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Belt J. Phenomenological Skepticism Reconsidered: A Husserlian Answer to Dennett's Challenge. Front Psychol 2020; 11:2058. [PMID: 33013522 PMCID: PMC7498690 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2020] [Accepted: 07/24/2020] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
There is a long-standing tradition of questioning the viability and scientificity of first-person methods. Husserlian reflective methodology, in particular, has been challenged on the basis of its perceived inability to meet the standards of objectivity and reliability, leading to what has been called “phenomenological skepticism” (Roy, 2007). In this article, I reassess this line of objection by outlining Daniel C. Dennett’s empirically driven skepticism and reconstructing his methodological arguments against Husserlian phenomenology. His ensuing phenomenological skepticism is divided into strong skepticism and categorical and gradual versions of weak skepticism. Both strands of Dennett’s criticism are then countered by analyzing the key components of Husserl’s method of phenomenological reflection: epoché and transcendental reduction, intentional analysis, eidetic variation, and intersubjective validation. Laying out the basic features of phenomenological reflection serves two purposes. First, it undermines Dennett’s methodological arguments, which are based on the unfounded assumptions that Husserl is committed to introspection, methodological solipsism, the first-person-plural presumption, and the lone-wolf approach. Second, it shows how Husserl’s own methodology can alleviate the more justified empirical worries concerning overinterpretation, underdescription, and disagreement. Finally, I argue that gradual weak skepticism is the only plausible form of phenomenological skepticism and conclude that Husserlian methodology is well-equipped to combat it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jaakko Belt
- Unit of History, Philosophy and Literature, Faculty of Social Sciences (SOC), Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
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Feinberg TE, Mallatt J. Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1041. [PMID: 32595555 PMCID: PMC7304239 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2020] [Accepted: 04/27/2020] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a "strong" or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property-albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent "explanatory gap" between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard ("weak") emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An "experiential" or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Todd E. Feinberg
- Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, Psychiatry and Neurology, New York, NY, United States
| | - Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington, WWAMI Medical Education Program, The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID, United States
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Pointeau G, Dominey PF. The Role of Autobiographical Memory in the Development of a Robot Self. Front Neurorobot 2017; 11:27. [PMID: 28676751 PMCID: PMC5476692 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2017.00027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2016] [Accepted: 05/22/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
This article briefly reviews research in cognitive development concerning the nature of the human self. It then reviews research in developmental robotics that has attempted to retrace parts of the developmental trajectory of the self. This should be of interest to developmental psychologists, and researchers in developmental robotics. As a point of departure, one of the most characteristic aspects of human social interaction is cooperation-the process of entering into a joint enterprise to achieve a common goal. Fundamental to this ability to cooperate is the underlying ability to enter into, and engage in, a self-other relation. This suggests that if we intend for robots to cooperate with humans, then to some extent robots must engage in these self-other relations, and hence they must have some aspect of a self. Decades of research in human cognitive development indicate that the self is not fully present from the outset, but rather that it is developed in a usage-based fashion, that is, through engaging with the world, including the physical world and the social world of animate intentional agents. In an effort to characterize the self, Ulric Neisser noted that self is not unitary, and he thus proposed five types of self-knowledge that correspond to five distinct components of self: ecological, interpersonal, conceptual, temporally extended, and private. He emphasized the ecological nature of each of these levels, how they are developed through the engagement of the developing child with the physical and interpersonal worlds. Crucially, development of the self has been shown to rely on the child's autobiographical memory. From the developmental robotics perspective, this suggests that in principal it would be possible to develop certain aspects of self in a robot cognitive system where the robot is engaged in the physical and social world, equipped with an autobiographical memory system. We review a series of developmental robotics studies that make progress in this enterprise. We conclude with a summary of the properties that are required for the development of these different levels of self, and we identify topics for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gregoire Pointeau
- Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Stem Cell and Brain Research Institute U1208, Univ Lyon, Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1Lyon, France.,Robot Cognition Laboratory, Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueLyon, France
| | - Peter Ford Dominey
- Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, Stem Cell and Brain Research Institute U1208, Univ Lyon, Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1Lyon, France.,Robot Cognition Laboratory, Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueLyon, France
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Vadakkan KI. A pressure-reversible cellular mechanism of general anesthetics capable of altering a possible mechanism for consciousness. SPRINGERPLUS 2015; 4:485. [PMID: 26380161 PMCID: PMC4561946 DOI: 10.1186/s40064-015-1283-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2015] [Accepted: 08/28/2015] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
Different anesthetics are known to modulate different types of membrane-bound receptors. Their common mechanism of action is expected to alter the mechanism for consciousness. Consciousness is hypothesized as the integral of all the units of internal sensations induced by reactivation of inter-postsynaptic membrane functional LINKs during mechanisms that lead to oscillating potentials. The thermodynamics of the spontaneous lateral curvature of lipid membranes induced by lipophilic anesthetics can lead to the formation of non-specific inter-postsynaptic membrane functional LINKs by different mechanisms. These include direct membrane contact by excluding the inter-membrane hydrophilic region and readily reversible partial membrane hemifusion. The constant reorganization of the lipid membranes at the lateral edges of the postsynaptic terminals (dendritic spines) resulting from AMPA receptor-subunit vesicle exocytosis and endocytosis can favor the effect of anesthetic molecules on lipid membranes at this location. Induction of a large number of non-specific LINKs can alter the conformation of the integral of the units of internal sensations that maintain consciousness. Anesthetic requirement is reduced in the presence of dopamine that causes enlargement of dendritic spines. Externally applied pressure can transduce from the middle ear through the perilymph, cerebrospinal fluid, and the recently discovered glymphatic pathway to the extracellular matrix space, and finally to the paravenular space. The pressure gradient reduce solubility and displace anesthetic molecules from the membranes into the paravenular space, explaining the pressure reversal of anesthesia. Changes in membrane composition and the conversion of membrane hemifusion to fusion due to defects in the checkpoint mechanisms can lead to cytoplasmic content mixing between neurons and cause neurodegenerative changes. The common mechanism of anesthetics presented here can operate along with the known specific actions of different anesthetics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kunjumon I Vadakkan
- Division of Neurology, Department of Medicine, University of Toronto, Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, 2075 Bayview Avenue, Room A4-08, Toronto, ON M4N 3M5 Canada
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What makes a conscious process conscious? Behav Brain Sci 2014; 37:43-4. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x13000885] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
AbstractNewell & Shanks' (N&S's) critical review considers only a very limited sense in which mental processes can be thought of as either conscious or unconscious and consequently gives a misleading analysis of the role of consciousness in human information processing. This commentary provides an expanded analysis of conscious processing that also reveals the various ways in which mental processes are unconscious.
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Ferunaj P, Tschan H. The comparison of maximal and endurance strength of quadriceps femori in trained and untrained elderly. JOURNAL OF HUMAN SPORT AND EXERCISE 2013. [DOI: 10.4100/jhse.2012.8.proc2.24] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022] Open
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Abstract
AbstractWe compare the way two models of consciousness treat subjective timing. According to the standard “Cartesian Theater” model, there is a place in the brain where “it all comes together,” and the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and “presented” for subjective judgment. The timing of the events in this theater determines subjective order. According to the alternative “Multiple Drafts” model, discriminations are distributed in both space and time in the brain. These events do have temporal properties, but those properties do not determine subjective order because there is no single, definitive “stream of consciousness,” only a parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents. Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation by the Cartesian model are analyzed: (1) a gradual apparent motion phenomenon involving abrupt color change (Kolers & von Grünau 1976), (2) an illusion of an evenly spaced series of “hops” produced by two or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin (Geldard & Sherrick's “cutaneous rabbit” [1972]), (3) backwards referral in time, and (4) subjective delay of consciousness of intention (both reported in this journal by LIbet 1985a; 1987; 1989a). The unexamined assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater so attractive are exposed and dismantled. The Multiple Drafts model provides a better account of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and metaphysical extravagances of the Cartesian Theater: The temporal order of subjective events is a product of the brain's interpretational processes, not a direct reflection of events making up those processes.
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The place of consciousness in the information processing approach: The mental-pool thought experiment. Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00082066] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Consciousness, not focal attention, is causally effective in human information processing. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00030855] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00029174] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Abstract
AbstractAs adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00028934] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Abstract
AbstractFolk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon. A decision to ascribe such a word to oneself depends on matching to the CR an instance representation (IR) of one's current state. As in visual object recognition, evidence about a CR's content includes the IRs that are or are not available to trigger a match. This poses serious problems for functionalism, the theory-of-mind approach to the meaning of mental terms. A simple functionalist model is inadequate because (1) the relational and subjunctive (what would have happened) information it requires concerning target states is not generally available and (2) it could lead to combinatorial explosion. A modified functionalist model can appeal to qualitative (phenomenological) properties, but the earlier problems still reappear. Qualitative properties are important for sensations, propositional attitudes, and their contents, providing a model that need not refer to functional (causal-relational) properties at all. The introspectionist character of the proposed model does not imply that ascribing mental states to oneself is infallible or complete; nor is the model refuted by empirical research on introspective reports. Empirical research on “theory of mind” does not support any strict version of functionalism but only an understanding of mentalistic words that may depend on phenomenological or experiential qualities.
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven. Behav Brain Sci 2010. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00028983] [Citation(s) in RCA: 64] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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