Altered time course of unconscious response priming in schizophrenia patients

Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of Consciousness? Experimental and Phenomenological Support for Anomalous Unconscious Processing

Decades ago, several authors have proposed that disorders in automatic processing lead to intrusive symptoms or abnormal contents in the consciousness of people with schizophrenia. However, since then, studies have mainly highlighted difficulties in patients' conscious experiencing and processing but rarely explored how unconscious and conscious mechanisms may interact in producing this experience. We report three lines of research, focusing on the processing of spatial frequencies, unpleasant information, and time-event structure that suggest that impairments occur at both the unconscious and conscious level. We argue that focusing on unconscious, physiological and automatic processing of information in patients, while contrasting that processing with conscious processing, is a first required step before understanding how distortions or other impairments emerge at the conscious level. We then indicate that the phenomenological tradition of psychiatry supports a similar claim and provides a theoretical framework helping to understand the relationship between the impairments and clinical symptoms. We base our argument on the presence of disorders in the minimal self in patients with schizophrenia. The minimal self is tacit and non-verbal and refers to the sense of bodily presence. We argue this sense is shaped by unconscious processes, whose alteration may thus affect the feeling of being a unique individual. This justifies a focus on unconscious mechanisms and a distinction from those associated with consciousness.

Discriminating between first- and second-order cognition in first-episode paranoid schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

An impairment of visually perceiving backward masked stimuli is commonly observed in patients with schizophrenia, yet it is unclear whether this impairment is the result of a deficiency in first or higher order processing and for which subtypes of schizophrenia it is present.

METHODS

Here, we compare identification (first order) and metacognitive (higher order) performance in a visual masking paradigm between a highly homogenous group of young first-episode patients diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (N = 11) to that of carefully matched healthy controls (N = 13).

RESULTS

We find no difference across groups in first-order performance, but find a difference in metacognitive performance, particularly for stimuli with relatively high visibility.

CONCLUSIONS

These results indicate that the masking deficit is present in first-episode patients with paranoid schizophrenia, but that it is primarily an impairment of metacognition.