The neural basis of consciousness

Insight and non-insight problem solving: A heart rate variability study

Occasionally, problems are solved with a sudden Aha! moment (insight), while the mundane approach to solving problems is analytical (non-insight). At first glance, non-insight appears to depend on the availability and taxation of cognitive resources to execute the step-by-step approach, whereas insight does not, or to a lesser extent. However, this remains debated. To investigate the reliance of both solution types on cognitive resources, we assessed the involvement of the prefrontal cortex using vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) as an index. Participants (N = 68) solved 70 compound remote associates word puzzles solvable with insight and non-insight. Before, during, and after solving the word puzzles, we measured the vmHRV. Our results showed that resting-state vmHRV (trait) showed a negative association with behavioural performance for both solution types. This might reflect inter-individual differences in inhibitory control. As the solution search requires one to think of remote associations, inhibitory control might hamper rather than aid this process. Furthermore, we observed, for both solution types, a vmHRV increase from resting-state to solution search (state), lingering on in the post-task recovery period. This could mark the increase of prefrontal resources to promote an open-minded stance, essential for divergent thinking, which arguably is crucial for this task. Our findings suggest that, at a general level, both solution types share common aspects. However, a closer analysis of early and late solutions and puzzle difficulty suggested that metacognitive differentiation between insight and non-insight improved with higher trait vmHRV, and that a unique association between trait vmHRV and puzzle difficulty was present for each solution type.

Metric error monitoring as a component of metacognitive processing

Metacognitive processing constitutes one of the contemporary target domains in consciousness research. Error monitoring (the ability to correctly report one's own errors without feedback) is considered one of the functional outcomes of metacognitive processing. Error monitoring is traditionally investigated as part of categorical decisions where choice accuracy is a binary construct (choice is either correct or incorrect). However, recent studies revealed that this ability is characterized by metric features (i.e., direction and magnitude) in temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Here, we discuss methodological approaches to investigating metric error monitoring in both humans and non-human animals and review their findings. The potential neural substrates of metric error monitoring measures are also discussed. This new scope of metacognitive processing can help improve our current understanding of conscious processing from a new perspective. Thus, by summarizing and discussing the perspectives, findings, and common applications in the metric error monitoring literature, this paper aims to provide a guideline for future research.

EEG Microstate Dynamics Associated with Dream-Like Experiences During the Transition to Sleep

Consciousness always requires some representational content; that is, one can only be conscious about something. However, the presence of conscious experience (awareness) alone does not determine whether its content is in line with the external and physical world. Dreams, apart from certain forms of hallucinations, typically consist of non-veridical percepts, which are not recognized as false, but rather considered real. This type of experiences have been described as a state of dissociation between phenomenal and reflective awareness. Interestingly, during the transition to sleep, reflective awareness seems to break down before phenomenal awareness as conscious experience does not immediately fade with reduced wakefulness but is rather characterized by the occurrence of uncontrolled thinking and perceptual images, together with a reduced ability to recognize the internal origin of the experience. Relative deactivation of the frontoparietal and preserved activity in parieto-occipital networks has been suggested to account for dream-like experiences during the transition to sleep. We tested this hypothesis by investigating subjective reports of conscious experience and large-scale brain networks using EEG microstates in 45 healthy young subjects during the transition to sleep. We observed an inverse relationship between cognitive effects and physiological activation; dream-like experiences were associated with an increased presence of a microstate with sources in the superior and middle frontal gyrus and precuneus. Additionally, the presence of a microstate associated with higher-order visual areas was decreased. The observed inverse relationship might therefore indicate a disengagement of cognitive control systems that is mediated by specific, inhibitory EEG microstates.

Variation in functional networks between clinical and subclinical discharges in childhood absence epilepsy: A multi-frequency MEG study

OBJECTIVE

Two types of spike-and-wave discharges (SWDs) exist in childhood absence epilepsy (CAE): clinical discharges are prolonged and manifest primarily as impaired consciousness, whereas subclinical discharges are brief with few objectively visible symptoms. This study aimed to compare neural functional network and default mode network (DMN) activity between clinical and subclinical discharges to better understand the underlying mechanism of CAE.

METHODS

Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) data from 21 patients, we obtained 25 segments each of clinical discharges and subclinical discharges. Amplitude envelope correlation analysis was used to construct functional networks and graph theory was used to calculate network topological data. We then compared differences in functional connectivity within the DMN between clinical and subclinical discharges. All statistical comparisons were performed using paired-sample tests.

RESULTS

Compared to subclinical discharges, the functional network of clinical discharges exhibited higher synchronization - particularly in the parahippocampal gyrus - as early as 10 s before the seizure. Additionally, the functional network of clinical SWDs presented an anterior shift of key nodes in the alpha frequency band. Regarding clinical discharge progression, there were gradual increases in the parameter node strengths (S), clustering coefficients (C), and global efficiency (E) of the functional networks, while the path lengths (L) decreased. These changes were most prominent at the onset of discharges and followed by some recovery in the high-frequency bands, but no significant change in the low-frequency bands. Furthermore, connections within the DMN during the discharge period were significantly stronger for clinical discharge compared to subclinical discharges.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest that a more regular network before abnormal discharges in clinical discharges contributes to SWD explosion and that the parahippocampal gyrus plays an important role in maintaining oscillations. An absence seizure is a gradual process and the emergence of SWDs may be accompanied by initiation of inhibitory mechanisms. Enhanced functional connectivity among DMN brain regions may indicate that patients have entered a state of introspection, and functional abnormalities in the parahippocampal gyrus may be associated with patients' transient memory loss.

Bilateral tonic seizures probably induced by eperisone hydrochloride: a case report

Eperisone hydrochloride is a central muscle relaxant used to treat osteoporosis. Seizures are rare side effects of eperisone hydrochloride and have been previously reported in the medical literature in overdose situations but not at regular doses. This case report describes a 42-year-old male painter who developed severe bilateral tonic seizures after the initiation of eperisone hydrochloride at regular doses for low back pain. Symptoms gradually eased in the days following the discontinuation of eperisone hydrochloride and antiepileptic treatment, with no recurrence. This rare adverse drug reaction warrants clinical awareness; however, the mechanisms underlying these adverse reactions remain to be clarified.

Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness

This article proposes a methodological schema for engaging in a productive discussion of ethical issues regarding human brain organoids (HBOs), which are three-dimensional cortical neural tissues created using human pluripotent stem cells. Although moral consideration of HBOs significantly involves the possibility that they have consciousness, there is no widely accepted procedure to determine whether HBOs are conscious. Given that this is the case, it has been argued that we should adopt a precautionary principle about consciousness according to which, if we are not certain whether HBOs have consciousness—and where treating HBOs as not having consciousness may cause harm to them—we should proceed as if they do have consciousness. This article emphasizes a methodological advantage of adopting the precautionary principle: it enables us to sidestep the question of whether HBOs have consciousness (the whether-question) and, instead, directly address the question of what kinds of conscious experiences HBOs can have (the what-kind-question), where the what-kind-question is more tractable than the whether-question. By addressing the what-kind-question (and, in particular, the question of what kinds of valenced experiences HBOs can have), we will be able to examine how much moral consideration HBOs deserve. With this in mind, this article confronts the what-kind-question with the assistance of experimental studies of consciousness and suggests an ethical framework which supports restricting the creation and use of HBOs in bioscience.

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

V1 as an egocentric cognitive map

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1's laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

Deficits in access consciousness, integrative function, and consequent autonoetic thinking in schizophrenia

Alterations within consciousness in schizophrenia can be evidenced by impediments in self-awareness and loss of agency. Ned Block's definition of access consciousness is applied in order to further delineate cognitive deficits involving reflective thought and autonoetic thinking in persons with schizophrenia. Current theories on the nature and functioning of consciousness are discussed, which include Global Workspace Theory and metarepresentational characterizations. These describe a recursive, integrative quality to consciousness, contributed to by the functions of access consciousness, that is relevant in examining cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. The integrative deficit that is described as operating in conscious process involves a failure to incorporate prior outputs from a separate cognitive task and integrate these into a novel working schema. The alterations in access consciousness in persons with schizophrenia appear to be a consequence of disrupted integrative cognitive functions. An anteceding problem with cortical circuits involving integrative functions related to access consciousness is therefore hypothesized to manifest as subsequent cognitive dysfunction that leads to symptoms of schizophrenia. Constitutive failures to integrate information in schizophrenia could lead to an inability to create experiential unity and manage content in autonoetic consciousness. Some of the aberrant reasoning manifested by persons with schizophrenia, including problems with hierarchical relational reasoning, model-based-learning, J-con, ipseity, and source monitoring, could also reflect alterations in access consciousness, and their investigation offers additional approaches for scientific inquiry.

Neural correlates of conscious tactile perception: An analysis of BOLD activation patterns and graph metrics

Theories of human consciousness substantially vary in the proposed spatial extent of brain activity associated with conscious perception as well as in the assumed functional alterations within the involved brain regions. Here, we investigate which local and global changes in brain activity accompany conscious somatosensory perception following electrical finger nerve stimulation, and whether there are whole-brain functional network alterations by means of graph metrics. Thirty-eight healthy participants performed a somatosensory detection task and reported their decision confidence during fMRI. For conscious tactile perception in contrast to undetected near-threshold trials (misses), we observed increased BOLD activity in the precuneus, the intraparietal sulcus, the insula, the nucleus accumbens, the inferior frontal gyrus and the contralateral secondary somatosensory cortex. For misses compared to correct rejections, bilateral secondary somatosensory cortices, supplementary motor cortex and insula showed greater activations. The analysis of whole-brain functional network topology for hits, misses and correct rejections, did not result in any significant differences in modularity, participation, clustering or path length, which was supported by Bayes factor statistics. In conclusion, for conscious somatosensory perception, our results are consistent with an involvement of (probably) domain-general brain areas (precuneus, insula, inferior frontal gyrus) in addition to somatosensory regions; our data do not support the notion of specific changes in graph metrics associated with conscious experience. For the employed somatosensory submodality of fine electrical current stimulation, this speaks for a global broadcasting of sensory content across the brain without substantial reconfiguration of the whole-brain functional network resulting in an integrative conscious experience.