Creative problem solving in knowledge-rich contexts

Semantic associative abilities and executive control functions predict novelty and appropriateness of idea generation

Novelty and appropriateness are two fundamental components of creativity. However, the way in which novelty and appropriateness are separated at behavioral and neural levels remains poorly understood. In the present study, we aim to distinguish behavioral and neural bases of novelty and appropriateness of creative idea generation. In alignment with two established theories of creative thinking, which respectively, emphasize semantic association and executive control, behavioral results indicate that novelty relies more on associative abilities, while appropriateness relies more on executive functions. Next, employing a connectome predictive modeling (CPM) approach in resting-state fMRI data, we define two functional network-based models-dominated by interactions within the default network and by interactions within the limbic network-that respectively, predict novelty and appropriateness (i.e., cross-brain prediction). Furthermore, the generalizability and specificity of the two functional connectivity patterns are verified in additional resting-state fMRI and task fMRI. Finally, the two functional connectivity patterns, respectively mediate the relationship between semantic association/executive control and novelty/appropriateness. These findings provide global and predictive distinctions between novelty and appropriateness in creative idea generation.

Recognizing ideas generated in a creative task: the roles of the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex in facilitating self-generated learning

Creative idea generation plays an important role in promoting successful memory formation. Yet, its underlying neural correlates remain unclear. We investigated the self-generated learning of creative ideas motivated by the schema-linked interactions between medial prefrontal and medial temporal regions framework. This was achieved by having participants generate ideas in the alternative uses task, self-evaluating their ideas based on novelty and source (i.e. new or old), and then later being tested on the recognition performance of the generated ideas. At the behavioral level, our results indicated superior performances in discriminating novel ideas, highlighting the novelty effect on memory. At the neural level, the regions-of-interest analyses revealed that successful recognition of novel ideas was associated with greater activations in the hippocampus (HPC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during ideation. However, only activation in the right HPC was positively related to the successful recognition of novel ideas. Importantly, the weaker the connection between the right HPC and left mPFC, the higher the recognition accuracy of novel ideas. Moreover, activations in the right HPC and left mPFC were both effective predictors of successful recognition of novel ideas. These findings uniquely highlight the role of novelty in promoting self-generated learning of creative ideas.

Divergent thinking benefits from functional antagonism of the left IFG and right TPJ: a transcranial direct current stimulation study

Divergent thinking is assumed to benefit from releasing the constraint of existing knowledge (i.e. top-down control) and enriching free association (i.e. bottom-up processing). However, whether functional antagonism between top-down control-related and bottom-up processing-related brain structures is conducive to generating original ideas is largely unknown. This study was designed to investigate the effect of functional antagonism between the left inferior frontal gyrus and the right temporoparietal junction on divergent thinking performance. A within-subjects design was adopted for three experiments. A total of 114 participants performed divergent thinking tasks after receiving transcranial direct current stimulation over target regions. In particular, cathodal stimulation over the left inferior frontal gyrus and anodal stimulation over the right inferior frontal gyrus (Experiment 1), anodal stimulation over the right temporoparietal junction (Experiment 2), and both cathodal stimulation over the left inferior frontal gyrus and anodal stimulation over the right temporoparietal junction (Experiment 3) were manipulated. Compared with sham stimulation, the combination of hyperpolarization of the left inferior frontal gyrus and depolarization of the right temporoparietal junction comprehensively promoted the fluency, flexibility, and originality of divergent thinking without decreasing the rationality of generated ideas. Functional antagonism between the left inferior frontal gyrus (hyperpolarization) and right temporoparietal junction (depolarization) has a "1 + 1 > 2" superposition effect on divergent thinking.

The unity and diversity of verbal and visuospatial creativity: Dynamic changes in hemispheric lateralisation

The investigation of similarities and differences in the mechanisms of verbal and visuospatial creative thinking has long been a controversial topic. Prior studies found that visuospatial creativity was primarily supported by the right hemisphere, whereas verbal creativity relied on the interaction between both hemispheres. However, creative thinking also involves abundant dynamic features that may have been ignored in the previous static view. Recently, a new method has been developed that measures hemispheric laterality from a dynamic perspective, providing new insight into the exploration of creative thinking. In the present study, dynamic lateralisation index was calculated with resting-state fMRI data. We combined the dynamic lateralisation index with sparse canonical correlation analysis to examine similarities and differences in the mechanisms of verbal and visuospatial creativity. Our results showed that the laterality reversal of the default mode network, fronto-parietal network, cingulo-opercular network and visual network contributed significantly to both verbal and visuospatial creativity and consequently could be considered the common neural mechanisms shared by these creative modes. In addition, we found that verbal creativity relied more on the language network, while visuospatial creativity relied more on the somatomotor network, which can be considered a difference in their mechanism. Collectively, these findings indicated that verbal and visuospatial creativity may have similar mechanisms to support the basic creative thinking process and different mechanisms to adapt to the specific task conditions. These findings may have significant implications for our understanding of the neural mechanisms of different types of creative thinking.

Diverse functional interaction driven by control-default network hubs supports creative thinking

Complex cognitive processes, like creative thinking, rely on interactions among multiple neurocognitive processes to generate effective and innovative behaviors on demand, for which the brain's connector hubs play a crucial role. However, the unique contribution of specific hub sets to creative thinking is unknown. Employing three functional magnetic resonance imaging datasets (total N = 1,911), we demonstrate that connector hub sets are organized in a hierarchical manner based on diversity, with "control-default hubs"-which combine regions from the frontoparietal control and default mode networks-positioned at the apex. Specifically, control-default hubs exhibit the most diverse resting-state connectivity profiles and play the most substantial role in facilitating interactions between regions with dissimilar neurocognitive functions, a phenomenon we refer to as "diverse functional interaction". Critically, we found that the involvement of control-default hubs in facilitating diverse functional interaction robustly relates to creativity, explaining both task-induced functional connectivity changes and individual creative performance. Our findings suggest that control-default hubs drive diverse functional interaction in the brain, enabling complex cognition, including creative thinking. We thus uncover a biologically plausible explanation that further elucidates the widely reported contributions of certain frontoparietal control and default mode network regions in creativity studies.

Creative mindset reduces racial ingroup bias in empathic neural responses

Spontaneous racial categorization of other-race individuals provides a cognitive basis of racial ingroup biases in empathy and prosocial behavior. In two experiments, we investigated whether fostering a creativity mindset reduces racial ingroup biases in empathy and undermines spontaneous racial categorization of other-race faces. Before and after a creative mindset priming procedure that required the construction of novel objects using discreteness, we recorded electroencephalography signals to Asian and White faces with painful or neutral expressions from Chinese adults to assess neural activities underlying racial ingroup biases in empathy and spontaneous racial categorization of faces. We found that a frontal-central positive activity within 200 ms after face onset (P2) showed greater amplitudes to painful (vs. neutral) expressions of Asian compared with White faces and exhibited repetition suppression in response to White faces. These effects, however, were significantly reduced by creative mindset priming. Moreover, the creative mindset priming enhanced the P2 amplitudes to others' pain to a larger degree in participants who created more novel objects. The priming effects were not observed in control participants who copied objects constructed by others. Our findings suggest that creative mindsets may reduce racial ingroup biases in empathic neural responses by undermining spontaneous racial categorization of faces.

A systematic framework of creative metacognition

Creative cognition does not just involve cognitive processes in direct service of the main task objective (e.g., idea generation), but also metacognitive processes that monitor and regulate cognition adaptively (e.g., evaluation of ideas and task performance, or development and selection of task strategies). Although metacognition is vital for creative performance, relevant work is sparse, which may be partly due to persistent ambiguities in the theoretical conceptualization of creative metacognition. Therefore, this article proposes a systematic framework of creative metacognition (CMC), which builds on recent advancements in metacognition theory and extends them to meet the specifics of creative cognition. The CMC framework consists of two dynamic components-monitoring and control-and a more static component of metacognitive knowledge, each subsuming metacognitive processes applying to the level of task, performance, and responses. We describe the presumed function of these metacognitive components in the creative process, present evidence in support of each, and discuss their association with related constructs, such as creative self-beliefs. We further highlight the dynamic interplay of metacognitive processes across task performance and identify promising avenues for future research.

Unconscious processing of prototype heuristics in scientific innovation problem-solving

Previously published studies on the effect of how different levels of unconsciousness (UC) and different loads of executive functions (EFs) affect insight problem solving are inconsistent. In a set of three experiments, we used scientific innovation problems (SIP) as insight metrics and distractor tasks to induce UC. Experiment 1 confirmed that, compared with conscious processing, unconscious processing is more conducive to obtaining prototype heuristics for correctly solving scientific innovation problems creatively. Furthermore, Experiment 2 found that different levels of unconscious processing, which were induced by different distractor tasks, made a different impact on high or low difficulty creative problem solving. Experiment 3 indicated that unconscious processing could improve prototype activation and the ability to use key heuristics information in prototype heuristics processing by improving working memory, inhibitory control, and shifting ability of EFs. Overall, the present results provide additional evidence for the role of consciousness levels in insight problem solving.