Science in court: Head case

A Cumulants-Based Human Brain Decoding

Human cognition is influenced by the way the nervous system processes information and is linked to this mechanical explanation of the human body’s cognitive function. Accuracy is the key emphasis in neuroscience which may be enhanced by utilising new hardware, mathematical, statistical, and computational methodologies. Feature extraction and feature selection also play a crucial function in gaining improved accuracy since the proper characteristics can identify brain states efficiently. However, both feature extraction and selection procedures are dependent on mathematical and statistical techniques which implies that mathematical and statistical techniques have a direct or indirect influence on prediction accuracy. The forthcoming challenges of the brain-computer interface necessitate a thorough critical understanding of the complicated structure and uncertain behavior of the brain. It is impossible to upgrade hardware periodically, and thus, an option is necessary to collect maximum information from the brain against varied actions. The mathematical and statistical combination could be the ideal answer for neuroscientists which can be utilised for feature extraction, feature selection, and classification. That is why in this research a statistical technique is offered together with specialised feature extraction and selection methods to increase the accuracy. A score fusion function is changed utilising an enhanced cumulants-driven likelihood ratio test employing multivariate pattern analysis. Functional MRI data were acquired from 12 patients versus a visual test that comprises of pictures from five distinct categories. After cleaning the data, feature extraction and selection were done using mathematical approaches, and lastly, the best match of the projected class was established using the likelihood ratio test. To validate the suggested approach, it is compared with the current methods reported in recent research.

Decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics: Recent progress and ongoing challenges

In the past decade, decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics have developed many new insights in the study of decision making. This review provides an overarching update on how the field has advanced in this time period. Although our initial review a decade ago outlined several theoretical, conceptual, methodological, empirical, and practical challenges, there has only been limited progress in resolving these challenges. We summarize significant trends in decision neuroscience through the lens of the challenges outlined for the field and review examples where the field has had significant, direct, and applicable impacts across economics and psychology. First, we review progress on topics including reward learning, explore-exploit decisions, risk and ambiguity, intertemporal choice, and valuation. Next, we assess the impacts of emotion, social rewards, and social context on decision making. Then, we follow up with how individual differences impact choices and new exciting developments in the prediction and neuroforecasting of future decisions. Finally, we consider how trends in decision-neuroscience research reflect progress toward resolving past challenges, discuss new and exciting applications of recent research, and identify new challenges for the field. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Emotion and Motivation.

A case of developmental pedophilia unmasked by frontotemporal dementia

A 65-year-old right-handed man gradually became socially indifferent and less active. Four years later, he was indicted for molesting children on multiple occasions. Psychomotor slowness and executive impairment contrasted with sparing of language, semantic memory, visuospatial perception, construction praxis, and right-left orientation. Neuroimaging showed asymmetric atrophy of dorsomedial frontal and anterior temporal lobes, and hypoperfusion of medial prefrontal cortex consistent with a diagnosis of behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia. Further information revealed that the patient exhibited pedophilic behavior several years prior to symptom onset. We conclude that preexisting developmental pedophilia was "unmasked" by the underlying progressive frontotemporal degeneration.

Biological Evidence Regarding Psychopathy Does Not Affect Mock Jury Sentencing

Research on the biological factors influencing criminal behavior is increasingly being introduced into court, necessitating research on how such evidence is perceived and influences decision makers. Research on how this evidence influences sentencing recommendations is inconclusive. In this study, we focus on biological evidence related to psychopathy, a construct commonly associated with criminal behavior. Approximately 800 community members were presented with a case vignette detailing an individual who is described as having a high level of psychopathic traits. Participants received either psychological information about psychopathy (i.e., no biological evidence), evidence the defendant had genetic risk factors for psychopathy, or written neuroimaging evidence the defendant had brain deficits associated with psychopathy. Participants then recommended a sentence. Overall, recommended sentence lengths did not differ between evidence conditions. These findings add to a growing body of research suggesting that biological evidence may not have as much of an influence on jurors as previously thought.

Mild traumatic brain injury: Is DTI ready for the courtroom?

Important advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging have revolutionized our understanding of the human brain. Many of these advances provide new evidence regarding compensable injuries that have been used to support changes in legal policy. For example, we now know that regions of the brain involved in decision making continue to develop into the mid-20s, and this information weighs heavily in determining that execution or automatic sentence of life without the possibility of parole for someone younger than 18 years old, at the time of the crime, violates the 8th Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." The probative value of other testimony regarding neuroimaging, however, is less clear, particularly for mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI), also known as concussion. There is nonetheless some evidence that new imaging technologies, most notably diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), may be useful in detecting mTBI. More specifically, DTI is sensitive to detecting diffuse axonal brain injuries in white matter, the most common brain injury in mTBI. DTI is, in fact, the most promising technique available today for such injuries and it is beginning to be used clinically, although it remains largely within the purview of research. Its probative value is also not clear as it may be both prejudicial and misleading given that standardization is not yet established for use in either the clinic or the courtroom, and thus it may be premature for use in either. There are also concerns with the methods and analyses that have been used to provide quantitative evidence in legal cases. It is within this context that we provide a commentary on the use of neuroimaging in the courtroom, most particularly DTI, and the admissibility of evidence, as well as the definition and role of expert testimony. While there is a great deal of evidence demonstrating cognitive impairments in attention, processing speed, memory, and concentration from neuropsychological testing following mTBI, we focus here on the more recent introduction of DTI imaging in the courtroom. We also review definitions of mTBI followed by admissibility standards for scientific evidence in the courtroom, including Daubert criteria and two subsequent cases that comprise the so-called Daubert trilogy rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony. This is followed by a brief review of neuroimaging techniques available today, the latter with an emphasis on DTI and its application to mTBI. We then review some of the court rulings on the use of DTI. We end by highlighting the importance of neuroimaging in providing a new window on the brain, while cautioning against the premature use of new advances in imaging in the courtroom before standards are established in the clinical arena, which are informed by research. We also discuss further what is needed to reach a tipping point where such advances will provide important and meaningful data with respect to their probative value.

The charm of structural neuroimaging in insanity evaluations: guidelines to avoid misinterpretation of the findings

Despite the popularity of structural neuroimaging techniques in twenty-first-century research, its results have had limited translational impact in real-world settings, where inferences need to be made at the individual level. Structural neuroimaging methods are now introduced frequently to aid in assessing defendants for insanity in criminal forensic evaluations, with the aim of providing "convergence" of evidence on the mens rea of the defendant. This approach may provide pivotal support for judges' decisions. Although neuroimaging aims to reduce uncertainty and controversies in legal settings and to increase the objectivity of criminal rulings, the application of structural neuroimaging in forensic settings is hampered by cognitive biases in the evaluation of evidence that lead to misinterpretation of the imaging results. It is thus increasingly important to have clear guidelines on the correct ways to apply and interpret neuroimaging evidence. In the current paper, we review the literature concerning structural neuroimaging in court settings with the aim of identifying rules for its correct application and interpretation. These rules, which aim to decrease the risk of biases, focus on the importance of (i) descriptive diagnoses, (ii) anatomo-clinical correlation, (iii) brain plasticity and (iv) avoiding logical fallacies, such as reverse inference. In addition, through the analysis of real forensic cases, we describe errors frequently observed due to incorrect interpretations of imaging. Clear guidelines for both the correct circumstances for introducing neuroimaging and its eventual interpretation are defined.

Discovering the Neural Nature of Moral Cognition? Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Challenges in Bioethical Research with Electroencephalography (EEG)

In this article we critically review the neural mechanisms of moral cognition that have recently been studied via electroencephalography (EEG). Such studies promise to shed new light on traditional moral questions by helping us to understand how effective moral cognition is embodied in the brain. It has been argued that conflicting normative ethical theories require different cognitive features and can, accordingly, in a broadly conceived naturalistic attempt, be associated with different brain processes that are rooted in different brain networks and regions. This potentially morally relevant brain activity has been empirically investigated through EEG-based studies on moral cognition. From neuroscientific evidence gathered in these studies, a variety of normative conclusions have been drawn and bioethical applications have been suggested. We discuss methodological and theoretical merits and demerits of the attempt to use EEG techniques in a morally significant way, point to legal challenges and policy implications, indicate the potential to reveal biomarkers of psychopathological conditions, and consider issues that might inform future bioethical work.

Predicting the knowledge-recklessness distinction in the human brain

Criminal convictions require proof that a prohibited act was performed in a statutorily specified mental state. Different legal consequences, including greater punishments, are mandated for those who act in a state of knowledge, compared with a state of recklessness. Existing research, however, suggests people have trouble classifying defendants as knowing, rather than reckless, even when instructed on the relevant legal criteria. We used a machine-learning technique on brain imaging data to predict, with high accuracy, which mental state our participants were in. This predictive ability depended on both the magnitude of the risks and the amount of information about those risks possessed by the participants. Our results provide neural evidence of a detectable difference in the mental state of knowledge in contrast to recklessness and suggest, as a proof of principle, the possibility of inferring from brain data in which legally relevant category a person belongs. Some potential legal implications of this result are discussed.

Are Mental Disorders Brain Diseases, and What Does This Mean? A Clinical-Neuropsychological Perspective

Neuroscientific research has substantially increased our knowledge about mental disorders in recent years. Along with these benefits, radical postulates have been articulated according to which understanding and treatment of mental disorders should generally be based on biological terms, such as neurons/brain areas, transmitters, genes etc. Proponents of such a 'biological psychiatry' claim that mental disorders are analogous to neurological disorders and refer to neurology and neuropsychology to corroborate their claims. The present article argues that, from a clinical-neuropsychological perspective, 'biological psychiatry' is based on a mechanistic, 'cerebrocentric' framework of brain (dys-)function which has its roots in experimental neuroscience but runs up against narrow limits in clinical neurology and neuropsychology. In fact, understanding and treating neurological disorders generally demands a systems perspective including brain, organism and environment as intrinsically entangled. In this way, 'biological' characterizes a 'holistic', nonreductionist level of explanation, according to which the significance of particular mechanisms can only be estimated in the context of the organism (or person). This is evident in the common observation that local brain damage does not just lead to an isolated loss of function, but to multiple attempts of reorganization and readaptation; it initiates new developments. Furthermore, treating brain disorders necessarily includes aspects of individuality and subjectivity, a conclusion that contradicts the purely 'objectivist', third-person stance put forward by some proponents of biological psychiatry. In sum, understanding and treating brain damage sequelae in the clinical neurosciences demands a biopsychosocial perspective, for both conceptual and historical reasons. The same may hold for psychiatry when adopting a brain-based view on mental disorders. In such a perspective, biological psychiatry seems an interesting project but falls short of its original claims.

[Neuroscience in the Courtroom: From responsibility to dangerousness, ethical issues raised by the new French law]

AIM

In the past few years, spectacular progress in neuroscience has led to the emergence of a new interdisciplinary field, the so-called "neurolaw" whose goal is to explore the effects of neuroscientific discoveries on legal proceedings and legal rules and standards. In the United States, a number of neuroscientific researches are designed specifically to explore legally relevant topics and a case-law has already been developed. In Europe, neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in criminal courtrooms, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. Though largely debated, up to now the use of neuroscience in legal contexts had not specifically been regulated by any legislation. In 2011, with the new bioethics law, France has become the first country to admit by law the use of brain imaging in judicial expertise. According to the new law, brain imaging techniques can be used only for medical purposes, or scientific research, or in the context of judicial expertise. This study aims to give an overview of the current state of the neurolaw in the US and Europe, and to investigate the ethical issues raised by this new law and its potential impact on the rights and civil liberties of the offenders.

METHOD

An overview of the emergence and development of "neurolaw" in the United States and Europe is given. Then, the new French law is examined in the light of the relevant debates in the French parliament. Consequently, we outline the current tendencies in Neurolaw literature to focus on assessments of responsibility, rather than dangerousness. This tendency is analysed notably in relation to the legal context relevant to criminal policies in France, where recent changes in the legislation and practice of forensic psychiatry show that dangerousness assessments have become paramount in the process of judicial decision. Finally, the potential interpretations of neuroscientific data introduced into psychiatric testimonies by judges are explored.

RESULTS

The examination of parliamentary debates showed that the new French law allowing neuroimaging techniques in judicial expertise was introduced in the aim to provide a legal framework that would protect the subject against potential misuses of neuroscience. The underlying fear above all, was that this technology be used as a lie detector, or as a means to predict the subject's behaviour. However, the possibility of such misuse remains open. Contrary to the legislator's wish, the defendant is not fully guaranteed against uses of neuroimaging techniques in criminal courts that would go against their interests and rights. In fact, the examination of the recently adopted legislation in France shows that assessments of dangerousness and of risk of recidivism have become central elements of the criminal policy, which makes it possible, if not likely that neuroimaging techniques be used for the evaluation of the dangerousness of the defendant. This could entail risks for the latter, as judges could perceive neuroscientific data as hard evidence, more scientific and reliable than the soft data of traditional psychiatry. If such neuroscientific data are interpreted as signs of potential dangerousness of a subject rather than as signs of criminal responsibility, defendants may become subjected to longer penalties or measures aiming to ensure public safety in the detriment of their freedom.

CONCLUSION

In the current context of accentuated societal need for security, the judge and the expert-psychiatrist are increasingly asked to evaluate the dangerousness of a subject, regardless of their responsibility. Influenced by this policy model, the judge might tend to use neuroscientific data introduced by an expert as signs of dangerousness. Such uses, especially when they subjugate an individual's interest to those of society, might entail serious threats to an individual's freedom and civil liberties.

Neurobiological correlates in forensic assessment: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

With the increased knowledge of biological risk factors, interest in including this information in forensic assessments is growing. Currently, forensic assessments are predominantly focused on psychosocial factors. A better understanding of the neurobiology of violent criminal behaviour and biological risk factors could improve forensic assessments.

OBJECTIVE

To provide an overview of the current evidence about biological risk factors that predispose people to antisocial and violent behaviour, and determine its usefulness in forensic assessment.

METHODS

A systematic literature search was conducted using articles from PsycINFO, Embase and Pubmed published between 2000 and 2013.

RESULTS

This review shows that much research on the relationship between genetic predisposition and neurobiological alterations with aggression is performed on psychiatric patients or normal populations. However, the number of studies comparing offenders is limited. There is still a great need to understand how genetic and neurobiological alterations and/or deficits are related to violent behaviour, specifically criminality. Most studies focus on only one of the genetic or neurobiological fields related to antisocial and/or violent behaviour. To reliably correlate the findings of these fields, a standardization of methodology is urgently needed.

CONCLUSION

Findings from the current review suggest that violent aggression, like all forms of human behaviour, both develops under specific genetic and environmental conditions, and requires interplay between these conditions. Violence should be considered as the end product of a chain of life events, during which risks accumulate and potentially reinforce each other, displaying or triggering a specific situation. This systematic review did not find evidence of predispositions or neurobiological alterations that solely explain antisocial or violent behaviour. With better designed studies, more correlation between diverse fields, and more standardisation, it might be possible to elucidate underlying mechanisms. Thus, we advocate maintaining the current case-by-case differentiated approach to evidence-based forensic assessment.

[Non-medical applications for brain MRI: Ethical considerations]

INTRODUCTION

The recent neuroimaging techniques offer the possibility to better understand complex cognitive processes that are involved in mental disorders and thus have become cornerstone tools for research in psychiatry. The performances of functional magnetic resonance imaging are not limited to medical research and are used in non-medical fields. These recent applications represent new challenges for bioethics.

OBJECTIVE

In this article we aim at discussing the new ethical issues raised by the applications of the latest neuroimaging technologies to non-medical fields.

METHODS

We included a selection of peer-reviewed English medical articles after a search on NCBI Pubmed database and Google scholar from 2000 to 2013. We screened bibliographical tables for supplementary references. Websites of governmental French institutions implicated in ethical questions were also screened for governmental reports.

RESULTS

Findings of brain areas supporting emotional responses and regulation have been used for marketing research, also called neuromarketing. The discovery of different brain activation patterns in antisocial disorder has led to changes in forensic psychiatry with the use of imaging techniques with unproven validity. Automated classification algorithms and multivariate statistical analyses of brain images have been applied to brain-reading techniques, aiming at predicting unconscious neural processes in humans. We finally report the current position of the French legislation recently revised and discuss the technical limits of such techniques.

DISCUSSION

In the near future, brain imaging could find clinical applications in psychiatry as diagnostic or predictive tools. However, the latest advances in brain imaging are also used in non-scientific fields raising key ethical questions. Involvement of neuroscientists, psychiatrists, physicians but also of citizens in neuroethics discussions is crucial to challenge the risk of unregulated uses of brain imaging.

The neuropathology of morality: Germany 1930-1960

This article analyzes brain scientists' attempts to trace morality in the brain in Germany from 1930 to 1960. The debate around Karl Kleist's localization of the Gemeinschafts-Ich [community-I] in the 1930s is depicted in order to illustrate the central arguments for and against localizations of morality. The focus of this article is on the period 1936-1960 in which experts put forth specific ideas on morality's cerebral underpinnings that mirror the larger theoretical shift from strict localization doctrine to a more holistic understanding of the brain. As a result of this shift, experts avoided exact localizations of morality. Instead, they posited correlations between brain areas and morality. The analysis illustrates the dependence of neuropathological research on morality on general theories of brain functioning and marks a first contribution to the history of the neuroscience of morality for the time after 1930.

Prospects of functional magnetic resonance imaging as lie detector

Following the demise of the polygraph, supporters of assisted scientific lie detection tools have enthusiastically appropriated neuroimaging technologies "as the savior of scientifically verifiable lie detection in the courtroom" (Gerard, 2008: 5). These proponents believe the future impact of neuroscience "will be inevitable, dramatic, and will fundamentally alter the way the law does business" (Erickson, 2010: 29); however, such enthusiasm may prove premature. For in nearly every article published by independent researchers in peer reviewed journals, the respective authors acknowledge that fMRI research, processes, and technology are insufficiently developed and understood for gatekeepers to even consider introducing these neuroimaging measures into criminal courts as they stand today for the purpose of determining the veracity of statements made. Regardless of how favorable their analyses of fMRI or its future potential, they all acknowledge the presence of issues yet to be resolved. Even assuming a future where these issues are resolved and an appropriate fMRI lie-detection process is developed, its integration into criminal trials is not assured for the very success of such a future system may necessitate its exclusion from courtrooms on the basis of existing legal and ethical prohibitions. In this piece, aimed for a multidisciplinary readership, we seek to highlight and bring together the multitude of hurdles which would need to be successfully overcome before fMRI can (if ever) be a viable applied lie detection system. We argue that the current status of fMRI studies on lie detection meets neither basic legal nor scientific standards. We identify four general classes of hurdles (scientific, legal and ethical, operational, and social) and provide an overview on the stages and operations involved in fMRI studies, as well as the difficulties of translating these laboratory protocols into a practical criminal justice environment. It is our overall conclusion that fMRI is unlikely to constitute a viable lie detector for criminal courts.

Neuroscientists in court

Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being offered in court cases. Consequently, the legal system needs neuroscientists to act as expert witnesses who can explain the limitations and interpretations of neuroscientific findings so that judges and jurors can make informed and appropriate inferences. The growing role of neuroscientists in court means that neuroscientists should be aware of important differences between the scientific and legal fields, and, especially, how scientific facts can be easily misunderstood by non-scientists, including judges and jurors.

Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law and Research Policy Collide

Progress in the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain to evaluate deception and differentiate lying from truth-telling has created anticipation of a breakthrough in the search for technology-based methods of lie detection. In the last few years, litigants have attempted to introduce fMRI lie detection evidence in courts. This article weighs in on the interdisciplinary debate about the admissibility of such evidence, identifying the missing pieces of the scientific puzzle that need to be completed if fMRI-based lie detection is to meet the standards of either legal reliability or general acceptance. We believe that the Daubert's "known error rate" is the key concept linking the legal and scientific standards. We posit that properly-controlled clinical trials are the most convincing means to determine the error rates of fMRI-based lie detection and confirm or disprove the relevance of the promising laboratory research on this topic. This article explains the current state of the science and provides an analysis of the case law in which litigants have sought to introduce fMRI lie detection. Analyzing the myriad issues related to fMRI lie detection, the article identifies the key limitations of the current neuroimaging of deception science as expert evidence and explores the problems that arise from using scientific evidence before it is proven scientifically valid and reliable. We suggest that courts continue excluding fMRI lie detection evidence until this potentially useful form of forensic science meets the scientific standards currently required for adoption of a medical test or device. Given a multitude of stakeholders and, the charged and controversial nature and the potential societal impact of this technology, goodwill and collaboration of several government agencies may be required to sponsor impartial and comprehensive clinical trials that will guide the development of forensic fMRI technology.

"Do octopuses have a brain?" Knowledge, perceptions and attitudes towards neuroscience at school

The present study contributes to the question of school literacy about the brain, with an original survey conducted on Italian students from the 3^rd to 10^th grades (n = 508). The main goal was to test student's knowledge, attitudes, and interests about neuroscience, to assess needs, prospects, and difficulties in teaching about the brain from elementary to high school. A written questionnaire, maintaining anonymity, asked 12 close-ended multiple choice questions on topics related to human and animal brains, plus one facultative open-ended question about interests and curiosities on brain topics. The results show that respondents have a fragmentary level of basic knowledge about the brain, with aspects related to brain functions and consciousness the most challenging. As expected, degrees of performance improve with school level; elementary school students answered correctly an average number of 5.3 questions, middle school 6.5, and high school 7.4. Overall, students show great interest in the brain, as shown by the large number of questions gathered through the open-ended question (n = 384). Other topics are addressed, mostly related to brain structure/functions and the role of the brain in the everyday life. The survey indicates the need of more thorough school programs on this subject, reinforced by interdisciplinary teaching where comparative anatomy and evolutionary aspects of brain development are covered.

The Puzzle of Neuroimaging and Psychiatric Diagnosis: Technology and Nosology in an Evolving Discipline

Brain imaging provides ever more sensitive measures of structure and function relevant to human psychology and has revealed correlates for virtually every psychiatric disorder. Yet it plays no accepted role in psychiatric diagnosis beyond ruling out medical factors such as tumors or traumatic brain injuries. Why is brain imaging not used in the diagnosis of primary psychiatric disorders, such as depression, bipolar disease, schizophrenia, and ADHD? The present article addresses this question. It reviews the state of the art in psychiatric imaging, including diagnostic and other applications, and explains the nonutility of diagnostic imaging in terms of aspects of both the current state of imaging and the current nature of psychiatric nosology. The likely future path by which imaging-based diagnoses will be incorporated into psychiatry is also discussed. By reviewing one well-known attempt to use SPECT-scanning in psychiatric diagnosis, the article examines a real-world practice that illustrates several related points: the appeal of the idea of image-assisted diagnosis for physicians, patients and families, despite a lack of proven effectiveness, and the mismatch between the categories and dimensions of current nosology and those suggested by imaging.

Neuroscience may supersede ethics and law

Advances in technology now make it possible to monitor the activity of the human brain in action, however crudely. As this emerging science continues to offer correlations between neural activity and mental functions, mind and brain may eventually prove to be one. If so, such a full comprehension of the electrochemical bases of mind may render current concepts of ethics, law, and even free will irrelevant.

The double-edged sword: does biomechanism increase or decrease judges' sentencing of psychopaths?

We tested whether expert testimony concerning a biomechanism of psychopathy increases or decreases punishment. In a nationwide experiment, U.S. state trial judges (N = 181) read a hypothetical case (based on an actual case) where the convict was diagnosed with psychopathy. Evidence presented at sentencing in support of a biomechanical cause of the convict's psychopathy significantly reduced the extent to which psychopathy was rated as aggravating and significantly reduced sentencing (from 13.93 years to 12.83 years). Content analysis of judges' reasoning indicated that even though the majority of judges listed aggravating factors (86.7%), the biomechanical evidence increased the proportion of judges listing mitigating factors (from 29.7 to 47.8%). Our results contribute to the literature on how biological explanations of behavior figure into theories of culpability and punishment.

Neuroethics: the ethical, legal, and societal impact of neuroscience

Advances in cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience raise a host of new questions concerning the ways in which neuroscience can and should be used. These advances also challenge our intuitions about the nature of humans as moral and spiritual beings. Neuroethics is the new field that grapples with these issues. The present article surveys a number of applications of neuroscience to such diverse arenas as marketing, criminal justice, the military, and worker productivity. The ethical, legal, and societal effects of these applications are discussed. Less practical, but perhaps ultimately more consequential, is the impact of neuroscience on our worldview and our understanding of the human person.

Brains in context in the neurolaw debate: the examples of free will and "dangerous" brains

Will neuroscience revolutionize forensic practice and our legal institutions? In the debate about the legal implications of brain research, free will and the neural bases of antisocial or criminal behavior are of central importance. By analyzing frequently quoted examples for the unconscious determinants of behavior and antisocial personality changes caused by brain lesions in a wider psychological and social context, the paper argues for a cautious middle position: Evidence for an impending normative "neuro-revolution" is scarce and neuroscience may instead gradually improve legal practice in the long run, particularly where normative questions directly pertain to brain-related questions. In the conclusion the paper raises concerns that applying neuroscience methods about an individual's responsibility or dangerousness is premature at the present time and carries serious individual and societal risks. Putting findings from brain research in wider contexts renders them empirically investigable in a way that does not neglect psychological and social aspects of human mind and behavior.

"Can it read my mind?" - What do the public and experts think of the current (mis)uses of neuroimaging?

Emerging applications of neuroimaging outside medicine and science have received intense public exposure through the media. Media misrepresentations can create a gulf between public and scientific understanding of the capabilities of neuroimaging and raise false expectations. To determine the extent of this effect and determine public opinions on acceptable uses and the need for regulation, we designed an electronic survey to obtain anonymous opinions from as wide a range of members of the public and neuroimaging experts as possible. The surveys ran from 1^st June to 30 September 2010, asked 10 and 21 questions, respectively, about uses of neuroimaging outside traditional medical diagnosis, data storage, science communication and potential methods of regulation. We analysed the responses using descriptive statistics; 660 individuals responded to the public and 303 individuals responded to the expert survey. We found evidence of public skepticism about the use of neuroimaging for applications such as lie detection or to determine consumer preferences and considerable disquiet about use by employers or government and about how their data would be stored and used. While also somewhat skeptical about new applications of neuroimaging, experts grossly underestimated how often neuroimaging had been used as evidence in court. Although both the public and the experts rated highly the importance of a better informed public in limiting the inappropriate uses to which neuroimaging might be put, opinions differed on the need for, and mechanism of, actual regulation. Neuroscientists recognized the risks of inaccurate reporting of neuroimaging capabilities in the media but showed little motivation to engage with the public. The present study also emphasizes the need for better frameworks for scientific engagement with media and public education.

Decoding patterns of human brain activity

Considerable information about mental states can be decoded from noninvasive measures of human brain activity. Analyses of brain activity patterns can reveal what a person is seeing, perceiving, attending to, or remembering. Moreover, multidimensional models can be used to investigate how the brain encodes complex visual scenes or abstract semantic information. Such feats of "brain reading" or "mind reading," though impressive, raise important conceptual, methodological, and ethical issues. What does successful decoding reveal about the cognitive functions performed by a brain region? How should brain signals be spatially selected and mathematically combined to ensure that decoding reflects inherent computations of the brain rather than those performed by the decoder? We highlight recent advances and describe how multivoxel pattern analysis can provide a window into mind-brain relationships with unprecedented specificity, when carefully applied. However, as brain-reading technology advances, issues of neuroethics and mental privacy will be important to consider.

Neuroimage evidence and the insanity defense

The introduction of neuroscientific evidence in criminal trials has given rise to fears that neuroimagery presented by an expert witness might inordinately influence jurors' evaluations of the defendant. In this experiment, a diverse sample of 1,170 community members from throughout the U.S. evaluated a written mock trial in which psychological, neuropsychological, neuroscientific, and neuroimage-based expert evidence was presented in support of a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) defense. No evidence of an independent influence of neuroimagery was found. Overall, neuroscience-based evidence was found to be more persuasive than psychological and anecdotal family history evidence. These effects were consistent across different insanity standards. Despite the non-influence of neuroimagery, however, jurors who were not provided with a neuroimage indicated that they believed neuroimagery would have been the most helpful kind of evidence in their evaluations of the defendant.