Cognitive control and dishonesty

Time pressure and deliberation affect moral punishment

The deliberate-morality account implies that moral punishment should be decreased with time pressure and increased with deliberation while the intuitive-morality account predicts the opposite. In three experiments, moral punishment was examined in a simultaneous one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. The players cooperated or defected and then decided whether or not to punish their partners. In Experiment 1, the punishment decisions were made without or with time pressure. In Experiment 2, the punishment decisions were immediate or delayed by pauses in which participants deliberated their decisions. In Experiment 3, participants were asked to deliberate self-interest or fairness before deciding whether to punish their partners. Different types of punishment were distinguished using the cooperation-and-punishment model. In Experiment 1, time pressure decreased moral punishment. In Experiment 2, deliberation increased moral punishment. So far, the evidence supports the deliberate-morality account. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the effect of deliberation depends on what is deliberated. When participants deliberated self-interest rather than fairness, moral punishment was decreased. The results suggest that unguided deliberation increases moral punishment, but the effects of deliberation are modulated by the type of deliberation that takes place. These results strengthen a process-based account of punishment which offers a more nuanced understanding of the context-specific effect of deliberation on moral punishment than the deliberate-morality account.

Behavioral dishonesty in multiscenes: Associations with trait honesty and neural patterns during (dis)honesty video-watching

Cross-situational inconsistency is common in the expression of honesty traits; yet, there is insufficient emphasis on behavioral dishonesty across multiple contexts. The current study aimed to investigate behavioral dishonesty in various contexts and reveal the associations between trait honesty, behavioral dishonesty, and neural patterns of observing others behave honestly or dishonestly in videos (abbr.: (dis)honesty video-watching). First, the results revealed limitations in using trait honesty to reflect variations in dishonest behaviors and predict behavioral dishonesty. The finding highlights the importance of considering neural patterns in understanding and predicting dishonest behaviors. Second, by comparing the predictive performance of seven types of data across three neural networks, the results showed that functional connectivity in the hypothesis-driven network during (dis)honesty video-watching provided the highest predictive power in predicting multitask behavioral dishonesty. Last, by applying the feature elimination method, the midline self-referential regions (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex), anterior insula, and striatum were identified as the most informative brain regions in predicting behavioral dishonesty. In summary, the study offered insights into individual differences in deception and the intricate connections among trait honesty, behavioral dishonesty, and neural patterns during (dis)honesty video-watching.

Sex modulated the relationship between trait approach motivation and decision-making

It has been observed that one's Behavioral Approach System (BAS) can have an effect on decision-making under uncertainty, although the results have been mixed. To discern the underlying neural substrates, we hypothesize that sex may explain the conflicting results. To test this idea, a large sample of participants was studied using resting state fMRI, utilizing fractional Amplitude of Low Frequency Fluctuations (fALFF) and Resting-State Functional Connectivity (rsFC) techniques. The results of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) revealed an interaction between sex and BAS, particularly in the last 60 trials (decision-making under risk). Males with high BAS showed poorer performance than those with low BAS. fALFF analysis showed a significant interaction between BAS group and sex in the left superior occipital gyrus, as well as the functional connectivity between this region and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Additionally, this functional connectivity was further positively correlated with male performance in the IGT, particularly in the decision-making under risk stage. Furthermore, it was found that the functional connectivity between left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and left superior occipital gyrus could mediate the relationship between BAS and decision-making in males, particularly in the decision-making under risk stage. These results suggest possible sex-based differences in decision-making, providing an explanation for the inconsistent results found in prior research. Since the research was carried out exclusively with Chinese university students, it is essential to conduct further studies to investigate whether the findings can be generalized.

On cooperative libertines and wicked puritans

We agree with Fitouchi et al. that self-denial is sometimes moralized to signal capacity for cooperation, but propose that a person's cooperative character is more precisely judged by willingness to follow cultural, group, and interpersonal goals, for which many rules can serve as proxies, including rules about abstention. But asceticism is not a moral signal if its aims are destructive, while indulging impulses in a culturally approved way can also signal cooperation.

Why people engage in corrupt collaboration: an observation at the multi-brain level

Recent studies suggest that corrupt collaboration (i.e. acquiring private benefits with joint immoral acts) represents a dilemma between the honesty and reciprocity norms. In this study, we asked pairs of participants (labeled as A and B) to individually toss a coin and report their outcomes; their collective benefit could be maximized by dishonestly reporting (a corrupt behavior). As expected, the likelihood of corrupt behavior was high; this probability was negatively correlated with player A's moral judgment ability but positively correlated with player B's empathic concern (EC). Functional near-infrared spectroscopy data revealed that the brain-to-brain synchronization in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was associated with fewer corrupt behaviors, and that it mediated the relationship between player A's moral judgment ability and corrupt collaboration. Meanwhile, the right temporal-parietal junction synchronization was associated with more corrupt behaviors, and that it mediated the relationship between player B's EC and corrupt collaboration. The roles of these 2 regions are interpreted according to the influence of the honesty and reciprocity norms on corrupt collaboration. In our opinion, these findings provide insight into the underlying mechanisms and modulating factors of corrupt collaboration.

Reputation risk during dishonest social decision-making modulates anterior insular and cingulate cortex activity and connectivity

To explore the neural underpinnings of (dis)honest decision making under quasi-ecological conditions, we used an fMRI adapted version of a card game in which deceptive or truthful decisions are made to an opponent, with or without the risk of getting caught by them. Dishonest decisions were associated to increased activity in a cortico-subcortical circuit including the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and right caudate. Crucially, deceptive immoral decisions under reputation risk enhanced activity of - and functional connectivity between - the bilateral ACC and left AI, suggesting the need for heightened emotional processing and cognitive control when making immoral decisions under reputation risk. Tellingly, more manipulative individuals required less involvement of the ACC during risky self-gain lies but more involvement during other-gain truths, pointing to the need of cognitive control only when going against one's own moral code.

The acute effects of stress on dishonesty are moderated by individual differences in moral default

In daily life we regularly must decide whether to act dishonestly for personal gain or to be honest and maintain a positive image of ourselves. While evidence suggests that acute stress influences moral decisions, it is unclear whether stress increases or decreases immoral behavior. Here, we hypothesize that stress, through its effects on cognitive control, has different effects on moral decision making for different individuals, depending on their moral default. We test this hypothesis by combining a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating with a well-established stress induction task. Our findings confirm our hypothesis, revealing that effects of stress on dishonesty are not uniform, but instead depend on the individual: for those who are relatively dishonest, stress increases dishonesty, whereas for participants who are relatively honest stress makes them more honest. These findings go a long way in resolving the conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of stress on moral decisions, suggesting that stress affects dishonesty differently for different individuals, depending on their moral default.

The Role of Cognition in Dishonest Behavior

Dishonesty has received increased attention from many professionals in recent years for its relevance in many social areas such as finance and psychology, among others. Understanding the mechanisms underlying dishonesty and the channels in which dishonesty operates could enable the detection and even prevention of dishonest behavior. However, the study of dishonesty is a challenging endeavor; dishonesty is a complex behavior because it imposes a psychological and cognitive burden. The study of this burden has fostered a new research trend that focuses on cognition’s role in dishonesty. This paper reviews the theoretical aspects of how such cognitive processes modulate dishonest behavior. We will pay special attention to executive functions such as inhibitory processes, working memory, or set-shifting that may modulate the decision to be (dis)honest. We also account for some frameworks in cognitive and social psychology that may help understand dishonesty, such as the Theory of Mind, the role of creative processes, and discourse analyses within language studies. Finally, we will discuss some specific cognitive-based models that integrate cognitive mechanisms to explain dishonesty. We show that cognition and dishonest behavior are firmly related and that there are several important milestones to reach in the future to advance the understanding of dishonesty in our society.