The cultural learning account of first impressions

Implicit bias and experience influence overall but not relative trustworthiness judgment of other-race faces

Impressions of trustworthiness are formed quickly from faces. To what extent are these impressions shared among observers of the same or different races? Although high consensus of trustworthiness evaluation has been consistently reported, recent studies suggested substantial individual differences. For instance, negative implicit racial bias and low contact experience towards individuals of the other race have been shown to be related to low trustworthiness judgments for other-race faces. This pre-registered study further examined the effects of implicit social bias and experience on trustworthiness judgments of other-race faces. A relatively large sample of White (N = 338) and Black (N = 299) participants completed three tasks: a trustworthiness rating task of faces, a race implicit association test, and a questionnaire of experience. Each participant rated trustworthiness of 100 White faces and 100 Black faces. We found that the overall trustworthiness ratings for other-race faces were influenced by both implicit bias and experience with individuals of the other-race. Nonetheless, when comparing to the own-race baseline ratings, high correlations were observed for the relative differences in trustworthiness ratings of other-race faces for participants with varied levels of implicit bias and experience. These results suggest differential impact of social concepts (e.g., implicit bias, experience) vs. instinct (e.g., decision of approach-vs-avoid) on trustworthiness impressions, as revealed by overall vs. relative ratings on other-race faces.

Facial first impressions are not mandatory: A priming investigation

A common assertion is that, based around prominent character traits, first impressions are spontaneously extracted from faces. Specifically, mere exposure to a person is sufficient to trigger the involuntary extraction of core personality characteristics (e.g., trustworthiness, dominance, competence), an outcome that supports a range of significant judgments (e.g., hiring, investing, electing). But is this in fact the case? Noting ambiguities in the extant literature, here we used a repetition priming procedure to probe the extent to which impressions of dominance are extracted from faces absent the instruction to evaluate the stimuli in this way. Across five experiments in which either the character trait of interest was made increasingly obvious to participants (Expts. 1-3) or attention was explicitly directed toward the faces to generate low-level/high-level judgments (Expts. 4 & 5), no evidence for the spontaneous extraction of first impressions was observed. Instead, priming only emerged when judgments of dominance were an explicit requirement of the task at hand. Thus, at least using a priming methodology, the current findings contest the notion that first impressions are a mandatory product of person perception.

The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle

People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.

Iterated learning reveals stereotypes of facial trustworthiness that propagate in the absence of evidence

When we look at someone's face, we rapidly and automatically form robust impressions of how trustworthy they appear. Yet while people's impressions of trustworthiness show a high degree of reliability and agreement with one another, evidence for the accuracy of these impressions is weak. How do such appearance-based biases survive in the face of weak evidence? We explored this question using an iterated learning paradigm, in which memories relating (perceived) facial and behavioral trustworthiness were passed through many generations of participants. Stimuli consisted of pairs of computer-generated people's faces and exact dollar amounts that those fictional people shared with partners in a trust game. Importantly, the faces were designed to vary considerably along a dimension of perceived facial trustworthiness. Each participant learned (and then reproduced from memory) some mapping between the faces and the dollar amounts shared (i.e., between perceived facial and behavioral trustworthiness). Much like in the game of 'telephone', their reproductions then became the training stimuli initially presented to the next participant, and so on for each transmission chain. Critically, the first participant in each chain observed some mapping between perceived facial and behavioral trustworthiness, including positive linear, negative linear, nonlinear, and completely random relationships. Strikingly, participants' reproductions of these relationships showed a pattern of convergence in which more trustworthy looks were associated with more trustworthy behavior - even when there was no relationship between looks and behavior at the start of the chain. These results demonstrate the power of facial stereotypes, and the ease with which they can be propagated to others, even in the absence of any reliable origin of these stereotypes.

Contextual modulation of appearance-trait learning

When we encounter a stranger for the first time, we spontaneously attribute to them a wide variety of character traits based on their facial appearance. There is increasing consensus that learning plays a key role in these first impressions. According to the Trait Inference Mapping (TIM) model, first impressions are the products of mappings between 'face space' and 'trait space' acquired through domain-general associative processes. Drawing on the associative learning literature, TIM predicts that first-learned associations between facial appearance and character will be particularly influential: they will be difficult to unlearn and will be more likely to generalise to novel contexts than appearance-trait associations acquired subsequently. The study of face-trait learning de novo is complicated by the fact that participants, even young children, already have extensive experience with faces before they enter the lab. This renders the study of first-learned associations from faces intractable. Here, we overcome this problem by using Greebles - a class of novel synthetic objects about which participants had no previous knowledge or preconceptions - as a proxy for faces. In four experiments (total N = 640) with adult participants we adapt classic AB-A and AB-C renewal paradigms to study appearance-trait learning. Our results indicate that appearance-trait associations are subject to contextual control, and are resistant to counter-stereotypical experience.

Preferential looking studies of trustworthiness detection confound structural and expressive cues to facial trustworthiness

On encountering a stranger, we spontaneously attribute to them character traits (e.g., trustworthiness, intelligence) based on their facial appearance. Participants can base impressions on structural face cues-the stable aspects of facial appearance that support identity recognition-or expression cues, such as the presence of a smile. It has been reported that 6- to 8-month-old infants attend to faces that adults judge to be trustworthy in preference to faces judged untrustworthy. These results are striking because the face stimuli employed were ostensibly emotion neutral. Consequently, these preferential looking effects have been taken as evidence for innate sensitivity to structural face cues to trustworthiness. However, scrutiny of the emotion rating procedure used with adults suggests that the face stimuli employed may have been judged emotion neutral only when interleaved with more obvious examples of facial affect. This means that the faces may vary in emotional expression when compared to each other. Here, we report new evidence obtained from adult raters that the stimuli used in these studies confound trustworthiness and untrustworthiness with the presence of happiness and anger, respectively. These findings suggest that the preferential looking effects described in infants are compatible with a preference for positive facial affect and may not reflect early sensitivity to structural face cues to trustworthiness.