Digging into Déjà Vu

Effects of scripted activities on false feelings of having previously visited a location

False memories of one's past are often created by unconscious influences of previous experiences. This study examined whether action sequences, scripts that are frequent in everyday life, might induce false beliefs of having visited a location. Participants were shown photos of places they had not previously visited. Next, they rated how strongly they felt that they had visited the locations in the target scenes. Results indicated that when typical actions were presented in canonical order before the target scene, the feeling of having previously visited the location increased, relative to a condition with a random ordering of typical actions or to one with no presented actions. This study suggests that activation of script knowledge and misattribution of the source of feelings of familiarity elicit false beliefs of having visited a specific location, even if one understands that one has never previously visited the location.

Déjà Vu: An Illusion of Prediction

Déjà vu is beginning to be scientifically understood as a memory phenomenon. Despite recent scientific advances, a remaining puzzle is the purported association between déjà vu and feelings of premonition. Building on research showing that déjà vu can be driven by an unrecalled memory of a past experience that relates to the current situation, we sought evidence of memory-based predictive ability during déjà vu states. Déjà vu did not lead to above-chance ability to predict the next turn in a navigational path resembling a previously experienced but unrecalled path (although such resemblance increased reports of déjà vu). However, déjà vu states were accompanied by increased feelings of knowing the direction of the next turn. The results suggest that feelings of premonition during déjà vu occur and can be illusory. Metacognitive bias brought on by the state itself may explain the peculiar association between déjà vu and the feeling of premonition.

Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action

In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as "the will" and "freedom" are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act.