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Fischer E, Jukola S. Bodies of evidence: The 'Excited Delirium Syndrome' and the epistemology of cause-of-death inquiry. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2024; 104:38-47. [PMID: 38452435 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.12.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2023] [Revised: 09/28/2023] [Accepted: 12/08/2023] [Indexed: 03/09/2024]
Abstract
"Excited Delirium Syndrome" (ExDS) is a controversial diagnosis. The supposed syndrome is sometimes considered to be a potential cause of death. However, it has been argued that its sole purpose is to cover up excessive police violence because it is mainly used to explain deaths of individuals in custody. In this paper, we examine the epistemic conditions giving rise to the controversial diagnosis by discussing the relation between causal hypotheses, evidence, and data in forensic medicine. We argue that the practitioners' social context affects causal inquiry through background assumptions that enter inquiry at multiple stages. This analysis serves to better understand the wide usage of the controversial diagnosis of ExDS.
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Affiliation(s)
- Enno Fischer
- Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44780 Bochum, Germany
| | - Saana Jukola
- University of Twente, Drienerlolaan 5, 7522 NB Enschede, the Netherlands.
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2
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Ambrosj J, Dierickx K, Desmond H. The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2023; 29:1. [PMID: 36622481 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-022-00427-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2022] [Accepted: 12/22/2022] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
Even if the "value-free ideal of science" (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify-for the use of RI scholars-the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jacopo Ambrosj
- Department of Public Health and Primary Care, Center for Biomedical Ethics and Law, KU Leuven, Kapucijnenvoer 35 Box, 7001 3000, Leuven, Flanders, Belgium.
| | - Kris Dierickx
- Department of Public Health and Primary Care, Center for Biomedical Ethics and Law, KU Leuven, Kapucijnenvoer 35 Box, 7001 3000, Leuven, Flanders, Belgium
| | - Hugh Desmond
- Department of Public Health and Primary Care, Center for Biomedical Ethics and Law, KU Leuven, Kapucijnenvoer 35 Box, 7001 3000, Leuven, Flanders, Belgium
- Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, CNRS/Paris I-Sorbonne, Paris, Île-de-France, France
- Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Flanders, Belgium
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Hilligardt H. Looking beyond values: The legitimacy of social perspectives, opinions and interests in science. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2022; 12:58. [PMID: 36210908 PMCID: PMC9531222 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-022-00490-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2022] [Accepted: 09/19/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
This paper critically assesses the current debates in philosophy of science that focus on the concept of values. In these debates, it is often assumed that all relevant non-epistemic influences on scientific research can be described as values and, consequently, that science carries social legitimacy if the correct values play their proper role in research. I argue that values are not the only relevant non-epistemic influences on research: not unless our definition of values is so broad that it becomes unmanageable. Other factors also affect the authority and social legitimacy of science. I employ political theorist Iris Marion Young's concepts of social perspectives, opinions and interests to attempt a differentiation of contextual influences relevant to scientific research. While problems arising from these influences may overlap, they often differ in important ways too. As a consequence, I argue that contextual influences cannot be managed jointly but require distinct and complementary strategies.
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Bueter A. Bias as an epistemic notion. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2022; 91:307-315. [PMID: 34955230 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.12.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/22/2020] [Revised: 11/22/2021] [Accepted: 12/04/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
Once one abandons the ideal of value-free, impartial science, the question of how to distinguish biased from legitimately value-laden science arises. To approach this "new demarcation problem", I argue that one should distinguish different uses of "bias" in a first step: a narrow sense of bias as systematic deviation from the truth, and a wider sense that covers any kind of tendency impacting scientific reasoning. Secondly, the narrow sense exemplifies an ontological notion of bias, which understands bias in terms of a deviation from an impartial ideal outcome. I propose to replace it with an epistemic notion of bias, which understands biased research as research that we have good reasons to suspect could have been (done) systematically better. From a socio-epistemic perspective, such good reasons to expect better can be found in a lack of responsiveness to conventional standards and/or critical discourse in the scientific community. In short, bias in an epistemic sense consists in a deviation, not from truth but from current best practice. While this turns bias into something that is dependent on time and context, it allows for value-laden research to be unbiased, if there are no good reasons to expect this research to be better.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anke Bueter
- Aarhus University, School of Culture and Society, Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Jens Christian Skous Vej 7, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark.
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Lusk G. Does democracy require value-neutral science? Analyzing the legitimacy of scientific information in the political sphere. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2021; 90:102-110. [PMID: 34619535 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.08.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2020] [Revised: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 08/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
Philosophers now commonly reject the value free ideal for science by arguing that non-epistemic values, including personal or social values, are permissible within the core of scientific research. However, little attention has been paid to the normative political consequences of this position. This paper explores these consequences and shows how political theory is fruitful for proceeding in a world without value-neutral science. I draw attention to an oft-overlooked argument employed by proponents of the value free ideal I dub the "political legitimacy argument." This argument claims that the value-free ideal follows directly from the foundational principles of liberal democracy. If so, then the use of value-laden scientific information within democratic decision making would be illegitimate on purely political grounds. Despite highlighting this unaddressed and important argument, I show how it can be rejected. By appealing to deliberative democratic theory, I demonstrate scientific information can be value-laden and politically legitimate. The deliberative democratic account I develop is well suited for capturing the intuitions of many opponents of the value free ideal and points to a new set of questions for those interested in values in science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Greg Lusk
- Lyman Briggs College and the Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, USA.
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van Dongen N, Sikorski M. Objectivity for the research worker. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2021; 11:93. [PMID: 34721744 PMCID: PMC8550135 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-021-00400-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2020] [Accepted: 07/12/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
In the last decade, many problematic cases of scientific conduct have been diagnosed; some of which involve outright fraud (e.g., Stapel, 2012) others are more subtle (e.g., supposed evidence of extrasensory perception; Bem, 2011). These and similar problems can be interpreted as caused by lack of scientific objectivity. The current philosophical theories of objectivity do not provide scientists with conceptualizations that can be effectively put into practice in remedying these issues. We propose a novel way of thinking about objectivity for individual scientists; a negative and dynamic approach.We provide a philosophical conceptualization of objectivity that is informed by empirical research. In particular, it is our intention to take the first steps in providing an empirically and methodologically informed inventory of factors that impair the scientific practice. The inventory will be compiled into a negative conceptualization (i.e., what is not objective), which could in principle be used by individual scientists to assess (deviations from) objectivity of scientific practice. We propose a preliminary outline of a usable and testable instrument for indicating the objectivity of scientific practice.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Michał Sikorski
- University of Gdańsk, Gdańsk, Poland
- Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
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Ahn S. How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2020; 84:57-65. [PMID: 33218466 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2019] [Revised: 07/13/2020] [Accepted: 08/02/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Soohyun Ahn
- Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, Northwest Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4, Canada.
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John S. Science, truth and dictatorship: Wishful thinking or wishful speaking? STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2019; 78:64-72. [PMID: 31818420 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2018] [Revised: 10/11/2018] [Accepted: 12/14/2018] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
This paper argues for a novel way of addressing questions about the relationship between politics and science: in terms of norms of communication, rather than norms of cognition. The first half of the paper motivates this general shift through close study of the concept of "wishful speaking"; arguing that this vice - rather than the more familiar "wishful thinking" - better captures real-life cases, such as the Lysenko affair. The second half builds on the ethics of communication to develop an account of the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification in terms of "value-aptness".
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen John
- Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH, UK.
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Carrier M. Facing the Credibility Crisis of Science: On the Ambivalent Role of Pluralism in Establishing Relevance and Reliability. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2017. [DOI: 10.1162/posc_a_00249] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
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Rolin K. Values, standpoints, and scientific/intellectual movements. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2016; 56:11-19. [PMID: 27083080 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2015] [Revised: 10/21/2015] [Accepted: 10/21/2015] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
Feminist standpoint empiricism contributes to the criticism of the value-free ideal by offering a unique analysis of how non-epistemic values can play not only a legitimate but also an epistemically productive role in science. While the inductive risk argument focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the acceptance of hypotheses, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the production of evidence. And while many other analyses of values in science focus on the role of non-epistemic values either in an individual scientist's decision making or in the distribution of research efforts in scientific communities, standpoint empiricism focuses on the role of non-epistemic values in the building of scientific/intellectual movements.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kristina Rolin
- Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, P.O. Box 4, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland.
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Leuschner A. Social exclusion in academia through biases in methodological quality evaluation: On the situation of women in science and philosophy. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2015; 54:56-63. [PMID: 26568087 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.08.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2015] [Revised: 08/29/2015] [Accepted: 08/31/2015] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
Empirical studies show that academia is socially exclusive. I argue that this social exclusion works, at least partly, through the systematic methodological disqualification of contributions from members of underrepresented social groups. As methodological quality criteria are underdetermined their interpretation and weighting can be biased with relation to gender, race, social background, etc. Such biased quality evaluation can take place on a local or global level. The current situation of women in academic philosophy illuminates this. I conclude that only mechanical solutions can effectively change the situation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna Leuschner
- Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS), Kaiserstraße 12, D-76131 Karlsruhe, Germany.
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