Domain interplay in mice and men: New possibilities for the “natural kinds” theory of emotion

Behavioral models in psychopathology: epistemic and semantic considerations

The use of animals in neurosciences has a long history. It is considered indispensable in areas in which “translational” research is deemed invaluable, such as behavioral pharmacology and comparative psychology. Animal models are being used in pharmacology and genetics to screen for treatment targets, and in the field of experimental psychopathology to understand the neurobehavioral underpinnings of a disorder and of its putative treatment. The centrality of behavioral models betrays the complexity of the epistemic and semantic considerations which are needed to understand what a model is. In this review, such considerations are made, and the breadth of model building and evaluation approaches is extended to include theoretical considerations on the etiology of mental disorders. This expansion is expected to help improve the validity of behavioral models and to increase their translational value. Moreover, the role of theory in improving construct validity creates the need for behavioral scientists to fully engage this process.

Developing zebrafish models of autism spectrum disorder (ASD)

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a serious neurodevelopmental disorder with complex symptoms and unclear, multi-factorial pathogenesis. Animal (rodent) models of ASD-like behavior are extensively used to study genetics, circuitry and molecular mechanisms of ASD. The evolutionarily conserved nature of social behavior and its molecular pathways suggests that alternative experimental models can be developed to complement and enhance the existing rodent ASD paradigms. The zebrafish (Danio rerio) is rapidly becoming a popular model organism in neuroscience and biological psychiatry to study brain function, model human brain disorders and explore their genetic or pharmacological modulation. Representing highly social animals, zebrafish emerge as a strong potential model organism to study normal and pathological social phenotypes, as well as several other ASD-like symptoms. Here, we discuss the developing utility of zebrafish in modeling ASD as a new emerging field in translational neuroscience and drug discovery.

The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

Don’t Give Up on Basic Emotions

We argue that there are three coherent, nontrivial notions of basic-ness: conceptual basic-ness, biological basic-ness, and psychological basic-ness. There is considerable evidence for conceptually basic emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “fear”). These categories do not designate biologically basic emotions, but some forms of anger, fear, and so on that are biologically basic in a sense we will specify. Finally, two notions of psychological basic-ness are distinguished, and the evidence for them is evaluated. The framework we offer acknowledges the force of some of the objections to basic emotion theory whilst demonstrating that the notion of a basic emotion, once properly reformulated, is still of scientific value.