Measuring bias against disconfirmatory evidence: An evaluation of BADE task scoring methods and the case for a novel method

Hasty decision making and belief inflexibility in the more delusion prone? A modified disambiguating-scenarios paradigm assessing cognitive biases implicated in delusions

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary models of psychosis imply that cognitive biases such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC), the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and the liberal acceptance (LA) bias play a role in the pathogenesis of delusions. Most of the studies investigating the role of cognitive biases, however, have been conducted with socially neutral or abstract stimuli and have assessed patients with established psychoses. For the present study, we aimed to concurrently investigate multiple biases (i.e., the JTC, BADE, and LA biases) in a community sample with a new paradigm using more socially engaging stimuli.

METHODS

A large sample of participants (N = 874) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk was subdivided into two groups based on the frequency of their psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) according to the positive subscale score of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE) and matched based on major demographics variables, resulting in two equally sized groups called High-PLE (at least 2 SD above the mean) and Low-PLE (maximum 0.5 above the mean; n = 46 for each group). Using a modified version of the written-scenarios BADE task, which emphasized social interactions between agents embedded in the scenario, participants rated the plausibility of response options in the face of new information.

RESULTS

In line with previous findings, the High-PLE group demonstrated the JTC, BADE, and LA biases. That is, the members of this group made more decisions after the initial piece of information, were less likely to revise their beliefs in light of new information, and provided higher plausibility ratings for implausible response options compared to the Low-PLE group.

CONCLUSIONS

Results corroborate prior findings suggesting that the JTC, BADE, and LA biases may be contributing factors in delusional ideation and that metacognitive biases extend to social situations.

Relationships between cognitive biases, decision-making, and delusions

Multiple measures of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. jumping to conclusions (JTC), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), win-switch behavior, random exploration) have been associated with delusional thinking in independent studies. Yet, it is unknown whether these variables explain shared or unique variance in delusional thinking, and whether these relationships are specific to paranoia or delusional ideation more broadly. Additionally, the underlying computational mechanisms require further investigation. To investigate these questions, task and self-report data were collected in 88 individuals (46 healthy controls, 42 schizophrenia-spectrum) and included measures of cognitive biases and behavior on probabilistic reversal learning and explore/exploit tasks. Of those, only win-switch rate significantly differed between groups. In regression, reversal learning performance, random exploration, and poor evidence integration during BADE showed significant, independent associations with paranoia. Only self-reported JTC was associated with delusional ideation, controlling for paranoia. Computational parameters increased the proportion of variance explained in paranoia. Overall, decision-making influenced by strong volatility and variability is specifically associated with paranoia, whereas self-reported hasty decision-making is specifically associated with other themes of delusional ideation. These aspects of decision-making under uncertainty may therefore represent distinct cognitive processes that, together, have the potential to worsen delusional thinking across the psychosis spectrum.

A Computational Analysis of Abnormal Belief Updating Processes and Their Association With Psychotic Experiences and Childhood Trauma in a UK Birth Cohort

BACKGROUND

Psychotic experiences emerge from abnormalities in perception and belief formation and occur more commonly in those experiencing childhood trauma. However, which precise aspects of belief formation are atypical in psychosis is not well understood. We used a computational modeling approach to characterize belief updating in young adults in the general population, examine their relationship with psychotic outcomes and trauma, and determine the extent to which they mediate the trauma-psychosis relationship.

METHODS

We used data from 3360 individuals from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children birth cohort who completed assessments for psychotic outcomes, depression, anxiety, and two belief updating tasks at age 24 and had data available on traumatic events assessed from birth to late adolescence. Unadjusted and adjusted regression and counterfactual mediation methods were used for the analyses.

RESULTS

Basic behavioral measures of belief updating (draws-to-decision and disconfirmatory updating) were not associated with psychotic experiences. However, computational modeling revealed an association between increased decision noise with both psychotic experiences and trauma exposure, although <3% of the trauma-psychotic experience association was mediated by decision noise. Belief updating measures were also associated with intelligence and sociodemographic characteristics, confounding most of the associations with psychotic experiences. There was little evidence that belief updating parameters were differentially associated with delusions compared with hallucinations or that they were differentially associated with psychotic outcomes compared with depression or anxiety.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings challenge the hypothesis that atypical belief updating mechanisms (as indexed by the computational models and behavioral measures we used) underlie the development of psychotic phenomena.

COVID-19 conspiracy ideation is associated with the delusion proneness trait and resistance to update of beliefs

The rapid spread of conspiracy ideas associated with the recent COVID-19 pandemic represents a major threat to the ongoing and coming vaccination programs. Yet, the cognitive factors underlying the pandemic-related conspiracy beliefs are not well described. We hypothesized that such cognitive style is driven by delusion proneness, a trait phenotype associated with formation of delusion-like beliefs that exists on a continuum in the normal population. To probe this hypothesis, we developed a COVID-19 conspiracy questionnaire (CCQ) and assessed 577 subjects online. Their responses clustered into three factors that included Conspiracy, Distrust and Fear/Action as identified using principal component analysis. We then showed that CCQ (in particular the Conspiracy and Distrust factors) related both to general delusion proneness assessed with Peter's Delusion Inventory (PDI) as well as resistance to belief update using a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task. Further, linear regression and pathway analyses suggested a specific contribution of BADE to CCQ not directly explained by PDI. Importantly, the main results remained significant when using a truncated version of the PDI where questions on paranoia were removed (in order to avoid circular evidence), and when adjusting for ADHD- and autistic traits (that are known to be substantially related to delusion proneness). Altogether, our results strongly suggest that pandemic-related conspiracy ideation is associated with delusion proneness trait phenotype.

Childhood trauma and cognitive biases associated with psychosis: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Childhood trauma is associated with an increased risk of psychosis, but the mechanisms that mediate this relationship are unknown. Exposure to trauma has been hypothesised to lead to cognitive biases that might have causal effects on psychotic symptoms. The literature on whether childhood trauma is associated with psychosis-related cognitive biases has not been comprehensively reviewed. A systematic review and meta-analysis or narrative synthesis of studies examining the association between childhood trauma and the following biases: external locus of control (LOC), external attribution, probabilistic reasoning, source monitoring, top-down processing, and bias against disconfirmatory evidence. Studies were assessed for quality, and sources of heterogeneity were explored. We included 25 studies from 3,465 studies identified. Individuals exposed to childhood trauma reported a more external LOC (14 studies: SMD Median = 0.40, Interquartile range 0.07 to 0.52), consistent with a narrative synthesis of 11 other studies of LOC. There was substantial heterogeneity in the meta-analysis (I2 = 93%) not explained by study characteristics examined. Narrative syntheses for other biases showed weaker, or no evidence of association with trauma. The quality of included studies was generally low. Our review provides some evidence of an association between childhood trauma and a more external LOC, but not with the other biases examined. The low quality and paucity of studies for most of the cognitive biases examined highlights the need for more rigorous studies to determine which biases occur after trauma, and whether they mediate an effect of childhood trauma on psychosis.

Stress and cognitive biases in schizotypy: A two-site study of bias against disconfirmatory evidence and jumping to conclusions

The dysfunctional cognitive and reasoning biases which underpin psychotic symptoms are likely to present prior to the onset of a diagnosable disorder and should therefore be detectable along the psychosis continuum in individuals with schizotypal traits. Two reasoning biases, Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) and Jumping to Conclusions (JTC), describe how information is selected and weighed under conditions of uncertainty during decision making. It is likely that states such as elevated stress exacerbates JTC and BADE in individuals with high schizotypal traits vulnerable to displaying these information gathering styles. Therefore, we evaluated whether stress and schizotypy interacted to predict these reasoning biases using separate samples from the US (JTC) and England (BADE). Generally speaking, schizotypal traits and stress were not independently associated with dysfunctional reasoning biases. However, across both studies, the interaction between schizotypy traits and stress significantly predicted reasoning biases such that increased stress was associated with increased reasoning biases, but only for individuals low in schizotypal traits. These patterns were observed for positive schizotypal traits (in both samples), for negative traits (in the England sample only), but not for disorganization traits. For both samples, our findings suggest that the presence of states such as stress is associated with, though not necessarily dysfunctional, reasoning biases in individuals with low schizotypy. These reasoning biases seemed, in some ways, relatively immutable to stress in individuals endorsing high levels of positive schizotypal traits.

When negative interpretations persist, positive emotions don't! Inflexible negative interpretations encourage depression and social anxiety by dampening positive emotions

Research on emotion regulation difficulties has been instrumental in understanding hallmark features of depression and social anxiety. Yet, the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to maladaptive patterns of emotion regulation strategy use remain underspecified. This investigation examined the association of negative interpretation inflexibility and interpretation biases with the use of common emotion regulation strategies in response to negative and positive emotional experiences (repetitive negative thinking, positive reappraisal, and dampening). Study 1 (N = 250) found that inflexibility in revising negative interpretations in response to disconfirmatory positive information was related to the dampening of positive emotions, but not to repetitive negative thinking or positive reappraisal. Importantly, dampening mediated the relation between inflexible negative interpretations and symptoms of both depression and social anxiety. This mediation model was further supported by the data from Study 2 (N = 294). Across both studies, negative interpretation bias was related to repetitive negative thinking and dampening, whereas positive interpretation bias was related to positive reappraisal. Collectively, these results suggest that both interpretation inflexibility and interpretation biases may contribute to difficulties in emotion regulation related to depression and social anxiety.

Dual-process theory, conflict processing, and delusional belief

Many reasoning biases that may contribute to delusion formation and/or maintenance are common in healthy individuals. Research indicating that reasoning in the general population proceeds via analytic processes (which depend upon working memory and support hypothetical thought) and intuitive processes (which are autonomous and independent of working memory) may therefore help uncover the source of these biases. Consistent with this possibility, recent studies imply that impaired conflict processing might reduce engagement in analytic reasoning, thereby producing reasoning biases and promoting delusions in individuals with schizophrenia. Progress toward understanding this potential pathway to delusions is currently impeded by ambiguity about whether any of these deficits or biases is necessary or sufficient for the formation and maintenance of delusions. Resolving this ambiguity requires consideration of whether particular cognitive deficits or biases in this putative pathway have causal primacy over other processes that may also participate in the causation of delusions. Accordingly, the present manuscript critically evaluates whether impaired conflict processing is the primary initiating deficit in the generation of reasoning biases that may promote the development and/or maintenance of delusions. Suggestions for future research that may elucidate mechanistic pathways by which reasoning deficits might engender and maintain delusions are subsequently offered.

Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

In the past few decades, sex differences have been identified in a number of clinical, cognitive and functional outcomes in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. However, to date, sex differences in higher-order cognitive biases have not been systematically studied. The present study aimed to examine sex differences in jumping-to-conclusions and evidence integration impairment based on data collected in two previous studies in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and healthy controls. For this purpose, data from n = 58 patients and n = 60 healthy controls on the Fish Task (as a measure of jumping to conclusions) and bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE; as a measure of evidence integration) task were analyzed. Results indicated a lack of sex differences in jumping-to-conclusions and evidence integration impairment both in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and healthy controls. Although the present study was adequately powered to detect sex differences of a low medium effect size, larger studies are warranted to exclude differences of a smaller magnitude between men and women regarding delusion-associated cognitive biases.