The Argumentative Theory: Predictions and Empirical Evidence

Wayfinding in pairs: comparing the planning and navigation performance of dyads and individuals in a real-world environment

Navigation is essential to life, and it is cognitively complex, drawing on abilities such as prospective and situated planning, spatial memory, location recognition, and real-time decision-making. In many cases, day-to-day navigation is embedded in a social context where cognition and behavior are shaped by others, but the great majority of existing research in spatial cognition has focused on individuals. The two studies we report here contribute to our understanding of social wayfinding, assessing the performance of paired and individual navigators on a real-world wayfinding task in which they were instructed to minimize time and distance traveled. In the first study, we recruited 30 pairs of friends (familiar dyads); in the second, we recruited 30 solo participants (individuals). We compare the two studies to the results of an earlier study of 30 pairs of strangers (unfamiliar dyads). We draw out differences in performance with respect to spatial, social, and cognitive considerations. Of the three conditions, solo participants were least successful in reaching the destination accurately on their initial attempt. Friends traveled more efficiently than either strangers or individuals. Working with a partner also appeared to lend confidence to wayfinders: dyads of either familiarity type were more persistent than individuals in the navigation task, even after encountering challenges or making incorrect attempts. Route selection was additionally impacted by route complexity and unfamiliarity with the study area. Navigators explicitly used ease of remembering as a planning criterion, and the resulting differences in route complexity likely influenced success during enacted navigation.

Explaining contentious political issues promotes open-minded thinking

Cognitive scientists suggest that inviting people to explain contentious political issues might reduce intergroup toxicity because it exposes people to how poorly they understand the issue. However, whether providing explanations can result in more open-minded political thinking remains unclear. On one hand, inviting people to explain a political issue might make them more impartial and open-minded in their thinking. On the other hand, an invitation to explain a contentious political issue might lead to myside bias-rationalization of one's default position. Here, we address these contrasting predictions in five experiments (N = 1884; three pre-registered), conducted across a variety of contexts: with graduate students interacting with an actor in a laboratory setting, with US residents at the peak of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, with UK residents before the highly polarized 2019 Brexit vote, and with gun-control partisans. Across studies, we found that explaining politically contentious topics resulted in more open-minded thinking, an effect that generalized across coded (Studies 1-4) and self-report (Studies 3-4) measures. We also observed that participants who were made to feel like their explanations were welcomed felt closer to their discussion partner (Studies 3-4), an effect that generalized to all outgroup members with whom they disagreed with about the politically contentious issue (Study 4). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, and the potential for explanations to foster open-minded political engagement.

What Makes Us Smart?

How did humans become clever enough to live in nearly every major ecosystem on earth, create vaccines against deadly plagues, explore the oceans depths, and routinely traverse the globe at 30,000 feet in aluminum tubes while nibbling on roasted almonds? Drawing on recent developments in our understanding of human evolution, we consider what makes us distinctively smarter than other animals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, human brilliance emerges not from our innate brainpower or raw computational capacities, but from the sharing of information in communities and networks over generations. We review how larger, more diverse, and more optimally interconnected networks of minds give rise to faster innovation and how the cognitive products of this cumulative cultural evolutionary process feedback to make us individually "smarter"-in the sense of being better at meeting the challenges and problems posed by our societies and socioecologies. Here, we consider not only how cultural evolution supplies us with "thinking tools" (like counting systems and fractions) but also how it has shaped our ontologies (e.g., do germs and witches exist?) and epistemologies, including our notions of what constitutes a "good reason" or "good evidence" (e.g., are dreams a source of evidence?). Building on this, we consider how cultural evolution has organized and distributed cultural knowledge and cognitive tasks among subpopulations, effectively shifting both thinking and production to the level of the community, population, or network, resulting in collective information processing and group decisions. Cultural evolution can turn mindless mobs into wise crowds by facilitating and constraining cognition through a wide variety of epistemic institutions-political, legal, and scientific. These institutions process information and aid better decision-making by suppressing or encouraging the use of different cultural epistemologies and ontologies.

Psychological inoculation strategies to fight climate disinformation across 12 countries

Decades after the scientific debate about the anthropogenic causes of climate change was settled, climate disinformation still challenges the scientific evidence in public discourse. Here we present a comprehensive theoretical framework of (anti)science belief formation and updating to account for the psychological factors that influence the acceptance or rejection of scientific messages. We experimentally investigated, across 12 countries (N = 6,816), the effectiveness of six inoculation strategies targeting these factors-scientific consensus, trust in scientists, transparent communication, moralization of climate action, accuracy and positive emotions-to fight real-world disinformation about climate science and mitigation actions. While exposure to disinformation had strong detrimental effects on participants' climate change beliefs (δ = -0.16), affect towards climate mitigation action (δ = -0.33), ability to detect disinformation (δ = -0.14) and pro-environmental behaviour (δ = -0.24), we found almost no evidence for protective effects of the inoculations (all δ < 0.20). We discuss the implications of these findings and propose ways forward to fight climate disinformation.

Political ideology shapes risk and benefit judgments of COVID-19 vaccines

In April 2021, the use of the Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine was paused to investigate whether it had caused serious blood clots to a small number of women (six out of 6.8 million Americans who had been administered that vaccine). As these events were unfolding, we surveyed a sample of Americans (N = 625) to assess their reactions to this news, whether they supported the pausing of the vaccine, and potential psychological factors underlying their decision. In addition, we employed automated text analyses as a supporting method to more classical quantitative measures. Results showed that political ideology influenced the support for the pausing of the vaccine; liberals were more likely to oppose it than conservatives. In addition, the effect of political ideology was mediated by the difference between perceived benefit and risk and the language style used to produce reasons in support (or against) the decision to pause the vaccine. Liberals perceived the benefit of vaccines higher than the risk, used a more analytic language style when stating their reasons, and had a more positive attitude toward the vaccine. We discuss the implications of our findings considering vaccine hesitancy and risk perception during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Rethinking paranoid ideation and reasoning: A pilot study based on the argumentative theory of reasoning

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Cognitive theories assume an imbalance of intuitive and analytical reasoning in paranoid ideation. The argumentative theory of reasoning offers an approach on the primary function of reasoning and its flaws. It assumes social exchange as main purpose of reasoning. We applied this theory to delusion research and tested experimentally whether social exchange in the form of production and evaluation of arguments influences subsequent reflective reasoning. Additionally, we examined whether the social network and the frequency/preference for discussions are associated with distorted reflective reasoning and paranoid ideation.

METHODS

327 participants completed the Social Network Index (SNI), the Paranoia Checklist (PCL), and the Cognitive Reflection Test-2 (CRT2). Moreover, preference and frequency of discussions were assessed. In the discussion group (N = 165), participants produced arguments and evaluated counterarguments on two socially relevant topics. The control group (N = 162) watched a nature video instead.

RESULTS

The discussion group showed lower distorted reflective reasoning than the control group. Discussion preference and/or frequency was associated with frequency and disturbance of paranoid thoughts, as well as overall paranoid ideation.

LIMITATIONS

Due to the online format environmental factors could not be held constant and no intrasubject comparison of the CRT2 could be computed in the trial. Furthermore, the sample mainly consisted of psychology students.

CONCLUSION

The results contribute to the understanding of distorted reflective reasoning and provides preliminary evidence that the argumentative theory of reasoning may offer a promising perspective for delusion research.

Online Interaction Turns the Congeniality Bias Into an Uncongeniality Bias

Online phenomena like echo chambers and polarization are believed to be driven by humans' penchant to selectively expose themselves to attitudinally congenial content. However, if like-minded content were the only predictor of online behavior, heated debate and flaming on the Internet would hardly occur. Research has overlooked how online behavior changes when people are given an opportunity to reply to dissenters. Three experiments (total N = 320; convenience student samples from Germany) and an internal meta-analysis show that in a discussion-forum setting where participants can reply to earlier comments larger cognitive conflict between participant attitude and comment attitude predicts higher likelihood to respond (uncongeniality bias). When the discussion climate was friendly (vs. oppositional) to the views of participants, the uncongeniality bias was more pronounced and was also associated with attitude polarization. These results suggest that belief polarization on social media may not only be driven by congeniality but also by conflict.

Science Communication as a Collective Intelligence Endeavor: A Manifesto and Examples for Implementation

Effective science communication is challenging when scientific messages are informed by a continually updating evidence base and must often compete against misinformation. We argue that we need a new program of science communication as collective intelligence-a collaborative approach, supported by technology. This would have four key advantages over the typical model where scientists communicate as individuals: scientific messages would be informed by (a) a wider base of aggregated knowledge, (b) contributions from a diverse scientific community, (c) participatory input from stakeholders, and (d) better responsiveness to ongoing changes in the state of knowledge.

Explaining Health Misinformation Belief through News, Social, and Alternative Health Media Use: The Moderating Roles of Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition

Explaining the spread and impact of health misinformation has garnered considerable attention with the uptake of social media and group messaging applications. This study contributes to that line of work by investigating how reliance on multiple digital media may help support or suppress misinformation belief, and how individual differences in misinformation susceptibility condition this process. Alternative health outlets (AH media), advocating home/homeopathic remedies over conventional medicine can be important sources of misinformation, yet are largely ignored previously. In this study, we first test how reliance on different platforms predicts health misinformation belief. Drawing from the elaboration likelihood model, we further investigate how need for cognition (NFC) and faith in intuition (FI) moderate the relationship between news reliance and susceptibility to misinformation. We conducted a survey in Singapore, Turkey, and the U.S (N = 3,664) to measure how these proposed relationships explain misinformed beliefs about vaccines, genetically modified foods and alternative medicine. We found reliance on online legacy news was negatively associated with the likelihood of believing health misinformation, while the reverse was true for social media and AH media. Additionally, those with both greater NFC and FI were more susceptible to health misinformation when they relied on social media and AH media more. In contrast, neither NFC nor FI moderated the relationship between reliance on online legacy news and health misinformation belief. These findings, mostly consistent across countries, also show that extensive reliance on social media and AH media for news mostly overwhelms the individual differences in predicting misinformation belief.

Pursuit and inquisitive reasons

Sometimes inquirers may rationally pursue a theory even when the available evidence does not favor that theory over others. Features of a theory that favor pursuing it are known as considerations of promise or pursuitworthiness. Examples of such reasons include that a theory is testable, that it has a useful associated analogy, and that it suggests new research and experiments. These reasons need not be evidence in favor of the theory. This raises the question: what kinds of reasons are provided by pursuitworthiness considerations? Are they epistemic reasons or practical reasons? I argue that pursuitworthiness considerations are a kind of non-evidential epistemic reason, which I call an inquisitive reason. In support of this, I first point out two important similarities between the traditional pursuitworthiness considerations discussed in philosophy of science, which I call promise reasons, and certain social epistemic reasons that I call social inquisitive reasons. Specifically, both kinds of reason (1) favor pursuing a theory in a non-evidential way, and (2) concern promoting successful inquiry. I then propose recognition of a new category of normative reason: inquisitive reasons. This category contains both promise and social inquisitive reasons. Finally, I argue that inquisitive reasons share three essential features with previously recognized epistemic reasons: a connection to epistemic aims, explanatory independence, and the presence of a specific right-kind/wrong-kind reasons distinction. Each of these features have been used to argue that evidence should be treated as part of a distinct, independent domain of epistemic normativity. Since inquisitive reasons share these features, they too should be considered part of this independent epistemic domain. Thus, inquisitive reasons, including pursuitworthiness considerations, are epistemic reasons.

Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility

In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote — intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one’s beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.

Intellectual humility involves acknowledging the limitations of one’s knowledge and that one’s beliefs might be incorrect. In this Review, Porter and colleagues synthesize concepts of intellectual humility across fields and describe the complex interplay between intellectual humility and related individual and societal factors.

Cognitive Blame Is Socially Shaped

Blame is not only a cognitive process but also a social act of moral criticism. Such acts of criticism often serve to correct a transgressor’s behavior but can be costly—to the moral critic, the transgressor, and the community. To limit these costs, blame is socially regulated: Communities set standards of evidence for blame and expect individuals to provide warrant, or justification, for their expressed judgments by pointing to appropriate evidence. We describe the path model of blame, which captures the cognitive processes that underlie blame judgments and that specify the kind of evidence that counts as warrant for blame. We then show how the varying costs of blaming put social pressure on the moral critic to be accurate and fair. We also identify conditions under which these pressures are weakened and standards of evidence decline: for example, when the transgressor has low status or is an out-group member, when the critic has high status or is anonymous, or when interactions are online. We close with numerous open questions that we hope will inspire further research into the hypothesis that cognitive blame is socially shaped.

Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies

Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to explain the processing of everyday arguments.

The Einstein effect provides global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity

People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. In a large and diverse cross-cultural sample (N = 10,195 from 24 countries), we presented participants with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. We found a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub 'the Einstein effect': across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, scientists held greater authority than spiritual gurus. In addition, individual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist compared with the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgements for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored our experimental findings. These findings suggest that irrespective of one's religious worldview, across cultures science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.

The potential for effective reasoning guides children's preference for small group discussion over crowdsourcing

Communication between social learners can make a group collectively "wiser" than any individual, but conformist tendencies can also distort collective judgment. We asked whether intuitions about when communication is likely to improve or distort collective judgment could allow social learners to take advantage of the benefits of communication while minimizing the risks. In three experiments (n = 360), 7- to 10-year old children and adults decided whether to refer a question to a small group for discussion or "crowdsource" independent judgments from individual advisors. For problems affording the kind of 'demonstrative' reasoning that allows a group member to reliably correct errors made by even a majority, all ages preferred to consult the discussion group, even compared to a crowd ten times as large-consistent with past research suggesting that discussion groups regularly outperform even their best members for reasoning problems. In contrast, we observed a consistent developmental shift towards crowdsourcing independent judgments when reasoning by itself was insufficient to conclusively answer a question. Results suggest sophisticated intuitions about the nature of social influence and collective intelligence may guide our social learning strategies from early in development.

Universality and Cultural Diversity in Moral Reasoning and Judgment

Many theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by anchoring it in the realm of the social systems and values of each culture. This review discusses the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. It aims to survey key criticisms that emerged in the past decades. In both cases, we highlight examples of cultural differences in morality, to show that there are cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners' individualistic culture and Easterners' collectivist culture. It suggests a paradigmatic change in this field by proposing pluralist "moralities" thought to be universal and rooted in the human evolutionary past. Notwithstanding, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral reasonings and judgments. Depending on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional regulations (e.g., kinship structure and economic markets), each society develops a moral system emphasizing several moral orientations. This variability raises questions for normative theories of morality from a cross-cultural perspective. Consequently, we shed light on future descriptive work on morality to identify the cultural characteristics likely to impact the expression or development of reasoning, justification, argumentation, and moral judgment in Westerners' individualistic culture and Easterners' collectivist culture.

Motivated to learn: An account of explanatory satisfaction

Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels satisfying. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally ("brute motivation" account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation ("aligned motivation" account). In Studies 1-2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2-4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative "reductive" explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the "imperfectly aligned motivation" account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.

Pseudoexpertise: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis

Some people publicly pretend to be experts while not being ones. They are pseudoexperts, and their presence seems to be ubiquitous in the current cultural landscape. This manuscript explores the nature and mechanisms of pseudoexpertise. We first provide a conceptual analysis of pseudoexperts based on prototypical cases of pseudoexpertise and recent philosophical work on the concept of expertise. This allows us to propose a definition that captures real-world cases of pseudoexpertise, distinguishes it from related but different concepts such as pseudoscience, and highlights what is wrong with pseudoexpertise. Next, based on this conceptual analysis, we propose a framework for further research on pseudoexpertise, built on relevant empirical and theoretical approaches to cultural cognition. We provide exploratory answers to three questions: why is there pseudoexpertise at all; how can pseudoexperts be successful despite not being experts; and what becomes of pseudoexperts in the long run. Together, these conceptual and theoretical approaches to pseudoexpertise draw a preliminary framework from which to approach the very troubling problem posed by persons usurping the capacities and reputations of genuine experts.

Does discussion make crowds any wiser?

Does discussion in large groups help or hinder the wisdom of crowds? To give rise to the wisdom of crowds, by which large groups can yield surprisingly accurate answers, aggregation mechanisms such as averaging of opinions or majority voting rely on diversity of opinions, and independence between the voters. Discussion tends to reduce diversity and independence. On the other hand, discussion in small groups has been shown to improve the accuracy of individual answers. To test the effects of discussion in large groups, we gave groups of participants (N = 1958 participants in groups of size ranging from 22 to 212; mean 59) one of three types of problems (demonstrative, factual, ethical) to solve, first individually, and then through discussion. For demonstrative (logical or mathematical) problems, discussion improved individual answers, as well as the answers reached through aggregation. For factual problems, discussion improved individual answers, and either improved or had no effect on the answers reached through aggregation. Our results suggest that, for problems which have a correct answer, discussion in large groups does not detract from the effects of the wisdom of crowds, and tends on the contrary to improve on it.

Modularity and composite diversity affect the collective gathering of information online

Many modern interactions happen in a digital space, where automated recommendations and homophily can shape the composition of groups interacting together and the knowledge that groups are able to tap into when operating online. Digital interactions are also characterized by different scales, from small interest groups to large online communities. Here, we manipulate the composition of groups based on a large multi-trait profiling space (including demographic, professional, psychological and relational variables) to explore the causal link between group composition and performance as a function of group size. We asked volunteers to search news online under time pressure and measured individual and group performance in forecasting real geo-political events. Our manipulation affected the correlation of forecasts made by people after online searches. Group composition interacted with group size so that composite diversity benefited individual and group performance proportionally to group size. Aggregating opinions of modular crowds composed of small independent groups achieved better forecasts than aggregating a similar number of forecasts from non-modular ones. Finally, we show differences existing among groups in terms of disagreement, speed of convergence to consensus forecasts and within-group variability in performance. The present work sheds light on the mechanisms underlying effective online information gathering in digital environments.

Group decisions based on confidence weighted majority voting

Background

It has repeatedly been reported that, when making decisions under uncertainty, groups outperform individuals. Real groups are often replaced by simulated groups: Instead of performing an actual group discussion, individual responses are aggregated by a numerical computation. While studies have typically used unweighted majority voting (MV) for this aggregation, the theoretically optimal method is confidence weighted majority voting (CWMV)—if independent and accurate confidence ratings from the individual group members are available. To determine which simulations (MV vs. CWMV) reflect real group processes better, we applied formal cognitive modeling and compared simulated group responses to real group responses.

Results

Simulated group decisions based on CWMV matched the accuracy of real group decisions, while simulated group decisions based on MV showed lower accuracy. CWMV predicted the confidence that groups put into their group decisions well. However, real groups treated individual votes to some extent more equally weighted than suggested by CWMV. Additionally, real groups tend to put lower confidence into their decisions compared to CWMV simulations.

Conclusion

Our results highlight the importance of taking individual confidences into account when simulating group decisions: We found that real groups can aggregate individual confidences in a way that matches statistical aggregations given by CWMV to some extent. This implies that research using simulated group decisions should use CWMV instead of MV as a benchmark to compare real groups to.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s41235-021-00279-0.

Cognitive reflection correlates with behavior on Twitter

We investigate the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection and behavior on the social media platform Twitter, using a convenience sample of N = 1,901 individuals from Prolific. We find that people who score higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test-a widely used measure of reflective thinking-were more discerning in their social media use, as evidenced by the types and number of accounts followed, and by the reliability of the news sources they shared. Furthermore, a network analysis indicates that the phenomenon of echo chambers, in which discourse is more likely with like-minded others, is not limited to politics: people who scored lower in cognitive reflection tended to follow a set of accounts which are avoided by people who scored higher in cognitive reflection. Our results help to illuminate the drivers of behavior on social media platforms and challenge intuitionist notions that reflective thinking is unimportant for everyday judgment and decision-making.

The neural bases of argumentative reasoning

Most reasoning tasks used in behavioral and neuroimaging studies are abstract, triggering slow, effortful processes. By contrast, most of everyday life reasoning is fast and effortless, as when we exchange arguments in conversation. Recent behavioral studies have shown that reasoning tasks with the same underlying logic can be solved much more easily if they are embedded in an argumentative context. In the present article, we study the neural bases of this type of everyday, argumentative reasoning. Such reasoning is both a social and a metarepresentational process, suggesting it should share some mechanisms, and thus some neural bases, with other social, metarepresentational process such as pragmatics, metacognition, or theory of mind. To isolate the neural bases of argumentative reasoning, we measured fMRI activity of participants who read the same statement presented either as the conclusion of an argument, or as an assertion. We found that conclusions of arguments, compared to assertions, were associated with greater activity in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex that was identified in quantitative meta-analyses of studies on theory of mind. This study shows that it is possible to use more ecologically valid tasks to study the neural bases of reasoning, and that using such tasks might point to different neural bases than those observed with the more abstract and artificial tasks typically used in the neuroscience of reasoning. Specifically, we speculate that reasoning in an argumentative context might rely on mechanisms supporting metarepresentational processes in the medial prefrontal cortex.

The effects of recursive communication dynamics on belief updating

Many social interactions are characterized by dynamic interplay, such that individuals exert reciprocal influence over each other's behaviours and beliefs. The present study investigated how the dynamics of reciprocal influence affect individual beliefs in a social context, over and above the information communicated in an interaction. To this end, we developed a simple social decision-making paradigm in which two people are asked to make perceptual judgments while receiving information about each other's decisions. In a Static condition, information about the partner only conveyed their initial, independent judgment. However, in a Dynamic condition, each individual saw the evolving belief of their partner as they learnt about and responded to the individual's own judgment. The results indicated that in both conditions, the majority of confidence adjustments were characterized by an abrupt change followed by smaller adjustments around an equilibrium, and that participants' confidence was used to arbitrate conflict (although deviating from Bayesian norm). Crucially, recursive interaction had systematic effects on belief change relative to the static baseline, magnifying confidence change when partners agreed and reducing confidence change when they disagreed. These findings indicate that during dynamic interactions-often a characteristic of real-life and online social contexts-information is collectively transformed rather than acted upon by individuals in isolation. Consequently, the output of social events is not only influenced by what the dyad knows but also by predictable recursive and self-reinforcing dynamics.

On the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence: Implications for conspiratorial, moral, paranormal, political, religious, and science beliefs

Does one’s stance toward evidence evaluation and belief revision have relevance for actual beliefs? We investigate the role of endorsing an actively open-minded thinking style about evidence (AOT-E) on a wide range of beliefs, values, and opinions. Participants indicated the extent to which they think beliefs (Study 1) or opinions (Studies 2 and 3) ought to change according to evidence on an 8-item scale. Across three studies with 1,692 participants from two different sources (Mechanical Turk and Lucid for Academics), we find that our short AOT-E scale correlates negatively with beliefs about topics ranging from extrasensory perception, to respect for tradition, to abortion, to God; and positively with topics ranging from anthropogenic global warming to support for free speech on college campuses. More broadly, the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence was robustly associated with political liberalism, the rejection of traditional moral values, the acceptance of science, and skepticism about religious, paranormal, and conspiratorial claims. However, we also find that AOT-E is more strongly predictive for political liberals (Democrats) than conservatives (Republicans). We conclude that socio-cognitive theories of belief (both specific and general) should take into account people’s beliefs about when and how beliefs should change – that is, meta-beliefs – but that further work is required to understand how meta-beliefs about evidence interact with political ideology.

Witnessing, Remembering, and Testifying: Why the Past Is Special for Human Beings

The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.

Fast Lane to Slow Science

Fast Science is bad for scientists and bad for science. Slow Science may actually help us to make faster progress, but how can we slow down? Here, I offer preliminary suggestions for how we can transition to a healthier and more sustainable research culture.

Towards a Discourse-Based Understanding of Sustainability Education and Decision Making

Based on the indeterminate character of the sustainability concept, a procedural and discursive understanding of sustainability decision making and corresponding approaches for education for sustainability (EFS) is proposed. A set of criteria for teaching strategies to promote sustainability decision making, taking into account the demands of deliberative democracy theory, are presented. These criteria (such as reason, complexity management, critical thinking, etc.) are used to argue for an educational approach that involves the development, justification, and weighting of arguments in combination with an instructional tool called Target-Mat. According to a consequent process orientation, structures for arguing or defining sustainability are not given as authorized standards. Suggestions from previous social discourse are only introduced as controversial pairings—for example, different definitions of sustainability. Examples of student decision-making processes are given to demonstrate the potential of the approach to encourage student reflection and cooperative negotiation that engenders a successive deepening of their argumentation.

Thought as a determinant of political opinion

Recent political events around the world, including the apparently sudden rise of populism and decline of democratic zeal, have surprised many of us and offered a window onto how people form beliefs and attitudes about the wider world. Cognitive scientists have tended to view belief and attitude formation from one of three perspectives: as a process of deliberative reasoning, as a gut reaction modulated by feelings, or as a cultural phenomenon grounded in partisan relationships. This special issue on the cognitive science of political thought brings a variety of voices to bear on the issue. The upshot is that each perspective captures part of the dynamics of opinion change, but the underlying processes operate in an integrated way. Individuals' affective reactions are conditioned by the social world, and therefore reflect their community norms. They often precede processes of reasoning, but not always. In turn, reasoning is generally motivated in the service of transmitting beliefs acquired from citizens' communities of belief. Cognition is largely a filter for attending to and sharing community norms.

Fast and slow thinking in distressing delusions: A review of the literature and implications for targeted therapy

The recent literature on reasoning biases in psychosis and delusions is reviewed. The state-of-the-art knowledge from systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the evidence for jumping to conclusions is briefly summarised, before a fuller discussion of the more recent empirical literature on belief flexibility as applied to delusions. The methodology and evidence in relation to studies of belief flexibility and the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) across the delusional continuum will be critically appraised, and implications drawn for improving cognitive therapy. It will be proposed that dual process models of reasoning, which Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011) popularised as 'fast and slow thinking', provide a useful theoretical framework for integrating further research and informing clinical practice. The emergence of therapies which specifically target fast and slow thinking in people with distressing delusions will be described.

Evidence Linking Brain Activity Modulation to Age and to Deductive Training

Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults (N = 47 (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and N = 38 (mean age of 68.92 ± 5.72)). The analysis reveals the benefits of training, showing that it lowers cerebral activation while increasing the number of correct responses in the trained reasoning task (p < 0.001). The brain source generators were identified by time-averaging low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) current density images. In both groups, a bilateral overactivation associated with the task and not with age was identified. However, while the profile of bilateral activation in younger adults was symmetrical in anterior areas, in the older ones, the profile was located asymmetrically in anterior and posterior areas. Consequently, bilaterality may be a marker of how the brain adapts to maintain cognitive function in demanding tasks in both age groups. However, the differential bilateral locations across age groups indicate that the tendency to brain modulation is determined by age.

Strategically Communicating Minds

Several recent theories postulate communicative functions for cognitive mechanisms previously thought to have individualistic functions—in particular, reasoning and metacognition. These theories join older theories suggesting that many of our behaviors have communicative functions, for instance to communicate emotions or to influence how people perceive us. Using the framework of the evolution of communication, we offer a series of questions to test these hypotheses. The first question is whether the mechanism enables effective communication. The second question takes into account the different strategic incentives between agents who send signals and those who receive them, asking whether receivers can discriminate beneficial from harmful signals. However, serving a function well is not sufficient evidence that a mechanism evolved to this end in particular. Accordingly, the third question bears on whether the mechanism serves other purported functions well and the fourth on whether some of its features can be explained as specifically serving a communicative function. An overview of the literature suggests that these questions have been experimentally addressed for some cognitive mechanisms (reasoning in particular) but not others. This framework thus opens up avenues for further research that will enable researchers to better test hypotheses regarding the communicative functions of cognitive mechanisms.

Attitudes and Attitude Change

This review covers research on attitudes and attitude change published between 2010 and 2017. We characterize this period as one of significant progress toward an understanding of how attitudes form and change in three critical contexts. The first context is the person, as attitudes change in connection to values, general goals, language, emotions, and human development. The second context is social relationships, which link attitude change to the communicator of persuasive messages, social media, and culture. The third context is sociohistorical and highlights the influence of unique events, including sociopolitical, economic, and climatic occurrences. In conclusion, many important recent findings reflect the fact that holism, with a focus on situating attitudes within their personal, social, and historical contexts, has become the zeitgeist of attitude research during this period.

Making better decisions in groups

We review the literature to identify common problems of decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that the world could be in and all the possible actions that one could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness, that enter into these psychological processes. While biases increase the efficiency of information processing, they often do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to make better group decisions.

Learning to argue via apprenticeship

We examined apprenticeship, in the form of interaction with a more capable other, as a mechanism of development of higher-order reasoning skills, specifically argumentation. Over a 1-year period, middle school students engaged in twice-weekly electronic dialogs with a sequence of different peers on a series of social issues. In one group, unbeknownst to participants, a highly capable adult substituted for peers in half of their dialogs. Beginning immediately, increasing with time, and extending to peer-only dialogs on a new topic, the quality of argumentation shown by the experimental group exceeded that of a comparison peer-only group, highlighting the power of apprenticeship as a mechanism in the development of reasoning, a demonstration of both theoretical and applied significance.

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

De-Problematizing 'GMOs': Suggestions for Communicating about Genetic Engineering

The public debates concerning genetic engineering (GE) involve many non-scientific issues. The ensuing complexity is one reason why biotechnologists are reluctant to become involved. By sharing our personal experiences in science communication and suggesting ways to de-problematize GE, we aim to inspire our colleagues to engage with the public.