Motivated misremembering of selfish decisions

Forever young: The end of history illusion in children

The "end of history" illusion in adults (Quoidbach et al., 2013) is an asymmetrical pattern in which people accept that they've changed in the past but don't believe they will change in the future. We explore here whether the same psychological forces that cause the illusion in adults exist in the minds of children. Two studies with 4- to 11-year-olds (N = 256) suggest that they do, even in a within-subject design where the same child is asked questions about the past and the future. A third study (N = 83) finds that this illusion does not persist when children are asked about other people. These studies suggest that even young children believe that although they used to be different in the past, from this point on, they will remain forever young.

Bias and constructive processes in a self-memory system

Martin Conway's influential theorising about the self-memory system (Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288) illuminated how the "working self" influences the construction of autobiographical memories. Moreover, his constructive view of self and memory is compatible with the occurrence of various kinds of errors and distortions in remembering. Here we consider one of the "seven sins" of memory (Schacter, D. L. (2021). The seven sins of memory updated edition: How the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) that we believe is most closely related to the operation of Conway's self-memory system: bias, which refers to the role of current knowledge, beliefs, and feelings in shaping and sometimes distorting memories for past experiences and attitudes. More specifically, we discuss recent research on three forms of bias - consistency, self-enhancing, and positivity biases - that illuminate their role in influencing how people remember the past and also imagine the future. We consider both theoretical and applied aspects of these biases and, consistent with Conway's perspective, argue that despite sometimes contributing to inaccuracies, bias also serves adaptive functions.

Beneficial effects of communicating intentions when delivering moral criticism: Cognitive and neural responses

People often do not accept criticism on their morality, especially when delivered by outgroup members. In two preregistered studies, we investigated whether people become more receptive to such negative feedback when feedback senders communicate their intention to help. Participants received negative feedback from ostensible others on their selfish (rather than altruistic) decisions in a donation task. We manipulated the identity of a feedback sender (ingroup vs. outgroup) and the intention that they provided for giving feedback. A sender either did not communicate any intentions, indicated the intention to help the feedback receiver improve, or communicated the intention to show moral superiority. We measured participants' self-reported responses to the feedback (Study 1, N = 44) and additionally recorded an EEG in Study 2 (N = 34). Results showed that when no intentions were communicated, participants assumed worse intentions from outgroup senders than ingroup senders (Study 1). However, group membership had no significant effect once feedback senders made their intentions explicit. Moreover, across studies, when feedback senders communicated their intention to help, participants perceived feedback as less unfair compared with when senders tried to convey their moral superiority. Complementing these results, exploratory event-related potential results of Study 2 suggested that communicating the intention to help reduced participants' attentional vigilance toward negative feedback messages on their morality (i.e., decreased P200 amplitudes). These results demonstrate the beneficial effects of communicating the intention to help when one tries to encourage others' moral growth through criticism.

Motivated Cognition in Cooperation

Successful cooperation is tightly linked to individuals' beliefs about their interaction partners, the decision setting, and existing norms, perceptions, and values. This article reviews and integrates findings from judgment and decision-making, social and cognitive psychology, political science, and economics, developing a systematic overview of the mechanisms underlying motivated cognition in cooperation. We elaborate on how theories and concepts related to motivated cognition developed in various disciplines define the concept and describe its functionality. We explain why beliefs play such an essential role in cooperation, how they can be distorted, and how this fosters or harms cooperation. We also highlight how individual differences and situational factors change the propensity to engage in motivated cognition. In the form of a construct map, we provide a visualization of the theoretical and empirical knowledge structure regarding the role of motivated cognition, including its many interdependencies, feedback loops, and moderating influences. We conclude with a brief suggestion for a future research agenda based on this compiled evidence.

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Grandiose narcissism influences the phenomenology of remembered past and imagined future events

Little empirical work has examined future thinking in narcissistic grandiosity. We here extend prior work finding that people scoring high in grandiosity have self-bolstering tendencies in remembering past events, and we consider whether these tendencies extend to imagining future events. Across an initial study (N = 112) and replication (N = 169), participants wrote about remembered past events and imagined future events in which they embodied or would embody either positive or negative traits. Participants then rated those events on several subjective measures. We find that people scoring higher in grandiosity remember past events in which they embody positive traits with greater detail and ease than past events in which they embody negative traits. These same effects persist when people scoring high in grandiosity imagine possible events in their future. Those scoring higher in grandiosity endorse thinking about positive events in their past and future more frequently than negative events, and they judge positive future events as more plausible than negative future events. These tendencies did not extend to objective detail provided in their written narratives about these events. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that grandiosity is associated with self-bolstering tendencies in both remembering the past and imagining the future.

On the cognitive mechanisms supporting prosocial disobedience in a post-genocidal context

The aim of the present study was to offer a first investigation of the neuro-cognitive processes and the temporal dynamics at the neural level, together with cultural, social and psychological dimensions, that may support resistance to orders to harm another person. Using a novel experimental approach to study experimentally disobedience, we recruited individuals from the first generation born after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Seventy-two were recruited and tested in Rwanda and 72 were recruited and tested in Belgium. Results indicated that a higher neural response to the pain of others and a higher feeling of responsibility when people obeyed orders were associated with more resistance to immoral orders. We also observed that participants who had a higher processing, as measured through mid-frontal theta activity, when listening to the orders of the experimenter disobeyed less frequently to immoral orders. Further, participants experiencing a higher conflict before administering a shock to the 'victim' also disobeyed more frequently to immoral orders. Finally, a low cultural relationship to authority and a high estimated family suffering during the genocide were also associated with more disobedience to immoral orders. The present study opens new paths for interdisciplinary field research dedicated to the study of obedience.

Psychological Selfishness

Selfishness is central to many theories of human morality, yet its psychological nature remains largely overlooked. Psychologists often draw on classical conceptions of selfishness from evolutionary biology (i.e., selfish gene theory), economics (i.e., rational self-interest), and philosophy (i.e., psychological egoism), but such characterizations offer limited insight into the psychology of selfishness. To address this gap, we propose a novel framework in which selfishness is recast as a psychological construction. From this view, selfishness is perceived in ourselves and others when we detect a situation-specific desire to benefit the self that disregards others' desires and prevailing social expectations for the situation. We argue that detecting and deterring such psychological selfishness in both oneself and others is crucial in social life-facilitating the maintenance of social cohesion and close relationships. In addition, we show how using this psychological framework offers a richer understanding of the nature of human social behavior. Delineating a psychological construct of selfishness can promote coherence in interdisciplinary research on selfishness and provide insights for interventions to prevent or remediate the negative effects of selfishness.

Distinguishing self-involving from self-serving choices in framing effects

We distinguish two types of cases that have potential to generate quasi-cyclical preferences: self-involving choices where an agent oscillates between first- and third-person perspectives that conflict regarding their life-changing implications, and self-serving choices where frame-based reasoning can be “first-personally rational” yet “third-personally irrational.” We argue that the distinction between these types of cases deserves more attention in Bermúdez's account.

Why do people follow social norms?

Norms prescribe how to make decisions in social situations and play a crucial role in sustaining cooperative relationships and coordinating collective action. However, following norms often requires restricting behavior, demanding to curtail selfishness, or suppressing personal goals. This raises the question why people adhere to norms. We review recent theories and empirical findings that aim at explaining why people follow norms even in private, when violations are difficult to detect and are not sanctioned. We discuss theories of norm internalization, social and self-image concerns, and social learning (i.e. preferences conditional on what others do/believe). Finally, we present two behavioral, incentivized tasks that can be used to elicit norms and measure the individual propensity to follow them.

Belief in Altruistic Motives Predicts Prosocial Actions and Inferences

Are humans ever truly altruistic? Or are all actions, however noble, ultimately motivated by self-interest? Psychologists and philosophers have long grappled with this question, but few have considered laypeople's beliefs about the nature of prosocial motives. Here we examine these beliefs and their social correlates across two experiments (N = 445). We find that people tend to believe humans can be, and frequently are, altruistically motivated-echoing prior work. Moreover, people who more strongly believe in altruistic motives act more prosocially themselves-for instance, sacrificing greater amounts of money and time to help others-a relationship that holds even when controlling for trait empathy. People who believe in altruistic motives also judge other prosocial agents to be more genuinely kind, especially when agents' motives are ambiguous. Lastly, people independently show a self-serving bias-believing their own motives for prosociality are more often altruistic than others'. Overall, this work suggests that believing in altruistic motives predicts the extent to which people both see altruism and act prosocially, possibly reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of such lay theories.

How peer influence shapes value computation in moral decision-making

Moral behavior is susceptible to peer influence. How does information from peers influence moral preferences? We used drift-diffusion modeling to show that peer influence changes the value of moral behavior by prioritizing the choice attributes that align with peers' goals. Study 1 (N = 100; preregistered) showed that participants accurately inferred the goals of prosocial and antisocial peers when observing their moral decisions. In Study 2 (N = 68), participants made moral decisions before and after observing the decisions of a prosocial or antisocial peer. Peer observation caused participants' own preferences to resemble those of their peers. This peer influence effect on value computation manifested as an increased weight on choice attributes promoting the peers' goals that occurred independently from peer influence on initial choice bias. Participants' self-reported awareness of influence tracked more closely with computational measures of prosocial than antisocial influence. Our findings have implications for bolstering and blocking the effects of prosocial and antisocial influence on moral behavior.

I remember being nice: self-enhancement memory bias in middle childhood

Adults tend to remember themselves in a positive way. For example, they are more likely to remember their past good deeds rather than their past bad deeds. We investigated whether children (N = 40) are also biased in how they remember information related to themselves. Using the self-reference memory paradigm, we found that 8- to 10-year-olds' source memory for mean action phrases (e.g., "Lie to someone") was worse when the phrases were encoded with reference to themselves compared to when they were encoded with reference to others. Source memory for self-referenced mean phrases was also worse than source memory for self-referenced nice action phrases (e.g., "Be kind to someone") and self-referenced neutral action phrases (e.g., "Draw a circle"). These results provide some of the first experimental evidence for self-enhancement in children's memory.

Unethical amnesia responds more to instrumental than to hedonic motives

Using large-scale incentivized online experiments, we tested two possible origins of individuals’ forgetting about their past cheating behavior in a mind game. We found that purely hedonic considerations, such as the maintenance of a positive self-image, are not sufficient to motivate unethical amnesia, but the addition of an instrumental value to forgetting triggers such amnesia. Individuals forget their past lies more when amnesia can serve as an excuse not to engage in future morally responsible behavior. These findings shed light on the interplay between dishonesty and memory and suggest further investigations of the cost function of unethical amnesia. A policy implication is that improving ethics requires making unethical amnesia more difficult for individuals.

Humans care about morality. Yet, they often engage in actions that contradict their moral self. Unethical amnesia is observed when people do not remember or remember less vividly these actions. This paper explores two reasons why individuals may experience unethical amnesia. Forgetting past unethical behavior may be motivated by purely hedonic or affective reasons, such as the willingness to maintain one’s moral self-image, but also by instrumental or strategic motives, in anticipation of future misbehavior. In a large-scale incentivized online experiment (n = 1,322) using a variant of a mind game, we find that hedonic considerations are not sufficient to motivate the forgetting of past cheating behavior. This is confirmed in a follow-up experiment (n = 1,005) in which recalls are elicited the same day instead of 3 wk apart. However, when unethical amnesia can serve as a justification for a future action, such as deciding on whether to keep undeserved money, motivated forgetting is more likely. Thereby, we show that motivated forgetting occurs as a self-excuse to justify future immoral decisions.