Mosaic Decisionmaking and Reemergent Agency after Severe Brain Injury

Equity in Clinical Care and Research Involving Persons with Disorders of Consciousness

People with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are characteristically unable to synchronously participate in decision-making about clinical care or research. The inability to self-advocate exacerbates preexisting socioeconomic and geographic disparities, which include the wide variability observed across individuals, hospitals, and countries in access to acute care, expertise, and sophisticated diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic interventions. Concerns about equity for people with DoC are particularly notable when they lack a surrogate decision-maker (legally referred to as "unrepresented" or "unbefriended"). Decisions about both short-term and long-term life-sustaining treatment typically rely on neuroprognostication and individual patient preferences that carry additional ethical considerations for people with DoC, as even individuals with well thought out advance directives cannot anticipate every possible situation to guide such decisions. Further challenges exist with the inclusion of people with DoC in research because consent must be completed (in most circumstances) through a surrogate, which excludes those who are unrepresented and may discourage investigators from exploring questions related to this population. In this article, the Curing Coma Campaign Ethics Working Group reviews equity considerations in clinical care and research involving persons with DoC in the following domains: (1) access to acute care and expertise, (2) access to diagnostics and therapeutics, (3) neuroprognostication, (4) medical decision-making for unrepresented people, (5) end-of-life decision-making, (6) access to postacute rehabilitative care, (7) access to research, (8) inclusion of unrepresented people in research, and (9) remuneration and reciprocity for research participation. The goal of this discussion is to advance equitable, harmonized, guideline-directed, and goal-concordant care for people with DoC of all backgrounds worldwide, prioritizing the ethical standards of respect for autonomy, beneficence, and justice. Although the focus of this evaluation is on people with DoC, much of the discussion can be extrapolated to other critically ill persons worldwide.

Brain-Computer Interfaces, Completely Locked-In State in Neurodegenerative Diseases, and End-of-Life Decisions

In the future, policies surrounding end-of-life decisions will be faced with the question of whether competent people in a completely locked-in state should be enabled to make end-of-life decisions via brain-computer interfaces (BCI). This article raises ethical issues with acting through BCIs in the context of these decisions, specifically self-administration requirements within assisted suicide policies. We argue that enabling patients to end their life even once they have entered completely locked-in state might, paradoxically, prolong and uphold their quality of life.

Disorders of Consciousness Rehabilitation: Ethical Dimensions and Epistemic Dilemmas

Patients with disorders of consciousness who survive to discharge following severe acute brain injury may face profoundly complex medical, ethical, and psychosocial challenges during their courses of recovery and rehabilitation. Although issues encountered in caring for such patients during acute hospitalization have received substantial attention, ethical challenges that may arise in subacute and chronic phases have been underexplored. Shedding light on these issues, this article explores the landscape of normative issues in the course of treating and facilitating access to care for persons with disorders of consciousness during rehabilitation and examines potential implications for patients, clinicians, family members, and society.

Ethics Along the Continuum of Research Involving Persons with Disorders of Consciousness

Interest in disorders of consciousness (DoC) has grown substantially over the past decade and has illuminated the importance of improving understanding of DoC biology; care needs (use of monitoring, performance of interventions, and provision of emotional support); treatment options to promote recovery; and outcome prediction. Exploration of these topics requires awareness of numerous ethics considerations related to rights and resources. The Curing Coma Campaign Ethics Working Group used its expertise in neurocritical care, neuropalliative care, neuroethics, neuroscience, philosophy, and research to formulate an informal review of ethics considerations along the continuum of research involving persons with DoC related to the following: (1) study design; (2) comparison of risks versus benefits; (3) selection of inclusion and exclusion criteria; (4) screening, recruitment, and enrollment; (5) consent; (6) data protection; (7) disclosure of results to surrogates and/or legally authorized representatives; (8) translation of research into practice; (9) identification and management of conflicts of interest; (10) equity and resource availability; and (11) inclusion of minors with DoC in research. Awareness of these ethics considerations when planning and performing research involving persons with DoC will ensure that the participant rights are respected while maximizing the impact and meaningfulness of the research, interpretation of outcomes, and communication of results.

Ethical Considerations in Clinical Trials for Disorders of Consciousness

As the clinical trial landscape for patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) expands, consideration of associated ethical challenges and opportunities is of ever-increasing importance. Responsible conduct of research in the vulnerable population of persons with DoC, including those with coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS), minimally conscious state (MCS), covert cortical processing (CCP), and cognitive motor dissociation (CMD), demands proactive deliberation of unique ethical issues that may arise and the adoption of robust protections to safeguard patients, surrogates, and other key stakeholders. Here we identify and critically evaluate four central categories of ethical considerations in clinical trials involving participants with DoC: (1) autonomy, respect for persons and informed consent of individuals with liminal consciousness; (2) balancing unknown benefits and risks, especially considering the epistemological gap between behavior and consciousness that complicates ordinary ascription of subjective states; (3) disclosure to surrogates and clinical teams of investigational results pertaining to consciousness; and (4) justice considerations, including equitable access to clinical trial enrollment across communities and geographies. We outline guiding principles and research opportunities for clinicians, neuroethicists, and researchers engaged in DoC clinical trials to advance ethical study design and deployment in this complex yet crucial area of investigation.

Disorders of Consciousness and Disability Law

In 2018, the American Academy of Neurology, the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, and the National Institute on Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research published a systematic evidence-based review and an associated practice guideline for improved assessment, treatment, and rehabilitation of patients with disorders of consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness include individuals in the vegetative and minimally conscious states, as well as others with covert consciousness and cognitive motor dissociation. These landmark publications (concurrently published in Neurology and Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation) supplant the 1994 New England Journal of Medicine Multi-Society Task Force report on the vegetative state and the 2002 criteria establishing minimally conscious states. The guideline re-designates the permanent vegetative state as chronic. In our article, we consider the legal and ethical implications of the practice guideline for clinical practice and explain the vulnerability of these patients who suffer from high rates of misdiagnosis, inadequate medical surveillance, undertreatment of pain, inadequate rehabilitation, and segregation in chronic care. We argue that these deficiencies in medical care are inconsistent with our growing appreciation of the dynamic nature of these brain states and an emerging standard of care as articulated by the national guideline. These deficiencies also violate domestic and international disability law. To substantiate this latter claim, we apply disability law to this population, focusing on key Americans with Disabilities Act mandates, the relevance of the 1999 Supreme Court, Olmstead v. L.C., and the utility of Olmstead enforcement actions to integrate the care of these individuals into the medical mainstream.

Building Intricate Partnerships with Neurotechnology: Deep Brain Stimulation and Relational Agency

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an FDA-approved treatment for symptoms of motor disorders—with experimental use for psychiatric disorders. DBS, however, causes a variety of side effects. Moral philosophers question DBS’s influence on users’ experiences of authenticity, identity, and/or autonomy. These characterizations of DBS, however, may not make sense of how DBS complicates, rather than simply impedes or bolsters, users’ abilities to exercise agency. Empirical work exploring DBS users’ lived-experiences and feminist accounts of relational autonomy demonstrate that the issues users face are better characterized in terms of the user’s relationship to their stimulator, that is, in terms of “relational agency.”

Assessment of Covert Consciousness in the Intensive Care Unit: Clinical and Ethical Considerations

OBJECTIVE

To propose a practical ethical framework for how task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) may be used in the intensive care unit (ICU) to identify covert consciousness in patients with acute severe traumatic brain injury (TBI).

METHODS

We present 2 clinical scenarios in which investigational task-based fMRI and EEG were performed in critically ill patients with acute severe TBI who appeared unconscious on the bedside behavioral assessment. From these cases, we consider the clinical and ethical challenges that emerge and suggest how to reconcile them. We also provide recommendations regarding communication with families about ICU patients with covert consciousness.

RESULTS

Covert consciousness was detected acutely in a patient who died in the ICU due to withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy, whereas covert consciousness was not detected in a patient who subsequently recovered consciousness, communication, and functional independence. These cases raise ethical challenges about how assessment of covert consciousness in the ICU might inform treatment decisions, prognostication, and perceptions about the benefits and burdens of ongoing care.

CONCLUSIONS

Given that covert consciousness can be detected acutely in the ICU, we recommend that clinicians reconsider evaluative norms for ICU patients. As our clinical appreciation of covert consciousness evolves and its ethical import unfolds, we urge prognostic humility and transparency when clinicians communicate with families in the ICU about goals of care.

A Critical Analysis of Joseph Fins' Mosaic Decisionmaking: A Response to "Mosaic Decisionmaking and Reemergent Agency after Severe Brain Injury" (CQ 27 (1))

In this paper, the author argues that Joseph Fins' mosaic decisionmaking model for brain-injured patients is untenable. He supports this claim by identifying three problems with mosaic decisionmaking. First, that it is unclear whether a mosaic is a conceptually adequate metaphor for a decisionmaking process that is intended to promote patient autonomy. Second, that the proposed legal framework for mosaic decisionmaking is inappropriate. Third, that it is unclear how we ought to select patients for participation in mosaic decisionmaking.

Deep brain stimulation and revising the Mental Health Act: the case for intervention-specific safeguards

Under the current Mental Health Act of England and Wales, it is lawful to perform deep brain stimulation in the absence of consent and independent approval. We argue against the Care Quality Commission's preferred strategy of addressing this problematic issue, and offer recommendations for deep brain stimulation-specific provisions in a revised Mental Health Act.Declaration of interestT.A. is a paid consultant for Boston Scientific, Medtronic and St. Jude Medical. He has received honoraria from Abbott, Boston and Medtronics and served as consultant to all three.

Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatments in Perceived Devastating Brain Injury: The Key Role of Uncertainty

BACKGROUND

Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (WOLST) is the leading proximate cause of death in patients with perceived devastating brain injury (PDBI). There are reasons to believe that a potentially significant proportion of WOLST decisions, in this setting, are premature and guided by a number of assumptions that falsely confer a sense of certainty.

METHOD

This manuscript proposes that these assumptions face serious challenges, and that we should replace unwarranted certainty with an appreciation for the great degree of multi-dimensional uncertainty involved. The article proceeds by offering a taxonomy of uncertainty in PDBI and explores the key role that uncertainty as a cognitive state, may play into how WOLST decisions are reached.

CONCLUSION

In order to properly share decision-making with families and surrogates of patients with PDBI, we will have to acknowledge, understand, and be able to communicate the great degree of uncertainty involved.

Ethical, Palliative, and Policy Considerations in Disorders of Consciousness

This essay complements the scientific and practice scope of the American Academy of Neurology Guideline on Disorders of Consciousness by providing a discussion of the ethical, palliative, and policy aspects of the management of this group of patients. We endorse the renaming of "permanent" vegetative state to "chronic" vegetative state given the increased frequency of reports of late improvements but suggest that further refinement of this class of patients is necessary to distinguish late recoveries from patients who were misdiagnosed or in cognitive-motor dissociation. Additional nosologic clarity and prognostic refinement is necessary to preclude overestimation of low probability events. We argue that the new descriptor "unaware wakefulness syndrome" is no clearer than "vegetative state" in expressing the mismatch between apparent behavioral unawareness when patients have covert consciousness or cognitive motor dissociation. We advocate routine universal pain precautions as an important element of neuropalliative care for these patients given the risk of covert consciousness. In medical decision-making, we endorse the use of advance directives and the importance of clear and understandable communication with surrogates. We show the value of incorporating a learning health care system so as to promote therapeutic innovation. We support the Guideline's high standard for rehabilitation for these patients but note that those systems of care are neither widely available nor affordable. Finally, we applaud the Guideline authors for this outstanding exemplar of engaged scholarship in the service of a frequently neglected group of brain-injured patients.

Ethical, palliative, and policy considerations in disorders of consciousness

This essay complements the scientific and practice scope of the American Academy of Neurology Guideline on Disorders of Consciousness by providing a discussion of the ethical, palliative, and policy aspects of the management of this group of patients. We endorse the renaming of "permanent" vegetative state to "chronic" vegetative state given the increased frequency of reports of late improvements but suggest that further refinement of this class of patients is necessary to distinguish late recoveries from patients who were misdiagnosed or in cognitive-motor dissociation. Additional nosologic clarity and prognostic refinement is necessary to preclude overestimation of low probability events. We argue that the new descriptor "unaware wakefulness syndrome" is no clearer than "vegetative state" in expressing the mismatch between apparent behavioral unawareness when patients have covert consciousness or cognitive motor dissociation. We advocate routine universal pain precautions as an important element of neuropalliative care for these patients given the risk of covert consciousness. In medical decision-making, we endorse the use of advance directives and the importance of clear and understandable communication with surrogates. We show the value of incorporating a learning health care system so as to promote therapeutic innovation. We support the Guideline's high standard for rehabilitation for these patients but note that those systems of care are neither widely available nor affordable. Finally, we applaud the Guideline authors for this outstanding exemplar of engaged scholarship in the service of a frequently neglected group of brain-injured patients.