The Sampling Brain

Multi-step planning of eye movements in visual search

The capability of directing gaze to relevant parts in the environment is crucial for our survival. Computational models have proposed quantitative accounts of human gaze selection in a range of visual search tasks. Initially, models suggested that gaze is directed to the locations in a visual scene at which some criterion such as the probability of target location, the reduction of uncertainty or the maximization of reward appear to be maximal. But subsequent studies established, that in some tasks humans instead direct their gaze to locations, such that after the single next look the criterion is expected to become maximal. However, in tasks going beyond a single action, the entire action sequence may determine future rewards thereby necessitating planning beyond a single next gaze shift. While previous empirical studies have suggested that human gaze sequences are planned, quantitative evidence for whether the human visual system is capable of finding optimal eye movement sequences according to probabilistic planning is missing. Here we employ a series of computational models to investigate whether humans are capable of looking ahead more than the next single eye movement. We found clear evidence that subjects' behavior was better explained by the model of a planning observer compared to a myopic, greedy observer, which selects only a single saccade at a time. In particular, the location of our subjects' first fixation differed depending on the stimulus and the time available for the search, which was well predicted quantitatively by a probabilistic planning model. Overall, our results are the first evidence that the human visual system's gaze selection agrees with optimal planning under uncertainty.

Local Choices: Rationality and the Contextuality of Decision-Making

Rational explanation is ubiquitous in psychology and social sciences, ranging from rational analysis, expectancy-value theories, ideal observer models, mental logic to probabilistic frameworks, rational choice theory, and informal "folk psychological" explanation. However, rational explanation appears to be challenged by apparently systematic irrationality observed in psychological experiments, especially in the field of judgement and decision-making (JDM). Here, it is proposed that the experimental results require not that rational explanation should be rejected, but that rational explanation is local, i.e., within a context. Thus, rational models need to be supplemented with a theory of contextual shifts. We review evidence in JDM that patterns of choices are often consistent within contexts, but unstable between contexts. We also demonstrate that for a limited, though reasonably broad, class of decision-making domains, recent theoretical models can be viewed as providing theories of contextual shifts. It is argued that one particular significant source of global inconsistency arises from a cognitive inability to represent absolute magnitudes, whether for perceptual variables, utilities, payoffs, or probabilities. This overall argument provides a fresh perspective on the scope and limits of human rationality.