Why so confident? The influence of outcome desirability on selective exposure and likelihood judgment

Toward a General Framework of Biased Reasoning: Coherence-Based Reasoning

A considerable amount of experimental research has been devoted to uncovering biased forms of reasoning. Notwithstanding the richness and overall empirical soundness of the bias research, the field can be described as disjointed, incomplete, and undertheorized. In this article, we seek to address this disconnect by offering "coherence-based reasoning" as a parsimonious theoretical framework that explains a sizable number of important deviations from normative forms of reasoning. Represented in connectionist networks and processed through constraint-satisfaction processing, coherence-based reasoning serves as a ubiquitous, essential, and overwhelmingly adaptive apparatus in people's mental toolbox. This adaptive process, however, can readily be overrun by bias when the network is dominated by nodes or links that are incorrect, overweighted, or otherwise nonnormative. We apply this framework to explain a variety of well-established biased forms of reasoning, including confirmation bias, the halo effect, stereotype spillovers, hindsight bias, motivated reasoning, emotion-driven reasoning, ideological reasoning, and more.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

Threshold point utilisation in juror decision-making

This study aims to identify whether a model of juror decision-making (i.e. the threshold point model) that encompasses both rational and intuitive decision-making exists. A total of 60 participants were selected who are eligible for jury duty in Scotland. These individuals read nine vignettes and rated the evidence of each vignette separately by placing the evidence in either a guilty, a not guilty or a not proven (a verdict type specific to Scotland) counter. Participants were asked after being presented with each piece of information to state how likely they thought the suspect was of being guilty, on a scale from 1 to 100. The data are best described using a flexible model (i.e. a diffusion model) that allows for information integration. Future research should examine whether or not the diffusion model can explain cognitive fallacies, such as confirmation bias, that are commonly studied in decision science.

Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization

People often express political opinions in starkly dichotomous terms, such as "Trump will either trigger a ruinous trade war or save U.S. factory workers from disaster." This mode of communication promotes polarization into ideological in-groups and out-groups. We explore the power of an emerging methodology, forecasting tournaments, to encourage clashing factions to do something odd: to translate their beliefs into nuanced probability judgments and track accuracy over time and questions. In theory, tournaments advance the goals of "deliberative democracy" by incentivizing people to be flexible belief updaters whose views converge in response to facts, thus depolarizing unnecessarily polarized debates. We examine the hypothesis that, in the process of thinking critically about their beliefs, tournament participants become more moderate in their own political attitudes and those they attribute to the other side. We view tournaments as belonging to a broader class of psychological inductions that increase epistemic humility and that include asking people to explore alternative perspectives, probing the depth of their cause-effect understanding and holding them accountable to audiences with difficult-to-guess views.

Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias

We demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Baseball games and a recently devised method for priming the consistency goal. When preference is the first response, priming cognitive consistency moves prediction toward greater agreement with that preference, thereby increasing the desirability bias. In contrast, when prediction is the first response, priming cognitive consistency facilitates greater agreement with the factual information for each game. This increases the accuracy of the prediction and reduces the desirability bias.

This Only Happens to Others

Abstract. This paper investigates the specific self-presentational situations in which people confirm or negate their comparative optimism in order to convey a favorable self-image. One pilot study and three experiments showed that people increase their comparative optimism to convey an image of competence, but not one of warmth (Pilot Study, Study 1), as well as to present an advantageous self-image in professional situations, although not in friendship situations (Studies 2–3). These effects occur in self-presentation situations involving both low (Studies 1–2) and high (Study 3) levels of accountability. Additional findings indicate that the presentation of a risk-taking self-image is unrelated to comparative optimism, whereas the presentation of a modest self-image leads people to decrease their comparative optimism estimates (Study 3). Results are discussed in the light of the underlying self-presentational motivations in specific situations.

The Argumentative Theory: Predictions and Empirical Evidence

The argumentative theory of reasoning suggests that the main function of reasoning is to exchange arguments with others. This theory explains key properties of reasoning. When reasoners produce arguments, they are biased and lazy, as can be expected if reasoning is a mechanism that aims at convincing others in interactive contexts. By contrast, reasoners are more objective and demanding when they evaluate arguments provided by others. This fundamental asymmetry between production and evaluation explains the effects of reasoning in different contexts: the more debate and conflict between opinions there is, the more argument evaluation prevails over argument production, resulting in better outcomes. Here I review how the argumentative theory of reasoning helps integrate a wide range of empirical findings in reasoning research.

A neuropsychological investigation of decisional certainty

The certainty that one feels following a decision increases decision-making efficiency, but can also result in decreased decision accuracy. In the current study, a neuropsychological approach was used to examine the impact of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) on core psychological processes promoting decision certainty: selective exposure, overconfidence, and decisiveness. Given previous research demonstrating that vmPFC damage disrupts the generation of negative emotional (somatic) states that have been associated with selective exposure and overconfidence, it was hypothesized that damage to the vmPFC would disrupt engagement in selective exposure, decrease overconfidence, and increase indecision. Individuals with vmPFC damage exhibited increased indecision, but contrary to our hypothesis, engaged in similar levels of selective exposure and overconfidence as the comparison groups. These results indicate that indecision may be an important psychological mechanism involved in decision-making impairments associated with vmPFC injury. The results also suggest that the vmPFC may not be critical for selective exposure or overconfidence, which provides support for a recent "desirability" account of selective exposure.