Motor images are action plans

Motor representations: One or many?

Two issues have been raised. The first concerns whether consciousness is attached to a given type of action. It is argued that purposive actions are represented before being executed and that motor representations can either remain implicit or become explicit according to the task. The second issue concerns whether or not mental imagery of action is independent from action. Recent evidence showing the commonality of neural mechanisms for motor imagery and action, respectively, goes against the idea of independent processes.

Response intention and imagery processes: Locus, interaction, and contribution to motor learning

By way of commentary on Jeannerod (1994), we propose that (1) intention, response imagery, and actual response processes carry equal weight in inferring from one process to another, (2) memory networks control intention, which interacts with imagery-based processing to control response imagery, and (3) response imagery will demonstrate learning effects better when imagery reconstruction and elaboration are emphasized and neutral retention tests are utilized.

Alternative origins of motor images

Jeannerod (1994) advocates studying motor images to understand the representation of action. We identify an unsettled issue that complicates the use of motor images to study the representation of action and present some evidence for a clear absence of equivalence between motor imagery and movement preparation. We then elaborate and emphasize the relevance of the mental practice literature, which was introduced in the first round of commentary. Finally, we suggest two methods that will allow motor imagery theorists to address these points.

In search of nonvisual motor images

Jeannerod's target article and a number of commentators stressed the necessity of distinguishing between motor representation and perceptual images. A patient with a lesion of the central somatosensory pathways allowed us to test for this distinction. The outcome suggests that motor images may not be visual and that the “pragmatic” framework proposed by Jeannerod for vision can apply to other sensory modalities.

Deficient internal models for planning hand-object interactions in apraxia

Motor imagery (MI) has been associated with planning stages of motor production, and in particular, with internal models that predict the sensory consequences of motor commands and specify the motor commands required to achieve a given outcome. In this study we investigated several predictions derived from the hypothesis that ideomotor apraxia (IM), a deficit in pantomime and imitation of skilled actions, may be attributable in part to deficits in internal models for planning object-related actions, in the face of relatively intact on-line, feedback-driven control of action. This hypothesis predicts that in IM, motor imagery should be (a) strongly correlated with other motor tasks not providing strong visual, tactile, and proprioceptive feedback from objects, i.e., object-related pantomime and imitation; (b) poorly correlated with performance tasks providing strong environmental feedback about the locations of effectors and targets, i.e., actual interaction with objects; and (c) particularly deficient in conditions that are computationally difficult for the motor planning system. Eight left fronto-parietal stroke patients with IM, five stroke patients without IM, and six healthy matched controls imagined grasping dowels and widgets presented at varying orientations, and actually grasped the same objects. The experimental predictions were confirmed. In addition, patients with IM and motor imagery deficits were significantly more likely than the non-apraxic group to have lesions in the intraparietal sulcus, a region previously implicated in imagery for hand-object interactions. The findings suggest a principled explanation for the deficits of IM patients in object-related gesture pantomime, imitation, and learning of new object-related gestures.

The meaning of meaningless gestures: a study of visuo-imitative apraxia

In two patients with damage to the inferior portion of the left angular gyrus severely defective imitation of meaningless gestures contrasted with preserved performance of meaningful gestures to verbal command and with preserved imitation of meaningful gestures. In one patient the imitation deficit was restricted to the imitation of hand positions while imitation of finger configurations was normal. In both patients replication of the hand positions on a mannikin was as defective as imitation on themselves. This pattern of preserved and impaired performances is incompatible with two-stage models of apraxia which posit that defective imitation stems from damage to an executional stage of gesture production. Interruption of a direct route from perception to execution of action could account for the dissociation between defective imitation of meaningless and preserved performance of meaningful gestures. We propose that functioning of this route requires the integrity of general knowledge about the structure of the human body.