Cotard delusion after brain injury

Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation

INTRODUCTION

Cotard delusion-the delusional belief "I am dead"-is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard. Ramachandran and Blakeslee proposed that the idea "I am dead" comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if "I am dead" were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world.

METHODS

We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief "I am dead", looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity.

RESULTS

In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea "I am dead" comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.

A medical algorithm for Cotard delusion based on more than 300 literature cases

OBJECTIVE

Cotard delusion (CD) is a rare psychiatric disorder in which the patient believes to be dead, i.e., the patient holds nihilistic delusions concerning his/her own existence. Taking into account its rarity, and possible subdiagnosis due to unawareness, most of the literature consists of case studies, complicating a more systematic approach and leading to difficulties in deciding the best clinical guidance to offer the patient suffering from CD. The objective of this work is to review the literature and propose an algorithm to help the differential diagnosis and the management of this condition.

METHOD

To do so, an extensive literature research was performed using several bibliographic databases. Since data on this topic is scarce, references in every article were cross-checked, aiming to obtain all available peer-reviewed works on CD.

RESULTS

Research resulted in 328 cases. Several treatment modalities were reported to improve the symptoms of CD, from pharmacotherapy - mainly consisting of antipsychotics and antidepressants - to electroconvulsive therapy.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite its challenging diagnosis, the delusion can be treated with readily available care. Hopefully, this work can be a useful tool to doctors when encountering this odd affliction.

Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief

INTRODUCTION

In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. Consciousness and Cognition, 87, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.

METHODS

In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.

RESULTS

We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.

CONCLUSIONS

In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.

A hypothesis on Cotard's syndrome as an evolution of obsessive-compulsive disorder

Cotard's syndrome usually presents as combined symptoms occurring in a broad series of neurological, psychiatric, and medical disorders, being severe depression the most frequent. The syndrome is not classified as a distinct clinical entity in the nosological systems but appears solely as a clinical condition in case reports. Thus, the diagnosis of Cotard's syndrome mainly centres on the psychiatric interview and the ability of the clinician to recognise specific symptoms due to the absence of both clinical instruments and diagnostic criteria. Cotard's syndrome has never been described to date in patients with a history of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). We report a case of a 49-year-old woman presenting obsessive symptoms and related compulsions for more than 30 years. Cotard's syndrome appeared after 3 years from a tragic event that had caused a psychological trauma. Such an occurrence may have contributed to worsening OCD and leading to a second major depressive episode followed by a suicidal attempt. Since then, the subject of our patient's obsessive thoughts changed, and the belief of being dead appeared. The repetitive and stereotyped thoughts caused severe distress, and accompanied the compulsive nature of reassurance seeking, temporarily beneficial to the anxiety arousing. The transition from obsession to delusion occurred when resistance was abandoned, and insight was lost. Once Cotard's syndrome had stabilised, OCD was no longer present. Additional distinctive features were the absence of psychiatric family history and the persistent nature of the affective psychosis. We concluded that Cotard's syndrome represented the evolution of the initial obsessive-compulsive disorder. Furthermore, we differentiated the clinical condition of our patient from other psychiatric diseases with similar clinical features. Larger-scale research is needed to consider topics other than comorbidity and also to explore significant elements of the patient's clinical history to discover what may influence the evolution and/or the persistence of the diseases.

The 'dead man walking' disorder: an update on Cotard's syndrome

In 1880, Jules Cotard described a peculiar syndrome after observing the case of a 43-year-old woman, which was characterized by melancholic anxiety, delusions of damnation or possession, a higher propensity to suicide ideation and deliberate self-harm, analgesia, hypochondriac thoughts of non-existence or ruin of several organs, of the whole body, of the soul, of divinity, and the idea of immortality or inability to die. Several expansions and reinterpretations have been made of the so-called Cotard's syndrome, which is often encompassed in different neurological and psychiatric disorders, complicating and worsening their symptomatic frameworks and making more difficult their treatments. However, the nosographic characterization of Cotard's syndrome remains elusive and is not now classified as a separate disorder in both ICD and DSM-5. Here, we try to give an update, as well as a putative systematization, of current views and opinions about this nosological entity in the light of the recent progress in the clinic, psychopathology and psycho-neurobiology.

FDG-PET in Cotard syndrome before and after treatment: can functional brain imaging support a two-factor hypothesis of nihilistic delusions?

Introduction: Cotard syndrome is a neuropsychiatric entity recognised by the presence of nihilistic delusions. Although different models have been proposed for the development of monothematic delusions, including Cotard syndrome, functional neuroanatomical models are lacking.Methods: A case report of a 19-year old male with autoimmune encephalitis and Cotard syndrome, in whom Positron Emission Tomography (¹⁸F-FDG-PET) scans were performed before and after successful treatment with electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), is presented. Literature review on brain imaging is provided to discuss a functional neuroanatomical model of Cotard syndrome, in accordance with the two-factor theory of delusions.Results: The patient's ¹⁸F-FDG-PET showed marked insular and prefrontal metabolic abnormalities. Except for insular hypometabolism, metabolic abnormalities improved after ECT. Previously reported structural neuroimaging studies in Cotard syndrome showed a predominance of right hemisphere lesions, in which frontal lobes were more frequently involved, followed by parietal and temporal lesions. Functional neuroimaging studies reported abnormalities in frontoparietal circuits as well as midline structures included in the "default mode network".Conclusions: Abnormalities in the functioning of the insular cortex and the prefrontal cortex could be related to the development of nihilistic delusions when a two-factor theory of delusions is considered.

'I am dead': Cotard syndrome and dementia

Background: Cotard syndrome is a rare condition whose main feature is a nihilistic delusion ranging from the denial of body parts to that of the existence of one's own life or even the entire universe. Objectives: The aim of this article is to review the nosological significance of Cotard syndrome and to explore the disorder among patients with dementia. Methods: Medline and Google Scholar searches were conducted for relevant articles, chapters and books published before 2018. Search terms used included Cotard delusion, Cotard syndrome and dementia, nihilistic delusion. Publications found through this indexed search were reviewed for further relevant references. Results and conclusion: In this narrative review we emphasise the fact that cases of Cotard syndrome involving patients with dementia are reported quite infrequently. Published studies are limited to very short series or isolated cases. Clinicians are obliged to treat the disorder. They should be alert to the potential high risk inherent in this condition. Keypoints Cotard syndrome is a rare condition characterised by nihilistic delusions that may range from negation of existence of parts of the body to delusion of being dead. The prevalence and incidence of this rare syndrome are not known. Since Cotard's syndrome is conceptualised as part of an underlying disorder, several psychiatric and somatic diseases have been associated with the syndrome. The syndrome may occur in patients suffering from dementia.

Uncommon psychopathological syndromes in psychiatry

Introduction: The development of biological sciences, as well as cultural and civilizational changes have led to the emergence of practice within the medicine of science, called psychiatry. Already at the turn of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Karl Jaspers - a German scholar - father of psychopathology - in the work “Allgemeine Psychopathologie” crystallized his intuitions in the field of psychopathology, which classifies and describes states that are deviations from the physiological mental state of a human being.

Material and method: his paper reviews available literature to approximate the symptoms of the most interesting psychopathological syndromes in psychiatry such as: Clerambault syndrome, Otheller syndrome, Cotard syndrome, Ekboma syndrome and Folie à deux.

Results: A multitude of psychopathological syndromes results from the wealth of survival of psychiatric patients. They represent the delusions of different contents that develop in a primitive way or as a consequence of other types of disorders. Psychopathological teams have been inspiring the poets and directors for centuries. The relationship between psychiatry and culture, film and literature undoubtedly testifies to its interdisciplinary nature.

Discussion: Despite the passage of time, the descriptions of these syndromes with a rich historical description, symptomatology and criteria have not lost their relevance and are still a clinical reality.

Cotard's Syndrome in a Patient with Schizophrenia: Case Report and Review of the Literature

Jules Cotard described, in 1880, the case of a patient characterized by delusions of negation, immortality, and guilt as well as melancholic anxiety among other clinical features. Later this constellation of symptoms was given the eponym Cotard's syndrome, going through a series of theoretical vicissitudes, considering itself currently as just the presence of nihilistic delusions. The presentation of the complete clinical features described by Cotard is a rare occurrence, especially in the context of schizophrenia. Here we present the case of a 50-year-old male patient with schizophrenia who developed Cotard's syndrome. The patient was treated with aripiprazole, showing improvement after two weeks of treatment. A review of the literature is performed about this case.

Cotard Delusion in the Context of Schizophrenia: A Case Report and Review of the Literature

Background: The Cotard delusion (CD) is one of a variety of narrowly defined monothematic delusions characterized by nihilistic beliefs about the body’s existence or life itself. The presence of CD within the context of schizophrenia is rare (<1%), and remains understudied.

Case: ‘Mr. C’ is a 58-year-old veteran with a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia, who presented with CD in the context of significant depression, suicidal ideation, violence, and self-harm behavior. He perseverated in his belief that he was physically dead and possessed by demons for several weeks. This delusion was reinforced by his religious belief that life was an attribute of God, and by inference, he as a human, was dead. His condition gradually improved over the course of treatment with Divalproex and quetiapine with discussions about the rationale for his belief. Upon discharge, Mr. C. demonstrated awareness of his fixation on death and an ability to redirect himself.

Discussion: This case highlights the need to better understand the co-occurrence of CD in schizophrenia, their differentiation, the increased risk of violence and self-harm behavior in this presentation, and how specific events and religious factors can influence delusional themes of CD. Pharmacotherapy and aspects of cognitive-behavioral therapy may be effective in ameliorating these symptoms in CD.

Cotard's syndrome: Two case reports and a brief review of literature

Cotard's syndrome is a rare neuropsychiatric condition in which the patient denies existence of one's own body to the extent of delusions of immortality. One of the consequences of Cotard's syndrome is self-starvation because of negation of existence of self. Although Cotard's syndrome has been reported to be associated with various organic conditions and other forms of psychopathology, it is less often reported to be seen in patients with catatonia. In this report we present two cases of Cotard's syndrome, both of whom had associated self-starvation and nutritional deficiencies and one of whom had associated catatonia.

[The Cotard syndrome in schizophrenic disorders]

BACKGROUND

The Cotard-Syndrome (CS), the belief of being dead, was described for the first time in 1880. Since then it met the interest not only of psychopathologists but also of philosophers. With a few exceptions, the literature is mainly restricted to case reports of anxious-depressive, demented or paranoid patients. It was the aim of our study to investigate the prevalence and the psychopathological context of the CS.

METHODS

We analyzed the Austrian data (N = 346) of the International Study of Psychotic Symptoms in Schizophrenia.

RESULTS

A CS could be diagnosed in three cases (0.87%). In all of them, CS developed on the basis of nihilistic-hypochondriac delusions and a progressive loss of energy. Two patients bridged the logical inconsistencies between obviously being alive and the belief of being dead by visual illusions, the third patient, however, by locating himself in an intermediate region between this world and the afterworld.

CONCLUSIONS

On the one hand the CS can be considered as a special manifestation of the topic of death in schizophrenic delusions, on the other as a nihilistic delusional identity. Without doubt, this uncommon and bizarre psychotic phenomenon will be an object of interest for general psychopathology as well as for the philosophy of mind also in future.

Neuropsychological research in delusional disorder: a comprehensive review

In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in the field of delusions, and different aspects of delusional disorder (DD) have been investigated. However, DD is still one of the most underresearched psychiatric disorders. In this paper, we review the literature on DD and most of the theoretical approaches proposed to explain the development and maintenance of delusions. DD research is infrequent, and delusions in this disorder have been scarcely investigated. We aim to establish the state of the art of delusions research to date and point to the shortage of neuropsychological studies in patients with DD. We also justify the need for future research into the neuropsychological correlates of DD as measured in patients with this disorder given that most previous research has mainly focused on other psychotic conditions.

Toward a neurobiology of delusions

Delusions are the false and often incorrigible beliefs that can cause severe suffering in mental illness. We cannot yet explain them in terms of underlying neurobiological abnormalities. However, by drawing on recent advances in the biological, computational and psychological processes of reinforcement learning, memory, and perception it may be feasible to account for delusions in terms of cognition and brain function. The account focuses on a particular parameter, prediction error--the mismatch between expectation and experience--that provides a computational mechanism common to cortical hierarchies, fronto-striatal circuits and the amygdala as well as parietal cortices. We suggest that delusions result from aberrations in how brain circuits specify hierarchical predictions, and how they compute and respond to prediction errors. Defects in these fundamental brain mechanisms can vitiate perception, memory, bodily agency and social learning such that individuals with delusions experience an internal and external world that healthy individuals would find difficult to comprehend. The present model attempts to provide a framework through which we can build a mechanistic and translational understanding of these puzzling symptoms.

The evolution of misbelief

From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting “culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious – but doxastically1noncommittal – action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, onlypositive illusionsmeet our criteria.

Varieties of confabulation and delusion

INTRODUCTION

Different types of confabulation or false memory can arise from brain disease. There are competing explanatory theories for the mechanisms underlying confabulation. Recent literature has attempted to relate the notion of delusion to that of confabulation.

METHOD

A brief review of the literature relating to these ideas.

RESULTS

The varieties of confabulation or false memory that can arise from brain disease are considered. The varieties of delusion and the contexts in which they arise are considered. Comparisons are made between the characteristics of spontaneous confabulation and those of delusional memory.

CONCLUSION

It is suggested that global theories purporting to account for both confabulation and delusions, in whatever circumstances they arise, can have only limited explanatory power. On the other hand, there are resemblances between confabulation and delusional memory, and the similarities and differences between these phenomena deserve further empirical investigation.

The misidentification syndromes as mindreading disorders

The patient with Capgras' syndrome claims that people very familiar to him have been replaced by impostors. I argue that this disorder is due to the destruction of a representation that the patient has of the mind of the familiar person. This creates the appearance of a familiar body and face, but without the familiar personality, beliefs, and thoughts. The posterior site of damage in Capgras' is often reported to be the temporoparietal junction, an area that has a role in the mindreading system, a connected system of cortical areas that allow us to attribute mental states to others. Just as the Capgras' patient claims that that man is not his father, the patient with asomatognosia claims that his arm is not really his. A similar account applies here, in that a nearby brain area, the supramarginal gyrus, is damaged. This area works in concert with the temporoparietal junction and other areas to produce a large representation of a mind inside a body situated in an environment. Damage to the mind-representing part of this system (coupled with damage to executive processes in the prefrontal lobes) causes Capgras' syndrome, whereas damage to the body-representing part of this system (also coupled with executive damage) causes asomatognosia.

Cotard's syndrome: a review

Cotard's syndrome is a rare disorder in which nihilistic delusions concerning one's own body are the central feature. It is not listed as a specific disorder in the DSM-IV, as it is typically viewed as a part of other underlying disorders. However, it remains important to recognize the syndrome because specific underlying mechanisms are present, and prognostic and therapeutic consequences have to be taken into account. This review presents an up-to-date overview of Cotard's syndrome, which was initially described more than a century ago.

Neuropsychological relationships in paranoid schizophrenia with and without delusional misidentification syndromes. A comparative study

Delusional misidentification syndromes (DMSs) and schizophrenia are strongly associated, since the former occur predominantly in the context of paranoid schizophrenia. However, the possible underlying neuropsychological relationships between DMSs and paranoid schizophrenia have not been thoroughly investigated. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether DMSs in paranoid schizophrenia are associated with a distinct neuropsychological substrate indicative of differential bilateral frontal and right hemisphere dysfunction. We compared two matched groups of paranoid schizophrenic patients with (N=22) and without (N=22) DMS(s) on a battery of neuropsychological tests assessing mainly frontal and right hemisphere functions. No statistically significant differences were detected between the two groups. Our findings are indicative of a bilateral frontal and right hemisphere dysfunction of equal severity in both DMS and non-DMS patients with paranoid schizophrenia.

Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a new field of cognitive psychology which seeks to learn more about the normal operation of high-level aspects of cognition such as belief formation, reasoning, decision making, theory of mind, and pragmatics by studying people in whom such processes are abnormal. So far, the high-level cognitive process most widely studied in cognitive neuropsychiatry has been belief formation, investigated by examining people with delusional beliefs. This paper describes some of the forms of delusional belief that have been examined from this perspective and offers a general two-deficit cognitive-neuropsychiatric account of delusional belief.

Attributional style in a case of Cotard delusion

Young and colleagues (e.g. Young, A. W., & Leafhead, K. M. (1996). Betwixt life and death: case studies of the Cotard delusion. In P. W. Halligan & J. C. Marshall (Eds.), Method in madness: Case studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.) have suggested that cases of the Cotard delusion (the belief that one is dead) result when a particular perceptual anomaly (caused by a disruption to the affective component of visual recognition) occurs in the context of an internalising attributional style. This hypothesis has not previously been tested directly. We report here an investigation of attributional style in a 24-year-old woman with Cotard delusion ("LU"). LU's attributional style (and that of ten healthy control participants) was assessed using the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (Kinderman, P., & Bentall, R. P. (1996). A new measure of causal locus: the internal, personal and situational attributions questionnaire. Personality and Individual Differences, 20(2), 261-264.). LU showed a significantly greater proportion of internalising attributions than the control group, both overall and for negative events specifically. The results obtained thus support an association of Cotard delusion with an internalising attributional style, and are therefore consistent with the account of Young and colleagues. The potential brain basis of Cotard delusion is discussed.

Schizophrenia and monothematic delusions

Numerous delusions have been studied which are highly specific and which can present in isolation in people whose beliefs are otherwise entirely unremarkable - "monothematic delusions" such as Capgras or Cotard delusions. We review such delusions and summarize our 2-factor theory of delusional belief which seeks to explain what causes these delusional beliefs to arise initially and what prevents them being rejected after they have arisen. Although these delusions can occur in the absence of other symptoms, they can also occur in the context of schizophrenia, when they are likely to be accompanied by other delusions and hallucinations. We propose that the 2-factor account of particular delusions like Capgras and Cotard still applies even when these delusions occur in the context of schizophrenia rather than occurring in isolation.

Delusional denial of pregnancy as a special form of Cotard's syndrome: case report and review of the literature

The following case report describes a pregnant woman who was convinced that her pregnancy was non-existent despite being in an advanced stage of clinically obvious pregnancy. The nosologically unspecific syndrome of denial of pregnancy is discussed by reviewing the literature. Based on the existing literature it will be explained why this specific syndrome is considered to indicate a special form of Cotard's syndrome.

Diagnosing schizophrenia circa 2005: how and why?

Since the introduction of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition in 1980, schizophrenia has been widely diagnosed with good to excellent levels of reliability. This is no small feat, as prior to the 1970s the reliability of this diagnosis over time and place was very poor. Although there have been some changes in the diagnostic algorithm for schizophrenia with subsequent revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, there has been little change in the overall classification scheme. However, there has also been relatively little movement toward enhancing the validity of this diagnosis. Although there is broad consensus that what we now call schizophrenia is probably very heterogeneous with respect to underlying etiology and pathophysiology, attempts to identify more valid subtypes or dimensions have not progressed to the point that they are likely to be incorporated into diagnostic systems any time soon. The limited progress in defining more valid disease categories has increasingly important clinical implications as the field moves more and more to treatment by preset algorithms that are typically driven by diagnosis.

Is psychosis a neurobiological syndrome?

OBJECTIVE

To describe theoretical weaknesses in the DSM-IV criteria for psychotic disorders and to argue that schizophrenia-like psychosis is a neurobiological syndrome similar to aphasia or apraxia.

METHOD

We outline the criteria for the concept of neurobiological syndrome and present supporting evidence for schizophrenia-like psychosis as a neurobiological syndrome.

RESULTS

There is evidence in the literature to support the hypothesis that schizophrenia-like psychosis is a neurobiological syndrome.

CONCLUSION

Conceptualizing schizophrenia-like psychosis as a neurobiological syndrome has important implications for both clinicians and researchers.

The Cotard syndrome. Report of two patients: with a review of the extended spectrum of 'delire des negations'

The Cotard syndrome is characterized by the delusion where an individual insists that he has died or part of his body has decayed. Although described classically in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, physical disorders including migraine, tumour and trauma have also been associated with the syndrome. Two new cases are described here, the one associated with arteriovenous malformations and the other with probable multiple sclerosis. The delusion has been embarrassing to each patient. Study of such cases may have wider implications for the understanding of the psychotic interpretation of body image, for example that occurring in anorexia nervosa.

Delusions demand attention

We used a variant of the Stroop paradigm to investigate attention bias in a young woman (JK) with delusional beliefs that she had died and that members of her family had changed. JK was shown sets of words printed in different colours of ink, and was asked to name the colour of each word. Sets of words were chosen which related to her delusions, and to possible contributory moods. The times taken by JK to colour-name words in these lists were compared with her times to colour-name sets of neutral words. There were three separate testing sessions which took place over a two-year period. In comparison to her times to name the colours of words in the neutral lists, JK was significantly slower to colour-name test lists containing words related to her delusional beliefs. When she was no longer experiencing these delusions, however, she was no slower to colour-name any of the test word lists. The results indicate that the Stroop paradigm can be useful in investigating individual cases of delusions and in monitoring changes in attentional bias over time.

Cotard's delusion or syndrome?: a conceptual history

This report offers an account of the historical construction of Cotard's syndrome showing that by délire des négations the French author meant a subtype of depressive illness. Subsequent debate led first to the belief that it was just a collection of symptoms associated with agitated depression (anxious melancholia) or general paralysis, and later to the view that it might after all constitute a separate entity. At the present moment, and impervious to the fact that the French term délire means far more than "delusion," some authors use Cotard's syndrome to refer to the belief of being dead and suggest that such a delusion might have a specific brain location. From the clinical and evolutionary perspective, it is unclear why a delusion should merit, simply because of its "nihilistic" content, a special brain location or presage chronicity. It is suggested here that before neurobiologic speculation starts, efforts should be made to map out the clinical features and correlations of the délire des négations.

Cotard's syndrome: analysis of 100 cases

In 1880, Jules Cotard reported a clinical state he believed was a new type of agitated melancholia. A statistical analysis has been carried out of 100 cases of Cotard's syndrome to determine how this clinical concept has fared since its inception. In terms of clinical profile, no difference was found between men and women or between underlying diagnostic categories; age seemed to increase the likelihood of developing délire des négations. Depression was reported in 89% of subjects; the most common nihilistic delusions concerned the body (86%) and existence (69%). Anxiety (65%) and guilt (63%) were also common, followed by hypochondriacal delusions (58%) and delusions of immortality (55). An exploratory factor analysis extracted 3 factors: psychotic depression, Cotard type I and Cotard type II. The psychotic depression factor included patients with melancholia and few nihilistic delusions. Cotard type 1 patients, on the other hand, showed no loadings for depression or other disease and are likely to constitute a pure Cotard syndrome whose nosology may be closer to the delusional than the affective disorders. Type II patients showed anxiety, depression and auditory hallucinations and constitute a mixed group. This new grouping cuts across the more traditional view and may have therapeutic implications. Authors, in general, have considered délire des négations as a syndrome rather than a new disease and do not seem to support the view that the completeness of the syndrome is a function of presence or severity of depression. The view that délire des négations refers only to the delusion of being dead has also carried little favour as its likely to waste information.

Impaired discrimination of familiar from unfamiliar faces

We report investigations of the face processing abilities of J.T., a man who had suffered a right hemisphere stroke. J.T. showed a marked problem in discriminating between familiar and unfamiliar faces, with no corresponding problem in discriminating familiar from unfamiliar names. The problem with faces was still found 2 years after the stroke, but had resolved at long-term follow-up (9 years post stroke). When given unlimited time to respond, J.T. did not show any problem in recognising familiar faces, but tended to think that he recognised unfamiliar faces. When under time pressure, however, J.T. also failed to recognise a number of familiar faces which he could readily identify when the time pressure was removed. J.T.'s ability to remember a face and to think of other people who might be similar in appearance was affected by whether or not the face seemed familiar or unfamiliar to him. Hence, whatever underlay the spurious sense of familiarity was sufficient to produce real differences between the way in which genuinely unfamiliar and spuriously familiar faces were seen, leading us to suggest that his impaired discrimination of unfamiliar from familiar faces reflected a malfunction of face recognition units.