Tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) spontaneously use visual but not acoustic information to find hidden food items

Is inferential reasoning a distinctly human cognitive feature? Testing reasoning in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Logical inference is often assumed a human-unique ability, although many species of apes and monkeys have shown some facility within a two-cup task in which one cup is baited, the primate is shown the cup which is empty (an exclusion cue), and subsequently chooses the other baited cup. In published reports, New World monkey species show a limited ability to choose successfully, often with half or more of the subjects tested not showing the ability with auditory cues or with exclusion cues. In this study, five cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) were tested in a two-cup task with visual or auditory cues which revealed the presence or absence of bait, and in a second study, were tested with a four-cup array using a variety of walls to define the baiting space and a variety of visual cues including inclusion and exclusion. Tamarins demonstrated the ability to use either visual or auditory exclusion cues to find rewards in the two-cup study, although the visual cue required some exposure before accuracy was expressed. Experiment 2 revealed that two of three tamarins' first guesses to find rewards matched best a logic model. When they made errors, they typically chose cups adjacent to the cued location or made choices that seemed generated from avoiding empty cups. These results suggest that tamarins can deduce the location of food using reasoning, although the ability is only applied robustly to first guesses, while second guesses are motivated by approach/avoidance and proximity to cued locations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Both sheep and goats can solve inferential by exclusion tasks

Despite the domestication of sheep and goats by humans for several millennia, we still lack comparative data on their cognitive capacity. Comparing the cognitive skills of farm animals can help understand the evolution of cognition. In this study, we compared the performances of sheep and goats in inference by exclusion tasks. We implemented two tasks, namely a cup task and a tube task, to identify whether success in solving the task could be attributed to either low-level mechanisms (avoiding the empty location strategy) or to deductive reasoning (if two possibilities A and B, but not A, then it must be B). In contrast to a previous study comparing goats and sheep in a cup task, we showed that both species solved the inferential condition with high success rates. In the tube task, performances could not be explained by alternative strategies such as avoiding the empty tube or preferring the bent tube. When applying a strict set of criteria concerning responses in all conditions and controlling for the potential effects of experience, we demonstrate that two individuals, a goat and a sheep, fulfil these criteria. This suggests that sheep and goats are able to make inferences based on deductive reasoning.

What happened? Do preschool children and capuchin monkeys spontaneously use visual traces to locate a reward?

The ability to infer unseen causes from evidence is argued to emerge early in development and to be uniquely human. We explored whether preschoolers and capuchin monkeys could locate a reward based on the physical traces left following a hidden event. Preschoolers and capuchin monkeys were presented with two cups covered with foil. Behind a barrier, an experimenter (E) punctured the foil coverings one at a time, revealing the cups with one cover broken after the first event and both covers broken after the second. One event involved hiding a reward, the other event was performed with a stick (order counterbalanced). Preschoolers and, with additional experience, monkeys could connect the traces to the objects used in the puncturing events to find the reward. Reversing the order of events perturbed the performance of 3-year olds and capuchins, while 4-year-old children performed above chance when the order of events was reversed from the first trial. Capuchins performed significantly better on the ripped foil task than they did on an arbitrary test in which the covers were not ripped but rather replaced with a differently patterned cover. We conclude that by 4 years of age children spontaneously reason backwards from evidence to deduce its cause.

Exclusion in the field: wild brown skuas find hidden food in the absence of visual information

Inferential reasoning by exclusion allows responding adaptively to various environmental stimuli when confronted with inconsistent or partial information. In the experimental context, this mechanism involves selecting correctly between an empty option and a potentially rewarded one. Recently, the increasing reports of this capacity in phylogenetically distant species have led to the assumption that reasoning by exclusion is the result of convergent evolution. Within one largely unstudied avian order, i.e. the Charadriiformes, brown skuas (Catharacta antarctica ssp lonnbergi) are highly flexible and opportunistic predators. Behavioural flexibility, along with specific aspects of skuas' feeding ecology, may act as influencing factors in their ability to show exclusion performance. Our study aims to test whether skuas are able to choose by exclusion in a visual two-way object-choice task. Twenty-six wild birds were presented with two opaque cups, one covering a food reward. Three conditions were used: 'full information' (showing the content of both cups), 'exclusion' (showing the content of the empty cup), and 'control' (not showing any content). Skuas preferentially selected the rewarded cup in the full information and exclusion condition. The use of olfactory cues was excluded by results in the control condition. Our study opens new field investigations for testing further the cognition of this predatory seabird.

Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes

Metacognition refers to thinking about one's thinking or knowing what one knows. Research suggests that this ability is not unique to humans and may be shared with nonhuman animals. In particular, great apes have shown behaviors on a variety of tasks that are suggestive of metacognitive ability. Here we combine a metacognitive task, the information-seeking task, with tool use and variable forms of initial information provided to chimpanzees to explore how informational states impact behavioral responses in these apes. Three chimpanzees were presented with an apparatus that contained five locations where food could be hidden. If they pointed to the correct location, they received the reward, but otherwise they did not. We first replicated several existing findings using this method, and then tested novel hypotheses. The chimpanzees were given different types of information across the experiments. Sometimes, they were shown the location of the food reward. Other times, they were shown only one empty location, which was not useful information. The chimpanzees also could use a tool to search any of those locations before making a selection. Chimpanzees typically used the tool to search out the location of the reward when they could not already know where it was, but they did not use the tool when they already had been given that information. One chimpanzee made inferences about the location of hidden food, even when that food was never shown in that location. The final experiment involved hiding foods of differing preference values, and then presenting the chimpanzees with different initial knowledge states (i.e., where the best food was located, where the less-preferred food was located, or where no food was located). All chimpanzees used the tool when they needed to use it to find the best possible item on that trial, but responded by choosing a location immediately when they did not need the tool. This finding highlights that their behavior was not the result of a simple rule following such as pointing to where any food had been seen.

The emergence of reasoning by the disjunctive syllogism in early childhood

Logical inference is often seen as an exclusively human and language-dependent ability, but several nonhuman animal species search in a manner that is consistent with a deductive inference, the disjunctive syllogism: when a reward is hidden in one of two cups, and one cup is shown to be empty, they will search for the reward in the other cup. In Experiment 1, we extended these results to toddlers, finding that 23-month-olds consistently approached the non-empty location. However, these results could reflect non-deductive approaches of simply avoiding the empty location, or of searching in any location that might contain the reward, rather than reasoning through the disjunctive syllogism to infer that the other location must contain the reward. Experiment 2 addressed these alternatives, finding evidence that 3- to 5-year-olds used the disjunctive syllogism, while 2.5-year-olds did not. This suggests that younger children may not easily deploy this logical inference, and that a non-deductive approach may be behind the successful performance of nonhuman animals and human infants.

Reasoning by exclusion in the kea (Nestor notabilis)

Reasoning by exclusion, i.e. the ability to understand that if there are only two possibilities and if it is not A, it must be B, has been a topic of great interest in recent comparative cognition research. Many studies have investigated this ability, employing different methods, but rarely exploring concurrent decision processes underlying choice behaviour of non-human animals encountering inconsistent or incomplete information. Here, we employed a novel training and test method in order to perform an in-depth analysis of the underlying processes. Importantly, to discourage the explorative behaviour of the kea, a highly neophilic species, the training included a large amount of novel, unrewarded stimuli. The subsequent test consisted of 30 sessions with different sequences of four test trials. In these test trials, we confronted the kea with novel stimuli that were paired with either the rewarded or unrewarded training stimuli or with the novel stimuli of previous test trials. Once habituated to novelty, eight out of fourteen kea tested responded to novel stimuli by inferring their contingency via logical exclusion of the alternative. One individual inferred predominantly in this way, while other response strategies, such as one trial learning, stimulus preferences and avoiding the negative stimulus also guided the responses of the remaining individuals. Interestingly, the difficulty of the task had no influence on the test performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the current hypotheses about the emergence of inferential reasoning in some avian species, considering causal links to brain size, feeding ecology and social complexity.

Inference by Exclusion in Goffin Cockatoos (Cacatua goffini)

Inference by exclusion, the ability to base choices on the systematic exclusion of alternatives, has been studied in many nonhuman species over the past decade. However, the majority of methodologies employed so far are hard to integrate into a comparative framework as they rarely use controls for the effect of neophilia. Here, we present an improved approach that takes neophilia into account, using an abstract two-choice task on a touch screen, which is equally feasible for a large variety of species. To test this approach we chose Goffin cockatoos (Cacatua goffini), a highly explorative Indonesian parrot species, which have recently been reported to have sophisticated cognitive skills in the technical domain. Our results indicate that Goffin cockatoos are able to solve such abstract two-choice tasks employing inference by exclusion but also highlight the importance of other response strategies.

Inferences about food location in three cercopithecine species: an insight into the socioecological cognition of primates

Many animal species use a variety of cognitive strategies to locate food resources. One strategy is to make inferences by exclusion, i.e., perceiving the absence of reward as a cue that another location should be investigated. The use of such advanced cognitive strategies may be more prominent in species that are known to frequently solve social challenges, and inferential reasoning has mainly been investigated in social species such as corvids, dogs, dolphins and non-human primates. In this paper, we investigate how far social intricacy may explain the disparity of reasoning performances observed in three cercopithecine species that differ in the density of their social network and the diversity of their social partners. We used standard reasoning tasks, testing the volume concept and inference by exclusion using visual and auditory modalities. We showed that Old World monkeys can infer the location of invisible food by exclusion. In addition, Tonkean macaques and olive baboons had greater performances in most tasks compared to rhesus macaques. These responses are consistent with the social complexity displayed by these three species. We suggest that the cognitive strategies required to navigate through a demanding social world are involved in the understanding of the physical domain.

Lack of evidence that Tonkean macaques understand what others can hear

By distinguishing the attentional cues of their mates, animals can learn what part of their environment is of potential interest. However, recognizing the attentional states of others through auditory perception appears to be difficult, since these states are generally not accompanied by ostensive signals liable to reveal them. In this context, one study found that rhesus macaques withhold their action when unobserved, then concluding that they know what others can hear. We replicated this study by testing 18 Tonkean macaques in an experimental setting where subjects had to choose between two boxes containing a food reward. One box made a noise when opened, and the other opened silently. An experimenter was present and could either have her back to subjects or be facing them. If subjects aimed to avoid attracting the experimenter's attention, they were expected to select the silent box while the experimenter's back was turned. Results showed that subjects did not discriminate between boxes, whatever the experimenter's position. We thus found no evidence that Tonkean macaques are able to take the auditory attentional states of a human into account. It is therefore premature to conclude that monkeys can establish a link between hearing and knowing.

Metacognitive-like information seeking in lion-tailed macaques: a generalized search response after all?

Previous research has demonstrated that Old World primates (both apes and monkeys) seek information about the location of a hidden food item, unless they are privy to the hiding process. This has been cited as evidence of metacognition. However, these results could also be interpreted using non-metacognitive accounts, including a generalized search response to uncertainty, in which subjects reach for food when it is seen, or search for food until it is spotted. In the present research, lion-tailed macaques were tested on an object-choice task. Conditions varied with respect to the visibility of the baiting process, and whether the location of the hidden food could be inferred by logical exclusion. Additionally, the hidden food could be located visually before a choice was made, by peering under the objects through a Plexiglas tray. Across conditions, monkeys consistently looked for the food when it had not been seen, even if its location could be inferred, despite the fact that these monkeys are capable of inference by exclusion. This suggests that apparently 'metacognitive' information seeking in monkeys may instead reflect a generalized search strategy. Alternatively, it is possible that monkeys only have metacognitive access to certain types of knowledge, including that obtained visually. Results are discussed with respect to the likelihood of metacognition in this species and the evolutionary emergence of metacognition across species.

Exclusion performance in dwarf goats (Capra aegagrus hircus) and sheep (Ovis orientalis aries)

Using a comparative approach, we investigated the ability of dwarf goats and sheep to use direct and indirect information about the location of a food reward in an object-choice task. Subjects had to choose between two cups with only one covering a reward. Before making a choice, subjects received information about the baited (direct information) or non-baited cup (indirect information). Both goats and sheep were able to use direct information (presence of food) in the object choice task. After controlling for local enhancement, we found that goats rather than sheep were able to use indirect information (i.e., the absence of food) to find a reward. The actual test setup could not clarify whether individual goats were able to inferentially reason about the content of the baited cup when only shown the content of the non-baited cup or if they simply avoided the empty cup in that situation. As browsing species, feral and wild goats exhibit highly selective feeding behaviour compared to the rather unselective grazing sheep. The potential influence of this species-specific foraging flexibility of goats and sheep for using direct and indirect information to find a food reward is discussed in relation to a higher aversion to losses in food acquisition in goats compared to sheep.

Why skill matters

Maximizing rewards per unit time is ideal for success and survival in humans and animals. This goal can be approached by speeding up behavior aiming at rewards and this is done most efficiently by acquiring skills. Importantly, reward-directed skills consist of two components: finding a good object (i.e., object skill) and acting on the object (i.e., action skill), which occur sequentially. Recent studies suggest that object skill is based on high-capacity memory for object-value associations. When a learned object is encountered the corresponding memory is quickly expressed as a value-based gaze bias, leading to the automatic acquisition or avoidance of the object. Object skill thus plays a crucial role in increasing rewards per unit time.

Understanding of and reasoning about object-object relationships in long-tailed macaques?

Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques’ understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers’ orientation. The macaques could use a board’s inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys’ performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.

Grey parrots use inferential reasoning based on acoustic cues alone

Our ability to make logical inferences is considered as one of the cornerstones of human intelligence, fuelling investigations of reasoning abilities in non-human animals. Yet, the evidence to date is equivocal, with apes as the prime candidates to possess these skills. For instance, in a two-choice task, apes can identify the location of hidden food if it is indicated by a rattling noise caused by the shaking of a baited container. More importantly, they also use the absence of noise during the shaking of the empty container to infer that this container is not baited. However, since the inaugural report of apes solving this task, to the best of our knowledge, no comparable evidence could be found in any other tested species such as monkeys and dogs. Here, we report the first successful and instantaneous solution of the shaking task through logical inference by a non-ape species, the African grey parrot. Surprisingly, the performance of the birds was sensitive to the shaking movement: they were successful with containers shaken horizontally, but not with vertical shaking resembling parrot head-bobbing. Thus, grey parrots seem to possess ape-like cross-modal reasoning skills, but their reliance on these abilities is influenced by low-level interferences.

Is caching the key to exclusion in corvids? The case of carrion crows (Corvus corone corone)

Recently, two corvid species, food-caching ravens and non-caching jackdaws, have been tested in an exclusion performance (EP) task. While the ravens chose by exclusion, the jackdaws did not. Thus, foraging behaviour may affect EP abilities. To investigate this possibility, another food-caching corvid species, the carrion crow (Corvus corone corone), was tested in the same exclusion task. We hid food under one of two cups and subsequently lifted either both cups, or the baited or the un-baited cup. The crows were significantly above chance when both cups were lifted or when only the baited cup was lifted. When the empty cup was lifted, we found considerable inter-individual variation, with some birds having a significant preference for the un-baited but manipulated cup. In a follow-up task, we always provided the birds with the full information about the food location, but manipulated in which order they saw the hiding or the removal of food. Interestingly, they strongly preferred the cup which was manipulated last, even if it did not contain any food. Therefore, we repeated the first experiment but controlled for the movement of the cups. In this case, more crows found the food reliably in the un-baited condition. We conclude that carrion crows are able to choose by exclusion, but local enhancement has a strong influence on their performance and may overshadow potential inferential abilities. However, these findings support the hypothesis that caching might be a key to exclusion in corvids.

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) use positive, but not negative, auditory cues to infer food location

Nonhuman primates appear to capitalize more effectively on visual cues than corresponding auditory versions. For example, studies of inferential reasoning have shown that monkeys and apes readily respond to seeing that food is present ("positive" cuing) or absent ("negative" cuing). Performance is markedly less effective with auditory cues, with many subjects failing to use this input. Extending recent work, we tested eight captive tufted capuchins (Cebus apella) in locating food using positive and negative cues in visual and auditory domains. The monkeys chose between two opaque cups to receive food contained in one of them. Cup contents were either shown or shaken, providing location cues from both cups, positive cues only from the baited cup, or negative cues from the empty cup. As in previous work, subjects readily used both positive and negative visual cues to secure reward. However, auditory outcomes were both similar to and different from those of earlier studies. Specifically, all subjects came to exploit positive auditory cues, but none responded to negative versions. The animals were also clearly different in visual versus auditory performance. Results indicate that a significant proportion of capuchins may be able to use positive auditory cues, with experience and learning likely playing a critical role. These findings raise the possibility that experience may be significant in visually based performance in this task as well, and highlight that coming to grips with evident differences between visual versus auditory processing may be important for understanding primate cognition more generally.

What you see is what you get? Exclusion performances in ravens and keas

Background

Among birds, corvids and parrots are prime candidates for advanced cognitive abilities. Still, hardly anything is known about cognitive similarities and dissimilarities between them. Recently, exclusion has gained increasing interest in comparative cognition. To select the correct option in an exclusion task, one option has to be rejected (or excluded) and the correct option may be inferred, which raises the possibility that causal understanding is involved. However, little is yet known about its evolutionary history, as only few species, and mainly mammals, have been studied.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We tested ravens and keas in a choice task requiring the search for food in two differently shaped tubes. We provided the birds with partial information about the content of one of the two tubes and asked whether they could use this information to infer the location of the hidden food and adjust their searching behaviour accordingly. Additionally, this setup allowed us to investigate whether the birds would appreciate the impact of the shape of the tubes on the visibility of food. The keas chose the baited tube more often than the ravens. However, the ravens applied the more efficient strategy, choosing by exclusion more frequently than the keas. An additional experiment confirmed this, indicating that ravens and keas either differ in their cognitive skills or that they apply them differently.

Conclusion

To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate that corvids and parrots may perform differently in cognitive tasks, highlighting the potential impact of different selection pressures on the cognitive evolution of these large-brained birds.