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Aitken CBA, Jentzsch I, O'Connor AR. Towards a conflict account of déjà vu: The role of memory errors and memory expectation conflict in the experience of déjà vu. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 155:105467. [PMID: 37979736 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105467] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/10/2023] [Revised: 10/22/2023] [Accepted: 11/13/2023] [Indexed: 11/20/2023]
Abstract
Déjà vu can be defined as conflict between a subjective evaluation of familiarity and a concurrent evaluation of novelty. Accounts of the déjà vu experience have not explicitly referred to a "conflict account of déjà vu" despite the acceptance of conflict-based definitions of déjà vu and relatively recent neuroimaging work that has implicated brain areas associated with conflict as underpinning the experience. Conflict monitoring functioning follows a similar age-related trajectory to déjà vu with a peak in young adulthood and a subsequent age-related decline. In this narrative review of the literature to date, we consider how déjà vu is defined and how this has influenced the understanding of déjà vu. We also review how déjà vu can be understood within theories of recognition memory and cognitive control. Finally, we summarise the conflict account of déjà vu and propose that this account of the experience may provide a coherent explanation as to why déjà vu experiences tend to decrease with age in the non-clinical population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Courtney B A Aitken
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, United Kingdom.
| | - Ines Jentzsch
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, United Kingdom
| | - Akira R O'Connor
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, United Kingdom
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Okada NS, McNeely-White KL, Cleary AM, Carlaw BN, Drane DL, Parsons TD, McMahan T, Neisser J, Pedersen NP. A virtual reality paradigm with dynamic scene stimuli for use in memory research. Behav Res Methods 2023:10.3758/s13428-023-02243-w. [PMID: 37845424 PMCID: PMC11018716 DOI: 10.3758/s13428-023-02243-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 09/15/2023] [Indexed: 10/18/2023]
Abstract
Episodic memory may essentially be memory for one's place within a temporally unfolding scene from a first-person perspective. Given this, pervasively used static stimuli may only capture one small part of episodic memory. A promising approach for advancing the study of episodic memory is immersing participants within varying scenes from a first-person perspective. We present a pool of distinct scene stimuli for use in virtual environments and a paradigm that is implementable across varying levels of immersion on multiple virtual reality (VR) platforms and adaptable to studying various aspects of scene and episodic memory. In our task, participants are placed within a series of virtual environments from a first-person perspective and guided through a virtual tour of scenes during a study phase and a test phase. In the test phase, some scenes share a spatial layout with studied scenes; others are completely novel. In three experiments with varying degrees of immersion, we measure scene recall, scene familiarity-detection during recall failure, the subjective experience of déjà vu, the ability to predict the next turn on a tour, the subjective sense of being able to predict the next turn on a tour, and the factors that influence memory search and the inclination to generate candidate recollective information. The level of first-person immersion mattered to multiple facets of episodic memory. The paradigm presents a useful means of advancing mechanistic understanding of how memory operates in realistic dynamic scene environments, including in combination with cognitive neuroscience methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and electrophysiology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Noah S Okada
- Department of Neurology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA.
| | | | - Anne M Cleary
- Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80523, USA
| | - Brooke N Carlaw
- Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80523, USA
| | - Daniel L Drane
- Department of Neurology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
- Department of Pediatrics, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
- Department of Neurology, University of Washington School of Medicine, Seattle, WA, 98105, USA
| | - Thomas D Parsons
- Grace Center, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
- Computational Neuropsychology & Simulation (CNS) Laboratory, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
| | - Timothy McMahan
- Department of Learning Technologies, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, 76203, USA
| | - Joseph Neisser
- Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA, 50112, USA
| | - Nigel P Pedersen
- Department of Neurology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA.
- Department of Neurology, University of California Davis, Sacramento, CA, 95816, USA.
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Neisser J, Abreu G, Drane DL, Pedersen NP, Parsons TD, Cleary AM. Opening a conceptual space for metamemory experience. NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOLOGY 2023; 69:100995. [PMID: 38223256 PMCID: PMC10786624 DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2022.100995] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joseph Neisser
- Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, 1120 Park St, Grinnell, IA, 50112, USA
| | - George Abreu
- Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, 1120 Park St, Grinnell, IA, 50112, USA
| | - Daniel L Drane
- Department of Neurology, Emory University, 101 Woodruff Circle, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
- Department of Neurology, University of Washington School of Medicine, Seattle, WA, 98105, USA
| | - Nigel P Pedersen
- Department of Pediatrics, Emory University, 101 Woodruff Circle, Atlanta, GA, 30322, USA
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, The Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 30332, USA
| | - Thomas D Parsons
- Simulation Science & Immersive Technology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
| | - Anne M Cleary
- Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80525, USA
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Barzykowski K, Moulin CJA. Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval? Behav Brain Sci 2022; 46:e356. [PMID: 36111499 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22002035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum.
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Affiliation(s)
- Krystian Barzykowski
- Applied Memory Research Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
| | - Chris J A Moulin
- Laboratoire de Psychologie et Neurocognition, Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
- Institut Universitaire de France
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