Neuroimages in court: less biasing than feared

Interpreting Neuroscientific Evidence in the Legal Domain: Do the Stereotypes Come In?

The current article explores the meaning of neuroscientific evidence in the legal domain. It takes a social-psychological perspective to discuss how group-based stereotypes affect legal decision-making critically. Examining how any interpretation is anchored and objectified is interesting as evidence is interpreted in the context. Dominantly, with the ubiquity of neuroscience in different domains, the brain is positioned as an authentic source of nurturing authenticity. It is observed that sometimes unquestionable scientific knowledge may surpass the rationality and intuition of judges. In one way, it is a boon; in another, it is shaping the whole framework of our knowledge system, where knowledge from brain studies reifies our understanding of human actions and thinking.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Neurolaw: Challenges and limits

This chapter canvasses the current relevance of behavioral neuroscience to the law, especially to issues of criminal responsibility and competence. It begins with an explanation of the legal doctrines at stake. I then explore the source of the often-inflated claims for the legal relevance of neuroscience. The next section discusses the scientific status of behavioral neuroscience. Then, it addresses two radical challenges to current conceptions of criminal responsibility that neuroscience allegedly poses: determinism and the death of agency. The question of the specific relevance of neuroscience to criminal law doctrine, practice, and institutions is considered next. This is followed by a discussion of how neuroscience evidence is being used in criminal cases in five different countries, including the United States. The penultimate section points to some areas warranting modest optimism. A brief conclusion suggests that neuroscience is at present of limited legal relevance, and advances in the science might alter that judgment.

Re-wiring Guilt: How Advancing Neuroscience Encourages Strategic Interventions Over Retributive Justice

The increasing visibility of neuroscience employed in legal contexts has rightfully prompted critical discourse regarding the boundaries of its utility. High profile debates include some extreme positions that either undermine the relevance of neuroscience or overstate its role in determining legal responsibility. Here we adopt a conciliatory attitude, reaffirming the current value of neuroscience in jurisprudence and addressing its role in shifting normative attitudes about culpability. Adopting a balanced perspective about the interaction between two dynamic fields (science and law) allows for more fruitful consideration of practical changes likely to improve the way we engage in legal decision-making. Neuroscience provides a useful platform for addressing nuanced and multifaceted deterministic factors promoting antisocial behavior. Ultimately, we suggest that shifting normative attitudes about culpability vis-à-vis advancing neuroscience are not likely to promote major changes in the way we assign legal responsibility. Rather, it helps us to shed our harshest retributivist instincts in favor of more pragmatic strategies for combating the most conspicuous patterns promoting mass incarceration and recidivism.

Neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom: a review

The use of neuroscience in the courtroom can be traced back to the early twentieth century. However, the use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal proceedings has increased significantly over the last two decades. This rapid increase has raised questions, among the media as well as the legal and scientific communities, regarding the effects that such evidence could have on legal decision makers. In this article, we first outline the history of neuroscientific evidence in courtrooms and then we provide a review of recent research investigating the effects of neuroscientific evidence on decision-making broadly, and on legal decisions specifically. In the latter case, we review studies that measure the effect of neuroscientific evidence (both imaging and nonimaging) on verdicts, sentencing recommendations, and beliefs of mock jurors and judges presented with a criminal case. Overall, the reviewed studies suggest mitigating effects of neuroscientific evidence on some legal decisions (e.g., the death penalty). Furthermore, factors such as mental disorder diagnoses and perceived dangerousness might moderate the mitigating effect of such evidence. Importantly, neuroscientific evidence that includes images of the brain does not appear to have an especially persuasive effect (compared with other neuroscientific evidence that does not include an image). Future directions for research are discussed, with a specific call for studies that vary defendant characteristics, the nature of the crime, and a juror’s perception of the defendant, in order to better understand the roles of moderating factors and cognitive mediators of persuasion.

Mild traumatic brain injury: Is DTI ready for the courtroom?

Important advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging have revolutionized our understanding of the human brain. Many of these advances provide new evidence regarding compensable injuries that have been used to support changes in legal policy. For example, we now know that regions of the brain involved in decision making continue to develop into the mid-20s, and this information weighs heavily in determining that execution or automatic sentence of life without the possibility of parole for someone younger than 18 years old, at the time of the crime, violates the 8th Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." The probative value of other testimony regarding neuroimaging, however, is less clear, particularly for mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI), also known as concussion. There is nonetheless some evidence that new imaging technologies, most notably diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), may be useful in detecting mTBI. More specifically, DTI is sensitive to detecting diffuse axonal brain injuries in white matter, the most common brain injury in mTBI. DTI is, in fact, the most promising technique available today for such injuries and it is beginning to be used clinically, although it remains largely within the purview of research. Its probative value is also not clear as it may be both prejudicial and misleading given that standardization is not yet established for use in either the clinic or the courtroom, and thus it may be premature for use in either. There are also concerns with the methods and analyses that have been used to provide quantitative evidence in legal cases. It is within this context that we provide a commentary on the use of neuroimaging in the courtroom, most particularly DTI, and the admissibility of evidence, as well as the definition and role of expert testimony. While there is a great deal of evidence demonstrating cognitive impairments in attention, processing speed, memory, and concentration from neuropsychological testing following mTBI, we focus here on the more recent introduction of DTI imaging in the courtroom. We also review definitions of mTBI followed by admissibility standards for scientific evidence in the courtroom, including Daubert criteria and two subsequent cases that comprise the so-called Daubert trilogy rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony. This is followed by a brief review of neuroimaging techniques available today, the latter with an emphasis on DTI and its application to mTBI. We then review some of the court rulings on the use of DTI. We end by highlighting the importance of neuroimaging in providing a new window on the brain, while cautioning against the premature use of new advances in imaging in the courtroom before standards are established in the clinical arena, which are informed by research. We also discuss further what is needed to reach a tipping point where such advances will provide important and meaningful data with respect to their probative value.

The charm of structural neuroimaging in insanity evaluations: guidelines to avoid misinterpretation of the findings

Despite the popularity of structural neuroimaging techniques in twenty-first-century research, its results have had limited translational impact in real-world settings, where inferences need to be made at the individual level. Structural neuroimaging methods are now introduced frequently to aid in assessing defendants for insanity in criminal forensic evaluations, with the aim of providing "convergence" of evidence on the mens rea of the defendant. This approach may provide pivotal support for judges' decisions. Although neuroimaging aims to reduce uncertainty and controversies in legal settings and to increase the objectivity of criminal rulings, the application of structural neuroimaging in forensic settings is hampered by cognitive biases in the evaluation of evidence that lead to misinterpretation of the imaging results. It is thus increasingly important to have clear guidelines on the correct ways to apply and interpret neuroimaging evidence. In the current paper, we review the literature concerning structural neuroimaging in court settings with the aim of identifying rules for its correct application and interpretation. These rules, which aim to decrease the risk of biases, focus on the importance of (i) descriptive diagnoses, (ii) anatomo-clinical correlation, (iii) brain plasticity and (iv) avoiding logical fallacies, such as reverse inference. In addition, through the analysis of real forensic cases, we describe errors frequently observed due to incorrect interpretations of imaging. Clear guidelines for both the correct circumstances for introducing neuroimaging and its eventual interpretation are defined.

Legal Evidence of Subjective States: A Brain-Based Model of Chronic Pain Increases Accuracy and Fairness in Law

Advances in structural and functional neuroimaging offer new ways to conceptualize chronic pain disorders and to prevent, diagnose, and treat chronic pain. Advances in pain science, though, do not entail changes in the concepts of chronic pain in law and culture. Authoritative legal and cultural conceptions of chronic pain continue to promote abstruse theories, characterizing these disorders as arising out of everything from a person's unmet need for love to resistance to "patriarchy." These constructs have consequences, impeding treatment and affecting whether individuals with chronic pain can obtain legal redress. Legal systems themselves are disadvantaged, as adjudicators struggle to make sense of regulations and presumptions at odds with the medical evidence that they must evaluate. Law's pain schema is so misdescriptive that, paradoxically, it can reward fraudulent claims and disadvantage legitimate ones. This review discusses advances in neuroimaging and related sciences that are contributing to an emerging neurological model of chronic pain. It then describes doctrines and cases in the United States and United Kingdom, demonstrating how law's pre-neurological model of pain complicates the legal process for all participants. It concludes with suggestions for doctrinal revisions, which may have broader effects on law's long-standing dualistic conception of body versus mind.

Prefrontal electrical stimulation in non-depressed reduces levels of reported negative affects from daily stressors

Advances in neuroscience and pharmacology have led to improvements in the cognitive performance of people with neurological disease and other forms of cognitive decline. These same methods may also afford cognitive enhancement in people of otherwise normal cognitive abilities. “Cosmetic”, or supranormal, cognitive enhancement offers opportunities to enrich our social or financial status, our interactions with others, and the common wealth of our community. It is common to focus on the potential benefits of cognitive enhancement, while being less than clear about the possible drawbacks. Here I examine the harms or side-effects associated with a range of cognitive enhancement interventions. I propose a taxonomy of harms in cognitive enhancement, with harms classified as (neuro)biological, ethical, or societal. Biological harms are those that directly affect the person’s biological functioning, such as when a drug affects a person’s mood or autonomic function. Ethical harms are those that touch on issues such as fairness and cheating, or on erosion of autonomy and coercion. Societal harms are harms that affect whole populations, and which are normally the province of governments, such as the use of enhancement in military contexts. This taxonomy of harms will help to focus the debate around the use and regulation of cognitive enhancement. In particular it will help to clarify the appropriate network of stakeholders who should take an interest in each potential harm, and in minimizing the impact of these harms.

Effects of Mental Health and Neuroscience Evidence on Juror Perceptions of a Criminal Defendant: the Moderating Role of Political Orientation

Several recent studies have examined the effects of mental health and neuroscientific evidence on attitudes toward criminal defendants, suggesting that these factors may influence juror decision-making in meaningful ways. Few studies to date have manipulated both of these variables while also considering theoretically important individual difference variables (e.g., political orientation). Using a criminal case simulation, this study manipulated the presence of evidence concerning mental disorders (psychopathy and schizophrenia) and increasing levels of neuroscientific detail regarding a defendant's brain injury, and examined verdicts and sentencing recommendations in over 400 persons attending jury duty. Main effects were detected for mental health testimony and political orientation, although interactions were noted as well. More negative reactions to defendants labeled as psychopaths were relatively consistent, whereas participants who identified as liberal generally were less punitive towards a defendant identified as schizophrenic than were more conservative jurors. Consistent with other recent research, juror perceptions of the defendant's level of psychopathic traits (independent of the effects of the experimental manipulations) predicted guilty verdicts and longer sentencing recommendations. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Neuroscience in forensic psychiatry: From responsibility to dangerousness. Ethical and legal implications of using neuroscience for dangerousness assessments

Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in criminal trials as part of psychiatric testimony. Up to now, "neurolaw" literature remained focused on the use of neuroscience for assessments of criminal responsibility. However, in the field of forensic psychiatry, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness and risk assessment gain increasing importance. In this paper, we argue that the introduction of neuroscientific data by forensic experts in criminal trials will be mostly be used in the future as a means to evaluate or as an indication of an offender's dangerousness, rather than their responsibility. Judges confronted with the pressure to ensure public security may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's risk of reoffending. First, we aim to show how the current socio-legal context has reshaped the task of the forensic psychiatrist, with dangerousness assessments prevailing. In the second part, we examine from a critical point of view the promise of neuroscience to serve a better criminal justice system by offering new tools for risk assessment. Then we aim to explain why neuroscientific evidence is likely to be used as evidence of dangerousness of the defendants. On a theoretical level, the current tendency in criminal policies to focus on prognostics of dangerousness seems to be "justified" by a utilitarian approach to punishment, supposedly revealed by new neuroscientific discoveries that challenge the notions of free will and responsibility. Although often promoted as progressive and humane, we believe that this approach could lead to an instrumentalization of neuroscience in the interest of public safety and give rise to interventions which could entail ethical caveats and run counter to the interests of the offenders. The last part of this paper deals with some of these issues-the danger of stigmatization for brain damaged offenders because of adopting a purely therapeutic approach to crime, and the impact on their sentencing, in particular.

Adult age-dependent differences in resting-state connectivity within and between visual-attention and sensorimotor networks

Healthy aging is accompanied by structural and functional changes in the brain, among which a loss of neural specificity (i.e., dedifferentiation) is one of the most consistent findings. Little is known, however, about changes in interregional integration underlying a dedifferentiation across different functional systems. In a large sample (n = 399) of healthy adults aged from 18 to 85 years, we analyzed age-dependent differences in resting-state (RS) (task-independent) functional connectivity (FC) of a set of brain regions derived from a previous fMRI study. In that study, these regions had shown an age-related loss of activation specificity in visual-attention (superior parietal area 7A and dorsal premotor cortex) or sensorimotor (area OP4 of the parietal operculum) tasks. In addition to these dedifferentiated regions, the FC analysis of the present study included “task-general” regions associated with both attention and sensorimotor systems (rostral supplementary motor area and bilateral anterior insula) as defined via meta-analytical co-activation mapping. Within this network, we observed both selective increases and decreases in RS-FC with age. In line with regional activation changes reported previously, we found diminished anti-correlated FC for inter-system connections (i.e., between sensorimotor-related and visual attention-related regions). Our analysis also revealed reduced FC between system-specific and task-general regions, which might reflect age-related deficits in top-down control possibly leading to dedifferentiation of task-specific brain activity. Together, our results underpin the notion that RS-FC changes concur with regional activity changes in the healthy aging brain, presumably contributing jointly to age-related behavioral changes.