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Hangel N, ChoGlueck C. On the pursuitworthiness of qualitative methods in empirical philosophy of science. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2023; 98:29-39. [PMID: 36842291 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.12.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/29/2021] [Revised: 12/05/2022] [Accepted: 12/30/2022] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nora Hangel
- Leibniz Center for Science and Society (LCSS), Leibniz University Hannover, Germany; Institute of History and Ethics in Medicine, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany.
| | - Christopher ChoGlueck
- Department of Communication, Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (New Mexico Tech), Socorro, NM, USA
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2
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Dijkstra I, Horstman K. Clarifying how social epidemiological research constructs the category of low socioeconomic status: A response to Kamphuis et al. Soc Sci Med 2023; 317:115610. [PMID: 36542926 DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.115610] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2022] [Accepted: 12/09/2022] [Indexed: 12/23/2022]
Abstract
In our previous article, published in this journal, we argued that epidemiology has a constructive role with regard to socioeconomic health inequalities. We concluded that, as long as the construction of LSES remains unquestioned, social epidemiology might continue to (re)produce what it examines: LSES populations 'known to be unhealthy'. Recently, in this journal, Kamphuis et al. responded to our article. While they welcomed our reflections, the authors also posed critique to our arguments. In this paper, we respond to that critique and deepen the discussion on the use of (L)SES categories in social epidemiology. For this purpose, we further clarify our arguments and state that in health inequality research it is important to: 1) Pay attention to the unintended effects of research; 2) Consider the origin and effects of explanatory concepts; and 3) reflect on the norms of cultural capital.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ilse Dijkstra
- Care and Public Health Research Institute (CAPHRI) Maastricht University, Maastricht PO Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, the Netherlands.
| | - Klasien Horstman
- Care and Public Health Research Institute (CAPHRI) Maastricht University, Maastricht PO Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, the Netherlands.
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3
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Martinez AS, Underwood AJ, Christofoletti RA, Pardal A, Fortuna MA, Marcelo-Silva J, Morais GC, Lana PC. On the science of marine environmental impact assessments in Brazil: A reply to Choueri et al. (2022). Sci Total Environ 2022; 826:155229. [PMID: 35421498 DOI: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.155229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/08/2022] [Accepted: 04/08/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Aline S Martinez
- Institute of Marine Science, Federal University of São Paulo (IMar/UNIFESP), Rua Dr Carvalho de Mendonça 144, Santos, SP 11070-100, Brazil.
| | - Antony J Underwood
- Marine Ecology Laboratories A11, School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
| | - Ronaldo A Christofoletti
- Institute of Marine Science, Federal University of São Paulo (IMar/UNIFESP), Rua Dr Carvalho de Mendonça 144, Santos, SP 11070-100, Brazil
| | - André Pardal
- Institute of Marine Science, Federal University of São Paulo (IMar/UNIFESP), Rua Dr Carvalho de Mendonça 144, Santos, SP 11070-100, Brazil; Center for Natural and Human Sciences, Federal University of ABC (CCNH/UFABC), Rua Santa Adélia, 166, Santo André, SP 09210-170, Brazil
| | - Monique A Fortuna
- Institute of Marine Science, Federal University of São Paulo (IMar/UNIFESP), Rua Dr Carvalho de Mendonça 144, Santos, SP 11070-100, Brazil
| | - João Marcelo-Silva
- Institute of Marine Science, Federal University of São Paulo (IMar/UNIFESP), Rua Dr Carvalho de Mendonça 144, Santos, SP 11070-100, Brazil
| | - Gisele C Morais
- Laboratório de Bentos, Centro de Estudos do Mar, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Av. Beira-mar, s/n, Pontal do Paraná, PR 83255-976, Brazil
| | - Paulo C Lana
- Laboratório de Bentos, Centro de Estudos do Mar, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Av. Beira-mar, s/n, Pontal do Paraná, PR 83255-976, Brazil
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4
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Lenhard J. A transformation of Bayesian statistics:Computation, prediction, and rationality. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2022; 92:144-151. [PMID: 35176618 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.01.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/18/2021] [Revised: 01/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/31/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
Bayesian approaches have long been a small minority group in scientific practice, but quickly acquired a high level of popularity since the 1990s. This paper shall describe and analyze this turn. I argue that the success of Bayesian approaches hinges on computational methods that make a class of models predictive that would otherwise lack practical relevance. Philosophically, however, this orientation toward prediction comes at a price. The new computational approaches change Bayesian rationality in an important way. Namely, they undercut the interpretation of priors, turning them from an expression of beliefs held prior to new evidence into an adjustable parameter that can be manipulated flexibly by computational machinery. Thus, in the case of Bayes, one can see a coevolution of computing technology, an exploratory-iterative mode of prediction, and the conception of rationality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johannes Lenhard
- Laboratory of Engineering Thermodynamics, TU Kaiserslautern, Germany.
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Dupré J, Leonelli S. Process epistemology in the COVID-19 era: rethinking the research process to avoid dangerous forms of reification. Eur J Philos Sci 2022; 12:20. [PMID: 35284029 PMCID: PMC8900089 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-022-00450-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2021] [Accepted: 01/30/2022] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
Whether we live in a world of autonomous things, or a world of interconnected processes in constant flux, is an ancient philosophical debate. Modern biology provides decisive reasons for embracing the latter view. How does one understand the practices and outputs of science in such a dynamic, ever-changing world - and particularly in an emergency situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where scientific knowledge has been regarded as bedrock for decisive social interventions? We argue that key to answering this question is to consider the role of the activity of reification within the research process. Reification consists in the identification of more or less stable features of the flux, and treating these as constituting stable things. As we illustrate with reference to biological and biomedical research on COVID-19, reification is a necessary component of any process of inquiry and comes in at least two forms: (1) means reification (phenomena-to-object), when researchers create objects meant to capture features of the world, or phenomena, in order to be able to study them; and (2) target reification (object-to-phenomena), when researchers infer an understanding of phenomena from an investigation of the epistemic objects created to study them. We note that both objects and phenomena are dynamic processes and argue that have no reason to assume that changes in objects and phenomena track one another. We conclude that failure to acknowledge these forms of reification and their epistemic role in scientific inquiry can have dire consequences for how the resulting knowledge is interpreted and used.
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Affiliation(s)
- John Dupré
- Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life Sciences (Egenis), University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
| | - Sabina Leonelli
- Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life Sciences (Egenis), University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
- Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Wallotstrasse 19, 14193 Berlin, Germany
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Camacho MP. Beyond descriptive accuracy: The central dogma of molecular biology in scientific practice. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2021; 86:20-26. [PMID: 33965660 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.01.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/28/2020] [Accepted: 01/02/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
There is no denying the Central Dogma's impact on the biological sciences. Since the Dogma's formulation by Francis Crick in 1958, however, many have debated the Dogma's empirical adequacy. My aim is to move beyond these discussions, and instead consider the Central Dogma's significance to contemporary biological practice. To do this, I consider four distinct approaches for determining the non-descriptive methodological significance of a scientific principle. I argue that these approaches fail to vindicate the Central Dogma, and that, under many of these approaches, the Dogma amounts to a triviality.
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Affiliation(s)
- M Polo Camacho
- The University of Kansas, Philosophy Department, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd., Lawrence, KS, Wescoe Hall, Room, 3090, United States.
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Fischhoff B, Dewitt B, Sahlin NE, Davis A. A secure procedure for early career scientists to report apparent misconduct. Life Sci Soc Policy 2021; 17:2. [PMID: 33487177 PMCID: PMC7831163 DOI: 10.1186/s40504-020-00110-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2020] [Accepted: 12/28/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Early career scientists sometimes observe senior scientists engage in apparent scientific misconduct, but feel powerless to intervene, lest they imperil their careers. We propose a Secure Reporting Procedure that both protects them, when pursuing those concerns, and treats the senior scientists fairly. The proposed procedure is, we argue, consistent with the ethical principles of the scientific community, as expressed in the codes of its professional organizations. However, its implementation will require changes in procedures and regulations. Those efforts will be a small price to pay for protecting the scientific community's integrity and fidelity to its principles. We begin by describing the circumstances motivating the proposal, then sketch its design, and, finally, illustrate next steps in its application in two national settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Baruch Fischhoff
- Department of Engineering & Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA USA
- Institute for Politics & Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA USA
| | - Barry Dewitt
- Department of Engineering & Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA USA
- Medical Ethics, Department of Clinical Sciences, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
| | - Nils-Eric Sahlin
- Medical Ethics, Department of Clinical Sciences, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
| | - Alex Davis
- Department of Engineering & Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA USA
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Luchetti M. From successful measurement to the birth of a law: Disentangling coordination in Ohm's scientific practice. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2020; 84:119-131. [PMID: 33218458 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.09.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2019] [Revised: 09/08/2020] [Accepted: 09/10/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm's work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means of abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm's measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm's experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm's assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm's law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination.
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Thines M, Aoki T, Crous PW, Hyde KD, Lücking R, Malosso E, May TW, Miller AN, Redhead SA, Yurkov AM, Hawksworth DL. Setting scientific names at all taxonomic ranks in italics facilitates their quick recognition in scientific papers. IMA Fungus 2020; 11:25. [PMID: 33292779 PMCID: PMC7670697 DOI: 10.1186/s43008-020-00048-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2020] [Accepted: 10/27/2020] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
It is common practice in scientific journals to print genus and species names in italics. This is not only historical as species names were traditionally derived from Greek or Latin. Importantly, it also facilitates the rapid recognition of genus and species names when skimming through manuscripts. However, names above the genus level are not always italicized, except in some journals which have adopted this practice for all scientific names. Since scientific names treated under the various Codes of nomenclature are without exception treated as Latin, there is no reason why names above genus level should be handled differently, particularly as higher taxon names are becoming increasingly relevant in systematic and evolutionary studies and their italicization would aid the unambiguous recognition of formal scientific names distinguishing them from colloquial names. Several leading mycological and botanical journals have already adopted italics for names of all taxa regardless of rank over recent decades, as is the practice in the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants, and we hereby recommend that this practice be taken up broadly in scientific journals and textbooks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco Thines
- Department of Biological Sciences, Goethe University, Institute of Ecology Evolution and Diversity, Max-von-Laue-Str. 13, 60439 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- Senckenberg Biodiversity and Climate Research Centre (BiK-F), Senckenberganlage 25, 60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
| | - Takayuki Aoki
- Genetic Resources Center, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, 2-1-2 Kannondai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8602 Japan
| | - Pedro W. Crous
- Westerdijk Fungal Biodiversity Institute, Uppsalalaan 8, 3584CT Utrecht, the Netherlands
| | - Kevin D. Hyde
- Center of Excellence in Fungal Research, Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, 57100 Thailand
| | - Robert Lücking
- Botanischer Garten und Botanisches Museum, Freie Universität Berlin, Königin-Luise-Straße 6-8, 14195 Berlin, Germany
| | - Elaine Malosso
- Departamento de Micologia. Recife, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Centro de Biociências, Recife, 50.740-600 Brazil
| | - Tom W. May
- Royal Botanic Gardens Victoria, Melbourne, Victoria 3004 Australia
| | - Andrew N. Miller
- Illinois Natural History Survey, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
| | - Scott A. Redhead
- Ottawa Research and Development Centre, Science and Technology Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 960 Carling Ave, Ottawa, ON K1A 0C6 Canada
| | - Andrey M. Yurkov
- Leibniz Institute DSMZ-German Collection of Microorganisms and Cell Cultures, Inhoffenstrasse 7B, 38124 Braunschweig, Germany
| | - David L. Hawksworth
- Department of Life Sciences, The Natural History Museum, Cromwell Road, London, SW7 5BD UK
- Comparative Plant and Fungal Biology, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, Surrey, TW9 3DS UK
- Jilin Agricultural University, Changchun, Jilin Province 130118 People’s Republic of China
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Priest G, De Toffoli S, Findlen P. Tools of Reason: The Practice of Scientific Diagramming from Antiquity to the Present. Endeavour 2018; 42:49-59. [PMID: 30143241 DOI: 10.1016/j.endeavour.2018.07.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Greg Priest
- Stanford University, Department of History, United States.
| | | | - Paula Findlen
- Stanford University, Department of History, United States
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Abstract
From his earliest student days through the writing of his last book, Charles Darwin drew diagrams. In developing his evolutionary ideas, his preferred form of diagram was the tree. An examination of several of Darwin's trees-from sketches in a private notebook from the late 1830s through the diagram published in the Origin-opens a window onto the role of diagramming in Darwin's scientific practice. In his diagrams, Darwin simultaneously represented both observable patterns in nature and conjectural narratives of evolutionary history. He then brought these natural patterns and narratives into dialogue, allowing him to explore whether the narratives could explain the patterns. But Darwin's diagrams did not reveal their meaning directly to passive readers; they required readers to engage dynamically with them in order to understand the connections they disclosed between patterns and narratives. Moreover, the narratives Darwin depicted in his diagrams did not represent past sequences of events that he claimed had actually occurred; the narratives were conjectural, schematic, and probabilistic. Instead of depicting actual histories in all their particularity, Darwin depicted narratives in his diagrams in order to make general claims about how nature works. The conjunction of these features of Darwin's diagrams is central to how they do their epistemic work.
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Affiliation(s)
- Greg Priest
- Stanford University Department of History, United States.
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12
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Sheredos B. Communicating with scientific graphics: A descriptive inquiry into non-ideal normativity. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2017; 63:32-44. [PMID: 28412578 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2017.03.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2016] [Revised: 12/13/2016] [Accepted: 03/09/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. Here I supplement our understanding of graphical practices via a case study of how researchers crafted the graphics for scientific publication in the field of circadian biology. The case highlights social aspects of graphical production which have gone understudied - especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I argue that it also supports a challenge to the claim that empirically-informed "cognitive design principles" offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern good scientific graphic design to communicate data and hypotheses to other experts. In this respect, the case-study also illustrates how "descriptive" studies of scientific practice can connect with normative issues in philosophy of science, thereby addressing a central concern in recent discussions of practice-oriented philosophy of science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Sheredos
- Department of Philosophy, Center for Circadian Biology, UC San Diego, United States.
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Ankeny RA, Leonelli S. Repertoires: A post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific change and collaborative research. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2016; 60:18-28. [PMID: 27938718 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.08.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2016] [Revised: 08/18/2016] [Accepted: 08/29/2016] [Indexed: 05/23/2023]
Abstract
We propose a framework to describe, analyze, and explain the conditions under which scientific communities organize themselves to do research, particularly within large-scale, multidisciplinary projects. The framework centers on the notion of a research repertoire, which encompasses well-aligned assemblages of the skills, behaviors, and material, social, and epistemic components that a group may use to practice certain kinds of science, and whose enactment affects the methods and results of research. This account provides an alternative to the idea of Kuhnian paradigms for understanding scientific change in the following ways: (1) it does not frame change as primarily generated and shaped by theoretical developments, but rather takes account of administrative, material, technological, and institutional innovations that contribute to change and explicitly questions whether and how such innovations accompany, underpin, and/or undercut theoretical shifts; (2) it thus allows for tracking of the organization, continuity, and coherence in research practices which Kuhn characterized as 'normal science' without relying on the occurrence of paradigmatic shifts and revolutions to be able to identify relevant components; and (3) it requires particular attention be paid to the performative aspects of science, whose study Kuhn pioneered but which he did not extensively conceptualize. We provide a detailed characterization of repertoires and discuss their relationship with communities, disciplines, and other forms of collaborative activities within science, building on an analysis of historical episodes and contemporary developments in the life sciences, as well as cases drawn from social and historical studies of physics, psychology, and medicine.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rachel A Ankeny
- School of Humanities, Napier 4th Floor, University of Adelaide, Adelaide 5005 SA, Australia.
| | - Sabina Leonelli
- Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology & Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life Sciences (Egenis), University of Exeter, Byrne House, St Germans Road, EX4 4PJ Exeter, UK.
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Abstract
This paper motivates and outlines a new account of scientific explanation, which I term 'collaborative explanation.' My approach is pluralist: I do not claim that all scientific explanations are collaborative, but only that some important scientific explanations are-notably those of complex organic processes like development. Collaborative explanation is closely related to what philosophers of biology term 'mechanistic explanation' (e.g., Machamer et al., Craver, 2007). I begin with minimal conditions for mechanisms: complexity, causality, and multilevel structure. Different accounts of mechanistic explanation interpret and prioritize these conditions in different ways. This framework reveals two distinct varieties of mechanistic explanation: causal and constitutive. The two have heretofore been conflated, with philosophical discussion focusing on the former. This paper addresses the imbalance, using a case study of modeling practices in Systems Biology to reveals key features of constitutive mechanistic explanation. I then propose an analysis of this variety of mechanistic explanation, in terms of collaborative concepts, and sketch the outlines of a general theory of collaborative explanation. I conclude with some reflections on the connection between this variety of explanation and social aspects of scientific practice.
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Love AC. Collaborative explanation, explanatory roles, and scientific explaining in practice. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2015; 52:88-94. [PMID: 26193791 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.03.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2015] [Accepted: 03/30/2015] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
Scientific explanation is a perennial topic in philosophy of science, but the literature has fragmented into specialized discussions in different scientific disciplines. An increasing attention to scientific practice by philosophers is (in part) responsible for this fragmentation and has put pressure on criteria of adequacy for philosophical accounts of explanation, usually demanding some form of pluralism. This commentary examines the arguments offered by Fagan and Woody with respect to explanation and understanding in scientific practice. I begin by scrutinizing Fagan's concept of collaborative explanation, highlighting its distinctive advantages and expressing concern about several of its assumptions. Then I analyze Woody's attempt to reorient discussions of scientific explanation around functional considerations, elaborating on the wider implications of this methodological recommendation. I conclude with reflections on synergies and tensions that emerge when the two papers are juxtaposed and how these draw attention to critical issues that confront ongoing philosophical analyses of scientific explanation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alan C Love
- University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, Department of Philosophy, Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave S, Minneapolis, MN 55455-0310, United States.
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Kochan J. Putting a spin on circulating reference, or how to rediscover the scientific subject. Stud Hist Philos Sci 2015; 49:103-107. [PMID: 26109416 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.10.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/05/2014] [Revised: 10/23/2014] [Accepted: 10/24/2014] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of "circulating reference." Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless practices of science are thus re-united.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeff Kochan
- Zukunftskolleg, Box 216, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany.
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