Factors that contribute to an inability to remember an important aspect of a traumatic event

Dissociative amnesia is controversial. We tested other factors that could contribute to an inability to remember an important aspect of a traumatic event: how traumatic the event was, organic amnesia, dissociative state, childhood amnesia, expression suppression, sleep disturbance, repeated experiences, and ordinary forgetting. Trauma survivors who reported an inability to remember an important aspect of a traumatic event rated the event as traumatic as trauma survivors who reported no such inability to remember. Moreover, all cases of an inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event could be explained by at least one factor other than dissociative amnesia. These findings are contrary to dissociative amnesia. Compared to participants who reported no inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event, participants who did report an inability to remember were more likely to (1) have felt disconnected from their body during the traumatic event, which may have altered memory encoding, (2) have experienced sleep problems in the year after the traumatic event, which may have reduced memory consolidation, and (3) have experienced the traumatic event repeatedly, which may have led to less detailed memories. These findings have implications for the inclusion of dissociative amnesia in the DSM.

Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychological Explanations

Psychoanalysis is an explanatory science, and if our aim is to develop accurate theories of the mind, psychoanalysis would benefit from integrating explanations developed by psychology and neuroscience. The main part of the essay shows how psychoanalysis can be integrated with neuroscience and psychology. The concept of integration is defined in terms of six criteria, and the author argues that no matter how tight the integration is, it does not entail that neuropsychological explanations can replace psychoanalytic theory.

The Return of the Repressed: The Persistent and Problematic Claims of Long-Forgotten Trauma

Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.

Alpha synchronization as a brain model for unconscious defense: An overview of the work of Howard Shevrin and his team

Howard Shevrin and his team have developed a stringent subliminal priming methodology, which experimentally approximates a situation of an internal, mental triggering of unconscious defense. Through a series of four studies they thus are able to bring evidence for this type of unconscious defense. With event-related potentials, three clinical studies show how synchronization of a specific brain wave, the alpha wave, known for its inhibitory function, is also induced by subliminally presented conflictual subject-specific stimuli. Therefore, alpha synchronization could serve as the brain mechanism of unconscious defense. The results only make sense if we suppose the existence of a dynamic unconscious, which has inherited childhood conflicts, and with privileged connections to neurotic symptom characteristics. Moreover, by showing that the unconscious conflict phrases, inferred by clinicians from clinical interviews, have a similar brain behavior, Shevrin and his team provide evidence that these inferences are not simply clinician-dependent subjective interpretations but also imply some form of independent mental reality. Finally, interpretation of the results has led us to propose two distinct physiological mechanisms for defense: one, unconscious defense, by alpha synchronization in connection with the drive derivatives, and another, repression, based on the indications of reality in connection with the ego.

Increased skin conductance responses and neural activity during fear conditioning are associated with a repressive coping style

The investigation of individual differences in coping styles in response to fear conditioning is an important issue for a better understanding of the etiology and treatment of psychiatric disorders. It has been assumed that an avoidant (repressive) coping style is characterized by increased emotion regulation efforts in context of fear stimuli as compared to a more vigilant coping style. However, no study so far has investigated the neural correlates of fear conditioning of repressors and sensitizers. In the present fMRI study, 76 participants were classified as repressors or as sensitizers and were exposed to a fear conditioning paradigm, in which the CS+ predicted electrical stimulation, while another neutral stimulus (CS-) did not. In addition, skin conductance responses (SCRs) were measured continuously. As the main findings, we found increased neural activity in repressors as compared to sensitizers in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during fear conditioning. In addition, elevated activity to the CS+ in amygdala, insula, occipital, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) as well as elevated conditioned SCRs were found in repressors. The present results demonstrate increased neural activations in structures linked to emotion down-regulation mechanisms like the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which may reflect the increased coping effort in repressors. At the same time, repressors showed increased activations in arousal and evaluation-associated structures like the amygdala, the occipital cortex (OCC), and the OFC, which was mirrored in increased SCRs. The present results support recent assumptions about a two-process model of repression postulating a fast vigilant response to fear stimuli, and a second process associated with the down-regulation of emotional responses.

The prevalence and quality of silent, socially silent, and disclosed autobiographical memories across adulthood

Two separate studies examined the prevalence and quality of silent (infrequently recalled), socially silent (i.e., recalled but not shared), and disclosed autobiographical memories. In Study 1 young and older men and women remembered positive events. Positive memories were more likely to be disclosed than to be kept socially silent or completely silent. However, socially silent and disclosed memories did not differ in memory quality: the memories were equally vivid, significant, and emotional. Silent memories were less qualitatively rich. This pattern of results was generally replicated in Study 2 with a lifespan sample for both positive and negative memories, and with additional qualitative variables. The exception was that negative memories were kept silent more often. Age differences were minimal. Women disclosed their autobiographical memories more, but men told a greater variety of people. Results are discussed in terms of the functions that memory telling and silences might serve for individuals.