The problem of coerced abortion in China and related ethical issues

Why empresses have more sons? Maternal instant social condition determines it

Abstract

Sexual selection echoed by the sex ratio is a critical issue in evolution and reproductive biology studies, and the second sex ratio (sex ratio at birth, SRB) is an important evaluation indicator for sex regulation. However, broad debates on sex ratio at birth exist due to the lack of a clear spatiotemporal genealogical database. This study explicitly tests the Trivers and Willard’s hypothesis stating that parents with good social conditions tend to show a male-biased SRB. Using a database of Chinese imperial families from 211BC to 1912 (2142 years) which avoids the spatiotemporal confusion of data thanks to its clear boundaries and long timespan, we found that a proportion of males at birth was 0.54. In particular, the results indicate that the empresses generated a significantly higher male-biased SRB than the concubines within the imperial harems (0.61 vs 0.53), while the SRB of concubines was not higher than ordinary people (0.53 vs 0.52). A significant difference of SRB before and after empress coronation (0.48 vs 0.65) was detected, indicating that the change to a higher social status is the leading cause of a biased SRB. These findings suggest that mothers with privileged instant social conditions tend to generate more boys than girls. In other words, a higher maternal social rank during the conception period, instead of rich resources, forms the primary mechanism regulating the SRB.

Significance statement

Adaptive sex ratio has been a debatable topic difficult to clearly verify since the publication of Trivers and Willard Hypothesis in 1973, which proposes that parents who have good conditions should produce more male offspring. The one reason is that the validity and sample size of the databases used contained unavoidable confounding noise, both genealogically and genetically. To overcome these issues, we specifically compiled a historical database of Chinese imperial families, which are characterized by a confined mating harem and unique eunuch system, guaranteeing biological and genetic purity with precise genealogical relationships and genetic linkages between the parents and the offspring. Thus, this is an extraordinary effort to clarify the hypotheses proposed by TWH and other hypotheses.

Modelling the impact of birth control policies on China's population and age: effects of delayed births and minimum birth age constraints

We consider age-structured models with an imposed refractory period between births. These models can be used to formulate alternative population control strategies to China's one-child policy. By allowing any number of births, but with an imposed delay between births, we show how the total population can be decreased and how a relatively older age distribution can be generated. This delay represents a more 'continuous' form of population management for which the strict one-child policy is a limiting case. Such a policy approach could be more easily accepted by society. Our analyses provide an initial framework for studying demographics and how social constraints influence population structure.

Modelling the impact of birth control policies on China's population and age: effects of delayed births and minimum birth age constraints

We consider age-structured models with an imposed refractory period between births. These models can be used to formulate alternative population control strategies to China's one-child policy. By allowing any number of births, but with an imposed delay between births, we show how the total population can be decreased and how a relatively older age distribution can be generated. This delay represents a more 'continuous' form of population management for which the strict one-child policy is a limiting case. Such a policy approach could be more easily accepted by society. Our analyses provide an initial framework for studying demographics and how social constraints influence population structure.

China’s One-Child Policy, a Policy without a Future

The Chinese Communist Party government has been forcefully promoting itsjihua shengyu(planned fertility) program, known as the “one-child policy,” for more than three decades. A distinctive authoritarian model of population governance has been developed. A pertinent question to be asked is whether China’s one-child policy and the authoritarian model of population governance have a future. The answer must be no; they do not. Although there are many demographic, economic, and social rationales for terminating the one-child policy, the most fundamental reason for opposing its continuation is drawn from ethics. The key ethical rationale offered for the policy is that it promotes the common social good, not only for China and the Chinese people but for the whole human family. The major irony associated with this apparently convincing justification is that, although designed to improve living standards and help relieve poverty and underdevelopment, the one-child policy and the application of the authoritarian model have instead caused massive suffering to Chinese people, especially women, and made them victims of state violence. A lesson from China—one learned at the cost of individual and social suffering on an enormous scale—is that an essential prerequisite for the pursuit of the common good is the creation of adequate constraints on state power.