Subjective distinguishability of seizure and non-seizure Déjà Vu: A case report, brief literature review, and research prospects

Does familiarity-detection flip attention inward? The familiarity-flip-of-attention account of the primacy effect in memory for repetitions

In cognitive psychology, research on attention is shifting from focusing primarily on how people orient toward stimuli in the environment toward instead examining how people orient internally toward memory representations. With this new shift the question arises: What factors in the environment send attention inward? A recent proposal is that one factor is cue familiarity-detection (Cleary, Irving & Mills, Cognitive Science, 47, e13274, 2023). Within this theoretical framework, we reinterpret a decades-old empirical pattern-a primacy effect in memory for repetitions-in a novel way. The effect is the finding that altered repetitions of an image were remembered as re-occurrences of the first presentation despite having a changed left-right orientation; participants better retained the first orientation while incorrectly remembering changed instantiations as repetitions of the first orientation (DiGirolamo & Hintzman, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 121-124, 1997). We argue that this pattern, which has never been fully explained, is an existing empirical test of the newly proposed mechanism of cue familiarity-detection flipping attention inward toward memory. Specifically, an image's first appearance is novel so draws attention outward toward encoding the stimulus' attributes like orientation; subsequent mirror-reversed appearances are detected as familiar so flip attention inward toward memory search, which leads to 1) inattentional blindness for the changed orientation due to the familiarity-driven shift of attention inward and 2) memory retrieval of the first instance and its orientation, thereby enhancing memory for the first instance and its previously encoded attributes like orientation.

Context familiarity is a third kind of episodic memory distinct from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: "familiarity" when generally recognizing an item and "recollection" when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon three conditions: "item-only hits with source unknown" ('item familiarity'), "low-confidence hits with correct source memory" ('context familiarity'), and "high-confidence hits with correct source memory" ('recollection'). Behaviorally, context familiarity was slower than the others during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited a negative effect from 800 to 1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400-600 ms) and recollection (600-900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory, and we offer a new, tri-component model of memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory.

A third kind of episodic memory: Context familiarity is distinct from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: 'familiarity' when generally recognizing an item and 'recollection' when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. Paradoxically, people sometimes report contextual information as familiar but without recollecting details, which is not easily accounted for by existing theories. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon 'item-only hits with source unknown' ('item familiarity'), 'low-confidence hits with correct source memory' ('context familiarity'), and 'high-confidence hits with correct source memory' ('recollection'). Results across multiple within-subjects (trial-wise) and between subjects (individual variability) levels indicated these were behaviorally and physiologically distinct. Behaviorally, a crossover interaction was evident in response times, with context familiarity being slower than each condition during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a Condition x Time x Location triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was then independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited an independent negative central effect from 800-1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400 to 600 ms) and recollection (600 to 900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory.

Summary

Memory for past events is widely believed to operate through two different processes: one called 'recollection' when retrieving confident, specific details of a memory, and another called 'familiarity' when only having an unsure but conscious awareness that an item was experienced before. When people successfully retrieve details such as the source or context of a prior event, it has been assumed to reflect recollection. We demonstrate that familiarity of context is functionally distinct from familiarity of items and recollection and offer a new, tri-component model of memory. The three memory responses were differentiated across multiple behavioral and brain wave measures. What has traditionally been thought to be two kinds of memory processes are actually three, becoming evident when using sensitive enough multi-measures. Results are independently replicated across studies from different labs. These data reveal that context familiarity is a third process of human episodic memory.

A virtual reality paradigm with dynamic scene stimuli for use in memory research

Episodic memory may essentially be memory for one's place within a temporally unfolding scene from a first-person perspective. Given this, pervasively used static stimuli may only capture one small part of episodic memory. A promising approach for advancing the study of episodic memory is immersing participants within varying scenes from a first-person perspective. We present a pool of distinct scene stimuli for use in virtual environments and a paradigm that is implementable across varying levels of immersion on multiple virtual reality (VR) platforms and adaptable to studying various aspects of scene and episodic memory. In our task, participants are placed within a series of virtual environments from a first-person perspective and guided through a virtual tour of scenes during a study phase and a test phase. In the test phase, some scenes share a spatial layout with studied scenes; others are completely novel. In three experiments with varying degrees of immersion, we measure scene recall, scene familiarity-detection during recall failure, the subjective experience of déjà vu, the ability to predict the next turn on a tour, the subjective sense of being able to predict the next turn on a tour, and the factors that influence memory search and the inclination to generate candidate recollective information. The level of first-person immersion mattered to multiple facets of episodic memory. The paradigm presents a useful means of advancing mechanistic understanding of how memory operates in realistic dynamic scene environments, including in combination with cognitive neuroscience methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and electrophysiology.

Towards a conflict account of déjà vu: The role of memory errors and memory expectation conflict in the experience of déjà vu

Déjà vu can be defined as conflict between a subjective evaluation of familiarity and a concurrent evaluation of novelty. Accounts of the déjà vu experience have not explicitly referred to a "conflict account of déjà vu" despite the acceptance of conflict-based definitions of déjà vu and relatively recent neuroimaging work that has implicated brain areas associated with conflict as underpinning the experience. Conflict monitoring functioning follows a similar age-related trajectory to déjà vu with a peak in young adulthood and a subsequent age-related decline. In this narrative review of the literature to date, we consider how déjà vu is defined and how this has influenced the understanding of déjà vu. We also review how déjà vu can be understood within theories of recognition memory and cognitive control. Finally, we summarise the conflict account of déjà vu and propose that this account of the experience may provide a coherent explanation as to why déjà vu experiences tend to decrease with age in the non-clinical population.

Opening a conceptual space for metamemory experience

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance.

Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval?

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum.