More phenomenology in psychiatry? Applied ontology as a method towards integration

Let's fail better: Using philosophical tools to improve neuroscientific research in psychiatry

Despite predictions that neuroscientific discoveries would revolutionize psychiatry, decades of research have not yet led to clinically significant advances in psychiatric care. For this reason, an increasing number of researchers are recognizing the limitations of a purely biomedical approach in psychiatric research. These researchers call for reevaluating the conceptualization of mental disorders and argue for a non-reductionist approach to mental health. The aim of this paper is to discuss philosophical assumptions that underly neuroscientific research in psychiatry and offer practical tools to researchers for overcoming potential conceptual problems that are derived from those assumptions. Specifically, we will discuss: the analogy problem, questioning whether mental health problems are equivalent to brain disorders, the normativity problem, addressing the value-laden nature of psychiatric categories and the priority problem, which describes the level of analysis (e.g., biological, psychological, social, etc.) that should be prioritized when studying psychiatric conditions. In addition, we will explore potential strategies to mitigate practical problems that might arise due to these implicit assumptions. Overall, the aim of this paper is to suggest philosophical tools of practical use for neuroscientists, demonstrating the benefits of a closer collaboration between neuroscience and philosophy.

The Nested States Model: A Phenomenologically-Grounded Model of the Mind

BACKGROUND

Subjective experience is central to the nature of mental illness, yet it has not played a central role in most empirical approaches to psychopathology. While phenomenological perspectives in psychiatry have seen a recent resurgence, there remains a need for more detailed models of psychopathological processes based on explicit phenomenological and enactive foundations.

SUMMARY

We present a framework derived from the Nested States Model (NSM) through which such phenomenologically-grounded models might be constructed. The NSM describes the dynamic structure of subjective experience as a system of nested states that reciprocally influence one another across hierarchical layers. Here, we show how the NSM provides a scheme for characterizing patterns of experience that comprise various psychopathological processes. We demonstrate the utility of this scheme both for clinical practice and for building our knowledge of psychopathological processes more broadly.

KEY MESSAGES

The NSM can advance three aims that we see as critical for the lasting integration of phenomenological approaches to psychopathology within psychiatry. First, we show that the NSM provides a means for constructing clinical formulations and treatment considerations that center squarely on an individual's subjective experiences. Second, the NSM supplies a framework for organizing findings from clinical-phenomenological research that can guide the construction of broader phenomenologically-grounded models of psychopathological processes. Lastly, the NSM aligns our perspective on subjective experience with emerging perspectives on brain dynamics, helping to bridge phenomenological work with ongoing neurophysiological research.

Elucidating multifinal and equifinal pathways to developmental disorders by constructing real-world neurorobotic models

Vigorous research has been conducted to accumulate biological and theoretical knowledge about neurodevelopmental disorders, including molecular, neural, computational, and behavioral characteristics; however, these findings remain fragmentary and do not elucidate integrated mechanisms. An obstacle is the heterogeneity of developmental pathways causing clinical phenotypes. Additionally, in symptom formations, the primary causes and consequences of developmental learning processes are often indistinguishable. Herein, we review developmental neurorobotic experiments tackling problems related to the dynamic and complex properties of neurodevelopmental disorders. Specifically, we focus on neurorobotic models under predictive processing lens for the study of developmental disorders. By constructing neurorobotic models with predictive processing mechanisms of learning, perception, and action, we can simulate formations of integrated causal relationships among neurodynamical, computational, and behavioral characteristics in the robot agents while considering developmental learning processes. This framework has the potential to bind neurobiological hypotheses (excitation-inhibition imbalance and functional disconnection), computational accounts (unusual encoding of uncertainty), and clinical symptoms. Developmental neurorobotic approaches may serve as a complementary research framework for integrating fragmented knowledge and overcoming the heterogeneity of neurodevelopmental disorders.

"I was very sad, but not depressed": phenomenological differences between adjustment disorder and a major depressive episode

Introduction

Adjustment disorder (AD) is a diagnosis that must be differentiated from major depressive episode (MDE) because of the therapeutic implications. The aim of this study is to understand the experience of patients who in their lifetime have been diagnosed with AD as well as MDE to establish the characteristics of each disorder.

Methods

A descriptive phenomenological approach was used with in-depth interviews to four patients and the method proposed by Colaizzi to understand the experiences and reach the description of both disorders.

Results

Three women and one man, with advanced schooling were interviewed. The participants emphasized the existence of differences that were grouped in: the attribution made by the individual, the theme of cognitions, the variability in the course, the possibility of mood modulation, the syndrome severity, the presence of hopelessness and the perceived course.

Conclusion

Phenomenological differences were found in the subjective experience of MDE and AD. The MDE would be described as an intense state of generalized shutdown of the subject's own life, with little response to events, and the AD, as a dynamic reaction attributed to a stressful event, with high variability in the course of symptoms due to the dependence on such event, with the preserved hope that it will end.

Overcoming the translational crisis of contemporary psychiatry - converging phenomenological and spatiotemporal psychopathology

Despite all neurobiological/neurocomputational progress in psychiatric research, recent authors speak about a 'crisis of contemporary psychiatry'. Some argue that we do not yet know the computational mechanisms underlying the psychopathological symptoms ('crisis of mechanism') while others diagnose a neglect of subjectivity, namely first-person experience ('crisis of subjectivity'). In this perspective, we propose that Phenomenological Psychopathology, due to its focus on first-person experience of space and time, is in an ideal position to address the crisis of subjectivity and, if extended to the brain's spatiotemporal topographic-dynamic structure as key focus of Spatiotemporal Psychopathology, the crisis of mechanism. We demonstrate how the first-person experiences of space and time differ between schizophrenia, mood disorders and anxiety disorders allowing for their differential-diagnosis - this addresses the crisis of subjectivity. Presupposing space and time as shared features of brain, experience, and symptoms as their "common currency", the structure of abnormal space and time experience may also serve as template for the structure of the brain's spatiotemporal neuro-computational mechanisms - this may address the crisis of mechanism. Preliminary scientific evidence in our examples of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and depression support such clinically relevant spatiotemporal determination of both first-person experience (crisis of subjectivity) and the brain's neuro-computational structure (crisis of mechanism). In conclusion, converging Phenomenological Psychopathology with Spatiotemporal Psychopathology might help to overcome the translational crisis in psychiatry by delineating more fine-grained neuro computational and -phenomenal mechanisms; this offers novel candidate biomarkers for diagnosis and therapy including both pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatment.

Phenomenology as a resource for translational research in mental health: methodological trends, challenges and new directions

This editorial reflects on current methodological trends in translational research in mental health. It aims to build a bridge between two fields that are frequently siloed off from each other: interventional research and phenomenologically informed research. Recent years have witnessed a revival of phenomenological approaches in mental health, often - but not only - as a means of connecting the subjective character of experience with neurobiological explanatory accounts of illness. Rich phenomenological knowledge accrued in schizophrenia, and wider psychosis research, has opened up new opportunities for improving prediction, early detection, diagnosis, prognostic stratification, treatment and ethics of care. Novel qualitative studies of delusions and hallucinations have challenged longstanding assumptions about their nature and meaning, uncovering highly complex subjective dimensions that are not adequately captured by quantitative methodologies. Interdisciplinary and participatory research efforts, informed by phenomenological insights, have prompted revisions of pre-established narratives of mental disorder dominated by a dysfunction framework and by researcher-centric outcome measures. Despite these recent advances, there has been relatively little effort to integrate and translate phenomenological insights across applied clinical research, with the goal of producing more meaningful, patient-valued results. It is our contention that phenomenological psychopathology - as the basic science of psychiatry - represents an important methodology for advancing evidence-based practices in mental health, and ultimately improving real-world outcomes. Setting this project into motion requires a greater emphasis on subjectivity and the structures of experience, more attention to the quality and patient-centredness of outcome measures, and the identification of treatment targets that matter most to patients.

Addressing the dauntingness of formulation: The value of considering empathy as "grasping"

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

To explore the value of using Karl Jaspers' lived experience concept of 'grasping' in remediating the reported dauntingness of formulation.

CONCLUSIONS

Formulation can be construed as both the process and explication of understanding why a patient is presenting in a particular way. In an automatic process of abduction, 'feeling into' the mind of the other, hypotheses are posted to consciousness with little mental effort as meaningful connections are grasped. Subsequent more deliberative reasoning is synthesised continuously and with surprisingly little mental effort into the best explanation(s). Karl Jaspers' introduction to Psychiatry of the concepts involved, empathy and understanding, and his aim of making their use more scientific established the ongoing, often fierce debate about the ontology of Psychiatry; empirical versus interpretive. Trainees must resolve this for themselves in explicating a formulation, risking exposure of their prejudices. Jaspers' emphasis on the lived experience of empathic understanding that psychiatrists bring to their work found him often using the term 'grasp' rather than 'empathise'. 'Grasping' seems to convey more vividly and meaningfully the role that empathy plays in the initial ascertainment of mood and the subsequent hypothesis discovery, testing and synthesis.