Vigour in active avoidance

Acute stress promotes effort mobilization for safety-related goals

Although the acute stress response is a highly adaptive survival mechanism, much remains unknown about how its activation impacts our decisions and actions. Based on its resource-mobilizing function, here we hypothesize that this intricate psychophysiological process may increase the willingness (motivation) to engage in effortful, energy-consuming, actions. Across two experiments (n = 80, n = 84), participants exposed to a validated stress-induction protocol, compared to a no-stress control condition, exhibited an increased willingness to exert physical effort (grip force) in the service of avoiding the possibility of experiencing aversive electrical stimulation (threat-of-shock), but not for the acquisition of rewards (money). Use of computational cognitive models linked this observation to subjective value computations that prioritize safety over the minimization of effort expenditure; especially when facing unlikely threats that can only be neutralized via high levels of grip force. Taken together, these results suggest that activation of the acute stress response can selectively alter the willingness to exert effort for safety-related goals. These findings are relevant for understanding how, under stress, we become motivated to engage in effortful actions aimed at avoiding aversive outcomes.

Latent cause inference during extinction learning in trauma-exposed individuals with and without PTSD

BACKGROUND

Problems in learning that sights, sounds, or situations that were once associated with danger have become safe (extinction learning) may explain why some individuals suffer prolonged psychological distress following traumatic experiences. Although simple learning models have been unable to provide a convincing account of why this learning fails, it has recently been proposed that this may be explained by individual differences in beliefs about the causal structure of the environment.

METHODS

Here, we tested two competing hypotheses as to how differences in causal inference might be related to trauma-related psychopathology, using extinction learning data collected from clinically well-characterised individuals with varying degrees of post-traumatic stress (N = 56). Model parameters describing individual differences in causal inference were related to multiple post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression symptom dimensions via network analysis.

RESULTS

Individuals with more severe PTSD were more likely to assign observations from conditioning and extinction stages to a single underlying cause. Specifically, greater re-experiencing symptom severity was associated with a lower likelihood of inferring that multiple causes were active in the environment.

CONCLUSIONS

We interpret these results as providing evidence of a primary deficit in discriminative learning in participants with more severe PTSD. Specifically, a tendency to attribute a greater diversity of stimulus configurations to the same underlying cause resulted in greater uncertainty about stimulus-outcome associations, impeding learning both that certain stimuli were safe, and that certain stimuli were no longer dangerous. In the future, better understanding of the role of causal inference in trauma-related psychopathology may help refine cognitive therapies for these disorders.

A Causal Role for Gastric Rhythm in Human Disgust Avoidance

Rotten food, maggots, bodily waste-all elicit disgust in humans. Disgust promotes survival by encouraging avoidance of disease vectors1 but is also implicated in prejudice toward minority groups; avoidance of environmentally beneficial foods, such as insect protein; and maladaptive avoidance behavior in neuropsychiatric conditions.2-5 Unlike fear, pathological disgust is not improved substantially by exposure therapy clinically,6 nor in experimental work does behavioral avoidance of disgusting images habituate following prolonged exposure.7,8 Under normal physiological conditions, perception of disgusting stimuli disrupts myoelectrical rhythms in the stomach,9-13 inducing gastric dysrhythmias that correlate with neural signatures of disgust.11 However, the causal role of gastric rhythm in disgust avoidance is unknown. We manipulated gastric rhythm using domperidone, a peripheral dopamine D2/D3 antagonist and common anti-emetic, at a dose (10 mg) that acts to convert gastric dysrhythmias to normal rhythms.9 In a preregistered, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled crossover design in 25 healthy volunteers (aged 18-25), we measured the effects of domperidone on core disgust avoidance, using eye tracking to measure implicit (oculomotor) avoidance of disgusting images (feces) before and after an "exposure" intervention (monetary reinforcement for looking at disgusting images).7,8 We find that domperidone significantly reduces oculomotor disgust avoidance following incentivized exposure. This suggests that domperidone may weaken the "immunity" of disgust to habituation, putatively by reducing gastric dysrhythmias during incentivized engagement with disgusting stimuli. This indicates a causal role for disgust-related visceral changes in disgust avoidance, supporting the hypothesis that physiological homeostasis contributes to emotional experience.

Comparative transcriptome and coexpression network analysis of carpel quantitative variation in Paeonia rockii

BACKGROUND

Quantitative variation of floral organs in plants is caused by an extremely complex process of transcriptional regulation. Despite progress in model plants, the molecular mechanisms of quantitative variation remain unknown in woody flower plants. The Paeonia rockii originated in China is a precious woody plant with ornamental, medicinal and oil properties. There is a wide variation in the number of carpel in P. rockii, but the molecular mechanism of the variation has rarely been studied. Then a comparative transcriptome was performed among two cultivars of P. rockii with different development patterns of carpel in this study.

RESULTS

Through the next-generation and single-molecule long-read sequencing (NGS and SMLRS), 66,563 unigenes and 28,155 differentially expressed genes (DEGs) were identified in P. rockii. Then clustering pattern and weighted gene coexpression network analysis (WGCNA) indicated that 15 candidate genes were likely involved in the carpel quantitative variation, including floral organ development, transcriptional regulatory and enzyme-like factors. Moreover, transcription factors (TFs) from the MYB, WD, RING1 and LRR gene families suggested the important roles in the management of the upstream genes. Among them, PsMYB114-like, PsMYB12 and PsMYB61-like from the MYB gene family were probably the main characters that regulated the carpel quantitative variation. Further, a hypothetical model for the regulation pattern of carpel quantitative variation was proposed in which the candidate genes function synergistically the quantitative variation process.

CONCLUSIONS

We present the high-quality sequencing products in P. rockii. Our results summarize a valuable collective of gene expression profiles characterizing the carpel quantitative variation. The DEGs are candidate for functional analyses of genes regulating the carpel quantitative variation in tree peonies, which provide a precious resource that reveals the molecular mechanism of carpel quantitative variation in other woody flower crops.

The effect of frontoparietal paired associative stimulation on decision-making and working memory

Previous single-site neurostimulation experiments have unsuccessfully attempted to shift decision-making away from habitual control, a fast, inflexible cognitive strategy, towards goal-directed control, a flexible, though computationally expensive strategy. We employed a dual-target neurostimulation approach in 30 healthy participants, using cortico-cortical paired associative stimulation (ccPAS) to target two key nodes: lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS), to test whether decision-making can be artificially shifted from habitual toward goal-directed control. Participants received three active stimulations, delivered at least six days apart (each involving 100 paired pulses over the IPS and LPFC, varying the interstimulus interval): two interventional, time-relevant ccPAS (10 msec interval) and one control, non-time-relevant ccPAS (100 msec interval). Following stimulation, participants completed a sequential learning task, measuring goal-directed/habitual control, and a working memory task. IPS→LPFC ccPAS (stimulating IPS, then LPFC with a 10 msec interval) shifted decision-making from habitual toward goal-directed control, compared to control ccPAS. There was no effect of LPFC→IPS ccPAS, nor an effect of any PAS condition on working memory. Previous studies have shown ccPAS effects outside the motor domain targeting prefrontal regions on response inhibition, attentional bias, and alpha asymmetry. The present study measures the behavioural effects of parietal-prefrontal PAS, focusing on a highly complex decision-making task and working memory. If confirmed in larger studies, this would be the first instance of neurostimulation successfully shifting decision-making from habitual to goal-directed control, putatively via inducing long-term potentiation between the IPS and LPFC. However, we found no effect in the other direction (LPFC→IPS ccPAS), and no effect on working memory overall. PAS is a relatively new neuromodulatory technique in the cognitive arsenal, and this study could help guide future approaches in healthy and disordered decision-making.

Expected Free Energy Formalizes Conflict Underlying Defense in Freudian Psychoanalysis

Freud's core interest in the psyche was the dynamic unconscious: that part of the psyche which is unconscious due to conflict (Freud, 1923/1961). Over the course of his career, Freud variously described conflict as an opposition to the discharge of activation (Freud, 1950), opposition to psychic activity due to the release of unpleasure (Freud, 1990/1991), opposition between the primary principle and the reality principle (Freud, 1911/1963), structural conflict between id, ego, and superego (Freud, 1923/1961), and ambivalence (Freud, 1912/1963). Besides this difficulty of the shifting description of conflict, an underlying question remained the specific shared terrain in which emotions, thoughts, intentions or wishes could come into conflict with one another (the neuronal homolog of conflict), and most especially how they may exist as quantities in opposition within that terrain. Friston's free-energy principle (FEP henceforth) connected to the work of Friston (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010) has provided the potential for a powerful unifying theory in psychology, neuroscience, and related fields that has been shown to have tremendous consilience with psychoanalytic concepts (Hopkins, 2012). Hopkins (2016), drawing on a formulation by Hobson et al. (2014), suggests that conflict may be potentially quantifiable as free energy from a FEP perspective. More recently, work by Friston et al. (2017a) has framed the selection of action as a gradient descent of expected free energy under different policies of action. From this perspective, the article describes how conflict could potentially be formalized as a situation where opposing action policies have similar expected free energy, for example between actions driven by competing basic prototype emotion systems as described by Panksepp (1998). This conflict state may be avoided in the future through updating the relative precision of a particular set of prior beliefs about outcomes: this has the result of tending to favor one of the policies of action over others in future instances, a situation analogous to defense. Through acting as a constraint on the further development of the person, the defensive operation can become entrenched, and resistant to alteration. The implications that this formalization has for psychoanalysis is explored.

Anxiety, Depression, and Decision Making: A Computational Perspective

In everyday life, the outcomes of our actions are rarely certain. Further, we often lack the information needed to precisely estimate the probability and value of potential outcomes as well as how much effort will be required by the courses of action under consideration. Under such conditions of uncertainty, individual differences in the estimation and weighting of these variables, and in reliance on model-free versus model-based decision making, have the potential to strongly influence our behavior. Both anxiety and depression are associated with difficulties in decision making. Further, anxiety is linked to increased engagement in threat-avoidance behaviors and depression is linked to reduced engagement in reward-seeking behaviors. The precise deficits, or biases, in decision making associated with these common forms of psychopathology remain to be fully specified. In this article, we review evidence for which of the computations supporting decision making are altered in anxiety and depression and consider the potential consequences for action selection. In addition, we provide a schematic framework that integrates the findings reviewed and will hopefully be of value to future studies.

Computation in Psychotherapy, or How Computational Psychiatry Can Aid Learning-Based Psychological Therapies

Learning-based therapies, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, are used worldwide, and their efficacy is endorsed by health and research funding agencies. However, the mechanisms behind both their strengths and their weaknesses are inadequately understood. Here we describe how advances in computational modeling may help formalize and test hypotheses regarding how patients make inferences, which are core postulates of these therapies. Specifically, we highlight the relevance of computations with regard to the development, maintenance, and therapeutic change in psychiatric disorders. A Bayesian approach helps delineate which apparent inferential biases and aberrant beliefs are in fact near-normative, given patients' current concerns, and which are not. As examples, we formalize three hypotheses. First, high-level dysfunctional beliefs should be treated as beliefs over models of the world. There is a need to test how, and whether, people apply these high-level beliefs to guide the formation of lower level beliefs important for real-life decision making, conditional on their experiences. Second, during the genesis of a disorder, maladaptive beliefs grow because more benign alternative schemas are discounted during belief updating. Third, we propose that when patients learn within therapy but fail to benefit in real life, this can be accounted for by a mechanism that we term overaccommodation, similar to that used to explain fear reinstatement. Beyond these specifics, an ambitious collaborative research program between computational psychiatry researchers, therapists, and experts-by-experience needs to form testable predictions out of factors claimed to be important for therapy.