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Brooker JS, Webb CE, de Waal FBM, Clay Z. The expression of empathy in human's closest relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees: current and future directions. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 2024; 99:1556-1575. [PMID: 38597291 DOI: 10.1111/brv.13080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/31/2023] [Revised: 03/22/2024] [Accepted: 03/26/2024] [Indexed: 04/11/2024]
Abstract
Empathy is a complex, multi-dimensional capacity that facilitates the sharing and understanding of others' emotions. As our closest living relatives, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) provide an opportunity to explore the origins of hominin social cognition, including empathy. Despite certain assumptions that bonobos and chimpanzees may differ empathically, these species appear to overlap considerably in certain socio-emotional responses related to empathy. However, few studies have systematically tested for species variation in Pan empathic or socio-emotional tendencies. To address this, we synthesise the growing literature on Pan empathy to inform our understanding of the selection pressures that may underlie the evolution of hominin empathy, and its expression in our last common ancestor. As bonobos and chimpanzees show overlaps in their expression of complex socio-emotional phenomena such as empathy, we propose that group comparisons may be as or more meaningful than species comparisons when it comes to understanding the evolutionary pressures for such behaviour. Furthermore, key differences, such as how humans and Pan communicate, appear to distinguish how we experience empathy compared to our closest living relatives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jake S Brooker
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, South Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK
| | - Christine E Webb
- Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 11 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA
| | - Frans B M de Waal
- Department of Psychology, Emory University, 36 Eagle Row, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
| | - Zanna Clay
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, South Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK
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2
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Beloyianni V, Zbainos D, Karagianni MP. From mindreading to originality: Exploring the relationship between Theory of Mind and Creativity across the lifespan. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2024; 42:215-233. [PMID: 38379505 DOI: 10.1111/bjdp.12476] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2022] [Revised: 12/19/2023] [Accepted: 02/02/2024] [Indexed: 02/22/2024]
Abstract
In the previous psychoeducational literature, many theorists have argued that creativity and originality require the ability to make predictions and assumptions regarding other individuals' ideas. Thus, it has been widely hypothesized that social cognition and theory of mind (ToM) might be a fundamental component or even a prerequisite of creativity. Despite their common grounds, the empirical evidence examining the potential link between ToM and creative thinking throughout their development seems to be indirect, limited, and fragmented. In this respect, this scoping review aimed to collect and synthesize the existing knowledge about the relationship between ToM and creativity at different ages to identify significant literature gaps and generate updated research questions that might guide future research. The search process led to the inclusion, analysis, and collation of 6 relevant studies only, indicating that this research topic has been poorly investigated. Results demonstrated that ToM and creativity are strongly correlated even after partialling out significant mediators, such as age and intelligence. Such a strong association should be further investigated and explained.
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Affiliation(s)
- Vassiliki Beloyianni
- Harokopio University of Athens, Athens, Greece
- University of West Attica, Aigaleo, Greece
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3
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Forgács B. Meaning as mentalization. Front Hum Neurosci 2024; 18:1384116. [PMID: 38855407 PMCID: PMC11158629 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2024.1384116] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2024] [Accepted: 05/02/2024] [Indexed: 06/11/2024] Open
Abstract
The way we establish meaning has been a profound question not only in language research but in developmental science as well. The relation between linguistic form and content has been loosened up in recent pragmatic approaches to communication, showing that code-based models of language comprehension must be augmented by context-sensitive, pragmatic-inferential mechanisms to recover the speaker's intended meaning. Language acquisition has traditionally been thought to involve building a mental lexicon and extracting syntactic rules from noisy linguistic input, while communicative-pragmatic inferences have also been argued to be indispensable. Recent research findings exploring the electrophysiological indicator of semantic processing, the N400, have raised serious questions about the traditional separation between semantic decoding and pragmatic inferential processes. The N400 appears to be sensitive to mentalization-the ability to attribute beliefs to social partners-already from its developmental onset. This finding raises the possibility that mentalization may not simply contribute to pragmatic inferences that enrich linguistic decoding processes but that the semantic system may be functioning in a fundamentally mentalistic manner. The present review first summarizes the key contributions of pragmatic models of communication to language comprehension. Then, it provides an overview of how communicative intentions are interpreted in developmental theories of communication, with a special emphasis on mentalization. Next, it discusses the sensitivity of infants to the information-transmitting potential of language, their ability to pick up its code-like features, and their capacity to track language comprehension of social partners using mentalization. In conclusion, I argue that the recovery of meaning during linguistic communication is not adequately modeled as a process of code-based semantic retrieval complemented by pragmatic inferences. Instead, the semantic system may establish meaning, as intended, during language comprehension and acquisition through mentalistic attribution of content to communicative partners.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bálint Forgács
- Department of Experimental and Neurocognitive Psychology, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Cognitive Psychology, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
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4
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Woo BM, Chisholm GH, Spelke ES. Do toddlers reason about other people's experiences of objects? A limit to early mental state reasoning. Cognition 2024; 246:105760. [PMID: 38447359 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105760] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/30/2022] [Revised: 01/09/2024] [Accepted: 02/24/2024] [Indexed: 03/08/2024]
Abstract
Human social life requires an understanding of the mental states of one's social partners. Two people who look at the same objects often experience them differently, as a twinkling light or a planet, a 6 or a 9, and a random cat or Cleo, their pet. Indeed, a primary purpose of communication is to share distinctive experiences of objects or events. Here, we test whether toddlers (14-15 months) are sensitive to another agent's distinctive experiences of pictures when determining the goal underlying the agent's actions in a minimally social context. We conducted nine experiments. Across seven of these experiments (n = 206), toddlers viewed either videotaped or live events in which an actor, whose perspective differed from their own, reached (i) for pictures of human faces that were upright or inverted or (ii) for pictures that depicted a rabbit or a duck at different orientations. Then either the actor or the toddler moved to a new location that aligned their perspectives, and the actor alternately reached to each of the two pictures. By comparing toddlers' looking to the latter reaches, we tested whether their goal attributions accorded with the actor's experience of the pictured objects, with their own experience of the pictured objects, or with no consistency. In no experiment did toddlers encode the actor's goal in accord with his experiences of the pictures. In contrast, in a similar experiment that manipulated the visibility of a picture rather than the experience that it elicited, toddlers (n = 32) correctly expected the actor's action to depend on what was visible and occluded to him, rather than to themselves. In a verbal version of the tasks, older children (n = 35) correctly inferred the actor's goal in both cases. These findings provide further evidence for a dissociation between two kinds of mental state reasoning: When toddlers view an actor's object-directed action under minimally social conditions, they take account of the actor's visual access to the object but not the actor's distinctive experience of the object.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brandon M Woo
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States; The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States.
| | - Gabriel H Chisholm
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States; The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States
| | - Elizabeth S Spelke
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States; The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States
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5
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Gönül G, Kammermeier M, Paulus M. What is in an action? Preschool children predict that agents take previous paths and not previous goals. Dev Sci 2024; 27:e13466. [PMID: 38054272 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13466] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2021] [Revised: 11/17/2023] [Accepted: 11/27/2023] [Indexed: 12/07/2023]
Abstract
Developmental science has experienced a vivid debate on whether young children prioritize goals over means in their prediction of others' actions. Influential developmental theories highlight the role of goal objects for action understanding. Yet, recent infant studies report evidence for the opposite. The empirical evidence is therefore inconclusive. The current study advanced this debate by assessing preschool children's verbal predictions of others' actions. In five experiments (N = 302), we investigated whether preschool children and adults predict agents to move towards their previous goal (that is, show goal-related predictions) or predict agents to move along the same movement path that they pursued before. While Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c presented young children and adults with animated agents, Experiments 2a and 2b presented participants with human grasping action. An integrative analysis across experiments revealed that children were more likely to predict the agent to move along the same movement path, Z = -4.574, p ≤ 0.0001 (r = 0.304). That is, preschool children were more likely to predict that agents would move along the same trajectory even though this action would lead to a new goal object. Thus, our findings suggest that young children's action prediction relies on the detection of spatial and movement information. Overall, we discuss our findings in terms of theoretical frameworks that conceive of action understanding as an umbrella term that comprises different forms and facets in which humans understand others' actions. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: We investigated whether preschool children predict agents to move towards their previous goal or to move along the same movement path that they pursued before. Unlike adults, preschool children predicted that agents would move along the same trajectory even though this action would lead to a new goal. Adults' goal-based predictions were affected from contextual details, whereas children systematically made path-based predictions. Young children's action prediction relies on the detection of spatial and movement information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gökhan Gönül
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
- Cognitive Science Centre, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchatel, Switzerland
| | - Marina Kammermeier
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | - Markus Paulus
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
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6
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Conson M, Siciliano M, Zappullo I, Baiano C, Trojano L, Salzano S, Santangelo G. Measuring mindreading in preschoolers: The perspective battery (PERBAT). Clin Neuropsychol 2024; 38:763-782. [PMID: 37615423 DOI: 10.1080/13854046.2023.2250071] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2022] [Accepted: 08/15/2023] [Indexed: 08/25/2023]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE The capacity to take another person's visual perspective is pivotal for solving mindreading tests, such as Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks, but most of them heavily rely on domain-general abilities (e.g., language, executive functions). Here we present a novel battery of visual perspective-taking tests for child neuropsychological assessment, the Perspective Battery (PERBAT), which poses a limited load on domain-general abilities. METHODS The battery includes four tests: i) Block Building; ii) Hide and Seek; iii) Deceptive Figures; iv) Double-Sided Shelf. We administered the PERBAT to 126 typically developing preschoolers (65 males; 3-6-year-old); the participants also performed classical tests of social cognition, language, and nonverbal abstract reasoning. RESULTS The scores of all the PERBAT tests were significantly and positively related with age and scores of the classical social cognition tests, but not with scores of the language and nonverbal abstract reasoning tests. CONCLUSIONS The PERBAT could represent a useful neuropsychological tool providing a comprehensive assessment of visual perspective-taking skills in preschool children. Future investigation is needed to examine the validity of the PERBAT with neurotypical samples across countries, race, ethnicity, and language as well as with clinical populations. Longitudinal studies are also encouraged to examine whether early visual perspective-taking weaknesses are associated with later development of mindreading skills.
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Affiliation(s)
- Massimiliano Conson
- Department of Psychology, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Caserta, Italy
| | - Mattia Siciliano
- Department of Psychology, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Caserta, Italy
- Department of Advanced Medical and Surgical Sciences, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Naples, Italy
| | - Isa Zappullo
- Department of Psychology, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Caserta, Italy
| | - Chiara Baiano
- Department of Psychology, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Caserta, Italy
| | - Luigi Trojano
- Department of Psychology, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Caserta, Italy
| | - Sara Salzano
- Studies of Integrated Neuropsychological Therapy, Salerno, Italy
- Cognitive-Behavioral School of Psychotherapy 'Serapide SPEE', Naples, Italy
| | - Gabriella Santangelo
- Department of Psychology, University of Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', Caserta, Italy
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7
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Tsomokos DI, Flouri E. The role of social cognition in mental health trajectories from childhood to adolescence. Eur Child Adolesc Psychiatry 2024; 33:771-786. [PMID: 37000247 PMCID: PMC10894108 DOI: 10.1007/s00787-023-02187-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2022] [Accepted: 03/08/2023] [Indexed: 04/01/2023]
Abstract
We investigated the association between an aspect of Theory of Mind in childhood, false-belief understanding, and trajectories of internalising (emotional and peer) and externalising (conduct and hyperactivity) problems in childhood and adolescence. The sample was 8408 children from the UK's Millennium Cohort Study, followed at ages 5, 7, 11, 14, and 17 years. Social cognitive abilities were measured at 5 and 7 years through a vignette version of the Sally-Anne task administered by an unfamiliar assessor in a socially demanding dyadic interaction. Internalising and externalising problems were measured via the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire at 7-17 years. Using latent growth modelling, and after controlling for sex, ethnicity, maternal education, verbal ability, and time-varying family income, we found that superior social cognitive abilities predicted a decrease in emotional problems over time. In sex-stratified analyses, they predicted decreasing conduct problem trajectories in females and lower levels of conduct problems at baseline in males.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dimitris I Tsomokos
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK.
| | - Eirini Flouri
- Department of Psychology and Human Development, UCL Institute of Education, University College London, London, UK
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8
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Schmidt MFH, Vaish A, Rakoczy H. Don't Neglect the Middle Ground, Inspector Gadget! There Is Ample Space Between Big Special and Small Ordinary Norm Psychology. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024; 19:69-71. [PMID: 37669017 PMCID: PMC10790503 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231187408] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/06/2023]
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9
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Sauciuc GA, Persson T. Empirical challenges from the comparative and developmental literature to the Shared Intentionality Theory - a review of alternative data on recursive mind reading, prosociality, imitation and cumulative culture. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1157137. [PMID: 37901066 PMCID: PMC10613111 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1157137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2023] [Accepted: 09/28/2023] [Indexed: 10/31/2023] Open
Abstract
Humans have an irresistible inclination to coordinate actions with others, leading to species-unique forms of cooperation. According to the highly influential Shared Intentionality Theory (SITh), human cooperation is made possible by shared intentionality (SI), typically defined as a suite of socio-cognitive and motivational traits for sharing psychological states with others, thereby enabling individuals to engage in joint action in the mutually aware pursuit of shared goals. SITh theorises that SI evolved as late as 400,000 years ago, when our ancestors (in particular, Homo heidelbergensis) turned to a kind of food procurement that obligatorily required joint coordinated action. SI is, thus, hypothesized to be absent in other extant species, including our closest genetic relatives, the nonhuman great apes ("apes"). According to SITh, ape psychology is exclusively driven by individualistic motivations, as opposed to human psychology which is uniquely driven by altruistic motivations. The evolutionary scenario proposed by SITh builds on a series of findings from socio-cognitive research with apes and human children, and on the assumption that abilities expressed early in human development are human universals, unlikely to have been shaped by socio-cultural influences. Drawing on the primatological and developmental literature, we provide a systematic - albeit selective - review of SITh-inconsistent findings concerning psychological and behavioural traits theorised to be constitutive of SI. The findings we review pertain to all three thematic clusters typically addressed in SITh: (i) recursive mind reading; (ii) prosociality; (iii) imitation and cumulative culture. We conclude that such alternative data undermine two core SITh claims: the late evolutionary emergence of SI and the radical divide between ape and human psychology. We also discuss several conceptual and methodological limitations that currently hamper reliable comparative research on SI, in particular those engendered by Western-centric biases in the social sciences, where an overreliance on Western samples has promoted the formulation of Western-centric conceptualisations, operationalisations and methodologies.
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10
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Király I, Oláh K, Kovács ÁM. Can 18-Month-Olds Revise Attributed Beliefs? Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:435-444. [PMID: 37637294 PMCID: PMC10449395 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00087] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/24/2023] [Accepted: 05/29/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Successful social interactions rely on flexibly tracking and revising others' beliefs. These can be revised prospectively, new events leading to new beliefs, or retrospectively, when realizing that an attribution may have been incorrect. However, whether infants are capable of such belief revisions is an open question. We tested whether 18-month-olds can revise an attributed FB into a TB when they learn that a person may have witnessed an event that they initially thought she could not see. Infants first observed Experimenter 1 (E1) hiding two objects into two boxes. Then E1 left the room, and the locations of the objects were swapped. Infants then accompanied Experimenter 2 (E2) to the adjacent room. In the FB-revised-to-TB condition, infants observed E1 peeking into the experimental room through a one-way mirror, whereas in the FB-stays-FB condition, they observed E1 reading a book. After returning to the experimental room E1 requested an object by pointing to one of the boxes. In the FB-stays-FB condition, most infants chose the non-referred box, congruently with the agent's FB. However, in the FB-revised-to-TB condition, most infants chose the other, referred box. Thus, 18-month-olds revised an already attributed FB after receiving evidence that this attribution might have been wrong.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ildikó Király
- MTA-ELTE Social Minds Research Group, Psychology Institute, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Katalin Oláh
- MTA-ELTE Social Minds Research Group, Psychology Institute, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Ágnes M. Kovács
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
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11
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Haskaraca FN, Proft M, Liszkowski U, Rakoczy H. How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1142302. [PMID: 37492453 PMCID: PMC10363613 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1142302] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2023] [Accepted: 06/23/2023] [Indexed: 07/27/2023] Open
Abstract
It has been long assumed that meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) -our ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and other people- emerges around age four as indicated in performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, newer studies assessing false belief understanding with implicit, non-verbal measures suggest that some form of ToM may be present even in infancy. But these studies now face replication issues, and it remains unclear whether they can provide robust evidence for implicit ToM. One line of research on implicit ToM, however, may remain promising: Studies that tap so-called altercentric biases. Such biases occur when agents in their judgments about the world are influenced (perform slower, more error-prone) in light of another agent's deviating perspective even if that perspective is completely irrelevant to the task; they thus can be seen as indicators of spontaneous and implicit ToM. Altercentric biases are the mirror images of egocentric biases (agents are influenced by their own perspective when evaluating another agent's deviating perspective). In three studies with adults, we aimed to tap both egocentric and altercentric interference effects within the same task format. We used the so-called Sandbox task, a false belief task with continuous locations. In Study 1, we tested an online adaptation of the Sandbox task, which we also used to explore potential cross-cultural differences in these biases. Studies 2 and 3 combined the Sandbox task with mouse-tracking measures. These studies revealed neither egocentric nor altercentric biases. These null results are discussed with regard to the question whether absence of evidence here may present evidence of absence of such spontaneous perspective-taking biases or merely false negatives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feride Nur Haskaraca
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Marina Proft
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
| | - Ulf Liszkowski
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
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12
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Brandt S, Hargreaves S, Theakston A. Putting Complement Clauses into Context: Testing the Effects of Story Context, False-Belief Understanding, and Syntactic form on Children's and Adults' Comprehension and Production of Complement Clauses. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13311. [PMID: 37417456 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13311] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2021] [Revised: 06/08/2023] [Accepted: 06/16/2023] [Indexed: 07/08/2023]
Abstract
A key factor that affects whether and at what age children can demonstrate an understanding of false belief and complement-clause constructions is the type of task used (whether it is implicit/indirect or explicit/direct). In the current study, we investigate, in an implicit/indirect way, whether children understand that a story character's belief can be true or false, and whether this understanding affects children's choice of linguistic structure to describe the character's belief or to explain the character's belief-based action. We also measured children's understanding of false belief in explicit false-belief tasks. English- and German-speaking young 4- and 5-year-olds as well as English- and German-speaking adult controls heard complement-clause constructions in a story context where the belief mentioned in the complement clause (e.g., "He thinks that she's not feeling well") turned out to be false, true, or was left open. After hearing the test question ("Why does he not play with her?"), all age groups were most likely to repeat the whole complement-clause construction when the belief turned out to be false. That is, they tended to explicitly refer to the character's perspective and say "He thinks…" When the belief turned out to be true, participants often reverted to a simple clause ("She's not feeling well"). Furthermore, children with better short-term memory were more likely to repeat the whole complement-clause construction. However, children's performance in explicit false-belief tasks showed no relation to their performance in our novel, more implicit/indirect, task. Whether or not the complement clause was introduced by a that complementizer only had a small effect on the German adults' responses, where leaving out the complementizer also changes the word order of the complement clause. Overall, our results suggest that task characteristics and individual differences in short-term memory affect children's ability to demonstrate false-belief understanding and to express this understanding linguistically.
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Affiliation(s)
- Silke Brandt
- Department of Linguistics and English Language, Lancaster University
| | - Stephanie Hargreaves
- Division of Psychology, Communication and Human Neuroscience, University of Manchester
| | - Anna Theakston
- Division of Psychology, Communication and Human Neuroscience, University of Manchester
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13
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Li L. The other side of false belief: Constructing the objectivity of reality. INFANT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 2023. [DOI: 10.1002/icd.2416] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/30/2023]
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14
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Woo BM, Spelke ES. Toddlers' social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13314. [PMID: 35998080 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13314] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2022] [Revised: 08/02/2022] [Accepted: 08/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Mature social evaluations privilege agents' intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes' contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brandon M Woo
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Elizabeth S Spelke
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
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15
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Smid CR, Kool W, Hauser TU, Steinbeis N. Computational and behavioral markers of model-based decision making in childhood. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13295. [PMID: 35689563 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13295] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/10/2021] [Revised: 05/12/2022] [Accepted: 05/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Human decision-making is underpinned by distinct systems that differ in flexibility and associated cognitive cost. A widely accepted dichotomy distinguishes between a cheap but rigid model-free system and a flexible but costly model-based system. Typically, humans use a hybrid of both types of decision-making depending on environmental demands. However, children's use of a model-based system during decision-making has not yet been shown. While prior developmental work has identified simple building blocks of model-based reasoning in young children (1-4 years old), there has been little evidence of this complex cognitive system influencing behavior before adolescence. Here, by using a modified task to make engagement in cognitively costly strategies more rewarding, we show that children aged 5-11-years (N = 85), including the youngest children, displayed multiple indicators of model-based decision making, and that the degree of its use increased throughout childhood. Unlike adults (N = 24), however, children did not display adaptive arbitration between model-free and model-based decision-making. Our results demonstrate that throughout childhood, children can engage in highly sophisticated and costly decision-making strategies. However, the flexible arbitration between decision-making strategies might be a critically late-developing component in human development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Claire R Smid
- Department of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, the United Kingdom
| | - Wouter Kool
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
| | - Tobias U Hauser
- Max Planck University College London Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, London, the United Kingdom.,Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, the United Kingdom
| | - Nikolaus Steinbeis
- Department of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, the United Kingdom
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16
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Ni Q, Shoyer J, Bautista Z, Raport A, Moll H. Toddlers' expressions indicate that they track agent-object interactions but do not detect false object representations. J Exp Child Psychol 2023; 231:105639. [PMID: 36863171 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105639] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2022] [Revised: 01/10/2023] [Accepted: 01/22/2023] [Indexed: 03/04/2023]
Abstract
In the theory of mind debate, a middle position between nativism and conceptual change theory has gained traction. This position states that children younger than 4 years track agent-object relations (by building "records" of others' experiences) without cognizing how agents represent-or misrepresent-the objects they encounter. We tested these claims with 3.5-year-olds using puppet shows geared to evoke suspenseful expressions. In two experiments (N = 90), children watched an agent approach an object that looked like her favorite food but was inedible. In Experiment 1, children showed tense expressions when an agent's real food item was, unbeknownst to her, replaced with a fake food item. Children, however, showed no signs of understanding that the agent would mistake the deceptive object for food. Consistent with this, children's expressions in Experiment 2 did not differ when the agent approached a deceptive object compared with when she approached a non-deceptive object. The experiments support the middle position's view that toddlers track agent-object interactions but fail to recognize when agents misrepresent objects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qianhui Ni
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA.
| | - Jake Shoyer
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
| | - Zoë Bautista
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
| | - Alexandra Raport
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
| | - Henrike Moll
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA
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17
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Choi Y, Luo Y. Understanding preferences in infancy. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023:e1643. [PMID: 36658758 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1643] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2022] [Revised: 12/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/03/2023] [Indexed: 01/21/2023]
Abstract
A preference is defined as a dispositional state that helps explain why a person chooses one option over another. Preference understanding is a significant part of interpreting and predicting others' behavior, which can also help to guide social encounters, for instance, to initiate interactions and even form relationships based on shared preferences. Cognitive developmental research in the past several decades has revealed that infants have relatively sophisticated understandings about others' preferences, as part of investigations into how young children make sense of others' behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, dispositions including preferences, and epistemic states. In recent years, research on early psychological knowledge expands to including infant understanding of social situations. As such, infants are also found to use their preference understandings in their social life. They treat favorably others who share their own preferences, and they prefer prosocial and similar others (e.g., those who speak their language). In reviewing these results, we point out future directions for research and conclude with further suggestions and recommendations. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Development and Aging.
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Affiliation(s)
- Youjung Choi
- School of Psychological and Behavioral Sciences, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA
| | - Yuyan Luo
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri at Columbia, Columbia, Missouri, USA
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18
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Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing. Trends Cogn Sci 2023; 27:17-29. [PMID: 36357300 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.10.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2021] [Revised: 10/08/2022] [Accepted: 10/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.
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Barone P, Wenzel L, Proft M, Rakoczy H. Do young children track other's beliefs, or merely their perceptual access? An interactive, anticipatory measure of early theory of mind. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2022; 9:211278. [PMID: 36226128 PMCID: PMC9533367 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.211278] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2021] [Accepted: 09/13/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
This paper aimed to contribute to answering three questions. First, how robust and reliable are early implicit measures of false belief (FB) understanding? Second, do these measures tap FB understanding rather than simpler processes such as tracking the protagonist's perceptual access? Third, do implicit FB tasks tap an earlier, more basic form of theory of mind (ToM) than standard verbal tasks? We conducted a conceptual replication of Garnham & Perner's task (Garnham and Perner 2001 Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 19, 413-432) simultaneously measuring children's anticipatory looking and interactive behaviours toward an agent with a true or FB (N = 81, M = 40 months). Additionally, we implemented an ignorance condition and a standard FB task. We successfully replicated the original findings: children's looking and interactive behaviour differed according to the agent's true or FB. However, children mostly did not differentiate between FB and ignorance conditions in various measures of anticipation and uncertainty, suggesting the use of simpler conceptual strategies than full-blown ToM. Moreover, implicit measures were all related to each other but largely not related to performance in the standard FB task, except for first look in the FB condition. Overall, our findings suggest that these implicit measures are robust but may not tap the same underlying cognitive capacity as explicit FB tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pamela Barone
- Department of Psychology, Universidad Católica de Murcia (UCAM), Campus de los Jerónimos, 30107 Murcia, Spain
- Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands, Carretera de Valldemossa km 7.5, 07122 Palma, Illes Balears, Spain
| | - Lisa Wenzel
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Marina Proft
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
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20
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Carruthers P, Williams DM. Model-free metacognition. Cognition 2022; 225:105117. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2021] [Revised: 03/25/2022] [Accepted: 03/31/2022] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
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21
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Is cultural variation the norm? A closer look at sequencing of the theory of mind scale. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101216] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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22
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The effects of developmental trauma on theory of mind and its relationship to psychotic experiences: A behavioural study. Psychiatry Res 2022; 312:114544. [PMID: 35417825 DOI: 10.1016/j.psychres.2022.114544] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2021] [Revised: 03/30/2022] [Accepted: 04/03/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Developmental psychological trauma induces vulnerability to psychosis. However, the mechanisms underlying this association are poorly understood. Impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) have been observed in adult survivors of developmental trauma and individuals with psychosis. ToM is therefore a candidate mechanism underlying the association between developmental trauma and psychosis. METHODS We used a computerised version of the Director task - where a participant is instructed by a confederate to move an object around a 4 × 4 grid, whilst taking account of whether these objects are visible to a confederate who instructs the participant - to investigate impairments in ToM in 209 participants (age: M = 37.8, SD=13.6; 56% female). Participants were divided into a) developmental trauma-positive (DT+) and control groups (DT-) based on their history of developmental trauma and b) then further into subclinical (S) and healthy groups (H) as based on psychotic experiences indexed by the CAPE-P15. After exclusion, the numbers in each group were: DT+H (47), DT+S (84), DT-H (54), DT-S (12). (Total: 197). RESULTS Developmental trauma exposure was associated with psychotic experiences (OR: 7.89, p < .001), which remained significant after controlling for demographic and clinical confounds (adjusted R2 = 0.452, R2 change = 0.0184, p = .009). Participants with developmental trauma (F1, 194) = 5.46, p = .020, ηp2 = 0.027) and participants more prone to psychotic experiences (F1, 194) = 4.71, p = .031, ηp2 = 0.024) demonstrated significantly lower accuracy on the Director task relative to their respective control, after controlling for the effects of age. CONCLUSIONS ToM deficits are associated with self-reported developmental trauma and psychotic experiences. Further work is needed to explore these relationships further and whether they represent generalised or specific effect effects on developmental trauma and psychopathological domains.
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23
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Moll H, Ni Q, Stekeler-Weithofer P. Ontogenetic steps of understanding beliefs: From practical to theoretical. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2073211] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Henrike Moll
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | - Qianhui Ni
- Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States
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24
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Théorie du corps lors de l’émersion de ses sensations internes : les dessins de conscience au Centre National des Arts du Cirque. EVOLUTION PSYCHIATRIQUE 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evopsy.2020.09.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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25
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Williams J, Fiore SM, Jentsch F. Supporting Artificial Social Intelligence With Theory of Mind. Front Artif Intell 2022; 5:750763. [PMID: 35295867 PMCID: PMC8919046 DOI: 10.3389/frai.2022.750763] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2021] [Accepted: 01/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the development of artificial theory of mind as foundational to an agent's ability to collaborate with human team members. Agents imbued with artificial social intelligence will require various capabilities to gather the social data needed to inform an artificial theory of mind of their human counterparts. We draw from social signals theorizing and discuss a framework to guide consideration of core features of artificial social intelligence. We discuss how human social intelligence, and the development of theory of mind, can contribute to the development of artificial social intelligence by forming a foundation on which to help agents model, interpret and predict the behaviors and mental states of humans to support human-agent interaction. Artificial social intelligence will need the processing capabilities to perceive, interpret, and generate combinations of social cues to operate within a human-agent team. Artificial Theory of Mind affords a structure by which a socially intelligent agent could be imbued with the ability to model their human counterparts and engage in effective human-agent interaction. Further, modeling Artificial Theory of Mind can be used by an ASI to support transparent communication with humans, improving trust in agents, so that they may better predict future system behavior based on their understanding of and support trust in artificial socially intelligent agents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jessica Williams
- Team Performance Laboratory, University of Central Florida, Institute for Simulation and Training, Orlando, FL, United States
- *Correspondence: Jessica Williams ;
| | - Stephen M. Fiore
- Cognitive Sciences Laboratory, University of Central Florida, Institute for Simulation and Training, Orlando, FL, United States
| | - Florian Jentsch
- Team Performance Laboratory, University of Central Florida, Institute for Simulation and Training, Orlando, FL, United States
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26
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Draperi M, Aïte A, Cassotti M, Le Stanc L, Houdé O, Borst G. Development of cool and hot theory of mind and cool and hot inhibitory control abilities from 3.5 to 6.5 years of age. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0262251. [PMID: 35085269 PMCID: PMC8794116 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0262251] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2020] [Accepted: 12/21/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Attributing affectively neutral mental states such as thoughts (i.e., cool theory of mind, cool ToM) to others appears to be rooted in different processes than the ones involved in attributing affectively charged mental states such as emotions (i.e., hot ToM) to others. However, no study has investigated the developmental pattern of hot and cool ToM abilities using a similar task and the relative contribution of cool and hot inhibitory control (IC) to cool and hot ToM development. To do so, we tested 112 children aged 3.5 to 6.5 years on a cool and a hot version of a ToM task and on a cool and hot version of an IC task. We found that hot ToM abilities developed more rapidly than cool ToM. Importantly, we found that hot IC abilities mediated the relation between age and hot ToM abilities. Taken together, our results suggest that the ability to attribute emotions to others develops more rapidly than the ability to attribute thoughts and that the growing efficiency of hot ToM with age is specifically rooted in the growing efficiency of hot IC abilities.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ania Aïte
- LaPsyDÉ, Université de Paris, CNRS, Paris, France
- * E-mail:
| | - Mathieu Cassotti
- LaPsyDÉ, Université de Paris, CNRS, Paris, France
- Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
| | | | - Olivier Houdé
- LaPsyDÉ, Université de Paris, CNRS, Paris, France
- Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
| | - Grégoire Borst
- LaPsyDÉ, Université de Paris, CNRS, Paris, France
- Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
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27
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Csulak T, Hajnal A, Kiss S, Dembrovszky F, Varjú-Solymár M, Sipos Z, Kovács MA, Herold M, Varga E, Hegyi P, Tényi T, Herold R. Implicit Mentalizing in Patients With Schizophrenia: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Front Psychol 2022; 13:790494. [PMID: 35185724 PMCID: PMC8847732 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.790494] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2021] [Accepted: 01/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Mentalizing is a key aspect of social cognition. Several researchers assume that mentalization has two systems, an explicit one (conscious, relatively slow, flexible, verbal, inferential) and an implicit one (unconscious, automatic, fast, non-verbal, intuitive). In schizophrenia, several studies have confirmed the deficit of explicit mentalizing, but little data are available on non-explicit mentalizing. However, increasing research activity can be detected recently in implicit mentalizing. The aim of this systematic review and meta-analysis is to summarize the existing results of implicit mentalizing in schizophrenia. METHODS A systematic search was performed in four major databases: MEDLINE, EMBASE, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), Web of Science. Eleven publications were selected. Five studies were found to be eligible for quantitative synthesis, and 9 studies were included in qualitative synthesis. RESULTS The meta-analysis revealed significantly lower accuracy, slower reaction time during implicit mentalizing in patients with schizophrenia. The systematic review found different brain activation pattern, further alterations in visual scanning, cue fixation, face looking time, and difficulties in perspective taking. DISCUSSION Overall, in addition to the deficit of explicit mentalization, implicit mentalization performance is also affected in schizophrenia, if not to the same extent. It seems likely that some elements of implicit mentalization might be relatively unaffected (e.g., detection of intentionality), but the effectiveness is limited by certain neurocognitive deficits. These alterations in implicit mentalizing can also have potential therapeutic consequences.Systematic Review Registration: https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/, identifier: CRD42021231312.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timea Csulak
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary.,Doctoral School of Clinical Neurosciences, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - András Hajnal
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Szabolcs Kiss
- Medical School, Institute for Translational Medicine, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Fanni Dembrovszky
- Medical School, Institute for Translational Medicine, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Margit Varjú-Solymár
- Medical School, Institute for Translational Medicine, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Zoltán Sipos
- Medical School, Institute for Translational Medicine, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Márton Aron Kovács
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary.,Doctoral School of Clinical Neurosciences, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Márton Herold
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary.,Doctoral School of Clinical Neurosciences, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Eszter Varga
- Department of Pediatrics, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Péter Hegyi
- Medical School, Institute for Translational Medicine, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Tamás Tényi
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
| | - Róbert Herold
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Medical School, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
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28
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What Is Unique in Infant Thinking About Others? Infant Social Cognition from an Evolutionary Perspective. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76000-7_13] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022] Open
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29
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Zoh Y, Chang SWC, Crockett MJ. The prefrontal cortex and (uniquely) human cooperation: a comparative perspective. Neuropsychopharmacology 2022; 47:119-133. [PMID: 34413478 PMCID: PMC8617274 DOI: 10.1038/s41386-021-01092-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2021] [Revised: 06/03/2021] [Accepted: 06/24/2021] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Abstract
Humans have an exceptional ability to cooperate relative to many other species. We review the neural mechanisms supporting human cooperation, focusing on the prefrontal cortex. One key feature of human social life is the prevalence of cooperative norms that guide social behavior and prescribe punishment for noncompliance. Taking a comparative approach, we consider shared and unique aspects of cooperative behaviors in humans relative to nonhuman primates, as well as divergences in brain structure that might support uniquely human aspects of cooperation. We highlight a medial prefrontal network common to nonhuman primates and humans supporting a foundational process in cooperative decision-making: valuing outcomes for oneself and others. This medial prefrontal network interacts with lateral prefrontal areas that are thought to represent cooperative norms and modulate value representations to guide behavior appropriate to the local social context. Finally, we propose that more recently evolved anterior regions of prefrontal cortex play a role in arbitrating between cooperative norms across social contexts, and suggest how future research might fruitfully examine the neural basis of norm arbitration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yoonseo Zoh
- grid.47100.320000000419368710Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA
| | - Steve W. C. Chang
- grid.47100.320000000419368710Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA
| | - Molly J. Crockett
- grid.47100.320000000419368710Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA
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30
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Lincoln SH, Mukerji CM, Dodell-Feder D, Riccio A, Hooker CI. The Neural Basis of Social Cognition in Typically Developing Children and Its Relationship to Social Functioning. Front Psychol 2021; 12:714176. [PMID: 34955950 PMCID: PMC8703015 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.714176] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2021] [Accepted: 10/04/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to think about the perspectives, beliefs, and feelings of another, develops throughout childhood and adolescence and is an important skill for social interactions. This study examines neural activity in typically developing children during a novel ToM task - the Movie Mentalizing Task- and tests its relations to ToM behavioral performance and social functioning. In this fMRI task, children ages 8-13years (N=25) watched a brief movie clip and were asked to predict a character's mental state after a social interaction. Engaging in the Movie Mentalizing Task activated the ToM neural network. Moreover, greater neural activity in the ToM network, including the superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, was associated with better behavioral performance on independent ToM tasks and was related to better social functioning, though these results do not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Results offer a new affective theory of mind task for children in the scanner that robustly recruits activity in theory of mind regions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sarah Hope Lincoln
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Cora M Mukerji
- Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, United States
| | - David Dodell-Feder
- Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, United States.,Department of Neuroscience, University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, NY, United States
| | - Arianna Riccio
- Boston University School of Social Work, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Christine I Hooker
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Rush University Medical Center, Chicago, IL, United States
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31
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Amodio P, Farrar BG, Krupenye C, Ostojić L, Clayton NS. Little evidence that Eurasian jays protect their caches by responding to cues about a conspecific's desire and visual perspective. eLife 2021; 10:69647. [PMID: 34505575 PMCID: PMC8536255 DOI: 10.7554/elife.69647] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2021] [Accepted: 09/09/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Eurasian jays have been reported to protect their caches by responding to cues about either the visual perspective or current desire of an observing conspecific, similarly to other corvids. Here, we used established paradigms to test whether these birds can - like humans - integrate multiple cues about different mental states and perform an optimal response accordingly. Across five experiments, which also include replications of previous work, we found little evidence that our jays adjusted their caching behaviour in line with the visual perspective and current desire of another agent, neither by integrating these social cues nor by responding to only one type of cue independently. These results raise questions about the reliability of the previously reported effects and highlight several key issues affecting reliability in comparative cognition research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piero Amodio
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.,Department of Biology and Evolution of Marine Organisms, Stazione Zoologica Anton Dohrn, Napoli, Italy
| | - Benjamin G Farrar
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.,Institute for Globally Distributed Open Research and Education (IGDORE), Sweden, Sweden
| | - Christopher Krupenye
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, United States.,Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
| | - Ljerka Ostojić
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.,Department of Psychology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia
| | - Nicola S Clayton
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
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32
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Mirski R, Bickhard MH. Conventional minds: An interactivist perspective on social cognition and its enculturation. NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2021.100856] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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33
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Kampis D, Kármán P, Csibra G, Southgate V, Hernik M. A two-lab direct replication attempt of Southgate, Senju and Csibra (2007). ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2021; 8:210190. [PMID: 34457336 PMCID: PMC8386515 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.210190] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2021] [Accepted: 07/15/2021] [Indexed: 05/29/2023]
Abstract
The study by Southgate et al. (2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587-592. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x)) has been widely cited as evidence for false-belief attribution in young children. Recent replication attempts of this paradigm have yielded mixed results: several studies did not replicate the original findings, raising doubts about the suitability of the paradigm to assess non-verbal action prediction and Theory of Mind. In a preregistered collaborative study including two of the original authors, we tested one hundred and sixty 24- to 26-month-olds across two locations using the original stimuli, procedure and analyses as closely as possible. We found no evidence for action anticipation: only roughly half of the infants looked to the location of an agent's impending action when action prediction did not require taking into account the agent's beliefs and a similar number when the agent held a false-belief. These results and other non-replications suggest that this paradigm does not reliably elicit action prediction and thus cannot assess false-belief understanding in 2-year-olds. While the present results do not support any claim regarding the presence or absence of Theory of Mind in infants, we conclude that an important piece of evidence that has to date supported arguments for the existence of this competence can no longer serve that function.
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Affiliation(s)
- D. Kampis
- Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - P. Kármán
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
| | - G. Csibra
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
| | - V. Southgate
- Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - M. Hernik
- Department of Psychology, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway
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Small procedural differences matter: Conceptual and direct replication attempts of the communication-intervention effect on infants’ false-belief ascriptions. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2021.101054] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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Sidera F, Lillard AS, Amadó A, Caparrós B, Rostan C, Serrat E. Pretending emotions in the early years: The role of language and symbolic play. INFANCY 2021; 26:920-931. [PMID: 34120410 DOI: 10.1111/infa.12414] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/10/2020] [Revised: 04/12/2021] [Accepted: 05/18/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Although 3-year-old children sometimes simulate emotions to adapt to social norms, we do not know if even younger children can pretend emotions in playful contexts. The present study investigated (1) what emotions infants of 1-2 years old are capable of pretending and (2) the possible role of language and symbolic play in the ability to pretend emotions. The sample included 69 infants aged 18 to 31 months and their parents. Infants were administrated the Test of Pretend Play, and their parents responded to the MacArthur-Bates CDI-II inventory, part of the MacArthur-Bates CDI-I, and a questionnaire about the expression of pretend emotions. Results suggest that very young children simulate emotions. Furthermore, children's simulation of emotions was related to both symbolic play and language. Specifically, the ability to label emotions was linked to the ability to simulate them. The role of language and symbolic play in the development of the capacity to express and understand pretend emotions is discussed.
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Borbás R, Fehlbaum LV, Rudin U, Stadler C, Raschle NM. Neural correlates of theory of mind in children and adults using CAToon: Introducing an open-source child-friendly neuroimaging task. Dev Cogn Neurosci 2021; 49:100959. [PMID: 33989857 PMCID: PMC8134957 DOI: 10.1016/j.dcn.2021.100959] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2020] [Revised: 04/27/2021] [Accepted: 05/01/2021] [Indexed: 01/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing is a basic social skill which is characterized by our ability of perspective-taking and the understanding of cognitive and emotional states of others. ToM development is essential to successfully navigate in various social contexts. The neural basis of mentalizing is well-studied in adults, however, less evidence exists in children. Potential reasons are methodological challenges, including a lack of age-appropriate fMRI paradigms. We introduce a novel child-friendly and open-source ToM fMRI task, for which accuracy and performance were evaluated behaviorally in 60 children ages three to nine (32♂). Furthermore, 27 healthy young adults (14♂; mean = 25.41 years) and 33 children ages seven to thirteen (17♂; mean = 9.06 years) completed the Cognitive and Affective Theory of Mind Cartoon task (CAToon;www.jacobscenter.uzh.ch/en/research/developmental_neuroscience/downloads/catoon.html) during a fMRI session. Behavioral results indicate that children of all ages can solve the CAToon task above chance level, though reliable performance is reached around five years. Neurally, activation increases were observed for adults and children in brain regions previously associated with mentalizing, including bilateral temporoparietal junction, temporal gyri, precuneus and medial prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortices. We conclude that CAToon is suitable for developmental neuroimaging studies within an fMRI environment starting around preschool and up.
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Affiliation(s)
- Réka Borbás
- Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development at the University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Basel, University Psychiatric Clinics Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Lynn V Fehlbaum
- Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development at the University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Basel, University Psychiatric Clinics Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Ursula Rudin
- Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Basel, University Psychiatric Clinics Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Christina Stadler
- Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Basel, University Psychiatric Clinics Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Nora M Raschle
- Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development at the University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Basel, University Psychiatric Clinics Basel, Basel, Switzerland.
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Kaltefleiter LJ, Sodian B, Kristen-Antonow S, Grosse Wiesmann C, Schuwerk T. Does syntax play a role in Theory of Mind development before the age of 3 years? Infant Behav Dev 2021; 64:101575. [PMID: 34020154 DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2021.101575] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2020] [Revised: 05/07/2021] [Accepted: 05/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Language plays an important role in Theory of Mind development. Specifically, longitudinal and training studies indicate that the acquisition of complement syntax has an effect on three- to five-year-old children's mastery of the concept of false belief. There is evidence for both a beginning explicit understanding of the mind and mastery of complement syntax in children before their third birthday. In the present study, we investigated longitudinally whether an early sensitivity to complement syntax is related to early development of Theory of Mind abilities in a sample of N = 159 German-speaking 27- to 36-month-old children. Children's sensitivity to formal properties of complement syntax at 33 months was associated with their perspective-taking skills and their metacognition of own ignorance three months later. This relation remained significant when controlling for the effects of general language abilities. Furthermore, children's sensitivity to complement syntax was concurrently related to their early false belief understanding. These findings support the view that complement syntax shares representational demands with an understanding of epistemic states and that language begins to support the acquisition of epistemic concepts earlier than was previously thought.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Beate Sodian
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
| | | | - Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
- Minerva Fast Track Group Milestones of Early Cognitive Development, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Tobias Schuwerk
- Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany
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Ye NN, Heyman GD, Ding XP. Linking young children's teaching to their reasoning of mental states: Evidence from Singapore. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 209:105175. [PMID: 34000589 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105175] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/07/2020] [Revised: 03/26/2021] [Accepted: 04/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
To fully participate in the human information-sharing ecosystem that allows for efficient knowledge dissemination and creation, children need to be able to teach others effectively. The current research is the first to investigate links between children's teaching abilities and their developing theory of mind abilities in a non-Western sample. In a sample of 4- to 6-year-old Singaporean children (N = 49), we examined relations between specific components of theory of mind abilities and teaching ability on a social cognitive task. We found that both false belief understanding and the ability to make mental state inferences in a teaching context were associated with effective teaching even after controlling for age and language ability. These findings provide a nuanced picture of the links between mental state reasoning and teaching ability. More broadly, they provide evidence that these links extend beyond Western cultures and generalize to social-cognitive teaching contexts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nina Ni Ye
- Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117570, Singapore
| | - Gail D Heyman
- Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
| | - Xiao Pan Ding
- Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117570, Singapore.
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Kovács ÁM, Téglás E, Csibra G. Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind. Cognition 2021; 213:104640. [PMID: 33757642 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104640] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2020] [Revised: 02/16/2021] [Accepted: 02/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that young infants, as well as nonhuman apes, can anticipate others' behavior based on their false beliefs. While such behaviors have been proposed to be accounted by simple associations between agents, objects, and locations, human adults are undoubtedly endowed with sophisticated theory of mind abilities. For example, they can attribute mental contents about abstract or non-existing entities, or beliefs whose content is poorly specified. While such endeavors may be human specific, it is unclear whether the representational apparatus that allows for encoding such beliefs is present early in development. In four experiments we asked whether 15-month-old infants are able to attribute beliefs with underspecified content, update their content later, and maintain attributed beliefs that are unknown to be true or false. In Experiment 1, infants observed as an agent hid an object to an unspecified location. This location was later revealed in the absence or presence of the agent, and the object was then hidden again to an unspecified location. Then the infants could search for the object while the agent was away. Their search was biased to the revealed location (that could be represented as the potential content of the agent's belief when she had not witnessed the re-hiding), suggesting that they (1) first attributed an underspecified belief to the agent, (2) later updated the content of this belief, and (3) were primed by this content in their own action even though its validity was unknown. This priming effect was absent when the agent witnessed the re-hiding of the object, and thus her belief about the earlier location of the object did not have to be sustained. The same effect was observed when infants searched for a different toy (Experiment 2) or when an additional spatial transformation was introduced (Experiment 4), but not when the spatial transformation disrupted belief updating (Experiment 3). These data suggest that infants' representational apparatus is prepared to efficiently track other agents' beliefs online, encode underspecified beliefs and define their content later, possibly reflecting a crucial characteristic of mature theory of mind: using a metarepresentational format for ascribed beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ágnes Melinda Kovács
- Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
| | - Ernő Téglás
- Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Gergely Csibra
- Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary; Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
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Horschler DJ, Santos LR, MacLean EL. How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden? Cognition 2021; 212:104658. [PMID: 33773422 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104658] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2020] [Revised: 03/02/2021] [Accepted: 03/03/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Although non-human primates (NHPs) generally appear to predict how knowledgeable agents use knowledge to guide their behavior, the cognitive mechanisms that enable this remain poorly understood. We assessed the conditions under which NHPs' representations of an agent's awareness break down. Free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) watched as an agent observed a target object being hidden in one of two boxes. While the agent could no longer see the boxes, the box containing the object flipped open and the object either changed in size/shape (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). Monkeys looked longer when the agent searched for the object incorrectly rather than correctly following the color change (a non-geometric manipulation), but not the size/shape change (a geometric manipulation). Even though the agent maintained knowledge of the object's location in both cases, monkeys no longer expected the agent to search correctly after it had been geometrically (but not non-geometrically) manipulated. Experiment 3 confirmed that monkeys were sensitive to the color manipulation used in Experiment 2, making it unlikely that a failure to perceive the color manipulation accounted for our findings. Our results show that NHPs do not always expect that knowledgeable agents will act on their knowledge to obtain their goals, consistent with heuristic-based accounts of how NHPs represent others' mental states. These findings also suggest that geometric changes that occur outside the agent's perceptual access may disrupt attribution of awareness more so than non-geometric changes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel J Horschler
- School of Anthropology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA; Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA.
| | - Laurie R Santos
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA
| | - Evan L MacLean
- School of Anthropology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA; Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA; Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA; College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA
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Schulze C, Hertwig R. A description-experience gap in statistical intuitions: Of smart babies, risk-savvy chimps, intuitive statisticians, and stupid grown-ups. Cognition 2021; 210:104580. [PMID: 33667974 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104580] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2020] [Revised: 12/10/2020] [Accepted: 12/24/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Comparison of different lines of research on statistical intuitions and probabilistic reasoning reveals several puzzling contradictions. Whereas babies seem to be intuitive statisticians, surprisingly capable of statistical learning and inference, adults' statistical inferences have been found to be inconsistent with the rules of probability theory and statistics. Whereas researchers in the 1960s concluded that people's probability updating is "conservatively" proportional to normative predictions, probability updating research in the 1970s suggested that people are incapable of following Bayes's rule. And whereas animals appear to be strikingly risk savvy, humans often seem "irrational" when dealing with probabilistic information. Drawing on research on the description-experience gap in risky choice, we integrate and systematize these findings from disparate fields of inquiry that have, to date, operated largely in parallel. Our synthesis shows that a key factor in understanding inconsistencies in statistical intuitions research is whether probabilistic inferences are based on symbolic, abstract descriptions or on the direct experience of statistical information. We delineate this view from other conceptual accounts, consider potential mechanisms by which attributes of first-hand experience can facilitate appropriate statistical inference, and identify conditions under which they improve or impair probabilistic reasoning. To capture the full scope of human statistical intuition, we conclude, research on probabilistic reasoning across the lifespan, across species, and across research traditions must bear in mind that experience and symbolic description of the world may engage systematically distinct cognitive processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christin Schulze
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany.
| | - Ralph Hertwig
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
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Ghrear S, Baimel A, Haddock T, Birch SAJ. Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0244141. [PMID: 33606742 PMCID: PMC7894954 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0244141] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2020] [Accepted: 12/04/2020] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or misrepresent reality (i.e., possess a 'Theory of Mind') is hotly debated. This understanding plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communicating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the 'Sally-Anne Task', because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test examining one's understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessarily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children-the 'curse of knowledge' (the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when considering less-informed perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old's (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at inferring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously observed developmental changes in children's performance could be attributed to the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge, highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Siba Ghrear
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
- * E-mail:
| | - Adam Baimel
- Department of Psychology, Health and Professional Development, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Taeh Haddock
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
| | - Susan A. J. Birch
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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44
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Limited evidence for probability matching as a strategy in probability learning tasks. PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/bs.plm.2021.02.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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45
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Barone P, Gomila A. Infants' performance in the indirect false belief tasks: A second-person interpretation. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2020; 12:e1551. [PMID: 33319503 PMCID: PMC9285846 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1551] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2020] [Revised: 11/13/2020] [Accepted: 11/16/2020] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Research in the last 15 years has challenged the idea that false belief attribution develops at 4 years of age. Studies with indirect false belief tasks contend to provide evidence of false belief attribution in the second year of life. We review the literature on indirect false belief tasks carried out in infants using looking and active helping paradigms. Although the results are heterogeneous and not conclusive, such tasks appear to capture a real effect. However, it is misleading to call them “false belief” tasks, as it is possible to pass them without making any false belief attribution. Infants need to keep track of the object's and agent's positions, trajectories, and focus of attention, given an intentional understanding of the agent, to pass these new tasks. We, therefore, argue that the evidence can be better explained in terms of second‐person attributions, which are transparent, extensional, nonpropositional, reciprocally contingent, and implicit. Second‐person attributions can also account for primates' mentalizing abilities, as revealed by similar indirect tasks. This article is categorized under:Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition
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Affiliation(s)
- Pamela Barone
- Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma, Spain.,Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands, Illes Balears, Spain
| | - Antoni Gomila
- Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma, Spain.,Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands, Illes Balears, Spain
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Strid K, Meristo M. Infants Consider the Distributor's Intentions in Resource Allocation. Front Psychol 2020; 11:596213. [PMID: 33192941 PMCID: PMC7661776 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.596213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/18/2020] [Accepted: 09/25/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent experimental studies suggest that preverbal infants are able to evaluate agents on the basis of their distributive actions. Here we asked whether such evaluations are based on infants' understanding of the distributors' intentions, or only the outcome of their actions. Ten-month-old infants observed animated movies of unequal resource allocations by distributors who attempted but failed to distribute resources equally or unequally between two individuals. We found that infants attended longer to the test event showing a third agent approaching a distributor who was unable to make an unequal distribution, compared to the test event where the third agent approached a distributor who was unable to make an equal distribution of resources. Our results suggest that infants' ability to encode distributive actions goes beyond an analysis of the outcome of these actions, by including the intentions of the distributors whose actions lead to these outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karin Strid
- Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
| | - Marek Meristo
- Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
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Burnside K, Neumann C, Poulin-Dubois D. Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals. Front Psychol 2020; 11:547680. [PMID: 33071864 PMCID: PMC7536113 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.547680] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2020] [Accepted: 08/18/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind (ToM) that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature (ToM) implies the understanding that mental states are person specific. Previous studies on infants' understanding of motivational mental states, such as goals and preferences have revealed that, by 9 months of age, infants do not generalize these motivational mental states across agents. However, it remains to be determined if infants also perceive epistemic states as person specific. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to use a switch agent paradigm with the classic false belief violation-of-expectation task. Results revealed that 16-month-old infants attributed true and false beliefs to a naïve agent - they did not perceive beliefs as person specific. These findings indicate that the mechanisms that underlie infants' implicit attribution of beliefs differ from those assumed for explicit reasoning about beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kimberly Burnside
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada
| | - Cassandra Neumann
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montréal, QC, Canada
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Wenzel L, Dörrenberg S, Proft M, Liszkowski U, Rakoczy H. Actions do not speak louder than words in an interactive false belief task. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2020; 7:191998. [PMID: 33204438 PMCID: PMC7657934 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.191998] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/08/2019] [Accepted: 09/16/2020] [Indexed: 06/11/2023]
Abstract
Traditionally, it had been assumed that meta-representational Theory of Mind (ToM) emerges around the age of 4 when children come to master standard false belief (FB) tasks. More recent research with various implicit measures, though, has documented much earlier competence and thus challenged the traditional picture. In interactive FB tasks, for instance, infants have been shown to track an interlocutor's false or true belief when interpreting her ambiguous communicative acts (Southgate et al. 2010 Dev. Sci. 13, 907-912. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x)). However, several replication attempts so far have produced mixed findings (e.g. Dörrenberg et al. 2018 Cogn. Dev. 46, 12-30. (doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.01.001); Grosse Wiesmann et al. 2017 Dev. Sci. 20, e12445. (doi:10.1111/desc.12445); Király et al. 2018 Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 115, 11 477-11 482. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1803505115)). Therefore, we conducted a systematic replication study, across two laboratories, of an influential interactive FB task (the so-called 'Sefo' tasks by Southgate et al. 2010 Dev. Sci. 13, 907-912. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x)). First, we implemented close direct replications with the original age group (17-month-olds) and compared their performance to those of 3-year-olds. Second, we designed conceptual replications with modifications and improvements regarding pragmatic ambiguities for 2-year-olds. Third, we validated the task with explicit verbal test versions in older children and adults. Results revealed the following: the original results could not be replicated, and there was no evidence for FB understanding measured by the Sefo task in any age group except for adults. Comparisons to explicit FB tasks suggest that the Sefo task may not be a sensitive measure of FB understanding in children and even underestimate their ToM abilities. The findings add to the growing replication crisis in implicit ToM research and highlight the challenge of developing sensitive, reliable and valid measures of early implicit social cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lisa Wenzel
- Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Sebastian Dörrenberg
- Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 18, 28359 Bremen, Germany
- Developmental Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Marina Proft
- Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Ulf Liszkowski
- Developmental Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Hannes Rakoczy
- Developmental Psychology, University of Göttingen, Waldweg 26, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
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Abstract
Accounts of teasing have a long history in psychological and sociological research, yet teasing itself is vastly underdeveloped as a topic of study. As a phenomenon that moves along the border between aggression and play, teasing presents an opportunity to investigate key foundations of social and mental life. Developmental studies suggest that preverbal human infants already playfully tease their parents by performing 'the unexpected,' apparently deliberately violating the recipient's expectations to create a shared humorous experience. Teasing behaviour may be phylogenetically old and perhaps an evolutionary precursor to joking. In this review, we present preliminary evidence suggesting that non-human primates also exhibit playful teasing. In particular, we argue that great apes display three types of playful teasing described in preverbal human infants: teasing with offer and withdrawal, provocative non-compliance and disrupting others' activities. We highlight the potential of this behaviour to provide a window into complex socio-cognitive processes such as attribution of others' expectations and, finally, we propose directions for future research and call for systematic studies of teasing behaviour in non-human primates.
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Affiliation(s)
- Johanna Eckert
- Department of Anthropology, University of California Los Angeles, Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA.,Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
| | - Sasha L Winkler
- Department of Anthropology, University of California Los Angeles, Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
| | - Erica A Cartmill
- Department of Anthropology, University of California Los Angeles, Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA.,Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Franz Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
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Hoyos C, Horton WS, Simms NK, Gentner D. Analogical Comparison Promotes Theory-of-Mind Development. Cogn Sci 2020; 44:e12891. [PMID: 32918371 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12891] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/04/2018] [Revised: 06/16/2020] [Accepted: 07/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Theory-of-mind (ToM) is an integral part of social cognition, but how it develops remains a critical question. There is evidence that children can gain insight into ToM through experience, including language training and explanatory interactions. But this still leaves open the question of how children gain these insights-what processes drive this learning? We propose that analogical comparison is a key mechanism in the development of ToM. In Experiment 1, children were shown true- and false-belief scenarios and prompted to engage in multiple comparisons (e.g., belief vs. world). In Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3, children saw a series of true- and false-belief events, varying in order and in their alignability. Across these experiments, we found that providing support for comparing true- and false-belief scenarios led to increased performance on false-belief tests. These findings show that analogical comparison can support ToM learning.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Nina K Simms
- Spatial Intelligence and Learning Center, Northwestern University
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