On the very idea of pursuitworthiness

Creativity, pursuit and epistemic tradition

This paper revisits the standard definition of scientific creativity in the contemporary philosophical literature. The standard definition of creativity says that there are two necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for creativity, novelty and value. This paper proposes to characterize the value condition of creativity in terms of "pursuitworthiness". The notion of pursuitworthiness, adopted from the recent debate on scientific pursuit in philosophy of science, refers to a form of prospective epistemic worth. It indicates that a certain object (such as a scientific hypothesis) is promising or has the potential to be epistemically fertile in the future, if further investigated. To support the claim that creative scientific instances are, qua creative, valuable in the sense of pursuitworthy, three examples of creative hypotheses taken from the history of the geosciences are introduced: MacCulloch's continuity hypothesis in mid-19th-century geology, Baron et al.'s phylogenetic hypothesis in contemporary paleontology, and the widely discussed Anthropocene hypothesis.

Paving the cowpath in research within pure mathematics: A medium level model based on text driven variations

In this paper we show how simple text-driven variations of given statements in mathematics can lead to interesting new problems and push forward a whole theory around simple initial questions. We exemplify this in two cases. Case 1 deals with problem-posing activities suitable for pupils and case 2 is a rational reconstruction of the organisation of mathematical knowledge within problems of graph colorings. Mathematicians learn to systematically look for subsequent problems around a given problem. We argue that this toy-model captures a nontrivial part of professional mathematical research within the pure fields and conjecture that it even grasps high level developments in mathematics. By doing this, we implicitly encourage a very simplistic view on criteria, so to speak a "cowpath" approach to progress in mathematics. The term "cowpath" is borrowed from architecture and software design, where it is commonly used. While we can contemplate which pathways are ideal, we may also just plant grass and see where people choose to walk. Those pathways are also self-enforcing, since we are less hesitant to walk on those rather than criss-cross the landscape.

On the pursuitworthiness of qualitative methods in empirical philosophy of science

While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.

Pursuitworthiness between daring conservatism and procrastination: Wheeler and the path towards black holes

This paper follows the story of how John A. Wheeler became the enthusiastic baptizer and popularizer of black holes, after he overcame his own initial resistance and protracted skepticism about earlier results. However, the present work is not only historical, since its aim is to suggest as well that the notion of pursuitworthiness can but benefit from a close confrontation with actual heuristic paths, examined in their complexity. This specific case, moreover, may suggest some historical-critical insights on the current situation at the most speculative frontiers of theoretical physics.

Peer review in funding-by-lottery: A systematic overview and expansion

Despite the surging interest in introducing lottery mechanisms into decision-making procedures for science funding bodies, the discourse on funding-by-lottery remains underdeveloped and, at times, misleading. Funding-by-lottery is sometimes presented as if it were a single mechanism when, in reality, there are many funding-by-lottery mechanisms with important distinguishing features. Moreover, funding-by-lottery is sometimes portrayed as an alternative to traditional methods of peer review when peer review is still used within funding-by-lottery approaches. This obscures a proper analysis of the (hypothetical and actual) variants of funding-by-lottery and important differences amongst them. The goal of this article is to provide a preliminary taxonomy of funding-by-lottery variants and evaluate how the existing evidence on peer review might lend differentiated support for variants of funding-by-lottery. Moreover, I point to gaps in the literature on peer review that must be addressed in future research. I conclude by building off of the work of Avin in moving toward a more holistic evaluation of funding-by-lottery. Specifically, I consider implications funding-by-lottery variants may have regarding trust and social responsibility.

Distributing epistemic and practical risks: a comparative study of communicating earthquake damages

This paper argues that the value of openness to epistemic plurality and the value of social responsiveness are essential for epistemic agents such as scientists who are expected to carry out non-epistemic missions. My chief philosophical claim is that the two values should play a joint role in their communication about earthquake-related damages when their knowledge claims are advisory. That said, I try to defend a minimal normative account of science in the context of communication. I show that these epistemic agents when acting as communicators may encounter various epistemic and practical uncertainties in making their knowledge claims. Using four vignettes, I show that the value of openness to epistemic plurality and the value of social responsiveness may best serve their epistemic and practical purposes across different contexts by reducing their epistemic and practical risks associated with the knowledge claims they communicated. The former may reduce the risks of prematurely excluding epistemic alternatives and is conducive to two types of epistemic plurality; the latter is supposed to reduce the risks of making self-defeating advisory claims and harmful wishful speaking by minimizing the values in tension that can be embedded in the social roles the epistemic agents play.

Revisiting the Basic/Applied Science Distinction: The Significance of Urgent Science for Science Funding Policy

There has been a resurgence between two closely related discussions concerning modern science funding policy. The first revolves around the coherence and usefulness of the distinction between basic and applied science and the second concerns whether science should be free to pursue research according to its own internal standards or pursue socially responsible research agendas that are held accountable to moral or political standards. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between basic and applied science, and the concomitant debate about freedom and social responsibility, require revision. I contend that the distinction can only be maintained in cases of urgent science. I go on to elucidate the notion of urgent science using a case study from research of the climate refugee crisis.