Godless in essence? Psychological essentialism, theistic meta-beliefs, and anti-atheist prejudice

Essential shape: The role of essentialist beliefs in preferences for misshapen produce

Understanding the reasons behind consumer rejection of misshapen produce is important because of its dramatic consequences on food waste. Drawing on psychological essentialism, we conduct seven studies to investigate the role of produce shape-related essentialist beliefs (i.e., the belief that produce shape is determined by an underlying and unobservable essence) in consumers' evaluations of misshapen produce. Our findings show that essentialist beliefs about produce shape are divided into four distinct dimensions (i.e., biological basis, discreteness, informativeness, and immutability). We find that endorsing discreteness beliefs decreases preferences for misshapen produce. Immutability beliefs produce the opposite effect, whereas informativeness and biological basis have little to no effect. These effects operate through typicality judgments. These findings suggest that considering essentialist beliefs have the potential to help enhance the acceptance of edible albeit misshapen produce.

The role of genetic essentialism and genetics knowledge in support for eugenics and genetically modified foods

People are regularly exposed to discussions about the role of genes in their lives, despite often having limited understanding about how they operate. The tendency to oversimplify genetic causes, and ascribe them with undue influence is termed genetic essentialism. Two studies revealed that genetic essentialism is associated with support for eugenic policies and social attitudes based in social inequality, and less acceptance of genetically modified foods. These views about eugenics and genetically-modified foods were especially evident among people who had less knowledge about genes, potentially highlighting the value of education in genetics.

Feeling correct is feeling prejudiced: The differential effects of attitude correctness and attitude clarity on evaluations of outgroups

Global attitude certainty consists of two subconstructs: attitude clarity—certainty that one is aware of one’s true attitudes—and attitude correctness, certainty that one’s attitudes are morally correct and valid. Attitude correctness is more often associated with group-related psychological and behavioral outcomes than attitude clarity. As such, we expected that attitude correctness, but not attitude clarity, would be associated with more negative attitudes toward outgroups when group boundaries are defined by attitudes. Across four studies, greater attitude correctness related to more negative attitudes toward attitudinal outgroups regardless of context (e.g., political, religious); attitude clarity’s relationship to prejudice was inconsistent (Studies 1a and 2: positive or no relationship; Study 3: negative; Studies 1b and 4: no relationship). In Studies 2 and 3, mediational analyses showed that greater attitude correctness was associated with stronger beliefs that group boundaries are sharp and distinct (i.e., discreteness beliefs), which in turn was associated with greater prejudice. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that the attitude correctness–prejudice link was associated with greater intention to engage in competitive behaviors in a conflict resolution scenario with an outgroup member.

Secularism in science: The role of religious affiliation in assessments of scientists' trustworthiness

With controversies surrounding numerous science topics, including vaccinations and climate change, science skepticism in the United States is of growing concern. Some skepticism of science may stem from the perceived association between science and atheism, as well as stereotypes of religious individuals as prosocial. Three studies examine how scientists' religious affiliation (or lack thereof) influences perceptions of their warmth and trustworthiness among Christian participants. (Study 1 also includes atheist participants for comparison purposes.) Whereas atheist participants evaluate atheist scientists as more trustworthy than scientists from various religious groups (e.g. Christian, Jewish, and Muslim), Christian participants consistently evaluate atheist scientists as less trustworthy and less warm than religious scientists, and not exclusively Christian scientists. These effects are explained, in part, by Christian participants' perceptions that atheist scientists are less motivated by prosociality compared to religiously affiliated scientists and, as Study 3 demonstrates, have a negative association with trust in scientists in general.