Cortical areas in visual awareness

Intact prioritisation of unconscious face processing in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Faces provide a rich source of social information, crucial for the successful navigation of daily social interactions. People with schizophrenia suffer a wide range of social-cognitive deficits, including abnormalities in face perception. However, to date, studies of face perception in schizophrenia have primarily employed tasks that require patients to make judgements about the faces. It is, thus, unclear whether the reported deficits reflect an impairment in encoding visual face information, or biased social-cognitive evaluative processes.

METHODS

We assess the integrity of early unconscious face processing in 21 out-patients diagnosed with Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder (15M/6F) and 21 healthy controls (14M/7F). In order to control for any direct influence of higher order cognitive processes, we use a behavioural paradigm known as breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS), where participants simply respond to the presence and location of a face. In healthy adults, this method has previously been used to show that upright faces gain rapid and privileged access to conscious awareness over inverted faces and other inanimate objects.

RESULTS

Here, we report similar effects in patients, suggesting that the early unconscious stages of face processing are intact in schizophrenia.

CONCLUSION

Our data indicate that face processing deficits reported in the literature must manifest at a conscious stage of processing, where the influence of mentalizing or attribution biases might play a role.

Implications on visual apperception: energy, duration, structure and synchronization

Although primary visual cortex (V1 or striate) activity per se is not sufficient for visual apperception (normal conscious visual experiences and conscious functions such as detection, discrimination, and recognition), the same is also true for extrastriate visual areas (such as V2, V3, V4/V8/VO, V5/M5/MST, IT, and GF). In the lack of V1 area, visual signals can still reach several extrastriate parts but appear incapable of generating normal conscious visual experiences. It is scarcely emphasized in the scientific literature that conscious perceptions and representations must have also essential energetic conditions. These energetic conditions are achieved by spatiotemporal networks of dynamic mitochondrial distributions inside neurons. However, the highest density of neurons in neocortex (number of neurons per degree of visual angle) devoted to representing the visual field is found in retinotopic V1. It means that the highest mitochondrial (energetic) activity can be achieved in mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase-rich V1 areas. Thus, V1 bear the highest energy allocation for visual representation. In addition, the conscious perceptions also demand structural conditions, presence of adequate duration of information representation, and synchronized neural processes and/or 'interactive hierarchical structuralism.' For visual apperception, various visual areas are involved depending on context such as stimulus characteristics such as color, form/shape, motion, and other features. Here, we focus primarily on V1 where specific mitochondrial-rich retinotopic structures are found; we will concisely discuss V2 where smaller riches of these structures are found. We also point out that residual brain states are not fully reflected in active neural patterns after visual perception. Namely, after visual perception, subliminal residual states are not being reflected in passive neural recording techniques, but require active stimulation to be revealed.

How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness

There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle's reasoning about the function of consciousness goes wrong because he conflates the two senses. And Francis Crick and Christof Koch fall afoul of the ambiguity in arguing that visual area V1 is not part of the neural correlate of consciousness. Crick and Koch's work raises issues that suggest that these two concepts of consciousness may have different (though overlapping) neural correlates – despite Crick and Koch's implicit rejection of this idea.

Anesthesia and the electrophysiology of auditory consciousness

Empirical work is reviewed which correlates the presence or absence of various parts of the auditory evoked potential with the disappearance and reemergence of auditory sensation during induction of and recovery from anesthesia. As a result, the hypothesis is generated that the electrophysiological correlate of auditory sensation is whatever neural activity generates the middle latency waves of the auditory evoked potential. This activity occurs from 20 to 80 ms poststimulus in the primary and secondary areas of the auditory cortex. Evidence is presented suggesting that earlier or later waves in the auditory evoked potential do not covary with auditory sensation (as opposed to auditory perception) and it is therefore suggested that they are possibly not the electrophysiological correlates of sensation.

Random dots blinking: a new approach to elucidate the activities of the extrastriate cortex in humans

To investigate cortical activities related to the visual recognition of characters, we recorded the magnetoencephalography (MEG) in six normal subjects who were encouraged to discriminate capital English letters displayed for a brief period. To reduce the primary responses evoked by the luminance change in the striate cortex (V1), we used a novel stimulus method, random dots blinking (RDB), by means of the temporal changes of patterns using a large number of small random dots. Along with the MEG recording, we also measured the discrimination accuracy rate (%) to know how well the subjects recognized the letters. One clear component, about 300 ms in peak latency, was identified in all six subjects. Its peak amplitude and the discrimination accuracy rate increased similarly as the character display duration became longer. Its signal source was estimated in the extrastriate cortex, around the fusiform gyrus, in the right hemisphere. We suspect that the activity in these cortical areas has strong relation to the conscious perception of characters.

Probing unconscious visual processing with the McCollough effect

The McCollough effect, an orientation-contingent color aftereffect, has been known for over 30 years and, like other aftereffects, has been taken as a means of probing the brain's operations psychophysically. In this paper, we review psychophysical, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies of the McCollough effect. Much of the evidence suggests that the McCollough effect depends on neural mechanisms that are located early in the cortical visual pathways, probably in V1. We also review evidence showing that the aftereffect can be induced without conscious perception of the induction patterns. Based on these two lines of evidence, it is argued that our conscious visual experience of the world arises in the cortical visual system beyond V1.

Panic disorder from a monistic perspective: integrating neurobiological and psychological approaches

In the literature, psychological and biological theories of panic disorder are often regarded as mutually exclusive. The present article presents an integrative theory that explains how and why cognitive misinterpretations and "false threat alarms" leading to irrational fear and anxiety can arise from a neurobiological dysfunction in the amygdala and ascending transmitter systems. According to this view, physiological symptoms (such as palpitations and respiration manoeuvres) and psychological symptoms of anxiety (perception of threat and anticipation of catastrophe) are elicited simultaneously by a subcortical threat detection mechanism. This perspective might help to integrate conflicting earlier approaches. It is discussed with respect to theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications.

Parietal neglect and visual awareness

The last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in the neural correlates of conscious vision, with most discussion focused on the 'blindsight' that can follow damage to primary visual cortex, in the occipital lobe. We suggest that new insights into the neural basis of visual awareness may be gleaned from a different neuropsychological phenomenon, namely visual 'neglect' after injury to regions in the parietal lobe. Neglect provides several revealing contrasts with occipital blindsight. Here we summarise four key findings. First, unlike the deficits caused by damage to primary visual cortex, the loss of awareness in parietal neglect is characteristically not strictly retinotopic. Second, visual segmentation processes are preserved in neglect, and can influence what will reach the patient's awareness. Third, extensive unconscious processing takes place for those stimuli on the neglected side which escape awareness, including some degree of object identification. Finally, parietal damage affects initial stages of motor planning as well as perception. These findings are consistent with recent data on single-cell activity in the monkey brain. They also suggest why areas in the inferior parietal lobe may play a prominent role in visual awareness.

Timing of motion representation in the human visual system

Visual stimulus in apparent motion evokes a magnetic field from the extrastriate cortex in humans. To investigate what this magnetic field represents, we measured the latencies of the responses in three subjects to the stimuli in apparent motion at various spatial separations. These different latencies were inversely related to the spatial separations of the stimuli (range of 74 to 182 ms) and correlated with each subject's reaction time. The direction of motion affected neither the latency of the magnetic response nor the reaction times. Estimations of the origins of the evoked magnetic fields showed they were always in the same area. In two subjects, the sites were around the meeting point of the ascending limb of the inferior temporal sulcus and the lateral occipital sulcus. In the third subject, the site was in the vicinity of the angular gyrus. The difference between the magnetic response and reaction time was fairly constant (about 64 ms) among the subjects. We consider the magnetic response to be related to the generation of a motion image: First, the response clearly corresponded to human reaction times to the same stimuli: Second, the fact that the magnetic response was related to the spatial separations but independent of the direction of motion is not explained if the response is evoked simply by both the onset and offset of the object in the stimulus. Furthermore, individual reaction times were mainly delayed by the speed of the process that generated the motion image.

When the brain changes its mind: interocular grouping during binocular rivalry

The prevalent view of binocular rivalry holds that it is a competition between the two eyes mediated by reciprocal inhibition among monocular neurons. This view is largely due to the nature of conventional rivalry-inducing stimuli, which are pairs of dissimilar images with coherent patterns within each eye's image. Is it the eye of origin or the coherency of patterns that determines perceptual alternations between coherent percepts in binocular rivalry? We break the coherency of conventional stimuli and replace them by complementary patchworks of intermingled rivalrous images. Can the brain unscramble the pieces of the patchwork arriving from different eyes to obtain coherent percepts? We find that pattern coherency in itself can drive perceptual alternations, and the patchworks are reassembled into coherent forms by most observers. This result is in agreement with recent neurophysiological and psychophysical evidence demonstrating that there is more to binocular rivalry than mere eye competition.