Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving

The lack of Aha! experience can be dependent on the problem difficulty

Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.

Tracing executive functions in insight

Usually the central executive is considered as a single capacity in the insight studies which leads to inconsistent results on the link between the central executive of working memory and insight. We suppose a more detailed view on the process of insight solution in which various executive functions could be important at different solution stages: updating is necessary to build a problem's representation, inhibition-to overcome the impasse, shifting-to restructure the problem's representation. These assumptions were not confirmed in an experiment via dual-task paradigm and cognitive load. We did not find the relation between executive functions and solution stages, but we demonstrated that the more complexity of dual-task, the more cognitive load in problem solving. Moreover, the highest load of executive functions is observed at the end of insight solution. We speculate that the loading occurs either due to decrease of the free space in working memory storage systems, or due to a resource-intensive event (for example, representational change).

Q-learning model of insight problem solving and the effects of learning traits on creativity

Despite the fact that insight is a crucial component of creative thought, the means by which it is cultivated remain unknown. The effects of learning traits on insight, specifically, has not been the subject of investigation in pertinent research. This study quantitatively examines the effects of individual differences in learning traits estimated using a Q-learning model within the reinforcement learning framework and evaluates their effects on insight problem solving in two tasks, the 8-coin and 9-dot problems, which fall under the umbrella term "spatial insight problems." Although the learning characteristics of the two problems were different, the results showed that there was a transfer of learning between them. In particular, performance on the insight tasks improved with increasing experience. Moreover, loss-taking, as opposed to loss aversion, had a significant effect on performance in both tasks, depending on the amount of experience one had. It is hypothesized that loss acceptance facilitates analogical transfer between the two tasks and improves performance. In addition, this is one of the few studies that attempted to analyze insight problems using a computational approach. This approach allows the identification of the underlying learning parameters for insight problem solving.

Memory and creativity: A meta-analytic examination of the relationship between memory systems and creative cognition

Increasing evidence suggests that specific memory systems (e.g., semantic vs. episodic) may support specific creative thought processes. However, there are a number of inconsistencies in the literature regarding the strength, direction, and influence of different memory (semantic, episodic, working, and short-term) and creativity (divergent and convergent thinking) types, as well as the influence of external factors (age, stimuli modality) on this purported relationship. In this meta-analysis, we examined 525 correlations from 79 published studies and unpublished datasets, representing data from 12,846 individual participants. We found a small but significant (r = .19) correlation between memory and creative cognition. Among semantic, episodic, working, and short-term memory, all correlations were significant, but semantic memory - particularly verbal fluency, the ability to strategically retrieve information from long-term memory - was found to drive this relationship. Further, working memory capacity was found to be more strongly related to convergent than divergent creative thinking. We also found that within visual creativity, the relationship with visual memory was greater than that of verbal memory, but within verbal creativity, the relationship with verbal memory was greater than that of visual memory. Finally, the memory-creativity correlation was larger for children compared to young adults despite no impact of age on the overall effect size. These results yield three key conclusions: (1) semantic memory supports both verbal and nonverbal creative thinking, (2) working memory supports convergent creative thinking, and (3) the cognitive control of memory is central to performance on creative thinking tasks.

A meta-analytical review of the impact of mindfulness on creativity: Framing current lines of research and defining moderator variables

Findings relating to the impact of mindfulness interventions on creative performance remain inconsistent, perhaps because of discrepancies between study designs, including variability in the length of mindfulness interventions, the absence of control groups or the tendencies to explore creativity as one unitary construct. To derive a clearer understanding of the impact that mindfulness interventions may exert on creative performance, two meta-analytical reviews were conducted, drawing respectively on studies using a control group design (n = 20) and studies using a pretest-posttest design (n = 17). A positive effect was identified between mindfulness and creativity, both for control group designs (d = 0.42, 95% CIs [0.29, 0.54]) and pretest-posttest designs (d = 0.59, 95% CIs [0.38, 0.81]). Subgroup analysis revealed that intervention length, creativity task (i.e., divergent vs. convergent thinking tasks) and control group type, were significant moderators for control group studies, whereas only intervention length was a significant moderator for pretest-posttest studies. Overall, the findings support the use of mindfulness as a tool to enhance creative performance, with more advantageous outcomes for convergent as opposed to divergent thinking tasks. We discuss the implications of study design and intervention length as key factors of relevance to future research aimed at advancing theoretical accounts of the relationship between mindfulness and creativity.

The nonlinearity of pupil diameter fluctuations in an insight task as criteria for detecting children who solve the problem from those who do not

Insights, characterized by sudden discoveries following unsuccessful problem-solving attempts, are fascinating phenomena. Dynamic systems perspectives argue that insight arises from self-organizing perceptual and motor processes. Entropy and fractal scaling are potential markers for emerging new and effective solutions. This study investigated whether specific features associated with self-organization in dynamical systems can distinguish between individuals who succeed and those who fail in solving insight tasks. To achieve this, we analyzed pupillary diameter fluctuations of children aged 6 to 12 during the 8-coin task, a well-established insight task. The participants were divided into two groups: successful (n = 24) and unsuccessful (n = 43) task completion. Entropy, determinism, recurrence ratio, and the β scaling exponent were estimated using Recurrence Quantification and Power Spectrum Density analyses. The results indicated that the solver group exhibited more significant uncertainty and lower predictability in pupillary diameter fluctuations before finding the solution. Recurrence Quantification Analysis revealed changes that went unnoticed by mean and standard deviation measures. However, the β scaling exponent did not differentiate between the two groups. These findings suggest that entropy and determinism in pupillary diameter fluctuations can identify early differences in problem-solving success. Further research is needed to determine the exclusive role of perceptual and motor activity in generating insights and investigate these results' generalizability to other tasks and populations.

Search and insight processes in card sorting games

Insight problems are particularly interesting, because problems which require restructuring allow researchers to investigate the underpinnings of the Aha-experience, creativity and out of the box thinking. There is a need for new insight tasks to probe and extend the limits of existing theories and cognitive frameworks. To shed more light on this fascinating issue, we addressed the question: Is it possible to convey a well-known card sorting game into an insight task? We introduced different conditions and tested them via two online experiments (N = 546). Between the conditions we systematically varied the available perceptual features, and the existence of non-obvious rules. We found that our card sorting game elicited insight experience. In the first experiment, our data revealed that solution strategies and insight experience varied by the availability and saliency of perceptual features. The discovery of a non-obvious rule, which is not hinted at by perceptual features, was most difficult. With our new paradigm, we were able to construe ambiguous problems which allowed participants to find more than one solution strategy. Interestingly, we realized interindividual preferences for different strategies. The same problem drove strategies which either relied on feature integration or on more deliberate strategies. The second experiment varied the degree of independence of a sorting rule from the standard rules which were in accordance with prior knowledge. It was shown that the more independent the hidden rule was, the more difficult the task became. In sum, we demonstrated a new insight task which extended the available task domains and shed light on sequential and multi-step rule learning problems. Finally, we provided a first sketch of a cognitive model that should help to integrate the data within the existing literature on cognitive models and speculated about the generalizability of the interplay of prior knowledge modification and variation for problem solving.

Surprise! Why Insightful Solution Is Pleasurable

Insight problems-as a type of ill-defined problems-are often solved without an articulate plan, and finding their solution is accompanied by the Aha! experience (positive feeling from suddenly finding a solution). However, the solution of such problems can also be guided, for example, by expectations in terms of criteria for achieving the goal. We hypothesize that adjusting the expectation accuracy based on the reward prediction error (discrepancy between the reward and its prediction) affects the strength of affective components of the Aha! experience (pleasure and surprise), allowing to learn how to solve similar problems. We manipulated expectation accuracy by varying the similarity in problem solution principle and structure in a short learning set. Each set was followed by a critical problem where both the structure and solution principle were changed (except for control set). Subjective feelings, solution time, and expectation were measured after each problem. The results revealed that problems with similarities become more expected at the end of the set and their solution time is decreased. However, the critical problem featured a rapid increase in pleasure and surprise and decrease in expectedness only in the condition where both the solution principle and structure were expected, suggesting that problem structure is a key feature determining expectedness in insight problem solving. The Aha! experience is not an epiphenomenon; it plays a role in learning of problem solving through adjusting expectations.

Problem type and externalization in problem-solving

We compared problem-solving in four sets of classical insight and analytic problems in the verbal and spatial domains, and examined the impact of externalization (verbalization or sketching). In a within-participants factorial design, we presented 24 classical insight and analytic problems, half verbal and half spatial. Participants solved these problems either while thinking aloud, while sketching, or in a baseline condition where neither was allowed. Higher solving accuracy was found in the analytic problems than in the insight ones as well as in the verbal problems than in the spatial ones. The verbal problems were also found to be solved faster than were spatial ones; in particular, verbal-insight problems were solved faster than spatial-insight and verbal-analytic ones. Therefore, spatial-insight problems stand out as particularly hard among the ones typically found in the literature. Surprisingly, no effects of externalization were found on problem-solving speed or accuracy. We discuss the implications of our results for the theses that insight problems involve special processes.

Between automatic and control processes: How relationships between problem elements interact to facilitate or impede insight

Solving a problem requires relating the pieces of information available to each other and to the solution. We investigated how the strength of these relationships determines the likelihood of solving insight tasks based on remote associates. In these tasks, the solver is provided with several cues (e.g., drop, coat, summer) and has to find the solution that matches those cues (e.g., rain). We measured the semantic similarity between the cues and the solution (cue-solution similarity) as well as between cues (cue-cue similarity). We assume those relationships modulate two basic processes underlying insight problem-solving. First, there is an automatic activation process whereby conceptual activation spreads across a semantic network from each cue node to their associated nodes, potentially reaching the node of the solution. Thus, in general, the higher cue-solution similarity, the more likely the solution will be found (Prediction 1). Second, there is a controlled search process focused on an area in semantic space whose radius depends on competing cue-cue similarity. High cue-cue similarity will bias a search for the solution close to the provided cues because the associated nodes shared by both cues are highly coactivated. Therefore, high cue-cue similarity will have a beneficial effect when the cue-solution similarity is high but a detrimental effect when cue-solution similarity is low (Prediction 2). Our two predictions were confirmed using both verbal and pictorial remote association tasks, supporting the view that insight is dependent on an interaction of meaningful relationships between cues and solutions, and clarify the mechanisms of insight problem solving in remote associates.

Current Understanding of the "Insight" Phenomenon Across Disciplines

Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition.

Sleep Facilitates Problem Solving With No Additional Gain Through Targeted Memory Reactivation

According to the active systems consolidation theory, memories undergo reactivation during sleep that can give rise to qualitative changes of the representations. These changes may generate new knowledge such as gaining insight into solutions for problem solving. targeted memory reactivation (TMR) uses learning-associated cues, such as sounds or odors, which have been shown to improve memory consolidation when re-applied during sleep. Here we tested whether TMR during slow wave sleep (SWS) and/or rapid eye movement (REM) sleep increases problem solving. Young healthy volunteers participated in one of two experiments. Experiment 1 tested the effect of natural sleep on problem solving. Subjects were trained in a video game-based problem solving task until being presented with a non-solved challenge. Followed by a ~10-h incubation interval filled with nocturnal sleep or daytime wakefulness, subjects were tested on the problem solving challenge again. Experiment 2 tested the effect of TMR on problem solving, with subjects receiving auditory TMR either during SWS (SWSstim), REM sleep (REMstim), or wakefulness (Wakestim). In Experiment 1, sleep improved problem solving, with 62% of subjects from the Sleep group solving the problem compared to 24% of the Wake group. Subjects with higher amounts of SWS in the Sleep group had a higher chance to solve the problem. In Experiment 2, TMR did not change the sleep effect on problem solving: 56 and 58% of subjects from the SWSstim and REMstim groups solved the problem compared to 57% from the Wakestim group. These findings indicate that sleep, and particularly SWS, facilitates problem solving, whereas this effect is not further increased by TMR.

Does thinking about coronavirus impact insight and analytical reasoning?

Stress and threats have been shown to influence our cognition and performance. In a preregistered online experiment (N = 446), we examined whether thinking about the ongoing covid-19 pandemic influences creative (insight problem solving) and analytic thinking. We found no support for our a-priori hypothesized effect (decrease in insight problem solving and no change in analytical thinking), however, several unpredicted results emerged. Exploratory analyses revealed that both types of thinking were harmed, yet only in men. Interestingly, the effect of exposure on thinking about covid-19 was indirect and led to careless task completion - again, only in men. We discuss these intriguing results and propose potential explanations along with future studies directions.

How physical interaction with insight problems affects solution rates, hint use, and cognitive load

So-called insight problems are widely studied because they tap into the creative thinking that is crucial for solving real problems. However, insight problems are typically presented in static formats (on paper, computer) that allow no physical interaction with the problem elements, whereas such an interaction might in fact reduce the load on limited cognitive resources, such as working memory (WM) capacity, thereby facilitating solutions. To test this proposition, 124 young adults were allowed to interact physically with nine established insight problems, while another 124 people attempted to solve these problems using paper and pencil. Additionally, hints were provided for three problems that typically no-one solves. No general facilitating effect of physical interaction was found, with only one problem clearly benefitting from it. Furthermore, making use of hints was actually hindered by physical interaction. No difference in perceived task load and correlation with WM capacity was observed between the formats, and subjective ratings of insight were virtually unaffected by presentation format. Overall, physical interaction minimally affected insight problem-solving, which appears to rely strongly on internalized cognitive processing involving WM.

Taking a Future Generation’s Perspective as a Facilitator of Insight Problem-Solving: Sustainable Water Supply Management

Human societies face various unsustainability problems, often characterized as “wicked” in the sense that they have no single definitive formulation. Thus, the role of creativity or insight in solving such problems has attracted a lot of attention from scholars. Therefore, this study investigated how an emerging methodology, Future Design (and its unique intervention of asking problem solvers to take a future generation’s perspective), can facilitate insight problem solving (IPS) and the generation of sustainable solutions. In a municipality in Japan, nine officers from a bureau responsible for water supply management participated in a series of seven Future Design workshops. In two groups, these officers created visions of water supply management 30 years into the future, taking the perspective of a future generation working in the same municipality. On the basis of in-depth transcription analyses of these workshops, we obtained a hypothetical framework demonstrating that four factors mediate the influence of perspective taking on IPS: (a) Discounting the present generation’s cost, (b) contrasting the future with the present, (c) deconstructing hierarchy, and (d) intellectual joy. While the first three mediators (a, b, and c) were considered to be contributors to the problem reframing and IPS via constraint relaxation, the fourth (d) was considered to do so via positive interpretation. Further, the reason why taking a future generation’s perspective is likely to lead to sustainable solutions, useful for the future—rather than the present—generation, is also discussed.

Incubation, not sleep, aids problem-solving

Solving a novel problem and finding innovative solutions requires a flexible and creative recombination of prior knowledge. It is thought that setting a problem aside before giving it another try aids problem-solving. The underlying mechanisms of such an incubation period could include unconscious processing that fosters spreading activation along associated networks and the restructuring of problem representations. Recently, it has been suggested that sleep may also support problem-solving by supporting the transformation and restructuring of memory elements. Since the effect of sleep on problem-solving has been mainly tested using the Remote Associates Test, we chose three different tasks-classical riddles, visual change detection, and anagrams-to examine various aspects of problem-solving and to pinpoint task-specific prerequisites for effects of sleep or incubation to emerge. Sixty-two participants were given two attempts to solve the problems. Both attempts either occurred consecutively or were spaced apart by a 3-hour incubation interval that was spent awake or asleep. We found that a period of incubation positively affected solutions rates in classical riddles, but not in visual change detection or anagram solving. Contrary to our hypothesis, spending the incubation period asleep, did not yield any additional benefit. Our study thus supports the notion that a period of letting a problem rest is beneficial for its solution and confines the role of sleep to memory transformations that do not directly impact on problem-solving ability.

When the Solution Is on the Doorstep: Better Solving Performance, but Diminished Aha! Experience for Chess Experts on the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Insight problems are difficult because the initially activated knowledge hinders successful solving. The crucial information needed for a solution is often so far removed that gaining access to it through restructuring leads to the subjective experience of "Aha!". Although this assumption is shared by most insight theories, there is little empirical evidence for the connection between the necessity of restructuring an incorrect problem representation and the Aha! experience. Here, we demonstrate a rare case where previous knowledge facilitates the solving of insight problems but reduces the accompanying Aha! experience. Chess players were more successful than non-chess players at solving the mutilated checkerboard insight problem, which requires retrieval of chess-related information about the color of the squares. Their success came at a price, since they reported a diminished Aha! experience compared to controls. Chess players' problem-solving ability was confined to that particular problem, since they struggled to a similar degree to non-chess players to solve another insight problem (the eight-coin problem), which does not require chess-related information for a solution. Here, chess players and non-chess players experienced the same degree of insight.

Once more with feeling: Normative data for the aha experience in insight and noninsight problems

Despite the presumed ability of insight problems to elicit the subjective feeling of insight, as well as the use of so-called insight problems to investigate this phenomenon for over 100 years, no research has collected normative data regarding the ability of insight problems to actually elicit the feeling of insight in a given individual. The work described in this article provides an overview of both classic and contemporary problems used to examine the construct of insight and presents normative data on the success rate, mean time to solution, and mean rating of aha experience for each problem and task type. We suggest using these data in future work as a reference for selecting problems on the basis of their ability to elicit an aha experience.

The Role of Motor Activity in Insight Problem Solving (the Case of the Nine-Dot Problem)

Attempts to estimate the contribution made by motor activity to insight problem solving is hindered by a lack of detailed description of motor behavior. The goal of this study was to develop and put to the test a novel method for studying the dynamics of insight problem solving based on a quantitative analysis of ongoing motor activity. As a proper problem model, we chose the nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930), in which solvers had to draw a sequence of connected line segments. Instead of using the traditional pen-and-paper way of solving the nine-dot problem we asked participants to use their index finger to draw line segments on the surface of a tablet computer. We are arguing that successful studying of the role of motor activity during problem solving requires the distinction between its instrumental and functional role. We considered the functional role on the motor activity as closely related to the on-line mode of motor planning. The goal of Experiment 1 was to explore the potential power of the method and, at the same time, to assay the patterns of motor activity related to on-line and off-line modes of motor planning. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to uncover the potential impact of preliminary motor training on the motor output of successful and unsuccessful problem solvers. In these experiments, we tested hypotheses on how preliminary motor training, which presumably played a functional role in Experiment 2 and an instrumental role in Experiment 3, affects the motor activity of a problem solver and hence their effectiveness in solving the problem. The three experiments showed consistent results. They suggest that successful solving of the nine-dot problem relies upon the functional role of motor activity and requires both off-line and on-line modes of motor planning, with the latter helping to overcome the perceptual constraints imposed by a spatial arrangement of the nine dots. The method that we applied allows for systematic comparison between successful and unsuccessful problem solvers based on the quantitative parameters of their motor activity. Through it, we found new specific patterns of motor activity that differentiate successful and unsuccessful solvers.

People got lost in solving a set of similar problems

A mental set generally refers to the human brain's tendency to persist with a familiar solution and stubbornly ignore alternatives. However, if a familiar solution is unable to solve a problem similar to a previous problem, does it continue to hinder alternative solutions, and if so, how and why? To answer these questions, a Chinese character decomposition task was adopted in this study. Participants were asked to perform a practice problem that could be solved by a familiar loose chunk decomposition (LCD) solution followed by a test problem that was similar to the practice problem but could only be solved by an unfamiliar tight chunk decomposition (TCD) solution or were asked to repeatedly perform 3-5 practice problems followed by a test problem; the former is the base-set condition, and the latter is the enhanced-set condition. The results showed that the test problem recruited more activation of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), middle occipital cortex (MOG), superior parietal lobule (SPL) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) than the practice problem in the latter operation and verification stage, but almost equal activation of the dACC occurred in the early exploration stage. This likely implied that people did not think that the familiar but currently invalid LCD solution could not be used to solve the test problem; thus, it continuously competed for attention with the unfamiliar TCD solution, which required more executive control to suppress. Moreover, compared with the base-set condition, the test problem in the enhanced-set condition recruited greater activations of the IFG, SPL and dACC in the latter verification stage but less activations of regions in the left IFG and MOG in the early exploration stage. These results revealed that people less actively explored and had to work harder to operate the unfamiliar TCD solution, particularly to resolve competition from the familiar but currently invalid LCD solution. In conclusion, people lost the ability to identify errors in the familiar but currently invalid solution, which in turn decreased the exploration efforts and increased the processing demands associated with alternative solutions in the form of attentional bias and competition. This finding broadly explains the dilemma of creative problem solving.

"The Penny Drops": Investigating Insight Through the Medium of Cryptic Crosswords

A new protocol for eliciting insight (“Aha!”/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, anagrams, rebus, and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as “classic” thematic or spatial challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the “Aha!” moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the positive emotional “payback” has an energizing effect on a participant's motivation to continue solving. Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits “Aha!” moments, cryptics should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an “insight problem” per se: typically, problems can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the “Aha!” moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution.

Sleep Does Not Promote Solving Classical Insight Problems and Magic Tricks

During creative problem solving, initial solution attempts often fail because of self-imposed constraints that prevent us from thinking out of the box. In order to solve a problem successfully, the problem representation has to be restructured by combining elements of available knowledge in novel and creative ways. It has been suggested that sleep supports the reorganization of memory representations, ultimately aiding problem solving. In this study, we systematically tested the effect of sleep and time on problem solving, using classical insight tasks and magic tricks. Solving these tasks explicitly requires a restructuring of the problem representation and may be accompanied by a subjective feeling of insight. In two sessions, 77 participants had to solve classical insight problems and magic tricks. The two sessions either occurred consecutively or were spaced 3 h apart, with the time in between spent either sleeping or awake. We found that sleep affected neither general solution rates nor the number of solutions accompanied by sudden subjective insight. Our study thus adds to accumulating evidence that sleep does not provide an environment that facilitates the qualitative restructuring of memory representations and enables problem solving.

Pleasures of the Mind: What Makes Jokes and Insight Problems Enjoyable

In this paper, a parallel analysis of the enjoyment derived from humor and insight problem solving is presented with reference to a “general” Theory of the Pleasures of the Mind (TPM) (Kubovy, 1999) rather than to “local” theories regarding what makes humor and insight problem solving enjoyable. The similarity of these two cognitive activities has already been discussed in previous literature in terms of the cognitive mechanisms which underpin getting a joke or having an insight experience in a problem solving task. The paper explores whether we can learn something new about the similarities and differences between humor and problem solving by means of an investigation of what makes them pleasurable. In the first part of the paper, the framework for this joint analysis is set. Two descriptive studies are then presented in which the participants were asked to report on their experiences relating to solving visuo-spatial insight problems (Study 1) or understanding cartoons (Study 2) in terms of whether they were enjoyable or otherwise. In both studies, the responses were analyzed with reference to a set of categories inspired by the TPM. The results of Study 1 demonstrate that finding the solution to a problem is associated with a positive evaluation, and the most frequent explanations for this were reported as being Curiosity, Virtuosity and Violation of expectations. The results of Study 2 suggest that understanding a joke (Joy of verification) and being surprised by it (Feeling of surprise) were two essential conditions: when they were not present, the cartoons were perceived as not enjoyable. However, this was not enough to explain the motivations for the choice of the most enjoyable cartoons. Recognizing a Violation of expectations and experiencing a Diminishment in the cleverness or awareness initially attributed to the characters in the cartoon were the aspects which were most frequently indicated by the participants to explain why they enjoyed the joke. These findings are evaluated in the final discussion, together with their limitations and potential future developments.

Insight into the ten-penny problem: guiding search by constraints and maximization

For a long time, insight problem solving has been either understood as nothing special or as a particular class of problem solving. The first view implicates the necessity to find efficient heuristics that restrict the search space, the second, the necessity to overcome self-imposed constraints. Recently, promising hybrid cognitive models attempt to merge both approaches. In this vein, we were interested in the interplay of constraints and heuristic search, when problem solvers were asked to solve a difficult multi-step problem, the ten-penny problem. In three experimental groups and one control group (N = 4 × 30) we aimed at revealing, what constraints drive problem difficulty in this problem, and how relaxing constraints, and providing an efficient search criterion facilitates the solution. We also investigated how the search behavior of successful problem solvers and non-solvers differ. We found that relaxing constraints was necessary but not sufficient to solve the problem. Without efficient heuristics that facilitate the restriction of the search space, and testing the progress of the problem solving process, the relaxation of constraints was not effective. Relaxing constraints and applying the search criterion are both necessary to effectively increase solution rates. We also found that successful solvers showed promising moves earlier and had a higher maximization and variation rate across solution attempts. We propose that this finding sheds light on how different strategies contribute to solving difficult problems. Finally, we speculate about the implications of our findings for insight problem solving.

Cognitive Architecture with Evolutionary Dynamics Solves Insight Problem

In this paper, we show that a neurally implemented a cognitive architecture with evolutionary dynamics can solve the four-tree problem. Our model, called Darwinian Neurodynamics, assumes that the unconscious mechanism of problem solving during insight tasks is a Darwinian process. It is based on the evolution of patterns that represent candidate solutions to a problem, and are stored and reproduced by a population of attractor networks. In our first experiment, we used human data as a benchmark and showed that the model behaves comparably to humans: it shows an improvement in performance if it is pretrained and primed appropriately, just like human participants in Kershaw et al. (2013)'s experiment. In the second experiment, we further investigated the effects of pretraining and priming in a two-by-two design and found a beginner's luck type of effect: solution rate was highest in the condition that was primed, but not pretrained with patterns relevant for the task. In the third experiment, we showed that deficits in computational capacity and learning abilities decreased the performance of the model, as expected. We conclude that Darwinian Neurodynamics is a promising model of human problem solving that deserves further investigation.

What about False Insights? Deconstructing the Aha! Experience along Its Multiple Dimensions for Correct and Incorrect Solutions Separately

The subjective Aha! experience that problem solvers often report when they find a solution has been taken as a marker for insight. If Aha! is closely linked to insightful solution processes, then theoretically, an Aha! should only be experienced when the correct solution is found. However, little work has explored whether the Aha! experience can also accompany incorrect solutions ("false insights"). Similarly, although the Aha! experience is not a unitary construct, little work has explored the different dimensions that have been proposed as its constituents. To address these gaps in the literature, 70 participants were presented with a set of difficult problems (37 magic tricks), and rated each of their solutions for Aha! as well as with regard to Suddenness in the emergence of the solution, Certainty of being correct, Surprise, Pleasure, Relief, and Drive. Solution times were also used as predictors for the Aha!

EXPERIENCE

This study reports three main findings: First, false insights exist. Second, the Aha! experience is multidimensional and consists of the key components Pleasure, Suddenness and Certainty. Third, although Aha! experiences for correct and incorrect solutions share these three common dimensions, they are also experienced differently with regard to magnitude and quality, with correct solutions emerging faster, leading to stronger Aha! experiences, and higher ratings of Pleasure, Suddenness, and Certainty. Solution correctness proffered a slightly different emotional coloring to the Aha! experience, with the additional perception of Relief for correct solutions, and Surprise for incorrect ones. These results cast some doubt on the assumption that the occurrence of an Aha! experience can serve as a definitive signal that a true insight has taken place. On the other hand, the quantitative and qualitative differences in the experience of correct and incorrect solutions demonstrate that the Aha! experience is not a mere epiphenomenon. Strong Aha! experiences are clearly, but not exclusively linked to correct solutions.

The Association of DRD2 with Insight Problem Solving

Although the insight phenomenon has attracted great attention from psychologists, it is still largely unknown whether its variation in well-functioning human adults has a genetic basis. Several lines of evidence suggest that genes involved in dopamine (DA) transmission might be potential candidates. The present study explored for the first time the association of dopamine D2 receptor gene (DRD2) with insight problem solving. Fifteen single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) covering DRD2 were genotyped in 425 unrelated healthy Chinese undergraduates, and were further tested for association with insight problem solving. Both single SNP and haplotype analysis revealed several associations of DRD2 SNPs and haplotypes with insight problem solving. In conclusion, the present study provides the first evidence for the involvement of DRD2 in insight problem solving, future studies are necessary to validate these findings.

Representation Aiding to Support Performance on Problem-Solving Tasks

A substantial literature has been developed that deals with the use of visual displays to support human problem solving. In particular, the cognitive systems engineering literature has emphasized the use of visual displays to improve performance on complex real-world tasks such as process control with the labels direct perception, ecological interface design, representational design, and semantic mapping, focusing on the use of representations that take advantage of powerful perceptual processes to support problem solving. Although the theoretical orientations and details of each approach are slightly different, they all share a fundamental core belief: The effectiveness of a graphical decision aid depends on relationships between the representation, the domain and associated task(s), and the characteristics of the agent (person). This review begins with a discussion of strategies for representation aiding, assuming that the appropriate domain semantics have been determined. It then discusses a core assumption in this literature that, in the design of complex real-world systems, designers cannot anticipate all the possible scenarios that could arise and must therefore design displays that support effective problem solving even when novel or unanticipated scenarios are encountered. Finally, the results of empirical studies of designs based on representation aiding are reviewed.

Intuition and Insight: Two Processes That Build on Each Other or Fundamentally Differ?

Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon. Unfortunately, both processes have been investigated differently and without much reference to each other. In this contribution, we therefore set out to fill this lacuna by examining the conceptualizations of the assumed underlying cognitive processes of both phenomena, and by also referring to the research traditions and paradigms of the respective field. Based on early work put forward by Bowers et al. (1990, 1995), we referred to semantic coherence tasks consisting of convergent word triads (i.e., the solution has the same meaning to all three clue words) and/or divergent word triads (i.e., the solution means something different with respect to each clue word) as an excellent kind of paradigm that may be used in the future to disentangle intuition and insight experimentally. By scrutinizing the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight, with this theoretical contribution, we hope to launch lacking but needed experimental studies and to initiate scientific cooperation between the research fields of intuition and insight that are currently still separated from each other.

It's a kind of magic-what self-reports can reveal about the phenomenology of insight problem solving

Magic tricks usually remain a mystery to the observer. For the sake of science, we offered participants the opportunity to discover the magician's secret method by repeatedly presenting the same trick and asking them to find out how the trick worked. In the context of insightful problem solving, the present work investigated the emotions that participants experience upon solving a magic trick. We assumed that these emotions form the typical “Aha! experience” that accompanies insightful solutions to difficult problems. We aimed to show that Aha! experiences can be triggered by magic tricks and to systematically explore the phenomenology of the Aha! experience by breaking it down into five previously postulated dimensions. 34 video clips of different magic tricks were presented up to three times to 50 participants who had to find out how the trick was accomplished, and to indicate whether they had experienced an Aha! during the solving process. Participants then performed a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of their Aha! experiences which was repeated after 14 days to control for its reliability. 41% of all suggested solutions were accompanied by an Aha! experience. The quantitative assessment remained stable across time in all five dimensions. Happiness was rated as the most important dimension. This primacy of positive emotions was also reflected in participants' qualitative self-reports which contained more emotional than cognitive aspects. Implementing magic tricks as problem solving task, we could show that strong Aha! experiences can be triggered if a trick is solved. We could at least partially capture the phenomenology of Aha! by identifying one prevailing aspect (positive emotions), a new aspect (release of tension upon gaining insight into a magic trick) and one less important aspect (impasse).

Insight and Search in Katona’s Five-Square Problem

Insights are often productive outcomes of human thinking. We provide a cognitive model that explains insight problem solving by the interplay of problem space search and representational change, whereby the problem space is constrained or relaxed based on the problem representation. By introducing different experimental conditions that either constrained the initial search space or helped solvers to initiate a representational change, we investigated the interplay of problem space search and representational change in Katona’s five-square problem. Testing 168 participants, we demonstrated that independent hints relating to the initial search space and to representational change had little effect on solution rates. However, providing both hints caused a significant increase in solution rates. Our results show the interplay between problem space search and representational change in insight problem solving: The initial problem space can be so large that people fail to encounter impasse, but even when representational change is achieved the resulting problem space can still provide a major obstacle to finding the solution.

Act first, think later: the presence and absence of inferential planning in problem solving

Planning is fundamental to successful problem solving, yet individuals sometimes fail to plan even one step ahead when it lies within their competence to do so. In this article, we report two experiments in which we explored variants of a ball-weighing puzzle, a problem that has only two steps, yet nonetheless yields performance consistent with a failure to plan. The results fit a computational model in which a solver's attempts are determined by two heuristics: maximization of the apparent progress made toward the problem goal and minimization of the problem space in which attempts are sought. The effectiveness of these heuristics was determined by lookahead, defined operationally as the number of steps evaluated in a planned move. Where move outcomes cannot be visualized but must be inferred, planning is constrained to the point where some individuals apply zero lookahead, which with n-ball problems yields seemingly irrational unequal weighs. Applying general-purpose heuristics with or without lookahead accounts for a range of rational and irrational phenomena found with insight and noninsight problems.

Creative brains: designing in the real world

The process of designing artifacts is a creative activity. It is proposed that, at the cognitive level, one key to understanding design creativity is to understand the array of symbol systems designers utilize. These symbol systems range from being vague, imprecise, abstract, ambiguous, and indeterminate (like conceptual sketches), to being very precise, concrete, unambiguous, and determinate (like contract documents). The former types of symbol systems support associative processes that facilitate lateral (or divergent) transformations that broaden the problem space, while the latter types of symbol systems support inference processes facilitating vertical (or convergent) transformations that deepen of the problem space. The process of artifact design requires the judicious application of both lateral and vertical transformations. This leads to a dual mechanism model of design problem-solving comprising of an associative engine and an inference engine. It is further claimed that this dual mechanism model is supported by an interesting hemispheric dissociation in human prefrontal cortex. The associative engine and neural structures that support imprecise, ambiguous, abstract, indeterminate representations are lateralized in the right prefrontal cortex, while the inference engine and neural structures that support precise, unambiguous, determinant representations are lateralized in the left prefrontal cortex. At the brain level, successful design of artifacts requires a delicate balance between the two hemispheres of prefrontal cortex.

Cues to solution, restructuring patterns, and reports of insight in creative problem solving

While the subjective experience of insight during problem solving is a common occurrence, an understanding of the processes leading to solution remains relatively uncertain. The goal of this study was to investigate the restructuring patterns underlying solution of a creative problem, and how providing cues to solution may alter the process. Results show that both providing cues to solution and analyzing problem solving performance on an aggregate level may result in restructuring patterns that appear incremental. Analysis of performance on an individual level provides evidence for insight-like solution patterns. However, no evidence is found for a relationship between an individual's restructuring pattern and their subjective experience of insight during problem solving.

Association between methylene tetrahydrofolate reductase and glutathione S-transferase M1 gene polymorphisms and chronic myeloid leukemia in a Brazilian population

Chronic myeloid leukemia is a hematopoietic stem cell disorder that causes uncontrolled proliferation of white blood cells. Although the clinical and biological aspects are well documented, little is known about individual susceptibility to this disease. We conducted a case-control study analyzing the prevalence of the polymorphisms MTHFR C677T, MTHFR A1298C, del{GSTM1}, del{GSTT1}, and haptoglobin in 105 patients with chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) and 273 healthy controls, using PCR-based methods. A significant association with risk of developing CML was found for MTHFR 1298AA (odds ratio (OR) = 1.794; 95% confidence interval (CI) = 1.14-2.83) and GSTM1 non-null (OR = 1.649; 95%CI = 1.05-2.6) genotypes, while MTHFR 1298AC (OR = 0.630; 95%CI = 0.40-0.99) and GSTM1 null (OR = 0.606; 95%CI = 0.21-0.77) genotypes significantly decreased this risk. There appeared to be selection for heterozygosity at the MTHFR 1298 locus. The considerable range of variation in this and other human populations may be a consequence of distinctive processes of natural selection and adaptation to variable environmental conditions. The Brazilian population is very mixed and heterogeneous; we found these two loci to be associated with CML in this population.

The role of chunk tightness and chunk familiarity in problem solving: evidence from ERPs and fMRI

Multiple factors of task difficulty keep problem solvers from finding the crucial thinking steps required to solve insight problems. In this study, we distinguished two difficulty factors, chunk familiarity and chunk tightness, and investigated their effects on chunk decomposition--a specific type of insight that depends on the process of breaking up perceptual patterns or chunks into elements so that they can be reorganized to form a new meaning. Subjects solved problems that required decomposing Chinese characters that differed in chunk familiarity and chunk tightness. Brain activity was recorded using the electroencephalogram and functional magnetic resonance imaging. The results showed that chunk familiarity could be overcome through an inhibition of familiar meanings, whereas overcoming chunk tightness required visual-spatial processing. Furthermore, chunk familiarity posed an additional difficulty when chunk tightness was high. This result demonstrates that the difficulty sources in a problem do not always simply add up. Rather, the difficulty of a problem can reside in the interaction of particular sources of difficulty.

The neural basis of breaking mental set: an event-related potential study

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded to explore the electrophysiological correlates of breaking mental set when subjects performed the Chinese character-generation task. A new experimental paradigm (learning-testing model) was adopted in order to make subjects find a solution actively by using a fixed way (Rep: repetition) or a new method (BMS: breaking mental set). Results showed that BMS elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P500-700) than did Rep between 500 and 700 ms after onset of the test stimuli. The P500-700 was possibly involved in the successful breaking of mental set and the initial forming of new associations during problem solving. Furthermore, BMS also elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P900-1300) than did Rep between 900 and 1,300 ms. The P900-1300 might reflect searching and generating a new character after breaking mental set.