Separability of reference frame distinctions from motor and visual images

Relationship between Visual and Motor Imagery

The relationship between visual and motor imagery was investigated by administering a battery of visual and motor imagery measures to a sample of 101 men ( n = 49) and women ( n = 52), who ranged in age from 18 to 59 ( M=34.5, SD=12.6). A principal components analysis applied to the correlation matrix indicated four underlying components, which explained 62.9% of the variance. The components were named Implicit Visual Imagery Ability, Self-report of Visual and Motor Imagery, Implicit Motor Imagery Ability, and Explicit Motor Imagery Ability. These results suggested a dissociation between visual and motor imagery although visual and motor imagery were associated as self-reports and there were correlations among particular measures.

Neurobiology of Unilateral Spatial Neglect

Hemispatial neglect is a common and disabling consequence of stroke. Earlier studies aimed to identify a single area of the brain where damage caused neglect and sought a single disrupted process that could account for the symptoms. Recent studies have shifted toward identifying component processes and representations underlying spatial attention required for various tasks and identifying areas of the brain responsible for each component that together constitute the network of regions responsible for neglect. This review focuses on recent insights into the mechanisms of neglect, regions of neural dysfunction that cause disruption of particular components or forms of neglect, and potential means of ameliorating neglect. Converging evidence supporting these insights comes from new imaging modalities in acute stroke, functional imaging, transcranial magnetic stimulation, electrophysiological studies in humans, and single-cell recording studies in nonhuman primates.

Motor representations: One or many?

Two issues have been raised. The first concerns whether consciousness is attached to a given type of action. It is argued that purposive actions are represented before being executed and that motor representations can either remain implicit or become explicit according to the task. The second issue concerns whether or not mental imagery of action is independent from action. Recent evidence showing the commonality of neural mechanisms for motor imagery and action, respectively, goes against the idea of independent processes.

Response intention and imagery processes: Locus, interaction, and contribution to motor learning

By way of commentary on Jeannerod (1994), we propose that (1) intention, response imagery, and actual response processes carry equal weight in inferring from one process to another, (2) memory networks control intention, which interacts with imagery-based processing to control response imagery, and (3) response imagery will demonstrate learning effects better when imagery reconstruction and elaboration are emphasized and neutral retention tests are utilized.

Alternative origins of motor images

Jeannerod (1994) advocates studying motor images to understand the representation of action. We identify an unsettled issue that complicates the use of motor images to study the representation of action and present some evidence for a clear absence of equivalence between motor imagery and movement preparation. We then elaborate and emphasize the relevance of the mental practice literature, which was introduced in the first round of commentary. Finally, we suggest two methods that will allow motor imagery theorists to address these points.

In search of nonvisual motor images

Jeannerod's target article and a number of commentators stressed the necessity of distinguishing between motor representation and perceptual images. A patient with a lesion of the central somatosensory pathways allowed us to test for this distinction. The outcome suggests that motor images may not be visual and that the “pragmatic” framework proposed by Jeannerod for vision can apply to other sensory modalities.

The relationship between the use of kinaesthetic imagery and different visual imagery perspectives

In two studies, we examined the strength of relationship between internal and external visual imagery with kinaesthetic imagery. In Study 1, 56 participants completed the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire and the Movement Imagery Questionnaire. Pearson's product-moment correlations failed to reveal a significant correlation between external visual imagery and kinaesthetic imagery. However, the correlation between internal visual imagery and kinaesthetic imagery approached significance. In Study 2, the instructional set of the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire was changed to make the participant the 'agent' of the external visual perspective images rather than somebody else. Sixty-four participants completed the two questionnaires. The results indicated a significant correlation between external visual imagery and kinaesthetic imagery (r = 0.60, P < 0.01). However, the correlation between internal visual imagery and kinaesthetic imagery was non-significant (r = 0.23, P > 0.01). The results are discussed in relation to who is the agent of the image and the processes that may underlie kinaesthetic imagery. The implications for researchers trying to establish the functional, behavioural and neurological differences within, and across, imagery modalities are considered.

Viewer- and object-centered mental explorations of an imagined environment are not equivalent

In this study we compared viewer-centered (VC) with object-centered (OC) mental exploration of an imagined clock drawn on the ground. An upper case F portrayed on a computer screen was to be imagined standing up in the center of the clock. In Expt. 1, an adjustment task was used to verify that the discrimination of clock directions rendered by this perspective drawing was quite accurate. Precision was not affected by the imaginary size of the clock. In Expt. 2, subjects either (1) indicated the clock location pointed by the F given their viewing position (VC condition), or (2) their location at the periphery of the clock given the location pointed by the F (OC condition). Response latencies were proportional to the explored imaginary distance and increased with the size of the imagined environment. We found an additional mean processing time of at least 2 s in the OC condition with respect to the VC condition. Results are interpreted within Kosslyn's (Kosslyn, S.M., A cognitive neuroscience of visual cognition: further developments. In: R.H. Logie and M. Denis (Eds.), Mental Images in Human Cognition, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1991, pp. 351-381 [17]) framework of cognitive neuroscience.