Angels everywhere? How beliefs in pure evil and pure good predict perceptions of heroic behavior

Moral decision-making and support for safety procedures amid the COVID-19 pandemic

Given that individual differences influence virus-mitigating behaviors and the COVID-19 pandemic posed new moral dilemmas for individuals to resolve, across three studies (N = 704), we assessed how masculine honor beliefs (MHB), beliefs in pure good (BPG), evil (BPE), and the dark triad (DT) influence COVID-19 moral decision-making. Specifically, we analyzed moral decision-making at the microlevel (i.e., individual- and familial-level; Study 1), in decisions with (hypothetical) life-or-death consequences (Study 2), and at the macrolevel (i.e., nationwide virus-mitigation efforts; Study 3). In all studies, participants completed the four individual difference scales and rated their pandemic attitudes on Likert-type agreement scales, and resolved various moral dilemmas in Studies 2 and 3. Consistent with our hypotheses, individuals reported more virus-mitigation efforts in order to protect their families than themselves. In terms of hypothetical life-or-death and nationwide decisions, MHB, BPE, and the DT predicted more confidence and social motivations, whereas BPG predicted more distress. This research has implications for moral decision-making at varying degrees of severity during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Cognition of Severe Moral Failure: A Novel Approach to the Perception of Evil

I describe the perception of evil as a categorization judgment, based on a prototype, with extensive feedback loops and top-down influences. Based on the attachment approach to moral judgment (Govrin, 2014, 2018), I suggest that the perception of evil consists of four salient features: Extreme asymmetry between victim and perpetrator; a specific perceived attitude of the perpetrator toward the victim's vulnerability; the observer's inability to understand the perpetrator's perspective; and insuperable differences between the observer and perpetrator's judgment following the incident which shake the observer no less than the event itself. I then show that the perception of evil involves a cognitive bias: The observer is almost always mistaken in his attributions of a certain state of mind to the perpetrator. The philosophical and evolutionary significance of this bias is discussed as well as suggestions for future testing of the prototype model of evil.