Ethics of uncertainty

Patients, doctors and risk attitudes

A lively topic of debate in decision theory over recent years concerns our understanding of the different risk attitudes exhibited by decision makers. There is ample evidence that risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviours are widespread, and a growing consensus that such behaviour is rationally permissible. In the context of clinical medicine, this matter is complicated by the fact that healthcare professionals must often make choices for the benefit of their patients, but the norms of rational choice are conventionally grounded in a decision maker's own desires, beliefs and actions. The presence of both doctor and patient raises the question of whose risk attitude matters for the choice at hand and what to do when these diverge. Must doctors make risky choices when treating risk-seeking patients? Ought they to be risk averse in general when choosing on behalf of others? In this paper, I will argue that healthcare professionals ought to adopt a deferential approach, whereby it is the risk attitude of the patient that matters in medical decision making. I will show how familiar arguments for widely held anti-paternalistic views about medicine can be straightforwardly extended to include not only patients' evaluations of possible health states, but also their attitudes to risk. However, I will also show that this deferential view needs further refinement: patients' higher-order attitudes towards their risk attitudes must be considered in order to avoid some counterexamples and to accommodate different views about what sort of attitudes risk attitudes actually are.

When the Unknown Is Unknowable: Confronting Diagnostic Uncertainty

The neonatology literature often refers to medical uncertainty and specifically the challenges of predicting morbidity for extremely premature infants, who can have widely varying outcomes. Less has been written about situations in which diagnoses are simply unknown or unattainable. This case highlights the importance of communication amidst uncertainty from a lack of knowledge about aspects of a patient's condition. Using epidemiologic and clinical reasoning, the authors challenge the assumption that diagnostic uncertainty must necessarily portend prognostic uncertainty. When physicians' quest for a diagnosis becomes burdensome and detrimental to the infant's quality of life, this should be abandoned and replaced by focusing on prognosis. The authors focus on the shift of the physician's role toward one of support, assisting the family in ascribing meaning to the dying experience. By focusing on prognosis and support, communication can proceed with more clarity, understanding, and empathy.

The conceptualization of acute bronchitis in general practice - a fuzzy problem with consequences? A qualitative study in primary care

BACKGROUND

Acute bronchitis is one of the most frequent diagnoses in primary care. Scientifically, it is conceptualized as a viral infection. Still, general practitioners (GPs) often prescribe antibiotics for acute bronchitis. The explanation for this discrepancy may lie in a different conceptualization of acute bronchitis. Therefore, we wanted to know, how GPs conceptualize acute bronchitis, and how they differentiate it from common cold and pneumonia. Furthermore, we tried to find out the GPs' reasons for prescribing antibiotics in those cases.

METHODS

To answer our study questions, we conducted a qualitative study with GPs in Bavaria, Germany, by using semi-structured guided interviews. The analysis of the data was conducted using the documentary method according to Ralf Bohnsack. The transcripts were subdivided into categories. Analyzing each part by reflective interpretation, first manually, secondly with the help of RQDA, we extracted the most representative citations and main messages from the interviews.

RESULTS

The term acute bronchitis seems to be applied when there is neither certainty of the diagnosis common cold, nor of pneumonia. It seems it bridges the gap of uncertainty between supposedly harmless clinical pictures (common cold/viral), to the more serious ones (pneumonia/bacterial). The conceptual transitions between common cold and acute bronchitis on the one side, and acute bronchitis and pneumonia on the other are fluid. The diagnosis acute bronchitis cannot solve the problem of uncertainty but seems to be a label to overcome it by offering a way to include different factors such as severity of symptoms, presumed signs of bacterial secondary infection, comorbidities, and presumed expectations of patients. It seems to solve the pathophysiologic riddle of bacterial or viral and of decision making in prescribing antibiotics.

CONCLUSION

Acute bronchitis as an "intermediate category" proved difficult to define for the GPs. Applying this diagnosis leaves GPs in abeyance of prescribing an antibiotic or not. As a consequence of this uncertainty in pathophysiologic reasoning (viral or bacterial) other clinical and social factors tip the balance towards antibiotic prescribing. Teaching physicians to better think in probabilities of outcomes instead of pathophysiologic reasoning and to deal with uncertainty might help reducing antibiotic overprescribing.

Evidence and Decision-Making

Today, every country struggles to provide adequate health care to its citizens. Globally, an average of $8.3 trillion or 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) is annually spent on health services. In 2019, the USA spent nearly 18% ($3.2 trillion) of its GDP on health care, projected to reach $6.2 trillion by 2028.

Shared decision-making in the realm of uncertainty: The example of coronary artery disease through an EBM and complexity science lens

Patients look to their clinicians for explanations and treatments that achieve predictable cures with certainty. Clinicians usually respond accordingly. Acknowledging uncertainty, while necessary, is difficult, anxiety-provoking and at times overwhelming for patients and clinicians alike. We here present three case studies to illustrate the uncertainties of managing patients with potentially life-threatening illnesses. Research aims to provide answers to clinical problems. But, conducting research almost inevitably entails a reduction of real-world complexities. Research ultimately can only provide 'partial or in general answers' mostly revealing new questions. Due to the complexity of clinical care, research cannot really achieve certainty and predictability for an individual within his specific living context and values. In an unavoidably uncertain environment, instead of oversimplifying, clinicians like patients-as far as possible-ought to better embrace a complexity thinking frame. This provides a deeper understanding how living bodies function as-a-whole within their living contexts. Uncertainty and unpredictability, being inherent elements of complexity thinking, cannot be overcome. However, it may be made easier to cope with uncertainty by at least adopting the thinking in probabilities for benefits and harms of patient related outcomes as introduced in Sackett's Evidence-Based Medicine framework. Through the lenses of evidence-based medicine and complexity sciences this paper critically explores the clinical management of three patients diagnosed as having coronary artery disease. They all received the same treatment even though they presented with very different clinical complaints arising from different disease manifestations. Looking at these case studies the authors reflect on the reasons behind this astonishing, but widely seen medical behaviour of 'one size fits all'. They critically reflect the importance of research and evidence in view of a person-centred solution.