inference (TI). Many species solve TI tasks in which they learn pairs of overlapping stimulus discriminations (A+B-, B+C-, etc.) and are tested with non-adjacent novel test pairings (BD). When relations between stimuli are determined by reinforcement (A is reinforced when paired with B, B when paired with C), performance can be controlled by the associative values of individual stimuli or by logical inference. In Experiment 1 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) chose the higher ranked item on non-adjacent test trials after training on a 7-image TI task. In Experiment 2 we measured the associative values of 7 TI images and found that these values did not correlate with choice in TI tests. In Experiment 3 large experimental manipulations of the associative value of images did influence performance in some TI test pairings, but performance on other pairs was consistent with the implied order. In Experiment 4 monkeys linked two previously learned 7-item lists into one 14-item list after training with a single linking pair. Linking cannot be explained by associative values. Associative value can control choice in TI tests in at least some extreme circumstances. Implied order better explains most TI choices in monkeys, and is a more viable mechanism for TI of social dominance, which has been observed in birds and fish.