An fMRI study of scientists with a Ph.D. in physics confronted with naive ideas in science

Relation of life sciences students' metacognitive monitoring to neural activity during biology error detection

Metacognitive calibration-the capacity to accurately self-assess one's performance-forms the basis for error detection and self-monitoring and is a potential catalyst for conceptual change. Limited brain imaging research on authentic learning tasks implicates the lateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate brain regions in expert scientific reasoning. This study aimed to determine how variation in undergraduate life sciences students' metacognitive calibration relates to their brain activity when evaluating the accuracy of biological models. Fifty undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory life sciences course completed a biology model error detection task during fMRI. Students with higher metacognitive calibration recruited lateral prefrontal regions linked in prior research to expert STEM reasoning to a greater extent than those with lower metacognitive calibration. Findings suggest that metacognition relates to important individual differences in undergraduate students' use of neural resources during an authentic educational task and underscore the importance of fostering metacognitive calibration in the classroom.

Tempering the tension between science and intuition

Scientific ideas can be difficult to access if they contradict earlier-developed intuitive theories; counterintuitive scientific statements like "bubbles have weight" are verified more slowly and less accurately than closely-matched intuitive statements like "bricks have weight" (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). Here, we investigate how context and instruction influences this conflict. In Study 1, college undergraduates (n = 100) verified scientific statements interspersed with images intended to prime either a scientific interpretation of the statements or an intuitive one. Participants primed with scientific images verified counterintuitive statements more accurately, but no more quickly, than those primed with intuitive images. In Study 2, college undergraduates (n = 138) received instruction that affirmed the scientific aspects of the target domain and refuted common misconceptions. Instruction increased the accuracy of participants' responses to counterintuitive statements but not the speed of their responses. Collectively, these findings indicate that scientific interpretations of a domain can be prioritized over intuitive ones but the conflict between science and intuition cannot be eliminated altogether.

An understanding of falling bodies across schooling and experience based on the conceptual prevalence framework

In this article, we describe a study conducted online with 953 participants of varying levels of education and, when applicable, science/physics teaching experience. These participants were asked to solve a cognitive task in which many different pairs of objects were presented and to identify which, if any, would touch the ground first when dropped (in atmospheric or non-atmospheric environments). Recorded accuracies and response times allowed us to conduct an analysis based on the conceptual prevalence framework, which posits that the coexistence of conceptual and/or misconceptual resources can produce interference in response production. The results show that the influence of some of them decreases or, more surprisingly, increases with training. In fact, secondary and college physics teachers seem to cultivate some of them, and most likely have contributed to their spread. The implications for teaching and research are discussed.

Interference between naïve and scientific theories in mathematics and science: An fMRI study comparing mathematicians and non-mathematicians

BACKGROUND

One frequent learning obstacle in mathematics is conceptual interference. However, the majority of research on conceptual interference has focused on science. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we examined the conceptual interference effects in both mathematics and science and the moderating influence of mathematical expertise.

METHODS

Thirty adult mathematicians and 31 gender-, age-, and intelligence-matched non-mathematicians completed a speeded reasoning tasks with statements from mathematics and science. Statements were either congruent (true or false according to both scientifically and naïve theories) or incongruent (differed in their truth value).

FINDINGS

Both groups exhibited more errors and a slower response time when evaluating incongruent compared to congruent statements in the science and mathematics task, but mathematicians were less affected by naïve theories. In mathematics, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was activated when inhibiting naïve theories, while in science it was the dorsolateral and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex bilaterally. Mathematical expertise did not moderate the conceptual interference effect at the neural level.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that naïve theories in mathematics are still present in mathematicians, even though they are less affected by them in performance than novices. In addition, the differential brain activation in the mathematics and science task indicates that the extent of inhibitory control processes to resolve conceptual interference depends on the quality of the involved concepts.

Persistence of the "Moving Things Are Alive" Heuristic into Adulthood: Evidence from EEG

Although a growing number of studies indicate that simple strategies, intuitions, or cognitive shortcuts called heuristics can persistently interfere with scientific reasoning in physics and chemistry, the persistence of heuristics related to learning biology is less known. In this study, we investigate the persistence of the "moving things are alive" heuristic into adulthood with 28 undergraduate students who were asked to select between two images, one of which one represented a living thing, while their electroencephalographic signals were recorded. Results show that N2 and LPP event-related potential components, often associated with tasks requiring inhibitory control, are higher in counterintuitive trials (i.e., in trials including moving things not alive or nonmoving things alive) compared with intuitive ones. To our knowledge, these findings represent the first neurocognitive evidence that the "moving things are alive" heuristic persists into adulthood and that overcoming this heuristic might require inhibitory control. Potential implications for life science education are discussed.