A divisive model of evidence accumulation explains uneven weighting of evidence over time

Continuous Bump Attractor Networks Require Explicit Error Coding for Gain Recalibration

Representations of continuous variables are crucial to create internal models of the external world. A prevailing model of how the brain maintains these representations is given by continuous bump attractor networks (CBANs) in a broad range of brain functions across different areas, such as spatial navigation in hippocampal/entorhinal circuits and working memory in prefrontal cortex. Through recurrent connections, a CBAN maintains a persistent activity bump, whose peak location can vary along a neural space, corresponding to different values of a continuous variable. To track the value of a continuous variable changing over time, a CBAN updates the location of its activity bump based on inputs that encode the changes in the continuous variable (e.g., movement velocity in the case of spatial navigation)-a process akin to mathematical integration. This integration process is not perfect and accumulates error over time. For error correction, CBANs can use additional inputs providing ground-truth information about the continuous variable's correct value (e.g., visual landmarks for spatial navigation). These inputs enable the network dynamics to automatically correct any representation error. Recent experimental work on hippocampal place cells has shown that, beyond correcting errors, ground-truth inputs also fine-tune the gain of the integration process, a crucial factor that links the change in the continuous variable to the updating of the activity bump's location. However, existing CBAN models lack this plasticity, offering no insights into the neural mechanisms and representations involved in the recalibration of the integration gain. In this paper, we explore this gap by using a ring attractor network, a specific type of CBAN, to model the experimental conditions that demonstrated gain recalibration in hippocampal place cells. Our analysis reveals the necessary conditions for neural mechanisms behind gain recalibration within a CBAN. Unlike error correction, which occurs through network dynamics based on ground-truth inputs, gain recalibration requires an additional neural signal that explicitly encodes the error in the network's representation via a rate code. Finally, we propose a modified ring attractor network as an example CBAN model that verifies our theoretical findings. Combining an error-rate code with Hebbian synaptic plasticity, this model achieves recalibration of integration gain in a CBAN, ensuring accurate representation for continuous variables.

Modelling decision-making biases

Biases are a fundamental aspect of everyday life decision-making. A variety of modelling approaches have been suggested to capture decision-making biases. Statistical models are a means to describe the data, but the results are usually interpreted according to a verbal theory. This can lead to an ambiguous interpretation of the data. Mathematical cognitive models of decision-making outline the structure of the decision process with formal assumptions, providing advantages in terms of prediction, simulation, and interpretability compared to statistical models. We compare studies that used both signal detection theory and evidence accumulation models as models of decision-making biases, concluding that the latter provides a more comprehensive account of the decision-making phenomena by including response time behavior. We conclude by reviewing recent studies investigating attention and expectation biases with evidence accumulation models. Previous findings, reporting an exclusive influence of attention on the speed of evidence accumulation and prior probability on starting point, are challenged by novel results suggesting an additional effect of attention on non-decision time and prior probability on drift rate.

A confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference

Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer's temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. The key dynamic that leads to a primacy bias in our model is an overweighting of new sensory information that agrees with the observer's existing belief-a type of 'confirmation bias'. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.

Mixing memory and desire: How memory reactivation supports deliberative decision-making

Memories affect nearly every aspect of our mental life. They allow us to both resolve uncertainty in the present and to construct plans for the future. Recently, renewed interest in the role memory plays in adaptive behavior has led to new theoretical advances and empirical observations. We review key findings, with particular emphasis on how the retrieval of many kinds of memories affects deliberative action selection. These results are interpreted in a sequential inference framework, in which reinstatements from memory serve as "samples" of potential action outcomes. The resulting model suggests a central role for the dynamics of memory reactivation in determining the influence of different kinds of memory in decisions. We propose that representation-specific dynamics can implement a bottom-up "product of experts" rule that integrates multiple sets of action-outcome predictions weighted based on their uncertainty. We close by reviewing related findings and identifying areas for further research. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition Neuroscience > Computation.

Choices change the temporal weighting of decision evidence

Many decisions result from the accumulation of decision-relevant information (evidence) over time. Even when maximizing decision accuracy requires weighting all the evidence equally, decision-makers often give stronger weight to evidence occurring early or late in the evidence stream. Here, we show changes in such temporal biases within participants as a function of intermittent judgments about parts of the evidence stream. Human participants performed a decision task that required a continuous estimation of the mean evidence at the end of the stream. The evidence was either perceptual (noisy random dot motion) or symbolic (variable sequences of numbers). Participants also reported a categorical judgment of the preceding evidence half-way through the stream in one condition or executed an evidence-independent motor response in another condition. The relative impact of early versus late evidence on the final estimation flipped between these two conditions. In particular, participants' sensitivity to late evidence after the intermittent judgment, but not the simple motor response, was decreased. Both the intermittent response as well as the final estimation reports were accompanied by nonluminance-mediated increases of pupil diameter. These pupil dilations were bigger during intermittent judgments than simple motor responses and bigger during estimation when the late evidence was consistent than inconsistent with the initial judgment. In sum, decisions activate pupil-linked arousal systems and alter the temporal weighting of decision evidence. Our results are consistent with the idea that categorical choices in the face of uncertainty induce a change in the state of the neural circuits underlying decision-making.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The psychology and neuroscience of decision-making have extensively studied the accumulation of decision-relevant information toward a categorical choice. Much fewer studies have assessed the impact of a choice on the processing of subsequent information. Here, we show that intermittent choices during a protracted stream of input reduce the sensitivity to subsequent decision information and transiently boost arousal. Choices might trigger a state change in the neural machinery for decision-making.

Flexible categorization in perceptual decision making

Perceptual decisions rely on accumulating sensory evidence. This computation has been studied using either drift diffusion models or neurobiological network models exhibiting winner-take-all attractor dynamics. Although both models can account for a large amount of data, it remains unclear whether their dynamics are qualitatively equivalent. Here we show that in the attractor model, but not in the drift diffusion model, an increase in the stimulus fluctuations or the stimulus duration promotes transitions between decision states. The increase in the number of transitions leads to a crossover between weighting mostly early evidence (primacy) to weighting late evidence (recency), a prediction we validate with psychophysical data. Between these two limiting cases, we found a novel flexible categorization regime, in which fluctuations can reverse initially-incorrect categorizations. This reversal asymmetry results in a non-monotonic psychometric curve, a distinctive feature of the attractor model. Our findings point to correcting decision reversals as an important feature of perceptual decision making.