Color categories are not universal: replications and new evidence from a stone-age culture

Communication as the Origin of Consciousness

Since the middle of the 20th century, more and more data have appeared on the limited role of consciousness in determining human behavior. In this opinion paper, we hypothesize that the basis of consciousness is precisely the communicative function, and discuss relations of consciousness to other cognitive processes such sensory detection, decision-making and emotions. Within the framework of the hypothesis, consciousness is considered as a highly specialized function of the brain, which ensures encoding of personal information as communication messages. On a subjective level, mental representation just means the state of information to be shared in a human group. Accordingly, consciousness affects only those components of human behavior that are associated with the transmission of messages. Sensory detection, decision-making, emotions and other processes are only projected into consciousness during the encoding of information of them. The communication hypothesis assumes that consciousness is an adaptation that increases the efficiency of a collective way of life, and the emergence of consciousness is inextricably linked with the development of language in human culture. In the future, our view of consciousness provides an opportunity for an objective analysis of subjective phenomena by means of a directed study of the formation of messages both at the level of brain processes and at the level of interactions between individuals.

"Red-Green" or "Brown-Green" Dichromats? The Accuracy of Dichromat Basic Color Terms Metacognition Supports Denomination Change

Two experiments compared “Red-Green” (R-G) dichromats’ empirical and metacognized capacities to discriminate basic color categories (BCCs) and to use the corresponding basic color terms (BCTs). A first experiment used a 102-related-colors set for a pointing task to identify all the stimuli that could be named with each BCT by each R-G dichromat type (8 protanopes and 9 deuteranopes). In a second experiment, a group of R-G dichromats (15 protanopes and 16 deuteranopes) estimated their difficulty discriminating BCCs-BCTs in a verbal task. The strong coincidences between the results derived from the pointing and the verbal tasks indicated that R-G dichromats have very accurate metacognition about their capacities (they only had considerable difficulty discriminating 13 out of the total of 55 possible BCT pairs) and limitations (Brown-Green and Blue-Purple pairs were rated especially difficult to differentiate) in the use of BCTs. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) solutions derived from both tasks were very similar: BCTs in R-G dichromats were properly represented in 2D MDS solutions that clearly show one chromatic dimension and one achromatic dimension. Important concordances were found between protanopes and deuteranopes. None of these dichromats showed substantial difficulty discriminating the Red-Green pair. So, to name them “R-G” dichromats is misleading considering their empirical capacities and their metacognition. Further reasons to propose the use of the alternative denomination “Brown-Green” dichromats are also discussed. We found some relevant differences between the “Brown-Green” dichromats’ empirical and self-reported difficulties using BCTs. Their metacognition can be considered a “caricature” of their practical difficulties. This caricature omits some difficulties including their problems differentiating “white” and “black” from other BCTs, while they overestimate their limitations in differentiating the most difficult pairs (Brown-Green and Blue-Purple). Individual differences scaling (INDSCAL) analyses indicated that the metacognition regarding the use of BCTs in “Brown-Green” dichromats, especially deuteranopes, is driven slightly more by the chromatic dimension and driven slightly less by the achromatic dimension, than their practical use of BCTs. We discuss the relevance of our results in the framework of the debate between the linguistic relativity hypothesis (LRH) and the universal evolution (UE) theories.

Exposure to linguistic labels during childhood modulates the neural architecture of race categorical perception

Perceptually categorizing a face to its racial belonging may have important consequences on interacting with people. However, race categorical perception (CP) has been scarcely investigated nor its developmental pathway. In this study, we tested the neurolinguistics rewiring hypothesis, stating that language acquisition modulates the brain processing of social perceptual categories. Accordingly, we investigated the electrophysiological correlates of race CP in a group of adults and children between 3 and 5 years of age. For both groups we found a greater modulation of the N400 connected with the processing of between category boundaries (i.e., faces belonging to different race groups) than within-category boundaries (i.e., different faces belonging to the same race group). This effect was the same in both adults and children, as shown by the comparable between-group amplitude of the differential wave (DW) elicited by the between-category faces. Remarkably, this effect was positively correlated with racial-labels acquisition, but not with age, in children. Finally, brain source analysis revealed the activation of a more modularized cortical network in adults than in children, with unique activation of the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which are areas connected to language processing. These are the first results accounting for an effect of language in rewiring brain connectedness when processing racial categories.

Categorical colour perception occurs in both signalling and non-signalling colour ranges in a songbird

Although perception begins when a stimulus is transduced by a sensory neuron, numerous perceptual mechanisms can modify sensory information as it is processed by an animal's nervous system. One such mechanism is categorical perception, in which (1) continuously varying stimuli are labelled as belonging to a discrete number of categories and (2) there is enhanced discrimination between stimuli from different categories as compared with equally different stimuli from within the same category. We have shown previously that female zebra finches ( Taeniopygia guttata) categorically perceive colours along an orange-red continuum that aligns with the carotenoid-based coloration of male beaks, a trait that serves as an assessment signal in female mate choice. Here, we demonstrate that categorical perception occurs along a blue-green continuum as well, suggesting that categorical colour perception may be a general feature of zebra finch vision. Although we identified two categories in both the blue-green and the orange-red ranges, we also found that individuals could better differentiate colours from within the same category in the blue-green as compared with the orange-red range, indicative of less clear categorization in the blue-green range. We discuss reasons why categorical perception may vary across the visible spectrum, including the possibility that such differences are linked to the behavioural or ecological function of different colour ranges.

Perceptual constraints on colours induce the universality of linguistic colour categorisation

The universal linguistic colour categorisation pattern as evident in the World Colour Survey (WCS) has been a principal focus of investigations on the relationship between language and cognition, yet most existing studies have failed to clarify whether this universality resulted primarily from individual perceptual constraints and/or socio-cultural transmissions. This paper designed an agent-based, unsupervised learning model to address the relative importance of these two aspects to linguistic colour categorisation. By directly comparing with the empirical data in the WCS, our study demonstrated that: the physical colour stimuli that reflect human perceptual constraints on colours trigger a categorisation pattern quantitatively resembling the WCS data, the randomised stimuli that distort such constraints lead to distinct categorisation patterns, and the processes of linguistic categorisation in both cases follow similar dynamics. These results reveal how perceptual and socio-cultural factors interact with each other to trigger linguistic universality, and serve as decisive evidence that human perceptual constraints induce the universality in linguistic categorisation, yet socio-cultural transmissions, though imperative, play an auxiliary role of transcribing perceptual constraints into common linguistic categories with slight variations.

The word order of languages predicts native speakers' working memory

The relationship between language and thought is controversial. One hypothesis is that language fosters habits of processing information that are retained even in non-linguistic domains. In left-branching (LB) languages, modifiers usually precede the head, and real-time sentence comprehension may more heavily rely on retaining initial information in working memory. Here we presented a battery of working memory and short-term memory tasks to adult native speakers of four LB and four right-branching (RB) languages from Africa, Asia and Europe. In working memory tasks, LB speakers were better than RB speakers at recalling initial stimuli, but worse at recalling final stimuli. Our results show that the practice of parsing sentences in specific directions due to the syntax and word order of our native language not only predicts the way we remember words, but also other non-linguistic stimuli.

The subjective metric of remembered colors: A Fisher-information analysis of the geometry of human chromatic memory

In order to explore the metric structure of the space of remembered colors, a computer game was designed, where players with normal color vision had to store a color in memory, and later retrieve it by selecting the best match out of a continuum of alternatives. All tested subjects exhibited evidence of focal colors in their mnemonic strategy. We found no concluding evidence that the focal colors of different players tended to cluster around universal prototypes. Based on the Fisher metric, for each subject we defined a notion of distance in color space that captured the accuracy with which similar colors where discriminated or confounded when stored and retrieved from memory. The notions of distance obtained for different players were remarkably similar. Finally, for each player, we constructed a new color scale, in which colors are memorized and retrieved with uniform accuracy.

Basic Color Terms (BCTs) and Categories (BCCs) in Three Dialects of the Spanish Language: Interaction Between Cultural and Universal Factors

Two experiments were performed to identify and compare the Basic Color Terms (BCTs) and the Basic Color Categories (BCCs) included in three dialects (Castilian, Mexican, and Uruguayan) of the Spanish language. Monolexemic Elicited lists were used in the first experiment to identify the BCTs of each dialect. Eleven BCTs appeared for the Spanish and the Mexican, and twelve did so for the Uruguayan. The six primary BCTs (rojo “red,” verde “green,” amarillo “yellow,” azul “blue,” negro “black,” and blanco “white”) appeared in the three dialects. This occurred for only three derived BCTs (gris “gray,” naranja “orange,” and rosa “pink”) but not for the other five derived BCTs (celeste “sky blue,” marrón “brown,” café “brown,” morado “purple,” and violeta “purple”). Color transitions were used in the second experiment for two different tasks. Extremes naming task was used to determine the relation between two different dialects' BCTs: equality, equivalence or difference. The results provided the first evidence for marrón “brown” and café “brown” being equivalent terms for the same BCC (brown in English) as is the case of morado “purple” and violeta “purple.” Uruguayan celeste “sky blue” had no equivalent BCT in the other two dialects. Boundary delimitation task required the selection of the color in the boundary between two categories. The task was used to reasonably estimate the volume occupied by each BCC in the color space considering its chromatic area and lightness range. Excluding sky blue (celeste “sky blue”) and blue (azul “blue”), the other BCCs color volumes were similar across the three dialects. Uruguayan sky blue and blue volumes conjointly occupied the portion of the color space corresponding to the Castilian and Mexican blue BCC. The fact that the BCT celeste “sky blue” only appeared in Uruguayan very probably derived from specific cultural factors (the use of the color in the flags and the arrival of an important number of Italian immigrants). Nevertheless, these cultural factors seem to nurture from a perceptive structuring of the color space, which nature is universal, as the boundaries of this category can be delimited from the responses of Spanish and Mexican participants.

Domain learning naming game for color categorization

Naming game simulates the evolution of vocabulary in a population of agents. Through pairwise interactions in the games, agents acquire a set of vocabulary in their memory for object naming. The existing model confines to a one-to-one mapping between a name and an object. Focus is usually put onto name consensus in the population rather than knowledge learning in agents, and hence simple learning model is usually adopted. However, the cognition system of human being is much more complex and knowledge is usually presented in a complicated form. Therefore, in this work, we extend the agent learning model and design a new game to incorporate domain learning, which is essential for more complicated form of knowledge. In particular, we demonstrate the evolution of color categorization and naming in a population of agents. We incorporate the human perceptive model into the agents and introduce two new concepts, namely subjective perception and subliminal stimulation, in domain learning. Simulation results show that, even without any supervision or pre-requisition, a consensus of a color naming system can be reached in a population solely via the interactions. Our work confirms the importance of society interactions in color categorization, which is a long debate topic in human cognition. Moreover, our work also demonstrates the possibility of cognitive system development in autonomous intelligent agents.

One Label or Two? Linguistic Influences on the Similarity Judgment of Objects between English and Japanese Speakers

Recent findings have re-examined the linguistic influence on cognition and perception, while identifying evidence that supports the Whorfian hypothesis. We examine how English and Japanese speakers perceive similarity of pairs of objects, by using two sets of stimuli: one in which two distinct linguistic categories apply to respective object images in English, but only one linguistic category applies in Japanese; and another in which two distinct linguistic categories apply to respective object images in Japanese, but only one applies in English. We conducted four studies and tested different groups of participants in each of them. In Study 1, we asked participants to name the two objects before engaging in the similarity judgment task. Here, we expected a strong linguistic effect. In Study 2, we asked participants to engage in the same task without naming, where we assumed that the condition is close enough to our daily visual information processing where language is not necessarily prompted. We further explored whether the language still influences the similarity perception by asking participants to engage in the same task basing on the visual similarity (Study 3) and the functional similarity (Study 4). The results overall indicated that English and Japanese speakers perceived the two objects to be more similar when they were in the same linguistic categories than when they were in different linguistic categories in their respective languages. Implications for research testing the Whorfian hypothesis and the requirement for methodological development beyond behavioral measures are discussed.

Does optimal partitioning of color space account for universal color categorization?

A 2007 study by Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal purports to show that universal categories emerge as a result of optimal partitioning of color space. Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal only consider color categorizations of up to six categories. However, in most industrialized societies eleven color categories are observed. This paper shows that when applied to the case of eleven categories, Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal's optimality criterion yields unsatisfactory results. Applications of the criterion to the intermediate cases of seven, eight, nine, and ten color categories are also briefly considered and are shown to yield mixed results. We consider a number of possible explanations of the failure of the criterion in the case of eleven categories, and suggest that, as color categorizations get more complex, further criteria come to play a role, alongside Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal's optimality criterion.

A neural signature of the unique hues

Since at least the 17^th century there has been the idea that there are four simple and perceptually pure “unique” hues: red, yellow, green, and blue, and that all other hues are perceived as mixtures of these four hues. However, sustained scientific investigation has not yet provided solid evidence for a neural representation that separates the unique hues from other colors. We measured event-related potentials elicited from unique hues and the ‘intermediate’ hues in between them. We find a neural signature of the unique hues 230 ms after stimulus onset at a post-perceptual stage of visual processing. Specifically, the posterior P2 component over the parieto-occipital lobe peaked significantly earlier for the unique than for the intermediate hues (Z = −2.9, p = 0.004). Having identified a neural marker for unique hues, fundamental questions about the contribution of neural hardwiring, language and environment to the unique hues can now be addressed.

Variations in normal color vision. VII. Relationships between color naming and hue scaling

A longstanding and unresolved question is how observers construct a discrete set of color categories to partition and label the continuous variations in light spectra, and how these categories might reflect the neural representation of color. We explored the properties of color naming and its relationship to color appearance by analyzing individual differences in color-naming and hue-scaling patterns, using factor analysis of individual differences to identify separate and shared processes underlying hue naming (labeling) and hue scaling (color appearance). Observers labeled the hues of 36 stimuli spanning different angles in cone-opponent space, using a set of eight terms corresponding to primary (red, green, blue, yellow) or binary (orange, purple, blue-green, yellow-green) hues. The boundaries defining different terms varied mostly independently, reflecting the influence of at least seven to eight factors. This finding is inconsistent with conventional color-opponent models in which all colors derive from the relative responses of underlying red-green and blue-yellow dimensions. Instead, color categories may reflect qualitatively distinct attributes that are free to vary with the specific spectral stimuli they label. Inter-observer differences in color naming were large and systematic, and we examined whether these differences were associated with differences in color appearance by comparing the hue naming to color percepts assessed by hue scaling measured in the same observers (from Emery et al., 2017). Variability in both tasks again depended on multiple (7 or 8) factors, with some Varimax-rotated factors specific to hue naming or hue scaling, but others common to corresponding stimuli for both judgments. The latter suggests that at least some of the differences in how individuals name or categorize color are related to differences in how the stimuli are perceived.

Naming influences 9-month-olds' identification of discrete categories along a perceptual continuum

A growing body of evidence documents that naming guides 9-month-old infants as they organize their visual experiences into categories. In particular, this evidence reveals that naming highlights categories when these are visually distinct. Here we advance this work in by introducing an anticipatory looking design to assess how naming influences infants' categorization of objects that vary along a perceptual continuum. We introduced 9-month-old infants (n = 48) to continua of novel creature-like objects. During the learning phase, infants had an opportunity to observe that objects from one end of the perceptual continuum moved to the left and objects from the other end moved to the right. What varied was how the objects were named. Infants in theone-name condition heard the same novel noun applied to all objects along the continuum; those in the two-name condition heard one name for objects from one end of the continuum and a second name for objects at the other end. At test, all infants viewed new objects from the same continuum. At issue was whether infants would anticipate the side to which the test objects would move and whether their expectations varied as a function of naming condition. Infants in the one-name condition formed a single overarching category and therefore searched for new test objects at either location; those in the two-name condition discerned two categories and therefore correctly anticipated the likely location of the test objects, whether these were close to the poles or to the center of the continuum. This provides the first evidence that by 9 months, naming supports both the number of categories infants impose along a perceptual continuum and the clarity of the category boundaries.

Focal colors across languages are representative members of color categories

Focal colors, or best examples of color terms, have traditionally been viewed as either the underlying source of cross-language color-naming universals or derived from category boundaries that vary widely across languages. Existing data partially support and partially challenge each of these views. Here, we advance a position that synthesizes aspects of these two traditionally opposed positions and accounts for existing data. We do so by linking this debate to more general principles. We show that best examples of named color categories across 112 languages are well-predicted from category extensions by a statistical model of how representative a sample is of a distribution, independently shown to account for patterns of human inference. This model accounts for both universal tendencies and variation in focal colors across languages. We conclude that categorization in the contested semantic domain of color may be governed by principles that apply more broadly in cognition and that these principles clarify the interplay of universal and language-specific forces in color naming.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and Probabilistic Inference: Evidence from the Domain of Color

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis holds that our thoughts are shaped by our native language, and that speakers of different languages therefore think differently. This hypothesis is controversial in part because it appears to deny the possibility of a universal groundwork for human cognition, and in part because some findings taken to support it have not reliably replicated. We argue that considering this hypothesis through the lens of probabilistic inference has the potential to resolve both issues, at least with respect to certain prominent findings in the domain of color cognition. We explore a probabilistic model that is grounded in a presumed universal perceptual color space and in language-specific categories over that space. The model predicts that categories will most clearly affect color memory when perceptual information is uncertain. In line with earlier studies, we show that this model accounts for language-consistent biases in color reconstruction from memory in English speakers, modulated by uncertainty. We also show, to our knowledge for the first time, that such a model accounts for influential existing data on cross-language differences in color discrimination from memory, both within and across categories. We suggest that these ideas may help to clarify the debate over the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

Decision theory, motor planning, and visual memory: deciding where to reach when memory errors are costly

Limitations in visual working memory (VWM) have been extensively studied in psychophysical tasks, but not well understood in terms of how these memory limits translate to performance in more natural domains. For example, in reaching to grasp an object based on a spatial memory representation, overshooting the intended target may be more costly than undershooting, such as when reaching for a cup of hot coffee. The current body of literature lacks a detailed account of how the costs or consequences of memory error influence what we encode in visual memory and how we act on the basis of remembered information. Here, we study how externally imposed monetary costs influence behavior in a motor decision task that involves reach planning based on recalled information from VWM. We approach this from a decision theoretic perspective, viewing decisions of where to aim in relation to the utility of their outcomes given the uncertainty of memory representations. Our results indicate that subjects accounted for the uncertainty in their visual memory, showing a significant difference in their reach planning when monetary costs were imposed for memory errors. However, our findings indicate that subjects memory representations per se were not biased by the imposed costs, but rather subjects adopted a near-optimal post-mnemonic decision strategy in their motor planning.

Chromatic Perceptual Learning but No Category Effects without Linguistic Input

Perceptual learning involves an improvement in perceptual judgment with practice, which is often specific to stimulus or task factors. Perceptual learning has been shown on a range of visual tasks but very little research has explored chromatic perceptual learning. Here, we use two low level perceptual threshold tasks and a supra-threshold target detection task to assess chromatic perceptual learning and category effects. Experiment 1 investigates whether chromatic thresholds reduce as a result of training and at what level of analysis learning effects occur. Experiment 2 explores the effect of category training on chromatic thresholds, whether training of this nature is category specific and whether it can induce categorical responding. Experiment 3 investigates the effect of category training on a higher level, lateralized target detection task, previously found to be sensitive to category effects. The findings indicate that performance on a perceptual threshold task improves following training but improvements do not transfer across retinal location or hue. Therefore, chromatic perceptual learning is category specific and can occur at relatively early stages of visual analysis. Additionally, category training does not induce category effects on a low level perceptual threshold task, as indicated by comparable discrimination thresholds at the newly learned hue boundary and adjacent test points. However, category training does induce emerging category effects on a supra-threshold target detection task. Whilst chromatic perceptual learning is possible, learnt category effects appear to be a product of left hemisphere processing, and may require the input of higher level linguistic coding processes in order to manifest.

Categorical perception of color: evidence from secondary category boundary

Despite a plethora of behavioral research exploring the phenomenon of color categorical perception (CP) known as “better discrimination between pair of colors stimuli from different categories and pair of colors stimuli from the same category even when the stimulus differences between the pairs of stimuli are equal”, most of the evidence for the CP of color was derived from Roman or top-to-down script readers and very rarely from right-to-left script readers in primary category. To date, no studies of color CP have been conducted on right-to-left script readers in secondary category boundary to support this theory. Three experiments have been conducted: Experiments 1 and 2 established the Arabic blue–purple secondary category boundary, and Experiment 3 tested the CP of color in the blue–purple category boundary. Sixty participants (30 men and 30 women) took part in this study. All spoke Arabic as their first language, and all were undergraduate or postgraduate students at King Saud University. Their ages ranged from 18–35 years with a mean age of 21.9 years (SD =5.2). The result indicated that for Experiments 1 and 2, it appeared that the Arabic blue–purple category boundary was approximately 10PB and it is in the same location as for English. For Experiment 3, reaction times in the between-categories condition were significantly faster than those in the within-category condition; this suggested that CP of color was shown in the Arabic’s blue–purple secondary category boundary.

Differentiating self-projection from simulation during mentalizing: evidence from fMRI

We asked participants to predict which of two colors a similar other (student) and a dissimilar other (retiree) likes better. We manipulated if color-pairs were two hues from the same color-category (e.g. green) or two conceptually different colors (e.g. green versus blue). In the former case, the mental state that has to be represented (i.e., the percept of two different hues of green) is predominantly non-conceptual or phenomenal in nature, which should promote mental simulation as a strategy for mentalizing. In the latter case, the mental state (i.e. the percept of green versus blue) can be captured in thought by concepts, which facilitates the use of theories for mentalizing. In line with the self-projection hypothesis, we found that cortical midline areas including vmPFC / orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus were preferentially activated for mentalizing about a similar other. However, activation was not affected by the nature of the color-difference, suggesting that self-projection subsumes simulation-like processes but is not limited to them. This indicates that self-projection is a universal strategy applied in different contexts—irrespective of the availability of theories for mentalizing. Along with midline activations linked to self-projection, we also observed activation in right lateral frontal and dorsal parietal areas showing a theory-like pattern. Taken together, this shows that mentalizing does not operate based on simulation or theory, but that both strategies are used concurrently to predict the choices of others.

Synesthesia for color is linked to improved color perception but reduced motion perception

Synesthesia is a rare condition in which one property of a stimulus (e.g., shape) triggers a secondary percept (e.g., color) not typically associated with the first. Work on synesthesia has predominantly focused on confirming the authenticity of synesthetic experience, but much less research has been conducted to examine the extent to which synesthesia is linked to broader perceptual differences. In the research reported here, we examined whether synesthesia is associated with differences in color and motion processing by comparing these abilities in synesthetes who experience color as their evoked sensation with nonsynesthetic participants. We show that synesthesia for color is linked to facilitated color sensitivity but decreased motion sensitivity. These findings are discussed in relation to the neurocognitive mechanisms of synesthesia and interactions between color and motion processing in typical adults.

Interaction between language and vision: it's momentary, abstract, and it develops

In this paper, we present a case study that explores the nature and development of the mechanisms by which language interacts with and influences our ability to represent and retain information from one of our most important non-linguistic systems - vision. In previous work (Dessalegn & Landau, 2008), we showed that 4 year-olds remembered conjunctions of visual features better when the visual target was accompanied by a sentence containing an asymmetric spatial predicate (e.g., the yellow is to the left of the black) but not when the visual target was accompanied by a sentence containing a novel noun (e.g., look at the dax) or a symmetric spatial predicate (e.g., the yellow is touching the black). In this paper, we extend these findings. In three experiments, 3, 4 and 6 year-olds were shown square blocks split in half by color vertically, horizontally or diagonally (e.g., yellow-left, black-right) and were asked to perform a delayed-matching task. We found that sentences containing spatial asymmetric predicates (e.g., the yellow is to the left of the black) and non-spatial asymmetric predicates (e.g., the yellow is prettier than the black) helped 4 year-olds, although not to the same extent. By contrast, 3 year-olds did not benefit from different linguistic instructions at all while 6 year-olds performed at ceiling in the task with or without the relevant sentences. Our findings suggest by age 4, the effects of language on non-linguistic tasks depend on highly abstract representations of the linguistic instructions and are momentary, seen only in the context of the task. We further speculate that language becomes more automatically engaged in nonlinguistic tasks over development.

The categorisation of non-categorical colours: a novel paradigm in colour perception

In this paper, we investigate a new paradigm for studying the development of the colour ‘signal’ by having observers discriminate and categorize the same set of controlled and calibrated cardinal coloured stimuli. Notably, in both tasks, each observer was free to decide whether two pairs of colors were the same or belonged to the same category. The use of the same stimulus set for both tasks provides, we argue, an incremental behavioural measure of colour processing from detection through discrimination to categorisation. The measured data spaces are different for the two tasks, and furthermore the categorisation data is unique to each observer. In addition, we develop a model which assumes that the principal difference between the tasks is the degree of similarity between the stimuli which has different constraints for the categorisation task compared to the discrimination task. This approach not only makes sense of the current (and associated) data but links the processes of discrimination and categorisation in a novel way and, by implication, expands upon the previous research linking categorisation to other tasks not limited to colour perception.

A quantitative theory of human color choices

The system for colorimetry adopted by the Commission Internationale de l’Eclairage (CIE) in 1931, along with its subsequent improvements, represents a family of light mixture models that has served well for many decades for stimulus specification and reproduction when highly controlled color standards are important. Still, with regard to color appearance many perceptual and cognitive factors are known to contribute to color similarity, and, in general, to all cognitive judgments of color. Using experimentally obtained odd-one-out triad similarity judgments from 52 observers, we demonstrate that CIE-based models can explain a good portion (but not all) of the color similarity data. Color difference quantified by CIELAB ΔE explained behavior at levels of 81% (across all colors), 79% (across red colors), and 66% (across blue colors). We show that the unexplained variation cannot be ascribed to inter- or intra-individual variations among the observers, and points to the presence of additional factors shared by the majority of responders. Based on this, we create a quantitative model of a lexicographic semiorder type, which shows how different perceptual and cognitive influences can trade-off when making color similarity judgments. We show that by incorporating additional influences related to categorical and lightness and saturation factors, the model explains more of the triad similarity behavior, namely, 91% (all colors), 90% (reds), and 87% (blues). We conclude that distance in a CIE model is but the first of several layers in a hierarchy of higher-order cognitive influences that shape color triad choices. We further discuss additional mitigating influences outside the scope of CIE modeling, which can be incorporated in this framework, including well-known influences from language, stimulus set effects, and color preference bias. We also discuss universal and cultural aspects of the model as well as non-uniformity of the color space with respect to different cultural biases.

On the origin of the hierarchy of color names

One of the fundamental problems in cognitive science is how humans categorize the visible color spectrum. The empirical evidence of the existence of universal or recurrent patterns in color naming across cultures is paralleled by the observation that color names begin to be used by individual cultures in a relatively fixed order. The origin of this hierarchy is largely unexplained. Here we resort to multiagent simulations, where a population of individuals, subject to a simple perceptual constraint shared by all humans, namely the human Just Noticeable Difference, categorizes and names colors through a purely cultural negotiation in the form of language games. We found that the time needed for a population to reach consensus on a color name depends on the region of the visible color spectrum. If color spectrum regions are ranked according to this criterion, a hierarchy with [red, (magenta)-red], [violet], [green/yellow], [blue], [orange], and [cyan], appearing in this order, is recovered, featuring an excellent quantitative agreement with the empirical observations of the WCS. Our results demonstrate a clear possible route to the emergence of hierarchical color categories, confirming that the theoretical modeling in this area has now attained the required maturity to make significant contributions to the ongoing debates concerning language universals.

The biological basis of a universal constraint on color naming: cone contrasts and the two-way categorization of colors

Many studies have provided evidence for the existence of universal constraints on color categorization or naming in various languages, but the biological basis of these constraints is unknown. A recent study of the pattern of color categorization across numerous languages has suggested that these patterns tend to avoid straddling a region in color space at or near the border between the English composite categories of "warm" and "cool". This fault line in color space represents a fundamental constraint on color naming. Here we report that the two-way categorization along the fault line is correlated with the sign of the L- versus M-cone contrast of a stimulus color. Moreover, we found that the sign of the L-M cone contrast also accounted for the two-way clustering of the spatially distributed neural responses in small regions of the macaque primary visual cortex, visualized with optical imaging. These small regions correspond to the hue maps, where our previous study found a spatially organized representation of stimulus hue. Altogether, these results establish a direct link between a universal constraint on color naming and the cone-specific information that is represented in the primate early visual system.

Swearing, euphemisms, and linguistic relativity

Participants read aloud swear words, euphemisms of the swear words, and neutral stimuli while their autonomic activity was measured by electrodermal activity. The key finding was that autonomic responses to swear words were larger than to euphemisms and neutral stimuli. It is argued that the heightened response to swear words reflects a form of verbal conditioning in which the phonological form of the word is directly associated with an affective response. Euphemisms are effective because they replace the trigger (the offending word form) by another word form that expresses a similar idea. That is, word forms exert some control on affect and cognition in turn. We relate these findings to the linguistic relativity hypothesis, and suggest a simple mechanistic account of how language may influence thinking in this context.

Cognition and native-language grammar: the organizational role of adjective--noun word order in information representation

In the present research, we investigated the influence of native-language adjective-noun word order on category accessibility for nouns and adjectives by comparing Portuguese speakers (in whose language nouns precede adjectives) with English speakers (in whose language adjectives precede nouns). In two studies, we presented participants with different numbers of verbal or pictorial stimuli, and subsequently they answered questions about noun- and adjective-conditioned frequencies. The results demonstrated a primacy effect of native-language word order. Specifically, although both populations showed a speed advantage for noun-conditioned questions, this tendency was significantly stronger for Portuguese than for American participants. We discuss the important role of native-language syntax rules for the categorization and representation of information.

Modeling the emergence of universality in color naming patterns

The empirical evidence that human color categorization exhibits some universal patterns beyond superficial discrepancies across different cultures is a major breakthrough in cognitive science. As observed in the World Color Survey (WCS), indeed, any two groups of individuals develop quite different categorization patterns, but some universal properties can be identified by a statistical analysis over a large number of populations. Here, we reproduce the WCS in a numerical model in which different populations develop independently their own categorization systems by playing elementary language games. We find that a simple perceptual constraint shared by all humans, namely the human Just Noticeable Difference (JND), is sufficient to trigger the emergence of universal patterns that unconstrained cultural interaction fails to produce. We test the results of our experiment against real data by performing the same statistical analysis proposed to quantify the universal tendencies shown in the WCS [Kay P & Regier T. (2003) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 100: 9085-9089], and obtain an excellent quantitative agreement. This work confirms that synthetic modeling has nowadays reached the maturity to contribute significantly to the ongoing debate in cognitive science.

Do top and bottom contribute to object perception more than left and right?

To examine whether the top-bottom axis has an inherent advantage in object perception over the left-right one, three experiments were conducted. In all of them, on each trial one of two alternative stimuli, identical in shape but opposite in direction (viz, related by reflection), was presented. Both reflection about the vertical axis and reflection about the horizontal axis were applied, in different blocks. In Experiment 1, objects with an orientation-free definition (arrows, incomplete squares) were presented. Subjects were to respond when the stimulus pointed in a specific direction, and to refrain from responding when it was reflected, namely pointed in the opposite direction. Axis of reflection (vertical, horizontal) was varied between blocks. In Experiment 2, the object was a Hebrew character asymmetric on both axes, presented either in its normal appearance or reflected. Subjects were to respond only when the stimulus was normal. Both axis of reflection (vertical, horizontal) and orientation angle (upright, tilted by 90 degrees ) were varied between blocks. In Experiment 3, stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2, but the task explicitly asked for a binary reflection judgment (normal vs. reflected). No sign for the presence of an axis effect was observed in any of those experiments, which seems incompatible with the hypothesis of vertical advantage in object perception. It is suggested that most vertical advantage observed before is due to extra-perceptual processing.

Categorical perception of color is lateralized to the right hemisphere in infants, but to the left hemisphere in adults

Both adults and infants are faster at discriminating between two colors from different categories than two colors from the same category, even when between- and within-category chromatic separation sizes are equated. For adults, this categorical perception (CP) is lateralized; the category effect is stronger for the right visual field (RVF)-left hemisphere (LH) than the left visual field (LVF)-right hemisphere (RH). Converging evidence suggests that the LH bias in color CP in adults is caused by the influence of lexical color codes in the LH. The current study investigates whether prelinguistic color CP is also lateralized to the LH by testing 4- to 6-month-old infants. A colored target was shown on a differently colored background, and time to initiate an eye movement to the target was measured. Target background pairs were either from the same or different categories, but with equal target-background chromatic separations. Infants were faster at initiating an eye movement to targets on different-category than same-category backgrounds, but only for targets in the LVF-RH. In contrast, adults showed a greater category effect when targets were presented to the RVF-LH. These results suggest that whereas color CP is stronger in the LH than RH in adults, prelinguistic CP in infants is lateralized to the RH. The findings suggest that language-driven CP in adults may not build on prelinguistic CP, but that language instead imposes its categories on a LH that is not categorically prepartitioned.

Further evidence that Whorfian effects are stronger in the right visual field than the left

The Whorf hypothesis holds that differences between languages induce differences in perception and/or cognition in their speakers. Much of the experimental work pursuing this idea has focused on the domain of color and has centered on the issue of whether linguistically coded color categories influence color discrimination. A new perspective has been cast on the debate by recent results that suggest that language influences color discrimination strongly in the right visual field but not in the left visual field (LVF). This asymmetry is likely related to the contralateral projection of visual fields to cerebral hemispheres and the specialization of the left hemisphere for language. The current study presents three independent experiments that replicate and extend these earlier results by using different tasks and testing across different color category boundaries. Our results differ in one respect: although we find that Whorfian effects on color are stronger for stimuli in the right visual field than in the LVF, we find that there are significant category effects in the LVF as well. The origin of the significant category effect in the LVF is considered, and two factors that might account for the pattern of results are proposed.

Universality of color names

We analyzed the World Color Survey (WCS) color-naming data set by using k-means cluster and concordance analyses. Cluster analysis relied on a similarity metric based on pairwise Pearson correlation of the complete chromatic color-naming patterns obtained from individual WCS informants. When K, the number of k-means clusters, varied from 2 to 10, we found that (i) the average color-naming patterns of the clusters all glossed easily to single or composite English patterns, and (ii) the structures of the k-means clusters unfolded in a hierarchical way that was reminiscent of the Berlin and Kay sequence of color category evolution. Gap statistical analysis showed that 8 was the optimal number of WCS chromatic categories: RED, GREEN, YELLOW-OR-ORANGE, BLUE, PURPLE, BROWN, PINK, and GRUE (GREEN-OR-BLUE). Analysis of concordance in color naming within WCS languages revealed small regions in color space that exhibited statistically significantly high concordance across languages. These regions agreed well with five of six primary focal colors of English. Concordance analysis also revealed boundary regions of statistically significantly low concordance. These boundary regions coincided with the boundaries associated with English WARM and COOL. Our results provide compelling evidence for similarities in the mechanisms that guide the lexical partitioning of color space among WCS languages and English.

Optimality of the basic colour categories for classification

Categorization of colour has been widely studied as a window into human language and cognition, and quite separately has been used pragmatically in image-database retrieval systems. This suggests the hypothesis that the best category system for pragmatic purposes coincides with human categories (i.e. the basic colours). We have tested this hypothesis by assessing the performance of different category systems in a machine-vision task. The task was the identification of the odd-one-out from triples of images obtained using a web-based image-search service. In each triple, two of the images had been retrieved using the same search term, the other a different term. The terms were simple concrete nouns. The results were as follows: (i) the odd-one-out task can be performed better than chance using colour alone; (ii) basic colour categorization performs better than random systems of categories; (iii) a category system that performs better than the basic colours could not be found; and (iv) it is not just the general layout of the basic colours that is important, but also the detail. We conclude that (i) the results support the plausibility of an explanation for the basic colours as a result of a pressure-to-optimality and (ii) the basic colours are good categories for machine vision image-retrieval systems.

The perception of handshapes in American sign language

Despite the constantly varying stream of sensory information that surrounds us, we humans can discern the small building blocks of words that constitute language (phonetic forms) and perceive them categorically (categorical perception, CP). Decades of controversy have prevailed regarding what is at the heart of CP, with many arguing that it is due to domain-general perceptual processing and others that it is determined by the existence of domain-specific linguistic processing. What is most key: perceptual or linguistic patterns? Here, we study whether CP occurs with soundless handshapes that are nonetheless phonetic in American Sign Language (ASL), in signers and nonsigners. Using innovative methods and analyses of identification and, crucially, discrimination tasks, we found that both groups separated the soundless handshapes into two classes perceptually but that only the ASL signers exhibited linguistic CR These findings suggest that CP of linguistic stimuli is based on linguistic categorization, rather than on purely perceptual categorization.