Blindsight: the role of feedforward and feedback corticocortical connections

Working memory forgetting: Bridging gaps between human and animal studies

The causes of forgetting in working memory (WM) remain a source of debate in cognitive psychology, partly because it has always been challenging to probe the complex neural mechanisms that govern rapid cognitive processes in humans. In this review, we argue that neural, and more precisely animal models, provide valuable tools for exploring the precise mechanisms of WM forgetting. First, we discuss theoretical perspectives concerning WM forgetting in humans. Then, we present neuronal correlates of WM in animals, starting from the initial evidence of delay activity observed in the prefrontal cortex to the later synaptic theory of WM. In the third part, specific theories of WM are discussed, including the notion that silent versus non-silent activity is more consistent with the processes of refreshing and decay proposed in human cognitive models. The review concludes with an exploration of the relationship between long-term memory and WM, revealing connections between these two forms of memory through the long-term synaptic hypothesis, which suggests that long-term storage of interference can potentially disrupt WM.

Identifying Consciousness in Other Creatures: Three Initial Steps

Identifying consciousness in other creatures, be they animals or exotic creatures that have yet to be discovered, remains a great scientific challenge. We delineate the first three steps that we think are necessary for identifying consciousness in other creatures. Step 1 is to define the particular kind of consciousness in which one is interested. Step 2 is to identify, in humans, the key differences between the brain processes that are associated with consciousness and the brain processes that are not associated with consciousness. For Step 2, to identify these differences, we focus on passive frame theory. Step 3 concerns how the insights derived from consciousness research on humans (e.g., concerning these differences) can be generalized to other creatures. We discuss the significance of examining how consciousness was fashioned by the process of evolution, a process that could be happenstance and replete with incessant tinkering, yielding adaptations that can be suboptimal and counterintuitive, far different in nature from our efficiently designed robotic systems. We conclude that the more that is understood about the differences between conscious processing and unconscious processing in humans, the easier it will be to identify consciousness in other creatures.

Bridging the gap between consciousness and matter: recurrent out-of-body projection of visual awareness revealed by the law of non-identity

Consciousness is the most precious function of brain; however, there is an explanatory gap between consciousness and matter, which is deemed to affect the scientific research on consciousness. We believe that a methodological trap commonly present in scientific research and the incompleteness of logic are the true reasons that affect the research on consciousness. Here, a novel logic tool, the non-identity law, was extracted from physics and applied into the analysis of the visual dynamics related to naturalistic observation of night-shot still life, whose methodological approach is consistent with Descartes' matter-body-mind approach, breaking free from the methodological trap of current research. We show that visual system, the representative sensory system, has a postponed, recurrent out-of-body projection pathway from brain to observed object, besides the well-known feedforward signaling pathway available in existing literature, suggesting that human possesses an instinct of not only subjectively imaging (brain-generated imagery) but also projecting the image back onto the original or a particular place according to the clue of the manipulated afferent messenger light pathway. This finding adds a key piece of puzzle to the visual system. The out-of-body projection, coupled with neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), bridges the gap between consciousness and matter. This study in a self-contained and systematic manner provides a foundation for understanding the subjectivity and intentionality of human consciousness from the angle of visual awareness as well as the isomorphic relationships between unknowable original, private experience, and shareable expression (recording, calculus and deduction), showing that consciousness is obedient to certain rules rather than being unruly. The result paves the way for scientific research on consciousness and facilitates the integration of humanities and natural science.

The Impact of Spatial Frequency on the Perception of Crowd Emotion: An fMRI Study

Recognizing the emotions of faces in a crowd is crucial for understanding overall behavior and intention as well as for smooth and friendly social interactions. However, it is unclear whether the spatial frequency of faces affects the discrimination of crowd emotion. Although high- and low-spatial-frequency information for individual faces is processed by distinct neural channels, there is a lack of evidence on how this applies to crowd faces. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate neural representations of crowd faces at different spatial frequencies. Thirty-three participants were asked to compare whether a test face was happy or more fearful than a crowd face that varied in high, low, and broad spatial frequencies. Our findings revealed that fearful faces with low spatial frequencies were easier to recognize in terms of accuracy (78.9%) and response time (927 ms). Brain regions, such as the fusiform gyrus, located in the ventral visual stream, were preferentially activated in high spatial frequency crowds, which, however, were the most difficult to recognize behaviorally (68.9%). Finally, the right inferior frontal gyrus was found to be better activated in the broad spatial frequency crowds. Our study suggests that people are more sensitive to fearful crowd faces with low spatial frequency and that high spatial frequency does not promote crowd face recognition.

The nature of blindsight: implications for current theories of consciousness

Blindsight regroups the different manifestations of preserved discriminatory visual capacities following the damage to the primary visual cortex. Blindsight types differentially impact objective and subjective perception, patients can report having no visual awareness whilst their behaviour suggests visual processing still occurs at some cortical level. This phenomenon hence presents a unique opportunity to study consciousness and perceptual consciousness, and for this reason, it has had an historical importance for the development of this field of research. From these studies, two main opposing models of the underlying mechanisms have been established: (a) blindsight is perception without consciousness or (b) blindsight is in fact degraded vision, two views that mirror more general theoretical options about whether unconscious cognition truly exists or whether it is only a degraded form of conscious processing. In this article, we want to re-examine this debate in the light of recent advances in the characterization of blindsight and associated phenomena. We first provide an in-depth definition of blindsight and its subtypes, mainly blindsight type I, blindsight type II and the more recently described blindsense. We emphasize the necessity of sensitive and robust methodology to uncover the dissociations between perception and awareness that can be observed in brain-damaged patients with visual field defects at different cognitive levels. We discuss these different profiles of dissociation in the light of both contending models. We propose that the different types of dissociations reveal a pattern of relationship between perception, awareness and metacognition that is actually richer than what is proposed by either of the existing models. Finally, we consider this in the framework of current theories of consciousness and touch on the implications the findings of blindsight have on these.

Causal manipulation of feed-forward and recurrent processing differentially affects measures of consciousness

It has been theorized that cortical feed-forward and recurrent neural activity support unconscious and conscious cognitive processes, respectively. Here we causally tested this proposition by applying event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) at early and late times relative to visual stimuli, together with a pulse designed to suppress conscious detection. Consistent with pre-registered hypotheses, early TMS affected residual, reportedly 'unseen' capacity. However, conscious perception also appeared critically dependent upon feed-forward processing to a greater extent than the later recurrent phase. Additional exploratory analyses suggested that these early effects dissociated from top-down criterion measures, which were most affected by later TMS. These findings are inconsistent with a simple dichotomy where feed-forward and recurrent processes correspond to unconscious and conscious mechanisms. Instead, different components of awareness may correspond to different phases of cortical dynamics in which initial processing is broadly perceptual whereas later recurrent processing might relate to decision to report.

Facilitating the propagation of spiking activity in feedforward networks by including feedback

Transient oscillations in network activity upon sensory stimulation have been reported in different sensory areas of the brain. These evoked oscillations are the generic response of networks of excitatory and inhibitory neurons (EI-networks) to a transient external input. Recently, it has been shown that this resonance property of EI-networks can be exploited for communication in modular neuronal networks by enabling the transmission of sequences of synchronous spike volleys (’pulse packets’), despite the sparse and weak connectivity between the modules. The condition for successful transmission is that the pulse packet (PP) intervals match the period of the modules’ resonance frequency. Hence, the mechanism was termed communication through resonance (CTR). This mechanism has three severe constraints, though. First, it needs periodic trains of PPs, whereas single PPs fail to propagate. Second, the inter-PP interval needs to match the network resonance. Third, transmission is very slow, because in each module, the network resonance needs to build up over multiple oscillation cycles. Here, we show that, by adding appropriate feedback connections to the network, the CTR mechanism can be improved and the aforementioned constraints relaxed. Specifically, we show that adding feedback connections between two upstream modules, called the resonance pair, in an otherwise feedforward modular network can support successful propagation of a single PP throughout the entire network. The key condition for successful transmission is that the sum of the forward and backward delays in the resonance pair matches the resonance frequency of the network modules. The transmission is much faster, by more than a factor of two, than in the original CTR mechanism. Moreover, it distinctly lowers the threshold for successful communication by synchronous spiking in modular networks of weakly coupled networks. Thus, our results suggest a new functional role of bidirectional connectivity for the communication in cortical area networks.

The cortex is organized as a modular system, with the modules (cortical areas) communicating via weak long-range connections. It has been suggested that the intrinsic resonance properties of population activities in these areas might contribute to enabling successful communication. A module’s intrinsic resonance appears in the damped oscillatory response to an incoming spike volley, enabling successful communication during the peaks of the oscillation. Such communication can be exploited in feedforward networks, provided the participating networks have similar resonance frequencies. This, however, is not necessarily true for cortical networks. Moreover, the communication is slow, as it takes several oscillation cycles to build up the response in the downstream network. Also, only periodic trains of spikes volleys (and not single volleys) with matching intervals can propagate. Here, we present a novel mechanism that alleviates these shortcomings and enables propagation of synchronous spiking across weakly connected networks with not necessarily identical resonance frequencies. In this framework, an individual spike volley can propagate by local amplification through reverberation in a loop between two successive networks, connected by feedforward and feedback connections: the resonance pair. This overcomes the need for activity build-up in downstream networks, causing the volley to propagate distinctly faster and more reliably.

A neurodynamic model of the interaction between color perception and color memory

The memory color effect and Spanish castle illusion have been taken as evidence of the cognitive penetrability of vision. In the same manner, the successful decoding of color-related brain signals in functional neuroimaging studies suggests the retrieval of memory colors associated with a perceived gray object. Here, we offer an alternative account of these findings based on the design principles of adaptive resonance theory (ART). In ART, conscious perception is a consequence of a resonant state. Resonance emerges in a recurrent cortical circuit when a bottom-up spatial pattern agrees with the top-down expectation. When they do not agree, a special control mechanism is activated that resets the network and clears off erroneous expectation, thus allowing the bottom-up activity to always dominate in perception. We developed a color ART circuit and evaluated its behavior in computer simulations. The model helps to explain how traces of erroneous expectations about incoming color are eventually removed from the color perception, although their transient effect may be visible in behavioral responses or in brain imaging. Our results suggest that the color ART circuit, as a predictive computational system, is almost never penetrable, because it is equipped with computational mechanisms designed to constrain the impact of the top-down predictions on ongoing perceptual processing.

Visual Size Processing in Early Visual Cortex Follows Lateral Occipital Cortex Involvement

Neural activation in the early visual cortex (EVC) reflects the perceived rather than retinal size of stimuli, suggesting that feedback possibly from extrastriate regions modulates retinal size information in EVC. Meanwhile, the lateral occipital cortex (LOC) has been suggested to be critically involved in object size processing. To test for the potential contributions of feedback modulations on size representations in EVC, we investigated the dynamics of relevant processes using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Specifically, we briefly disrupted the neural activity of EVC and LOC at early, intermediate, and late time windows while participants performed size judgment tasks in either an illusory or neutral context. TMS over EVC and LOC allowed determining whether these two brain regions are relevant for generating phenomenological size impressions. Furthermore, the temporal order of TMS effects allowed inferences on the dynamics of information exchange between the two areas. Particularly, if feedback signals from LOC to EVC are crucial for generating altered size representations in EVC, then TMS effects over EVC should be observed simultaneously or later than the effects following LOC stimulation. The data from 20 humans (13 females) revealed that TMS over both EVC and LOC impaired illusory size perception. However, the strongest effects of TMS applied over EVC occurred later than those of LOC, supporting a functionally relevant feedback modulation from LOC to EVC for scaling size information. Our results suggest that context integration and the concomitant change of perceived size require LOC and result in modulating representations in EVC via recurrent processing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How we perceive an object's size is not entirely determined by its physical size or the size of its retinal representation but also the spatial context. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation, we investigated the role of the early visual cortex (EVC) and the higher-level visual area, lateral occipital cortex (LOC), known to be critically involved in object processing, in transforming an initial retinal representation into one that reflects perceived size. Transcranial magnetic stimulation altered size perception earlier over LOC compared with EVC, suggesting that context integration and the concomitant change in perceived size representations in EVC rely on feedback from LOC.

Decoupling of Early V5 Motion Processing from Visual Awareness: A Matter of Velocity as Revealed by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation

Motion information can reach V5/MT through two parallel routes: one conveying information at early latencies through a direct subcortical route and the other reaching V5 later via recurrent projections through V1. Here, we tested the hypothesis that input via the faster direct pathway depends on motion characteristics. To this end, we presented motion stimuli to healthy human observers at different velocities (4.4°/sec vs. 23°/sec) with static stimuli as controls while applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) pulses over V5 or V1. We probed for TMS interference with objective (two-alternative forced choice [2AFC]) and subjective (awareness) measures of motion processing at six TMS delays from stimulus onset (poststimulus window covered: ∼27–160 msec). Our results for V5–TMS showed earlier interference with objective performance for fast motion (53.3 msec) than slow motion (80 msec) stimuli. Importantly, TMS-induced decreases in objective measures of motion processing did correlate with decreases in subjective measures for slow but not fast motion stimuli. Moreover, V1–TMS induced a temporally unspecific interference with visual processing as it impaired the processing of both motion and static stimuli at the same delays. These results are in accordance with fast moving stimuli reaching V5 through a different route than slow moving stimuli. The differential latencies and coupling to awareness suggest distinct involvement of a direct (i.e., colliculo-extrastriate) connection bypassing V1 depending on stimulus velocity (fast vs. slow). Implication of a direct pathway in the early processing of fast motion may have evolved through its behavioral relevance.

Neuropsychodynamic Approach to Depression: Integrating Resting State Dysfunctions of the Brain and Disturbed Self-Related Processes

A mechanism-based approach was developed focusing on the psychodynamic, psychological and neuronal mechanisms in healthy and depressed persons. In this integrative concept of depression, the self is a core dimension in depression. It is attributed to negative emotions (e.g., failure, guilt). The increased inward focus in depression is connected with a decreased environmental focus. The development of neuropsychodynamic hypotheses of the altered self-reference is based on the investigation of the emotional-cognitive interaction in depressed patients. It may be hypothesized that the increased negative self-attributions—as typical characteristics of an increased self-focus in depression—may result from altered neuronal activity in subcortical-cortical midline structures in the brain, especially from hyperactivity in the cortical-subcortical midline regions and hypoactivity in the lateral regions. The increased resting state activity in depression is especially associated with an increased resting state activity in the default mode network (DMN) and a dysbalance between DMN and executive network (EN) activity. Possible therapeutic consequences of the neuropsychodynamic approach to depression involve the necessary emotional attunement in psychotherapy of depressed patients and the adequate timing of therapeutic interventions. The hypotheses which have been developed in the context of the neuropsychodynamic model of depression may be used for more specific psychotherapeutic interventions, aiming at specific mechanisms of compensation and defence, which are related to the increased resting state activity and the disturbed resting state-stimulus-interaction.

Markers of TMS-evoked visual conscious experience in a patient with altitudinal hemianopia

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the occipital and parietal cortices can induce phosphenes, i.e. visual sensations of light without light entering the eyes. In this paper, we adopted a TMS-EEG interactive co-registration approach with a patient (AM) showing altitudinal hemianopia. Occipital and parietal cortices in both hemispheres were stimulated while concurrently recording EEG signal. Results showed that, for all sites, neural activity differentially encoding for the presence vs. absence of a conscious experience could be found in a cluster of electrodes close to the stimulation site at an early (70ms) time-period after TMS. The present data indicate that both occipital and parietal sites are independent early gatekeepers of perceptual awareness, thus, in line with evidence in favor of early correlates of perceptual awareness. Moreover, these data support the valuable contribution of the TMS-EEG approach in patients with visual field defects to investigate the neural processes responsible for perceptual awareness.

Dendritic Spikes in Sensory Perception

What is the function of dendritic spikes? One might argue that they provide conditions for neuronal plasticity or that they are essential for neural computation. However, despite a long history of dendritic research, the physiological relevance of dendritic spikes in brain function remains unknown. This could stem from the fact that most studies on dendrites have been performed in vitro. Fortunately, the emergence of novel techniques such as improved two-photon microscopy, genetically encoded calcium indicators (GECIs), and optogenetic tools has provided the means for vital breakthroughs in in vivo dendritic research. These technologies enable the investigation of the functions of dendritic spikes in behaving animals, and thus, help uncover the causal relationship between dendritic spikes, and sensory information processing and synaptic plasticity. Understanding the roles of dendritic spikes in brain function would provide mechanistic insight into the relationship between the brain and the mind. In this review article, we summarize the results of studies on dendritic spikes from a historical perspective and discuss the recent advances in our understanding of the role of dendritic spikes in sensory perception.

Distinct Visual Evoked Potential Morphological Patterns for Apparent Motion Processing in School-Aged Children

Measures of visual cortical development in children demonstrate high variability and inconsistency throughout the literature. This is partly due to the specificity of the visual system in processing certain features. It may then be advantageous to activate multiple cortical pathways in order to observe maturation of coinciding networks. Visual stimuli eliciting the percept of apparent motion and shape change is designed to simultaneously activate both dorsal and ventral visual streams. However, research has shown that such stimuli also elicit variable visual evoked potential (VEP) morphology in children. The aim of this study was to describe developmental changes in VEPs, including morphological patterns, and underlying visual cortical generators, elicited by apparent motion and shape change in school-aged children. Forty-one typically developing children underwent high-density EEG recordings in response to a continuously morphing, radially modulated, circle-star grating. VEPs were then compared across the age groups of 5-7, 8-10, and 11-15 years according to latency and amplitude. Current density reconstructions (CDR) were performed on VEP data in order to observe activated cortical regions. It was found that two distinct VEP morphological patterns occurred in each age group. However, there were no major developmental differences between the age groups according to each pattern. CDR further demonstrated consistent visual generators across age and pattern. These results describe two novel VEP morphological patterns in typically developing children, but with similar underlying cortical sources. The importance of these morphological patterns is discussed in terms of future studies and the investigation of a relationship to visual cognitive performance.

A massively asynchronous, parallel brain

Whether the visual brain uses a parallel or a serial, hierarchical, strategy to process visual signals, the end result appears to be that different attributes of the visual scene are perceived asynchronously--with colour leading form (orientation) by 40 ms and direction of motion by about 80 ms. Whatever the neural root of this asynchrony, it creates a problem that has not been properly addressed, namely how visual attributes that are perceived asynchronously over brief time windows after stimulus onset are bound together in the longer term to give us a unified experience of the visual world, in which all attributes are apparently seen in perfect registration. In this review, I suggest that there is no central neural clock in the (visual) brain that synchronizes the activity of different processing systems. More likely, activity in each of the parallel processing-perceptual systems of the visual brain is reset independently, making of the brain a massively asynchronous organ, just like the new generation of more efficient computers promise to be. Given the asynchronous operations of the brain, it is likely that the results of activities in the different processing-perceptual systems are not bound by physiological interactions between cells in the specialized visual areas, but post-perceptually, outside the visual brain.

Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.

A Top-Down Cortical Circuit for Accurate Sensory Perception

A fundamental issue in cortical processing of sensory information is whether top-down control circuits from higher brain areas to primary sensory areas not only modulate but actively engage in perception. Here, we report the identification of a neural circuit for top-down control in the mouse somatosensory system. The circuit consisted of a long-range reciprocal projection between M2 secondary motor cortex and S1 primary somatosensory cortex. In vivo physiological recordings revealed that sensory stimulation induced sequential S1 to M2 followed by M2 to S1 neural activity. The top-down projection from M2 to S1 initiated dendritic spikes and persistent firing of S1 layer 5 (L5) neurons. Optogenetic inhibition of M2 input to S1 decreased L5 firing and the accurate perception of tactile surfaces. These findings demonstrate that recurrent input to sensory areas is essential for accurate perception and provide a physiological model for one type of top-down control circuit.

Area V5-a microcosm of the visual brain

Area V5 of the visual brain, first identified anatomically in 1969 as a separate visual area, is critical for the perception of visual motion. As one of the most intensively studied parts of the visual brain, it has yielded many insights into how the visual brain operates. Among these are: the diversity of signals that determine the functional capacities of a visual area; the relationship between single cell activity in a specialized visual area and perception of, and preference for, attributes of a visual stimulus; the multiple asynchronous inputs into, and outputs from, an area as well as the multiple operations that it undertakes asynchronously; the relationship between activity at given, specialized, areas of the visual brain and conscious awareness; and the mechanisms used to “bind” signals from one area with those from another, with a different specialization, to give us our unitary perception of the visual world. Hence V5 is, in a sense, a microcosm of the visual world and its study gives important insights into how the whole visual brain is organized—anatomically, functionally and perceptually.

The effect of simultaneous flickering light stimulation on global form and motion perception thresholds

The question regarding the exact function of the primary visual cortex (V1) in vision has been around ever since the description of residual vision after damage to this cortical area by Riddoch in 1917. In 2002, Schoenfeld and colleagues proposed that V1 can be saturated by flashes of light, by which the function of V1-bypassing visual pathways can be "unmasked". The Schoenfeld group found that light flashes applied on stimulus onset led to the elevation of brightness increment detection thresholds, but left motion detection thresholds unaltered. Although the proposed method (i.e. the use of light flashes to induce refractoriness in V1) could be a simple, cheap and elegant way of exploring V1 functions, no study has followed up on this. Therefore it is not known if it works at all with other types of stimuli. For that reason, we decided to revisit the idea in a modified form. Global form and motion perception thresholds were assessed with static Glass pattern stimuli and random dot kinematograms, with and without 12Hz flickering light stimulation. Global motion thresholds were almost unaltered by flickering stimulation, while a significant threshold elevation was caused in the global form perception task. The strongest conclusion allowed by our data is that simultaneous flickering photostimulation elevates global form perception thresholds but not global motion perception thresholds. This is in some way related to the refractoriness generated in an unsatisfactorily defined part of V1. We suggest that this does not necessarily reflect the activity of V1-bypassing pathways, and propose that the application of light flashes is a method that deserves more attention in the exploration of the V1-dependent and independent elements of visual consciousness in human subjects.

The case for characterising type-2 blindsight as a genuinely visual phenomenon

Type-2 blindsight is often characterised as involving a non-visual form of awareness that blindsight subjects experience under certain presentation conditions. This paper evaluates the claim that type-2 awareness is non-visual and the proposal that it is a cognitive form of awareness. It is argued that, contrary to the standard account, type-2 awareness is best characterised as visual both because it satisfies certain criteria for being visual and because it can accommodate facts about the phenomenon that the cognitive account cannot. The conclusion is made that type-2 blindsight is best characterised as involving a form of abnormal, degraded visual awareness.

Why is "blindsight" blind? A new perspective on primary visual cortex, recurrent activity and visual awareness

The neuropsychological phenomenon of blindsight has been taken to suggest that the primary visual cortex (V1) plays a unique role in visual awareness, and that extrastriate activation needs to be fed back to V1 in order for the content of that activation to be consciously perceived. The aim of this review is to evaluate this theoretical framework and to revisit its key tenets. Firstly, is blindsight truly a dissociation of awareness and visual detection? Secondly, is there sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility that the loss of awareness resulting from a V1 lesion simply reflects reduced extrastriate responsiveness, rather than a unique role of V1 in conscious experience? Evaluation of these arguments and the empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the loss of phenomenal awareness in blindsight may not be due to feedback activity in V1 being the hallmark awareness. On the basis of existing literature, an alternative explanation of blindsight is proposed. In this view, visual awareness is a "global" cognitive function as its hallmark is the availability of information to a large number of perceptual and cognitive systems; this requires inter-areal long-range synchronous oscillatory activity. For these oscillations to arise, a specific temporal profile of neuronal activity is required, which is established through recurrent feedback activity involving V1 and the extrastriate cortex. When V1 is lesioned, the loss of recurrent activity prevents inter-areal networks on the basis of oscillatory activity. However, as limited amount of input can reach extrastriate cortex and some extrastriate neuronal selectivity is preserved, computations involving comparison of neural firing rates within a cortical area remain possible. This enables "local" read-out from specific brain regions, allowing for the detection and discrimination of basic visual attributes. Thus blindsight is blind due to lack of "global" long-range synchrony, and it functions via "local" neural readout from extrastriate areas.

The source of consciousness

Why does a relentless stream of experiences normally fill your mind? No answer is entirely satisfactory. We are not sure how the normal operation of the human brain might exude subjective experiences. Consciousness can thus seem miraculous, and research on consciousness a waste of time and money, ultimately doomed to fail. Yet, there are good reasons for optimism that should be shared with the public to justify research in this area.

The chronometry of visual perception: review of occipital TMS masking studies

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) continues to deliver on its promise as a research tool. In this review article we focus on the application of TMS to early visual cortex (V1, V2, V3) in studies of visual perception and visual awareness. Depending on the asynchrony between visual stimulus onset and TMS pulse (SOA), TMS can suppress visual perception, allowing one to track the time course of functional relevance (chronometry) of early visual cortex for vision. This procedure has revealed multiple masking effects ('dips'), some consistently (∼+100ms SOA) but others less so (∼-50ms, ∼-20ms, ∼+30ms, ∼+200ms SOA). We review the state of TMS masking research, focusing on the evidence for these multiple dips, the relevance of several experimental parameters to the obtained 'masking curve', and the use of multiple measures of visual processing (subjective measures of awareness, objective discrimination tasks, priming effects). Lastly, we consider possible future directions for this field. We conclude that while TMS masking has yielded many fundamental insights into the chronometry of visual perception already, much remains unknown. Not only are there several temporal windows when TMS pulses can induce visual suppression, even the well-established 'classical' masking effect (∼+100ms) may reflect more than one functional visual process.

The Timing and Neuroanatomy of Conscious Vision as Revealed by TMS-induced Blindsight

Following damage to the primary visual cortex, some patients exhibit “blindsight,” where they report a loss of awareness while retaining the ability to discriminate visual stimuli above chance. Transient disruption of occipital regions with TMS can produce a similar dissociation, known as TMS-induced blindsight. The neural basis of this residual vision is controversial, with some studies attributing it to the retinotectal pathway via the superior colliculus whereas others implicate spared projections that originate predominantly from the LGN. Here we contrasted these accounts by combining TMS with visual stimuli that either activate or bypass the retinotectal and magnocellular (R/M) pathways. We found that the residual capacity of TMS-induced blindsight occurs for stimuli that bypass the R/M pathways, indicating that such pathways, which include those to the superior colliculus, are not critical. We also found that the modulation of conscious vision was time and pathway dependent. TMS applied either early (0–40 msec) or late (280–320 msec) after stimulus onset modulated detection of stimuli that did not bypass R/M pathways, whereas during an intermediate period (90–130 msec) the effect was pathway independent. Our findings thus suggest a prominent role for the R/M pathways in supporting both the preparatory and later stages of conscious vision. This may help resolve apparent conflict in previous literature by demonstrating that the roles of the retinotectal and geniculate pathways are likely to be more nuanced than simply corresponding to the unconscious/conscious dichotomy.

Enhanced awareness followed reversible inhibition of human visual cortex: a combined TMS, MRS and MEG study

This series of experiments investigated the neural basis of conscious vision in humans using a form of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) known as continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS). Previous studies have shown that occipital TMS, when time-locked to the onset of visual stimuli, can induce a phenomenon analogous to blindsight in which conscious detection is impaired while the ability to discriminate ‘unseen’ stimuli is preserved above chance. Here we sought to reproduce this phenomenon using offline occipital cTBS, which has been shown to induce an inhibitory cortical aftereffect lasting 45–60 minutes. Contrary to expectations, our first experiment revealed the opposite effect: cTBS enhanced conscious vision relative to a sham control. We then sought to replicate this cTBS-induced potentiation of consciousness in conjunction with magnetoencephalography (MEG) and undertook additional experiments to assess its relationship to visual cortical excitability and levels of the inhibitory neurotransmitter γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA; via magnetic resonance spectroscopy, MRS). Occipital cTBS decreased cortical excitability and increased regional GABA concentration. No significant effects of cTBS on MEG measures were observed, although the results provided weak evidence for potentiation of event related desynchronisation in the β band. Collectively these experiments suggest that, through the suppression of noise, cTBS can increase the signal-to-noise ratio of neural activity underlying conscious vision. We speculate that gating-by-inhibition in the visual cortex may provide a key foundation of consciousness.

The coupling of vision with locomotion in cortical blindness

Maintaining or modifying the speed and direction of locomotion requires the coupling of the locomotion with the retinal optic flow that it generates. It is shown that this essential behavioral capability, which requires on-line neural control, is preserved in the cortically blind hemifield of a hemianope. In experiments, optic flow stimuli were presented to either the normal or blind hemifield while the patient was walking on a treadmill. Little difference was found between the hemifields with respect to the coupling (i.e. co-dependency) of optic flow detection with locomotion. Even in the cortically blind hemifield, faster walking resulted in the perceptual slowing of detected optic flow, and self-selected locomotion speeds demonstrated behavioral discrimination between different optic flow speeds. The results indicate that the processing of optic flow, and thereby on-line visuo-locomotor coupling, can take place along neural pathways that function without processing in Area V1, and thus in the absence of conscious intervention. These and earlier findings suggest that optic flow and object motion are processed in parallel along with correlated non-visual locomotion signals. Extrastriate interactions may be responsible for discounting the optical effects of locomotion on the perceived direction of object motion, and maintaining visually guided self-motion.

Postdiction: its implications on visual awareness, hindsight, and sense of agency

There are a few postdictive perceptual phenomena known, in which a stimulus presented later seems causally to affect the percept of another stimulus presented earlier. While backward masking provides a classical example, the flash lag effect stimulates theorists with a variety of intriguing findings. The TMS-triggered scotoma together with “backward filling-in” of it offer a unique neuroscientific case. Findings suggest that various visual attributes are reorganized in a postdictive fashion to be consistent with each other, or to be consistent in a causality framework. In terms of the underlying mechanisms, four prototypical models have been considered: the “catch up,” the “reentry,” the “different pathway” and the “memory revision” models. By extending the list of postdictive phenomena to memory, sensory-motor and higher-level cognition, one may note that such a postdictive reconstruction may be a general principle of neural computation, ranging from milliseconds to months in a time scale, from local neuronal interactions to long-range connectivity, in the complex brain. The operational definition of the “postdictive phenomenon” can be applicable to such a wide range of sensory/cognitive effects across a wide range of time scale, even though the underlying neural mechanisms may vary across them. This has significant implications in interpreting “free will” and “sense of agency” in functional, psychophysical and neuroscientific terms.

Quantized visual awareness

The proposed model holds that, at its most fundamental level, visual awareness is quantized. That is to say that visual awareness arises as individual bits of awareness through the action of neural circuits with hundreds to thousands of neurons in at least the human striate cortex. Circuits with specific topologies will reproducibly result in visual awareness that correspond to basic aspects of vision like color, motion, and depth. These quanta of awareness (qualia) are produced by the feedforward sweep that occurs through the geniculocortical pathway but are not integrated into a conscious experience until recurrent processing from centers like V4 or V5 select the appropriate qualia being produced in V1 to create a percept. The model proposed here has the potential to shift the focus of the search for visual awareness to the level of microcircuits and these likely exist across the kingdom Animalia. Thus establishing qualia as the fundamental nature of visual awareness will not only provide a deeper understanding of awareness, but also allow for a more quantitative understanding of the evolution of visual awareness throughout the animal kingdom.

Two visual streams: Interconnections do not imply duplication of function

Abstract Schenk and McIntosh (S&M) provide a useful review of the perception-action model (PAM), highlighting some of the gaps that need to be filled, and counteracting the erroneous belief held by some that the PAM implies two mutually independent streams. Although we agree with S&M's contention that the functional independence of the two streams has been overestimated, we reject their speculation that "the specializations proposed may be relative rather than absolute." We argue that the contributions made by the two streams are quite distinct, and that establishing how they work together is the key to a full understanding of visually guided behavior.

Unconscious Priming Requires Early Visual Cortex at Specific Temporal Phases of Processing

Although examples of unconscious shape priming have been well documented, whether such priming requires early visual cortex (V1/V2) has not been established. In the current study, we used TMS of V1/V2 at varying temporal intervals to suppress the visibility of preceding shape primes while the interval between primes and targets was kept constant. Our results show that, although conscious perception requires V1/V2, unconscious priming can occur without V1/V2 at an intermediate temporal interval but not at early (5–25 msec) or later (65–125 msec) stages of processing. Because the later time window of unconscious priming suppression has been proposed to interfere with feedback processing, our results further suggest that feedback processing is also essential for unconscious priming and may not be a sufficient condition for conscious vision.

The temporal dynamics of early visual cortex involvement in behavioral priming

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows for non-invasive interference with ongoing neural processing. Applied in a chronometric design over early visual cortex (EVC), TMS has proved valuable in indicating at which particular time point EVC must remain unperturbed for (conscious) vision to be established. In the current study, we set out to examine the effect of EVC TMS across a broad range of time points, both before (pre-stimulus) and after (post-stimulus) the onset of symbolic visual stimuli. Behavioral priming studies have shown that the behavioral impact of a visual stimulus can be independent from its conscious perception, suggesting two independent neural signatures. To assess whether TMS-induced suppression of visual awareness can be dissociated from behavioral priming in the temporal domain, we thus implemented three different measures of visual processing, namely performance on a standard visual discrimination task, a subjective rating of stimulus visibility, and a visual priming task. To control for non-neural TMS effects, we performed electrooculographical recordings, placebo TMS (sham), and control site TMS (vertex). Our results suggest that, when considering the appropriate control data, the temporal pattern of EVC TMS disruption on visual discrimination, subjective awareness and behavioral priming are not dissociable. Instead, TMS to EVC disrupts visual perception holistically, both when applied before and after the onset of a visual stimulus. The current findings are discussed in light of their implications on models of visual awareness and (subliminal) priming.

Primary visual cortex: awareness and blindsight

The primary visual cortex (V1) is the principal telencephalic recipient of visual input in humans and monkeys. It is unique among cortical areas in that its destruction results in chronic blindness. However, certain patients with V1 damage, though lacking visual awareness, exhibit visually guided behavior: blindsight. This phenomenon, together with evidence from electrophysiological, neuroimaging, and psychophysical experiments, has led to speculation that V1 activity has a special or direct role in generating conscious perception. To explore this issue, this article reviews experiments that have used two powerful paradigms--stimulus-induced perceptual suppression and chronic V1 ablation--each of which disrupts the ability to perceive salient visual stimuli. Focus is placed on recent neurophysiological, behavioral, and functional imaging studies from the nonhuman primate that shed light on V1's role in conscious awareness. In addition, anatomical pathways that relay visual information to the cortex during normal vision and in blindsight are reviewed. Although the critical role of V1 in primate vision follows naturally from its position as a bottleneck of visual signals, little evidence supports its direct contribution to visual awareness.

Dissociative disorders in DSM-5

BACKGROUND

We present recommendations for revision of the diagnostic criteria for the Dissociative Disorders (DDs) for DSM-5. The periodic revision of the DSM provides an opportunity to revisit the assumptions underlying specific diagnoses and the empirical support, or lack of it, for the defining diagnostic criteria.

METHODS

This paper reviews clinical, phenomenological, epidemiological, cultural, and neurobiological data related to the DDs in order to generate an up-to-date, evidence-based set of DD diagnoses and diagnostic criteria for DSM-5. First, we review the definitions of dissociation and the differences between the definitions of dissociation and conceptualization of DDs in the DSM-IV-TR and the ICD-10, respectively. Also, we review more general conceptual issues in defining dissociation and dissociative disorders. Based on this review, we propose a revised definition of dissociation for DSM-5 and discuss the implications of this definition for understanding dissociative symptoms and disorders.

RESULTS

We make the following recommendations for DSM-5: 1. Depersonalization Disorder (DPD) should include derealization symptoms as well. 2. Dissociative Fugue should become a subtype of Dissociative Amnesia (DA). 3. The diagnostic criteria for DID should be changed to emphasize the disruptive nature of the dissociation and amnesia for everyday as well as traumatic events. The experience of possession should be included in the definition of identity disruption. 4. Dissociative Trance Disorder should be included in the Unspecified Dissociative Disorder (UDD) category.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a growing body of evidence linking the dissociative disorders to a trauma history, and to specific neural mechanisms.

Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness

Solving the problem of consciousness remains one of the biggest challenges in modern science. One key step towards understanding consciousness is to empirically narrow down neural processes associated with the subjective experience of a particular content. To unravel these neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) a common scientific strategy is to compare perceptual conditions in which consciousness of a particular content is present with those in which it is absent, and to determine differences in measures of brain activity (the so called "contrastive analysis"). However, this comparison appears not to reveal exclusively the NCC, as the NCC proper can be confounded with prerequisites for and consequences of conscious processing of the particular content. This implies that previous results cannot be unequivocally interpreted as reflecting the neural correlates of conscious experience. Here we review evidence supporting this conjecture and suggest experimental strategies to untangle the NCC from the prerequisites and consequences of conscious experience in order to further develop the otherwise valid and valuable contrastive methodology.

Dissociative disorders in DSM-5

BACKGROUND

We present recommendations for revision of the diagnostic criteria for the Dissociative Disorders (DDs) for DSM-5. The periodic revision of the DSM provides an opportunity to revisit the assumptions underlying specific diagnoses and the empirical support, or lack of it, for the defining diagnostic criteria.

METHODS

This paper reviews clinical, phenomenological, epidemiological, cultural, and neurobiological data related to the DDs in order to generate an up-to-date, evidence-based set of DD diagnoses and diagnostic criteria for DSM-5. First, we review the definitions of dissociation and the differences between the definitions of dissociation and conceptualization of DDs in the DSM-IV-TR and the ICD-10, respectively. Also, we review more general conceptual issues in defining dissociation and dissociative disorders. Based on this review, we propose a revised definition of dissociation for DSM-5 and discuss the implications of this definition for understanding dissociative symptoms and disorders.

RESULTS

We make the following recommendations for DSM-5: 1. Depersonalization Disorder (DPD) should derealization symptoms as well. 2. Dissociative Fugue should become a subtype of Dissociative Amnesia (DA). 3. The diagnostic criteria for DID should be changed to emphasize the disruptive nature of the dissociation and amnesia for everyday as well as traumatic events. The experience of possession should be included in the definition of identity disruption. 4. Should Dissociative Trance Disorder should be included in the Unspecified Dissociative Disorder (UDD) category.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a growing body of evidence linking the dissociative disorders to a trauma history, and to specific neural mechanisms.