Proactive and reactive accumulation-to-bound processes compete during perceptual decisions

A neurocomputational model of decision and confidence in object recognition task

How does the brain process natural visual stimuli to make a decision? Imagine driving through fog. An object looms ahead. What do you do? This decision requires not only identifying the object but also choosing an action based on your decision confidence. In this circumstance, confidence is making a bridge between seeing and believing. Our study unveils how the brain processes visual information to make such decisions with an assessment of confidence, using a model inspired by the visual cortex. To computationally model the process, this study uses a spiking neural network inspired by the hierarchy of the visual cortex in mammals to investigate the dynamics of feedforward object recognition and decision-making in the brain. The model consists of two modules: a temporal dynamic object representation module and an attractor neural network-based decision-making module. Unlike traditional models, ours captures the evolution of evidence within the visual cortex, mimicking how confidence forms in the brain. This offers a more biologically plausible approach to decision-making when encountering real-world stimuli. We conducted experiments using natural stimuli and measured accuracy, reaction time, and confidence. The model's estimated confidence aligns remarkably well with human-reported confidence. Furthermore, the model can simulate the human change-of-mind phenomenon, reflecting the ongoing evaluation of evidence in the brain. Also, this finding offers decision-making and confidence encoding share the same neural circuit.

Influence of reinforcement and its omission on trial-by-trial changes of response bias in perceptual decision making

Discrimination performance in perceptual choice tasks is known to reflect both sensory discriminability and nonsensory response bias. In the framework of signal detection theory, these aspects of discrimination performance are quantified through separate measures, sensitivity (d') for sensory discriminability and decision criterion (c) for response bias. However, it is unknown how response bias (i.e., criterion) changes at the single-trial level as a consequence of reinforcement history. We subjected rats to a two-stimulus two-response conditional discrimination task with auditory stimuli and induced response bias through unequal reinforcement probabilities for the two responses. We compared three signal-detection-theory-based criterion learning models with respect to their ability to fit experimentally observed fluctuations of response bias on a trial-by-trial level. These models shift the criterion by a fixed step (1) after each reinforced response or (2) after each nonreinforced response or (3) after both. We find that all three models fail to capture essential aspects of the data. Prompted by the observation that steady-state criterion values conformed well to a behavioral model of signal detection based on the generalized matching law, we constructed a trial-based version of this model and find that it provides a superior account of response bias fluctuations under changing reinforcement contingencies.

Proactive Versus Reactive Control Strategies Differentially Mediate Alcohol Drinking in Male Wistars and P Rats

Problematic alcohol consumption is associated with deficits in decision-making and alterations in prefrontal cortex neural activity likely contribute. We hypothesized that the differences in cognitive control would be evident between male Wistars and a model of genetic risk: alcohol-preferring P rats. Cognitive control is split into proactive and reactive components. Proactive control maintains goal-directed behavior independent of a stimulus, whereas reactive control elicits goal-directed behavior at the time of a stimulus. We hypothesized that Wistars would show proactive control over alcohol seeking whereas P rats would show reactive control over alcohol seeking. Neural activity was recorded from the prefrontal cortex during an alcohol seeking task with two session types. On congruent sessions, the conditioned stimulus (CS+) was on the same side as alcohol access. Incongruent sessions presented alcohol opposite the CS+. Wistars, but not P rats, made more incorrect approaches during incongruent sessions, suggesting that Wistars utilized the previously learned rule. This motivated the hypothesis that neural activity reflecting proactive control would be observable in Wistars but not P rats. While P rats showed differences in neural activity at times of alcohol access, Wistars showed differences prior to approaching the sipper. These results support our hypothesis that Wistars are more likely to engage in proactive cognitive control strategies whereas P rats are more likely to engage in reactive cognitive control strategies. Although P rats were bred to prefer alcohol, the differences in cognitive control may reflect a sequela of behaviors that mirror those in humans at risk for an AUD.

Rapid, systematic updating of movement by accumulated decision evidence

Acting in the natural world requires not only deciding among multiple options but also converting decisions into motor commands. How the dynamics of decision formation influence the fine kinematics of response movement remains, however, poorly understood. Here we investigate how the accumulation of decision evidence shapes the response orienting trajectories in a task where freely-moving rats combine prior expectations and auditory information to select between two possible options. Response trajectories and their motor vigor are initially determined by the prior. Rats movements then incorporate sensory information as early as 60 ms after stimulus onset by accelerating or slowing depending on how much the stimulus supports their initial choice. When the stimulus evidence is in strong contradiction, rats change their mind and reverse their initial trajectory. Human subjects performing an equivalent task display a remarkably similar behavior. We encapsulate these results in a computational model that, by mapping the decision variable onto the movement kinematics at discrete time points, captures subjects' choices, trajectories and changes of mind. Our results show that motor responses are not ballistic. Instead, they are systematically and rapidly updated, as they smoothly unfold over time, by the parallel dynamics of the underlying decision process.

Transitions in dynamical regime and neural mode underlie perceptual decision-making

Perceptual decision-making is the process by which an animal uses sensory stimuli to choose an action or mental proposition. This process is thought to be mediated by neurons organized as attractor networks 1,2 . However, whether attractor dynamics underlie decision behavior and the complex neuronal responses remains unclear. Here we use an unsupervised, deep learning-based method to discover decision-related dynamics from the simultaneous activity of neurons in frontal cortex and striatum of rats while they accumulate pulsatile auditory evidence. We show that contrary to prevailing hypotheses, attractors play a role only after a transition from a regime in the dynamics that is strongly driven by inputs to one dominated by the intrinsic dynamics. The initial regime mediates evidence accumulation, and the subsequent intrinsic-dominant regime subserves decision commitment. This regime transition is coupled to a rapid reorganization in the representation of the decision process in the neural population (a change in the "neural mode" along which the process develops). A simplified model approximating the coupled transition in the dynamics and neural mode allows inferring, from each trial's neural activity, the internal decision commitment time in that trial, and captures diverse and complex single-neuron temporal profiles, such as ramping and stepping 3-5 . It also captures trial-averaged curved trajectories 6-8 , and reveals distinctions between brain regions. Our results show that the formation of a perceptual choice involves a rapid, coordinated transition in both the dynamical regime and the neural mode of the decision process, and suggest pairing deep learning and parsimonious models as a promising approach for understanding complex data.

Proactive Versus Reactive Control Strategies Differentially Mediate Alcohol Drinking in Wistar and P rats

Problematic alcohol consumption is associated with deficits in decision-making, and alterations in prefrontal cortex neural activity likely contributes. We hypothesized that differences in cognitive control would be evident between male Wistar rats and a model for genetic risk for alcohol use disorder (alcohol-preferring P rats). Cognitive control can be split into proactive and reactive components. Proactive control maintains goal-directed behavior independent of a stimulus whereas reactive control elicits goal-directed behavior at the time of a stimulus. We hypothesized that Wistars would show proactive control over alcohol-seeking whereas P rats would show reactive control over alcohol-seeking. Neural ensembles were recorded from prefrontal cortex during an alcohol seeking task that utilized two session types. On congruent sessions the CS+ was on the same side as alcohol access. Incongruent sessions presented alcohol opposite the CS+. Wistars, but not P rats, exhibited an increase in incorrect approaches during incongruent sessions, suggesting that Wistars utilized the previously learned task-rule. This motivated the hypothesis that ensemble activity reflecting proactive control would be observable in Wistars but not P rats. While P rats showed differences in neural activity at times relevant for alcohol delivery, Wistars showed differences prior to approaching the sipper. These results support our hypothesis that Wistars are more likely to engage proactive cognitive-control strategies whereas P rats are more likely to engage reactive cognitive control strategies. Although P rats were bred to prefer alcohol, differences in cognitive control may reflect a sequela of behaviors that mirror those in humans at risk for an AUD.

Recurrent networks endowed with structural priors explain suboptimal animal behavior

The strategies found by animals facing a new task are determined both by individual experience and by structural priors evolved to leverage the statistics of natural environments. Rats quickly learn to capitalize on the trial sequence correlations of two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks after correct trials but consistently deviate from optimal behavior after error trials. To understand this outcome-dependent gating, we first show that recurrent neural networks (RNNs) trained in the same 2AFC task outperform rats as they can readily learn to use across-trial information both after correct and error trials. We hypothesize that, although RNNs can optimize their behavior in the 2AFC task without any a priori restrictions, rats' strategy is constrained by a structural prior adapted to a natural environment in which rewarded and non-rewarded actions provide largely asymmetric information. When pre-training RNNs in a more ecological task with more than two possible choices, networks develop a strategy by which they gate off the across-trial evidence after errors, mimicking rats' behavior. Population analyses show that the pre-trained networks form an accurate representation of the sequence statistics independently of the outcome in the previous trial. After error trials, gating is implemented by a change in the network dynamics that temporarily decouple the categorization of the stimulus from the across-trial accumulated evidence. Our results suggest that the rats' suboptimal behavior reflects the influence of a structural prior that reacts to errors by isolating the network decision dynamics from the context, ultimately constraining the performance in a 2AFC laboratory task.