Flexible retrieval: When true inferences produce false memories

Constructive Memory and Conscious Experience

Episodic memory relies on constructive processes that support simulating novel future events by flexibly recombining elements of past experiences, and that can also give rise to memory errors. In recent studies, we have developed methods to characterize the cognitive and neural processes that support conscious experiences linked to this process of episodic recombination, both when people simulate novel future events and commit recombination-related memory errors. In this Perspective, we summarize recent studies that illustrate these phenomena, and discuss broader implications for characterizing the basis of conscious experiences associated with constructive memory from a cognitive neuroscience perspective.

Muscarinic receptor activation promotes destabilization and updating of object location memories in mice

The storage of long-term memories is a dynamic process. Reminder cues can destabilize previously consolidated memories, rendering them labile and modifiable. However, memories that are strongly encoded or relatively remote at the time of reactivation can resist destabilization only being rendered labile under conditions that favour memory updating. Using the object location recognition task, here we show in male C57BL/6 mice that novelty-induced destabilization of strongly-encoded memories requires muscarinic acetylcholine receptor (mAChR) activation. Furthermore, we use the objects-in-updated locations task to show that updating of object location memories is mAChR-dependent. Thus, mAChR stimulation appears to be critical for spatial memory destabilization and related memory updating. Enhancing our understanding of the role of ACh in memory updating should inform future research into the underlying causes of behavioural disorders that are characterized by persistent maladaptive memories, such as age-related cognitive inflexibility and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Conceptual relatedness promotes memory generalization at the cost of detailed recollection

An adaptive memory system is one that allows us to both retrieve detailed memories as well as generalize knowledge about our past, the latter termed memory generalization and is useful for making inferences about new situations. Research has indicated that memory generalization relies on forming knowledge structures by integrating experiences with shared encountered elements. Whether memory generalization occurs more readily when  experiences also have elements that share established (conceptual) information is less clear. It is also unclear if engaging in memory generalization during learning comes at the cost of retrieving detailed memories, the other function of episodic memory. To address these two knowledge gaps, we paired a modified version of the acquired equivalence task with a recognition memory test. Across three experiments, participants first learned a series of overlapping object-scene pairs (A-X, B-X and A-Y) in which half of the overlapping pairs contained conceptually-related objects (e.g., A-pencil; B-scissors; conceptual condition) and the other half contained unrelated objects (neutral condition). Participants ability to generalize to new overlapping object-scene pairs (B-Y) as well as not-learned but semantically-related objects was measured. Finally, participants completed a recognition memory test that included the encoded objects, perceptually similar lures or new foil objects. Across all experiments, we found higher rates of generalization but reduced detailed memory (indexed by increased false alarms to lure objects) for information learned in the conceptual than neutral condition. These results suggest the presence of conceptual knowledge biases an individual towards a generalization function of memory, which comes at the expense of detailed recollection.

Cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying false memories: misinformation, distortion or erroneous configuration?

Errors can affect our memory, yet even when there are gaps in our recollection of events, memory often serves us fairly well. Memory formation involves at least three different sub-processes, that are regulated by an underlying neural structure. From a cognitive neuropsychological perspective, a complex process of encoding, consolidating, and retrieval is involved in remembering an event, and it might be hindered by one's emotional state, physiological response to the event itself, and misinformation. As a result, it is very likely that one may struggle to remember specifics of what happened which can increase our susceptibility to the formation of false memories. This has major implications for everyday functioning, as in the case when you mistakenly remember you took your pills when you never did, or where errors have led to false accusations about trauma or abuse, and wrongful convictions of crimes. Memories sometimes contain biases and inaccuracies that prevent them from accurately recalling events. The review will provide an updated overview of current research advances on the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying inaccurate, distorted, or false memories.

Examining the engram encoding specificity hypothesis in mice

According to the encoding specificity hypothesis, memory is best recalled by retrieval cues that overlap with training cues. Human studies generally support this hypothesis. However, memories are thought to be stored in neuronal ensembles (engrams), and retrieval cues are thought to reactivate neurons in an engram to induce memory recall. Here, we visualized engrams in mice to test whether retrieval cues that overlap with training cues produce maximal memory recall via high engram reactivation (engram encoding specificity hypothesis). Using variations of cued threat conditioning (pairing conditioned stimulus [CS] with footshock), we manipulated encoding and retrieval conditions along multiple domains, including pharmacological state, external sensory cue, and internal optogenetic cue. Maximal engram reactivation and memory recall occurred when retrieval conditions closely matched training conditions. These findings provide a biological basis for the encoding specificity hypothesis and highlight the important interaction between stored information (engram) and cues available at memory retrieval (ecphory).

Generalization and false memory in acquired equivalence

Memory allows us to remember specific events but also combine information across events to infer new information. New inferences are thought to stem from integrating memories of related events during encoding but can be also generated on-demand, based on separate memories of individual events. Integrative encoding has been argued as dominant in the acquired equivalence paradigm, where people have a tendency to assume that when two faces share one preference, they also share another. A downside may be a loss of source memory, where inferred preferences are mistaken for observed ones. Here, we tested these predictions of the integrative encoding hypothesis across five datasets collected using variations of the acquired equivalence paradigm. Results showed a statistically reliable but numerically small tendency to generalize preferences across faces, with stronger evidence for on-demand inferences at retrieval rather than spontaneous integration during encoding. A newly included explicit source memory test showed that participants differentiated learned from inferred preferences to a high degree, irrespective of whether they generalized preferences across faces. False memory was however increased in participants who made generalization decisions faster, which could be consistent with integrative encoding and/or source monitoring frameworks. The results suggest that generalization in acquired equivalence may result from integrated representations that facilitate new inferences at the expense of source memory, but also demonstrate that on-demand retrieval-based processes may play a larger role in this paradigm than previously thought. Finally, the results indicate that reaction times may be more sensitive than performance as a means to assess representations underlying behavior. More broadly, the study informs current theories of generalization and knowledge representation and provides new insights into how memory biases decisions.

Memory Sins in Applied Settings: What Kind of Progress?

Over two decades ago, I proposed that memory errors could be classified into seven basic categories or sins (Schacter, 1999, 2001), comprising three sins of omission (transience, absentmindedness, and blocking) and four sins of commission (misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence). In the past two decades, much has been learned about the nature and basis of the memory sins. Here, I assess the extent of progress that has been made during that time regarding applied implications of five of the sins: transience, absentmindedness, misattribution, suggestibility, and persistence. The manifestations of these sins have been examined in a variety of applied settings, including educational, clinical, legal, and technological domains. I argue that considerable progress has been made in characterizing the impact of memory sins in each domain, identify gaps in and limitations of our current knowledge, and briefly consider how these developments bear on broad questions regarding the reliability of human memory.

Dissociating the involvement of muscarinic and nicotinic cholinergic receptors in object memory destabilization and reconsolidation

The content of long-term memory is neither fixed nor permanent. Reminder cues can destabilize consolidated memories, rendering them amenable to change before being reconsolidated. However, not all memories destabilize following reactivation. Characteristics of a memory, such as its age or strength, impose boundaries on destabilization. Previously, we demonstrated that presentation of salient novel information at the time of reactivation can readily destabilize resistant object memories in rats and this form of novelty-induced destabilization is dependent upon acetylcholine (ACh) activity at muscarinic receptors (mAChRs). In the present study, we sought to determine if this same mechanism for initiating destabilization of resistant object memories is present in mice and further expand our understanding of the mechanisms through which ACh modulates object memory destabilization by investigating the role of nicotinic receptors (nAChRs). We provide evidence that in mice mAChRs are necessary for destabilizing object memories that are readily destabilized and those that are resistant to destabilization. Conversely, nAChRs were found to be necessary only when memories are readily destabilized. We then investigated the role of both receptors in the reconsolidation of destabilized object memory traces and determined that nAChRs, but not mAChRs, are necessary for object memory reconsolidation. Together, these results suggest that nAChRs may play a more selective role in the re-storage of object memories following destabilization and that ACh acts through mAChRs to act as an override signal to initiate destabilization of resistant object memories following reactivation with novelty. These findings expand our current understanding of the role of ACh in the dynamic storage of long-term memory.

Mnemonic construction and representation of temporal structure in the hippocampal formation

The hippocampal-entorhinal region supports memory for episodic details, such as temporal relations of sequential events, and mnemonic constructions combining experiences for inferential reasoning. However, it is unclear whether hippocampal event memories reflect temporal relations derived from mnemonic constructions, event order, or elapsing time, and whether these sequence representations generalize temporal relations across similar sequences. Here, participants mnemonically constructed times of events from multiple sequences using infrequent cues and their experience of passing time. After learning, event representations in the anterior hippocampus reflected temporal relations based on constructed times. Temporal relations were generalized across sequences, revealing distinct representational formats for events from the same or different sequences. Structural knowledge about time patterns, abstracted from different sequences, biased the construction of specific event times. These findings demonstrate that mnemonic construction and the generalization of relational knowledge combine in the hippocampus, consistent with the simulation of scenarios from episodic details and structural knowledge.

Activity patterns in the hippocampus resemble temporal relations of learned event sequences. Here, the authors show that these relational memories arise through mnemonic construction and are generalized to reflect the temporal event structure.

Neural Reinstatement of Overlapping Memories in Young and Older Adults

When we update our episodic memories with new information, mnemonic competition between old and new memories may result because of the presence of shared features. Behavioral studies suggest that this competition can lead to proactive interference, resulting in unsuccessful memory updating, particularly for older adults. It is difficult with behavioral data alone to measure the reactivation of old, overlapping memories during retrieval and its impact on memory for new memories. Here, we applied encoding-retrieval representational similarity (ERS) analysis to EEG data to estimate event-specific encoding-related neural reinstatement of old associations during the retrieval of new ones and its impact on memory for new associations in young and older adults. Our results showed that older adults' new associative memory performance was more negatively impacted by proactive interference from old memories than that of young adults. In both age groups, ERS for old associative memories was greater for trials for which new associative memories were forgotten than remembered. In contrast, ERS for new associative memories was greater when they were remembered than forgotten. In addition, older adults showed relatively attenuated target (i.e., new associates) and lure (i.e., old associates) ERS effects compared to younger adults. Collectively, these results suggest that the neural reinstatement of interfering memories during retrieval contributes to proactive interference across age, whereas overall attenuated ERS effect in older adults might reflect their reduced memory fidelity.

Developmental differences in memory reactivation relate to encoding and inference in the human brain

Despite the fact that children can draw on their memories to make novel inferences, it is unknown whether they do so through the same neural mechanisms as adults. We measured memory reinstatement as participants aged 7-30 years learned new, related information. While adults brought memories to mind throughout learning, adolescents did so only transiently, and children not at all. Analysis of trial-wise variability in reactivation showed that discrepant neural mechanisms-and in particular, what we interpret as suppression of interfering memories during learning in early adolescence-are nevertheless beneficial for later inference at each developmental stage. These results suggest that while adults build integrated memories well-suited to informing inference directly, children and adolescents instead must rely on separate memories to be individually referenced at the time of inference decisions.

On the evolution of a functional approach to memory

In an analysis of memory systems, Sherry and Schacter (Psychological Review, 94, 439-454, 1987) emphasized the importance of functional and evolutionary considerations for characterizing mechanisms of memory. The present article considers four different yet closely related topics from more recent research in which similar considerations have played a prominent role in shaping both experiment and theory: the seven sins of memory, mechanisms underlying memory misattribution errors, the role of memory in imagining future experiences, and the relation between associative inference and memory errors. These lines of research illustrate the usefulness of attempting to integrate functional and mechanistic considerations, in line with the general approach articulated by Sherry and Schacter.

The seven sins of memory: an update

Memory serves critical functions in everyday life, but it is also vulnerable to error and illusion. Two decades ago, I proposed that memory errors could be classified into seven basic categories or "sins": transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. I argued that each of the seven sins provides important insights concerning the fundamentally constructive nature of human memory, while at the same time reflecting its adaptive features. In this article I briefly summarise some key developments during the past two decades that have increased our understanding of the nature, consequences, and adaptive functions of the memory sins.

How rich are false memories in a naturalistic context in healthy aging?

The recall of factual and contextual information is a core characteristic of episodic memory sensitive to aging effects. The innovative aim of the present study was to assess in a naturalistic context the quantity and quality of correct and false free recalls among younger and older adults considering feature binding (What-Where-When-Details) and recollection (Remembering vs. Knowing). Thanks to virtual reality, we designed a multimodal environment simulating a lively town in which we implemented a variant of a DRM task rich in sets of semantically related items (e.g., fruits on a market stall). We asked 30 young and 30 older participants to navigate in the virtual environment, paying attention to the items, and then recall as many items and as much contextual information as possible and indicate the presence of recollection. As expected, older adults produced fewer correct recall but more intrusions than younger adults, and their correct recall was more deficient in binding and recollection. In both age groups, false recall was associated with the correct context inferred from a related set of items. However, the intrusions produced by older adults were highly recollected compared to those of the younger adults, and they were associated with false item-related contextual information.

Linking creativity and false memory: Common consequences of a flexible memory system

Episodic retrieval plays a functional-adaptive role in supporting divergent thinking, the ability to creatively combine different pieces of information. However, the same constructive memory process that provides a functional-adaptive benefit can also leave memory prone to error. In two experiments, we employed an individual differences approach to examine the relationship between different forms of creative thinking (divergent and convergent thinking) and false memory generation in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. In Experiment 1, and replicating prior findings, false recognition was significantly predicted by convergent thinking performance. Critically, we also observed a novel predictive relationship between false recognition and quantitative metrics of divergent thinking performance. In Experiment 2, these findings were replicated and we further showed that false recall was predicted by quantitative metrics of divergent thinking. Our findings suggest that constructive memory processes link creative thinking with the production of memory errors.

Episodic memory enhancement versus impairment is determined by contextual similarity across events

For over a century, stability of spatial context across related episodes has been considered a source of memory interference, impairing memory retrieval. However, contemporary memory integration theory generates a diametrically opposite prediction. Here, we aimed to resolve this discrepancy by manipulating local context similarity across temporally disparate but related episodes and testing the direction and underlying mechanisms of memory change. A series of experiments show that contextual stability produces memory integration and marked reciprocal strengthening. Variable context, conversely, seemed to result in competition such that new memories become enhanced at the expense of original memories. Interestingly, these patterns were virtually inverted in an additional experiment where context was reinstated during recall. These observations 1) identify contextual similarity across original and new memories as an important determinant in the volatility of memory, 2) present a challenge to classic and modern theories on episodic memory change, and 3) indicate that the sensitivity of context-induced memory changes to retrieval conditions may reconcile paradoxical predictions of interference and integration theory.

Remembered together: Social interaction facilitates retrieval while reducing individuation of features within bound representations

When encountering social scenes, there appears to be rapid and automatic detection of social interactions. Representations of interacting people appear to be bound together via a mechanism of joint attention, which results in enhanced memory, even when participants are unaware that memory is required. However, even though access is facilitated for socially bound representations, we predicted that the individual features of these representations are less efficiently encoded, and features can therefore migrate between the constituent interacting individuals. This was confirmed in Experiment 1, where overall memory for interacting compared with non-interacting dyads was facilitated but binding of features within an individual was weak, resulting in feature migration errors. Experiment 2 demonstrated the role of conscious strategic processing, where participants were aware that memory would be tested. With such awareness, attention can be focused on individual objects allowing the binding of features. The results support an account of two forms of processing: an initial automatic social binding process where interacting individuals are represented as one episode in memory facilitating access and a further stage where attention can be focused on each individual enabling the binding of features within individual objects.

Dimensions and mechanisms of memory organization

Memory formation is dynamic in nature, and acquisition of new information is often influenced by previous experiences. Memories sharing certain attributes are known to interact so that retrieval of one increases the likelihood of retrieving the other, raising the possibility that related memories are organized into associative mnemonic structures of interconnected representations. Although the formation and retrieval of single memories have been studied extensively, very little is known about the brain mechanisms that organize and link related memories. Here we review studies that suggest the existence of mnemonic structures in humans and animal models. These studies suggest three main dimensions of experience that can serve to organize related memories: time, space, and perceptual/conceptual similarities. We propose potential molecular, cellular, and systems mechanisms that might support organization of memories according to these dimensions.

How do we generalize?

Humans and animals are able to generalize or transfer information from previous experience so that they can behave appropriately in novel situations. What mechanisms-computations, representations, and neural systems-give rise to this remarkable ability? The members of this Generative Adversarial Collaboration (GAC) come from a range of academic backgrounds but are all interested in uncovering the mechanisms of generalization. We started out this GAC with the aim of arbitrating between two alternative conceptual accounts: (1) generalization stems from integration of multiple experiences into summary representations that reflect generalized knowledge, and (2) generalization is computed on-the-fly using separately stored individual memories. Across the course of this collaboration, we found that-despite using different terminology and techniques, and although some of our specific papers may provide evidence one way or the other-we in fact largely agree that both of these broad accounts (as well as several others) are likely valid. We believe that future research and theoretical synthesis across multiple lines of research is necessary to help determine the degree to which different candidate generalization mechanisms may operate simultaneously, operate on different scales, or be employed under distinct conditions. Here, as the first step, we introduce some of these candidate mechanisms and we discuss the issues currently hindering better synthesis of generalization research. Finally, we introduce some of our own research questions that have arisen over the course of this GAC, that we believe would benefit from future collaborative efforts.

Imagination Reduces False Memories for Everyday Action Sentences: Evidence From Pragmatic Inferences

Human memory can be unreliable, and when reading a sentence with a pragmatic implication, such as "the karate champion hit the cinder block," people often falsely remember that the karate champion "broke" the cinder block. Yet, research has shown that encoding instructions affect the false memories we form. On the one hand, instructing participants to imagine themselves manipulating the to-be-recalled items increase false memories (imagination inflation effect). But on the other hand, instructions to imagine have reduced false memories in the DRM paradigm (imagination facilitation effect). Here, we explored the effect of imaginal encoding with pragmatic inferences, a way to study false memories for information about everyday actions. Across two experiments, we manipulated imaginal encoding through the instructions given to participants and the after-item filler task (none vs. math operations). In Experiment 1, participants were either assigned to the encoding condition of imagine+no filler; pay attention+math; or memorize+math. In Experiment 2, the encoding instructions (imagine vs. memorize) and the filler task (none vs. math) were compared across four separate conditions. Results from the two experiments showed that imagination instructions lead to better memory, by showing a higher proportion of correct responses and better performance in a memory benefit index. Similarly, a significant reduction of false memories was observed across both experiments, even though a complementary Bayesian analysis only supported this conclusion for Experiment 1. The findings show that imaginal encoding improves memory, suggesting the engagement of a distinctiveness heuristic and source-monitoring process.

Generalization and False Memory in an Acquired Equivalence Paradigm: The Influence of Physical Resemblance Across Related Episodes

The ability to make inferences about related experiences is an important function of memory that allows individuals to build generalizable knowledge. In some cases, however, making inferences may lead to false memories when individuals misremember inferred information as having been observed. One factor that is known to increase the prevalence of false memories is the physical resemblance between new and old information. The extent to which physical resemblance has parallel effects on generalization and memory for the source of inferred associations is not known. To investigate the parallels between memory generalization and false memories, we conducted three experiments using an acquired equivalence paradigm and manipulated physical resemblance between items that made up related experiences. The three experiments showed increased generalization for higher levels of resemblance. Recognition and source memory judgments revealed that high rates of generalization were not always accompanied by high rates of false memories. Thus, physical resemblance across episodes may promote generalization with or without a trade-off in terms of impeding memory specificity.

Examining the effects of time of day and sleep on generalization

Extracting shared structure across our experiences allows us to generalize our knowledge to novel contexts. How do different brain states influence this ability to generalize? Using a novel category learning paradigm, we assess the effect of both sleep and time of day on generalization that depends on the flexible integration of recent information. Counter to our expectations, we found no evidence that this form of generalization is better after a night of sleep relative to a day awake. Instead, we observed an effect of time of day, with better generalization in the morning than the evening. This effect also manifested as increased false memory for generalized information. In a nap experiment, we found that generalization did not benefit from having slept recently, suggesting a role for time of day apart from sleep. In follow-up experiments, we were unable to replicate the time of day effect for reasons that may relate to changes in category structure and task engagement. Despite this lack of consistency, we found a morning benefit for generalization when analyzing all the data from experiments with matched protocols (n = 136). We suggest that a state of lowered inhibition in the morning may facilitate spreading activation between otherwise separate memories, promoting this form of generalization.

Interactive mapping of language and memory with the GE2REC protocol

Previous studies have highlighted the importance of considering cognitive functions from a dynamic and interactive perspective and multiple evidence was brought for a language and memory interaction. In this study performed with healthy participants, we present a new protocol entitled GE2REC that interactively accesses the neural representation of language-and-memory network. This protocol consists of three runs related to each other, providing a link between tasks, in order to assure an interactive measure of linguistic and episodic memory processes. GE2REC consists of a sentence generation (GE) in the auditory modality and two recollecting (2REC) memory tasks, one recognition performed in the visual modality, and another one recall performed in the auditory modality. Its efficiency was evaluated in 20 healthy volunteers using a 3T MR imager. Our results corroborate the ability of GE2REC to robustly activate fronto-temporo-parietal language network as well as temporal mesial, prefrontal and parietal cortices in encoding during sentence generation and recognition. GE2REC is useful because it: (a) requires simultaneous and interactive language-and-memory processes and jointly maps their neural basis; (b) explores encoding and retrieval, managing to elicit activation of mesial temporal structures; (c) is easy to perform, hence being suitable for more restrictive settings, and (d) has an ecological dimension of tasks and stimuli. GE2REC may be useful for studying neuroplasticity of cognitive functions, especially in patients with temporal lobe epilepsy who show reorganization of both language and memory networks. Overall, GE2REC can provide valuable information in terms of the practical foundation of exploration language and memory interconnection.

Visual working memory items drift apart due to active, not passive, maintenance

How are humans capable of maintaining detailed representations of visual items in memory? When required to make fine discriminations, we sometimes implicitly differentiate memory representations away from each other to reduce interitem confusion. However, this separation of representations can inadvertently lead memories to be recalled as biased away from other memory items, a phenomenon termed repulsion bias. Using a nonretinotopically specific working memory paradigm, we found stronger repulsion bias with longer working memory delays, but only when items were actively maintained. These results suggest that (a) repulsion bias can reflect a mnemonic phenomenon, distinct from perceptually driven observations of repulsion bias; and (b) mnemonic repulsion bias is ongoing during maintenance and dependent on attention to internally maintained memory items. These results support theories of working memory where items are represented interdependently and further reveals contexts where stronger attention to working memory items during maintenance increases repulsion bias between them. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Reinstatement of item-specific contextual details during retrieval supports recombination-related false memories

Flexible retrieval mechanisms that allow us to infer relationships across events may also lead to memory errors or distortion when details of one event are misattributed to the related event. Here, we tested how making successful inferences alters representation of overlapping events, leading to false memories. Participants encoded overlapping associations ('AB' and 'BC'), each of which was superimposed on different indoor and outdoor scenes that were pre-exposed prior to associative learning. Participants were subsequently tested on both the directly learned pairs ('AB' and 'BC') and inferred relationships across pairs ('AC'). We predicted that when people make a correct inference, features associated with overlapping events may become integrated in memory. To test this hypothesis, participants completed a final detailed retrieval test, in which they had to recall the scene associated with initially learned 'AB' pairs (or 'BC' pairs). We found that the outcome of inference decisions impacted the degree to which neural patterns elicited during detailed 'AB' retrieval reflected reinstatement of the scene associated with the overlapping 'BC' event. After successful inference, neural patterns in the anterior hippocampus, posterior medial prefrontal cortex, and our content-reinstatement region (left inferior temporal gyrus) were more similar to the overlapping, yet incorrect 'BC' context relative to after unsuccessful inference. Further, greater hippocampal activity during inference was associated with greater reinstatement of the incorrect, overlapping context in our content-reinstatement region, which in turn tracked contextual misattributions during detailed retrieval. These results suggest recombining memories during successful inference can lead to misattribution of contextual details across related events, resulting in false memories.

Self-referential false associations: A self-enhanced constructive effect for verbal but not pictorial stimuli

Memory is considered to be a flexible and reconstructive system. However, there is little experimental evidence demonstrating how associations are falsely constructed in memory, and even less is known about the role of the self in memory construction. We investigated whether false associations involving non-presented stimuli can be constructed in episodic memory and whether the self plays a role in such memory construction. In two experiments, we paired participants' own names (i.e., self-reference) or the name "Adele" (i.e., other-reference) with words and pictures from Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists. We found that (1) participants not only falsely remembered the non-presented lure words and pictures as having been presented, but also misremembered that they were paired with their own name or "Adele," depending on the referenced person of related DRM lists; and (2) there were more critical lure-self associations constructed in the self-reference condition than critical lure-other associations in the other-reference condition for word but not for picture stimuli. These results suggest a self-enhanced constructive effect that might be driven by both relational and item-specific processing. Our results support the spreading-activation account for constructive episodic memory.

Statistical learning as a reference point for memory distortions: Swap and shift errors

Humans use regularities in the environment to facilitate learning, often without awareness or intent. How might such regularities distort long-term memory? Here, participants studied and reported the colors of objects in a long-term memory paradigm, uninformed that certain colors were sampled more frequently overall. When participants misreported an object's color, these errors were often centered around the average studied color (i.e., "Rich" color), demonstrating swap errors in long-term memory due to imposed statistical regularities. We observed such swap errors regardless of memory load, explicit knowledge, or the distance in color space between the correct color of the tested object and the Rich color. An explicit guessing strategy where participants intentionally made swap errors when uncertain could not fully account for our results. We discuss other potential sources of observed swap errors such as false memory and implicit biased guessing. Although less robust than swap errors, evidence was also observed for subtle shift errors towards or away from the Rich color dependent on the color distance between the correct color and the Rich color. Together, these findings of swap and shift errors provide converging evidence for memory distortion mechanisms induced by a reference point, bridging a gap in the literature between how attention to regularities similarly influences visual working memory and visual long-term memory.

Perceived similarity ratings predict generalization success after traditional category learning and a new paired-associate learning task

The current study investigated category learning across two experiments using face-blend stimuli that formed face families controlled for within- and between-category similarity. Experiment 1 was a traditional feedback-based category-learning task, with three family names serving as category labels. In Experiment 2, the shared family name was encountered in the context of a face-full name paired-associate learning task, with a unique first name for each face. A subsequent test that required participants to categorize new faces from each family showed successful generalization in both experiments. Furthermore, perceived similarity ratings for pairs of faces were collected before and after learning, prior to generalization test. In Experiment 1, similarity ratings increased for faces within a family and decreased for faces that were physically similar but belonged to different families. In Experiment 2, overall similarity ratings decreased after learning, driven primarily by decreases for physically similar faces from different families. The post-learning category bias in similarity ratings was predictive of subsequent generalization success in both experiments. The results indicate that individuals formed generalizable category knowledge prior to an explicit demand to generalize and did so both when attention was directed towards category-relevant features (Experiment 1) and when attention was directed towards individuating faces within a family (Experiment 2). The results tie together research on category learning and categorical perception and extend them beyond a traditional category-learning task.

EPS mid-career prize 2018: Inference within episodic memory reflects pattern completion

Recollection of episodic memories is a process of reconstruction where coherent events are inferred from subsets of remembered associations. Here, we investigated the formation of multielement events from sequential presentation of overlapping pairs of elements (people, places, and objects/animals), interleaved with pairs from other events. Retrievals of paired associations from a fully observed event (e.g., AB, BC, AC) were statistically dependent, indicating a process of pattern completion, but retrievals from a partially observed event (e.g., AB, BC, CD) were not. However, inference for unseen “indirect” associations (i.e., AC, BD or AD) from a partially observed event showed strong dependency with each other and with linking direct associations from that event. In addition, inference of indirect associations correlated with the product of performance on the linking direct associations across events (e.g., AC with ABxBC) but not on the non-linking association (e.g., AC with CD). These results were seen across three experiments, with greater differences in dependency between indirect and direct associations when they were separately tested, but similar results following single and repeated presentations of the direct associations. The results could be accounted for by a simple auto-associative network model of hippocampal memory function. Our findings suggest that pattern completion supports recollection of fully observed multielement events and the inference of indirect associations in partly observed multielement events, mediated via the directly observed linking associations (although the direct associations themselves were retrieved independently). Together with previous work, our results suggest that associative inference plays a key role in reconstructive episodic memory and does so through hippocampal pattern completion.

Generalization and the hippocampus: More than one story?

Memory-based cognition depends on both the ability to remember specific details of individual experiences and the ability to combine information across experiences to generalize and derive new knowledge. A hippocampal role in rapid encoding of specific events is long established. More recent research also demonstrates hippocampal contributions to generalization, but their nature is still debated. The current review provides an overview of hippocampal-based generalization in two lines of research-episodic inference and categorization-and discusses evidence for four candidate mechanisms and representational schemes that may underpin such generalization. We highlight evidence showing that the hippocampus contributes specific memories to generalization decisions, but also forms generalized representations that integrate information across experiences. Multiple views are currently plausible of how such generalized representations form and relate to specific memories. Future research that uses behavioral and neural indices of both generalization and specificity may help resolve between the candidate generalization mechanisms, with the possibility that more than one view of hippocampal-based generalization may be valid. Importantly, all views share the emphasis on the broader role of the hippocampus in cognition that goes beyond remembering the past.

The role of neuronal excitability, allocation to an engram and memory linking in the behavioral generation of a false memory in mice

Memory is a constructive, not reproductive, process that is prone to errors. Errors in memory, though, may originate from normally adaptive memory processes. At the extreme of memory distortion is falsely "remembering" an event that did not occur. False memories are well-studied in cognitive psychology, but have received relatively less attention in neuroscience. Here, we took advantage of mechanistic insights into how neurons are allocated or recruited into an engram (memory trace) to generate a false memory in mice using only behavioral manipulations. At the time of an event, neurons compete for allocation to an engram supporting the memory for this event; neurons with higher excitability win this competition (Han et al., 2007). Even after the event, these allocated "engram neurons" remain temporarily (~6 h) more excitable than neighboring neurons. Should a similar event occur in this 6 h period of heightened engram neuron excitability, an overlapping population of neurons will be co-allocated to this second engram, which serves to functionally link the two memories (Rashid et al., 2016). Here, we applied this principle of co-allocation and found that mice develop a false fear memory to a neutral stimulus if exposed to this stimulus shortly (3 h), but not a longer time (24 h), after cued fear conditioning. Similar to co-allocation, the generation of this false memory depended on the post-training excitability of engram neurons such that these neurons remained more excitable during exposure to the neutral stimulus at 3 h but not 24 h. Optogenetically silencing engram neurons 3 h after cued fear conditioning impaired formation of a false fear memory to the neutral stimulus, while optogenetically activating engram neurons 24 h after cued fear conditioning created a false fear memory. These results suggest that some false memories may originate from normally adaptive mnemonic processes such as neuronal excitability-dependent allocation and memory linking.

Training set coherence and set size effects on concept generalization and recognition

Building conceptual knowledge that generalizes to novel situations is a key function of human memory. Category-learning paradigms have long been used to understand the mechanisms of knowledge generalization. In the present study, we tested the conditions that promote formation of new concepts. Participants underwent 1 of 6 training conditions that differed in the number of examples per category (set size) and their relative similarity to the category average (set coherence). Performance metrics included rates of category learning, ability to generalize categories to new items of varying similarity to prototypes, and recognition memory for individual examples. In categorization, high set coherence led to faster learning and better generalization, while set size had little effect. Recognition did not differ reliably among conditions. We also tested the nature of memory representations used for categorization and recognition decisions using quantitative prototype and exemplar models fit to behavioral responses. Prototype models posit abstract category representations based on the category's central tendency, whereas exemplar models posit that categories are represented by individual category members. Prototype strategy use during categorization increased with increasing set coherence, suggesting that coherent training sets facilitate extraction of commonalities within a category. We conclude that learning from a coherent set of examples is an efficient means of forming abstract knowledge that generalizes broadly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The core episodic simulation network dissociates as a function of subjective experience and objective content

Episodic simulation - the mental construction of a possible future event - has been consistently associated with enhanced activity in a set of neural regions referred to as the core network. In the current functional neuroimaging study, we assessed whether members of the core network are differentially associated with the subjective experience of future events (i.e., vividness) versus the objective content comprising those events (i.e., the amount of episodic details). During scanning, participants imagined future events in response to object cues. On each trial, participants rated the subjective vividness associated with each future event. Participants completed a post-scan interview where they viewed each object cue from the scanner and verbally reported whatever they had thought about. For imagined events, we quantified the number of episodic or internal details in accordance with the Autobiographical Interview (i.e., who, what, when, and where details of each central event). To test whether core network regions are differentially associated with subjective experience or objective episodic content, imagined future events were sorted as a function of their rated vividness or the amount of episodic detail. Univariate analyses revealed that some regions of the core network were uniquely sensitive to the vividness of imagined future events, including the hippocampus (i.e., high > low vividness), whereas other regions, such as the lateral parietal cortex, were sensitive to the amount of episodic detail in the event (i.e., high > low episodic details). The present results indicate that members of the core network support distinct episodic simulation-related processes.

Adaptive constructive processes: An episodic specificity induction impacts false recall in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm

Numerous studies indicate that an episodic specificity induction (ESI)-brief training in recollecting the details of a past experience-enhances performance on subsequent tasks that rely on episodic retrieval, including autobiographical memory, imagination, problem solving, and creative thinking. In 5 experiments, we examined whether these benefits of the ESI extend to reducing susceptibility to false memory, or whether they are accompanied by a cost in the form of increased susceptibility to false memory. To assess how ESI impacts false memory generation, we used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, a reliable procedure for generating false memories. When an ESI was administered after DRM list presentation and just before a free recall test, rates of false recall for critical lures were significantly enhanced relative to a control induction. These findings support the hypothesis that ESI operates to boost recollection of illusory episodic details associated with critical lures in the DRM, and suggest that constructive rather than reproductive episodic retrieval processes support the wide-ranging effects of ESI on a range of cognitive tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

An account of subjective probability judgment for joint events: Conjunctive and disjunctive

Probability judgment is a vital part of many aspects of everyday life. In the present paper, we present a new theory of the way in which individuals produce probability estimates for joint events: conjunctive and disjunctive. We propose that a majority of individuals produce conjunctive (disjunctive) estimates by making a quasi-random adjustment, positive or negative, from the less (more) likely component probability with the other component playing no obvious role. In two studies, we produce evidence supporting propositions that follow from our theory. First, the component probabilities do appear to play the distinct roles we propose in determining the joint event probabilities. Second, contrary to probability theory and other accounts of probability judgment, we show that the conjunctive-less likely probability difference is unrelated to the more likely disjunctive probability difference (in normative theory these quantities are identical). In conclusion, while violating the norms of probability judgment, we argue that estimates produced in the manner we propose will be close enough to the normative values especially given the changing nature of the external environment and the incomplete nature of available information.

Post-learning stress reduces the misinformation effect: effects of psychosocial stress on memory updating

Episodic memories can be modified when exposed to new and related information. This phenomenon, known as memory updating, is generally thought to be adaptive but can also lead to incorporating false information into a memory trace. Given the well-known effects of stress on episodic memory, we used a false information paradigm to investigate if acute stress during memory updating (i.e., post-learning stage) affected false memory formation. In a between-subject design, young healthy participants completed the initial phases of the misinformation experiment - they studied an event via a slideshow and then were exposed a related narrative that contained misleading information about that event. After, half of the participants were exposed to acute psychosocial stress and the other half completed a control task. Once stress levels returned to baseline, all of the participants completed the final phase of the experiment, which was a memory test for slideshow that included items containing true facts and misinformation. Participants in the stress condition showed a reduced misinformation effect and were better able to discriminate true from false information compared to control participants. This pattern of results held even when participants were tested on the same memory test after a multiple day delay, illustrating the long-lasting effects of stress on false memory formation specifically, and memory updating generally. We discuss how our results add to the understanding of the time-dependent factors that moderate stress effects on memory, and speculate how stress effects on memory updating can be positive, by limiting intrusions into encoded events, but also negative, by limiting the ability to integrate information with other concepts, harming memory generalization.

Flexible retrieval mechanisms supporting successful inference produce false memories in younger but not older adults

Episodic memory involves flexible retrieval processes that allow a person to link elements of distinct episodes in order to make novel inferences across events. In younger adults, we recently found that the same retrieval-related recombination mechanism that supports successful associative inference produces source misattributions as a consequence of erroneous binding of contextual elements from distinct episodes. In the current experiment, we found that older adults, in contrast to younger adults, did not show an increase in source misattributions following successful associative inference. We observed this pattern both when (a) younger and older adults were tested under identical experimental conditions and (b) younger and older adults were matched on associative inference accuracy and overall source memory errors. We suggest that the differing patterns of results are a consequence of age-related deficits in associative binding during successful inferential retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record

Implicit Memory, Constructive Memory, and Imagining the Future: A Career Perspective

In this article I discuss some of the major questions, findings, and ideas that have driven my research program, which has examined various aspects of human memory using a combination of cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging approaches. I do so from a career perspective that describes important scientific influences that have shaped my approach to the study of memory and discusses considerations that led to choosing specific research paths. After acknowledging key early influences, I briefly summarize a few of the main takeaways from research on implicit memory during the 1980s and 1990s and then move on to consider more recent ideas and findings concerning constructive memory, future imagining, and mental simulation that have motivated my approach for the past 2 decades. A main unifying theme of this research is that memory can affect psychological functions in ways that go beyond the simple everyday understanding of memory as a means of revisiting past experiences.

The hippocampus is critical for value-based decisions guided by dissociative inference

The hippocampus supports flexible decision-making through memory integration: bridging across episodes and inferring associations between stimuli that were never presented together ('associative inference'). A pre-requisite for memory integration is flexible representations of the relationships between stimuli within episodes (AB) but also of the constituent units (A,B). Here we investigated whether the hippocampus is required for parsing experienced episodes into their constituents to infer their re-combined within-episode associations ('dissociative inference'). In three experiments male rats were trained on an appetitive conditioning task using compound auditory stimuli (AB+, BA+, CD-, DC-). At test either the compound or individual stimuli were presented as well as new stimuli. Rats with hippocampal lesions acquired and retained the compound discriminations as well as controls. Single constituent stimuli (A, B, C, D) were presented for the first time at test, so the only value with which they could be associated was the one from the compound to which they belonged. Controls inferred constituent tones' corresponding values while hippocampal rats did not, treating them as merely familiar stimuli with no associated value. This finding held whether compound training occurred before or after hippocampal lesions, suggesting that hippocampus-dependent inferential processes more likely occur at retrieval. The findings extend recent discoveries about the role of the hippocampus in intrinsic value representation, demonstrating hippocampal contributions to allocating value from primary rewards to individual stimuli. Importantly, we discovered that dissociative inferences serve to restructure or reparse patterns of directly acquired associations when animals are faced with environmental changes and need to extract relevant information from a multiplex memory. The hippocampus is critical for this fundamental flexible use of associations.

False memories, false preferences: Flexible retrieval mechanisms supporting successful inference bias novel decisions

Prior research suggests that episodic memory can guide value-based decisions when single episodes are encoded in relation to the specific reward-context in which they were experienced. The current experiments examine the role that a flexible recombination-related retrieval mechanism that allows one to link together distinct events plays in the misattribution of specific reward-contexts across distinct episodes. To determine whether the same recombination-related retrieval mechanism supports both successful inference and transfer of reward-context across episodes, we developed a modified version of an associative inference paradigm in which participants encoded overlapping associations (AB, BC) that could later be linked to support inferential retrieval (AC), where one element ("A") was tied to reward. Our key experimental manipulation concerned whether value memory (Experiments 1 and 2) or decision bias tests (Experiment 3) were probed before or after the associative inference test, thereby allowing us to assess whether false value transfer and decision bias scores increased after as compared to before successful versus unsuccessful inference. Results revealed that participants more frequently misattributed the specific reward-context ("A") to unrewarded items ("C;" Experiments 1 and 2) and showed higher decision bias scores when asked to choose between two previously unrewarded items ("C;" Experiment 3) for successful compared with unsuccessful inference, but only when the value memory and decision bias tests were given after the associative inference test. These results suggest that a recombination-related retrieval mechanism that supports successful inference also contributes to the misattribution of reward-context in memory and further biases participants' novel value-based decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Integrating educational knowledge: reactivation of prior knowledge during educational learning enhances memory integration

In everyday life and in education, we continuously build and structure our knowledge. Successful knowledge construction is suggested to happen through reactivation of previously learned information during new learning. This reactivation is presumed to lead to integration of old and new memories and strengthen long-term retention. Additionally, congruency with prior knowledge is shown to enhance subsequent memory. However, it is unknown how subjective reactivation and congruency jointly influence learning in an educational context. In two experiments, we investigated this question using an AB-AC inference paradigm where students were asked to first study an AB (word-picture) and then an AC-association (word-description). BC-associations were either congruent or incongruent and were linked by a common, unknown word (A). During AC-learning, participants were instructed to actively reactivate B (the picture) and report their subjective reactivation strength. Participants were first-year university students studying either psychology or family studies and the stimuli consisted of new information from their curricula. We expected that both reactivation and congruency would enhance subsequent associative memory for the inferred BC-association. This was assessed by cueing participants with C (the description) and asking to freely describe the associated picture. Results show a significant enhancement of both B-reactivation and congruency on associative memory scores in both experiments. Additionally, subjective meta-memory measures exhibited the same effect. These outcomes, showing beneficial effects of both reactivation and congruency on memory formation, can be of interest to educational practice, where effectively building knowledge through reactivation is imperative for success.

Episodic Future Thinking: Mechanisms and Functions

Episodic future thinking refers to the capacity to imagine or simulate experiences that might occur in one's personal future. Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging research concerning episodic future thinking has accelerated during recent years. This article discusses research that has delineated cognitive and neural mechanisms that support episodic future thinking as well as the functions that episodic future thinking serves. Studies focused on mechanisms have identified a core brain network that underlies episodic future thinking and have begun to tease apart the relative contributions of particular regions in this network, and the specific cognitive processes that they support. Studies concerned with functions have identified several domains in which episodic future thinking produces performance benefits, including decision making, emotion regulation, prospective memory, and spatial navigation.

Remembering and imagining alternative versions of the personal past

Although autobiographical memory and episodic simulations recruit similar core brain regions, episodic simulations engage additional neural recruitment in the frontoparietal control network due to greater demands on constructive processes. However, previous functional neuroimaging studies showing differences in remembering and episodic simulation have focused on veridical retrieval of past experiences, and thus have not fully considered how retrieving the past in different ways from how it was originally experienced may also place similar demands on constructive processes. Here we examined how alternative versions of the past are constructed when adopting different egocentric perspectives during autobiographical memory retrieval compared to simulating hypothetical events from the personal past that could have occurred, or episodic counterfactual thinking. Participants were asked to generate titles for specific autobiographical memories from the last five years, and then, during functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) scanning, were asked to repeatedly retrieve autobiographical memories or imagine counterfactual events cued by the titles. We used an fMRI adaptation paradigm in order to isolate neural regions that were sensitive to adopting alternative egocentric perspectives and counterfactual simulations of the personal past. The fMRI results revealed that voxels within left posterior inferior parietal and ventrolateral frontal cortices were sensitive to novel visual perspectives and counterfactual simulations. Our findings suggest that the neural regions supporting remembering become more similar to those underlying episodic simulation when we adopt alternative egocentric perspectives of the veridical past.