Visually guided action and the “need to know”

"What" and "how": evidence for the dissociation of object knowledge and mechanical problem-solving skills in the human brain

Patients with profound semantic deterioration resulting from temporal lobe atrophy have been reported to use many real objects appropriately. Does this preserved ability reflect (i) a separate component of the conceptual knowledge system ("action semantics") or (ii) the operation of a system that is independent of conceptual knowledge of specific objects, and rather is responsible for general mechanical problem-solving skills, triggered by object affordances? We contrast the performance of three patients-two with semantic dementia and focal temporal lobe atrophy and the third with corticobasal degeneration and biparietal atrophy-on tests of real object identification and usage, picture-based tests of functional semantic knowledge, and a task requiring selection and use of novel tools. The patient with corticobasal degeneration showed poor novel tool selection and impaired use of real objects, despite near normal semantic knowledge of the same objects' functions. The patients with semantic dementia had the expected deficit in object identification and functional semantics, but achieved flawless and effortless performance on the novel tool task. Their attempts to use this same mechanical problem-solving ability to deduce (sometimes successfully but often incorrectly) the use of the real objects provide no support for the hypothesis of a separate action-semantic system. Although the temporal lobe system clearly is necessary to identify "what" an object is, we suggest that sensory inputs to a parietal "how" system can trigger the use of objects without reference to object-specific conceptual knowledge.

Intention as a component of the alpha-rhythm response to mental activity

Many studies of alpha-rhythm reactivity conclude that alpha is selectively attenuated by attention accompanying mental activity. The topography of this attenuation is assumed to match the relevant functional topography of the cortex. But there are reports of apparent increased attention resulting in no change, or even enhanced alpha - the paradoxical response. It is proposed that in this case, alpha amplitude may be dependent on an intention component of behaviour. Some conflicting reports of alpha reactivity to mental processes may then be resolved. It is argued that the classical attention model of alpha is untenable, except for simple sensori-motor responses. Reasons are given to support this and the concept of intention as a neuropsychological variable is introduced. Evidence is presented for a generalisation of an oculomotor model of alpha activity proposed by Wertheim who demonstrated that alpha reduces during attentive, but not during intentive visual behaviour. The generalisation follows from reports of enhanced alpha in the few seconds prior to a skilled action in sport, and by neurophysiological evidence for a separate cortical organisation for perception and action. Varying proportions of attention and intention then add a dimension to the factors influencing alpha blocking which may explain its inconsistent response.